This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

171517Z Mar 05

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 OTTAWA 000800 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O.12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC ECON OPRC PREL CA
SUBJECT:  TAKING STOCK OF U.S.-CANADIAN RELATIONS -- AN END 
OF TOUR ASSESSMENT 
 
 
U.S.-Canadian Relations 
----------------------- 
 
¶1.  My core message as I depart Ottawa is that our 
relationship with Canada has changed fundamentally in the 
last four years, and we as a government need to catch up 
with this new reality.  Canada is the front line of our 
efforts to protect the U.S. homeland.  There is no priority 
in the hemisphere, in the world greater than that, and we 
will have to make sure that we are properly set up in Canada 
to address this priority. 
 
¶2.  The complexity of U.S.-Canadian ties, and of Canada's 
internal political and social reality, has played out 
visibly during my four-year tenure here.  When I arrived, 
Jean Chretien was in his third term as Prime Minister and 
Canada was in the process of disengaging from its former 
middle power status and withdrawing from the global stage. 
The bruising debate over Quebec separatism was largely over 
but the fissures it left in the country had not healed, and 
there was extreme caution in political decision-making. 
More recently, Chretien's replacement by Paul Martin, 
followed by elections which yielded a minority government, 
further restricted bold initiatives.  U.S. Canadian 
relations during this period were complicated, with 
increasing economic integration and strong support in the 
immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, but also growing 
negative reactions to festering trade disputes such as BSE 
and softwood lumber, and strong popular disagreement over 
the U.S. operation in Iraq. 
 
¶3.  Mission Canada has made broad strides over the past four 
years to strengthen all areas of the bilateral relationship, 
but most significantly in the realm of security, as 
manifested specifically by the Smart Border Action Plan and 
our daily support to implementing the programs and providing 
support to those in Washington pushing our policy agenda 
related to the plan.  We have also helped prod Canada to 
increase defense spending and have improved our cooperation 
on multilateral issues such as human rights, trafficking in 
persons, and curtailing the spread of weapons of mass 
destruction.  We did come up short on missile defense and 
military support for Iraq, but Canada has compensated in 
part by managing the international observer mission for 
Iraqi elections, contributing 300 million dollars to Iraqi 
reconstruction and supporting first Iraqi police training 
and now NATO's Iraqi army training.  On the economic side of 
the relationship Mission Canada has supported the policy and 
structural framework of deepening our economic ties.  In 
many ways we have reached the natural limits of the current 
NAFTA-led construct, as "border risk" has become a major 
theme of senior Canadian officials -- for instance, Toyota 
decided to locate a new plant in the U.S. because of concern 
with border crossings.  There are two sets of issues -- 
those related to border processing and delays, and the 
deeper issues related to failure to resolve trade disputes 
such as softwood lumber and BSE. 
 
The Ambassador's Role 
--------------------- 
 
¶4.  Overwhelmingly, the bilateral relationship occurs across 
the U.S.-Canadian border between individuals, businesses and 
communities who do not check in with Ottawa and Washington. 
Even at the government-to-government level, a great deal of 
interaction takes place directly between government 
agencies.  In this unique environment, I have found it 
effective to assume a high profile in Canadian public 
discourse for three key reasons. 
 
¶5.  First, we enjoy excellent working relations with the 
Government of Canada, and Canadian government officials, 
especially in law enforcement and the Canadian Forces, fully 
understand our current concerns and issues.  The same, 
however, cannot be said of the Canadian public, especially 
the media.  Moreover, Canadian political leaders are often 
reluctant to make the public case for close U.S.-Canada 
cooperation on controversial issues -- missile defense being 
the most recent case in point. 
 
¶6.  Secondly, while Canadians understand us better than 
perhaps any other country, they don't understand us as well 
as they think.  Canadians have long described their public 
discourse as a "dialogue of solitudes," in which they 
largely listen to each other.  Canada needs to hear from 
Americans directly on our views, impending decisions, and 
courses of action taken.  There is no American in Canada in 
a more authoritative position to communicate our views than 
the Ambassador of the United States. 
 
¶7.  Finally, it has been necessary to interpret Canada and 
to serve as a first alert for those in Washington who are 
immersed on issues of interest in all other parts of the 
world.  Canada believes it has a hard time getting 
Washington's attention.  This sometimes occurs through our 
own indecision but more often it is the result of our 
inability to bring to closure issues that are relatively 
small for us but that loom large for Canadians. 
 
¶8.  My public role has meant traveling widely throughout 
this vast and diverse country.  The fundamental message to 
all audiences has been highlighting the scope, depth and 
strength of the bilateral relationship; and emphasizing the 
need for Canada and the U.S. to continue to work together to 
ensure our mutual security and prosperity, across the globe 
as well as on the North American continent we share.  I have 
been able to explain our views directly, at a retail level, 
to a broad group of opinion leaders, including in civic and 
business organizations, think tanks and universities.  The 
importance of our bilateral relationship has also ensured 
that my remarks have received wide dissemination in the 
Canadian media. 
 
The Centrality of Public Diplomacy 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  Obviously, our public diplomacy efforts here and 
elsewhere need to include more than the Ambassador.  We were 
fortunate to have a steady stream of visitors from the 
Executive Branch, including the President, who each time 
helped advance our agenda and put forward the face of the 
U.S. as partner and friend.  Our few public diplomacy 
program dollars consistently prove their worth as Canadians 
who ought to know us better are predictable in their 
surprise at our dynamism, our diversity, and our friendship. 
Yes, even in Canada, exchanges, speaker and visitor programs 
are invaluable, especially with the uniformly positive 
reception for our outreach efforts in diaspora communities 
of Haitians, Middle Easterners, and South Asians. 
 
¶10.  Through all of this, I do not accept the notion that 
America and Canada are growing apart.  But I do believe that 
our economic ties and mutual prosperity could be greater, 
our security enhanced, and Canada could take a more active 
part in solving global problems, if we focused more 
consistently on tending this relationship.  Following are my 
thoughts on where we need to engage Canada in the coming 
years, and what I have learned about how best to do so. 
 
A Checklist of Opportunities for Enhanced Bilateral 
Engagement 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
-- 
 
 
¶11.  There are a number of excellent opportunities to better 
engage the Canadian government on global issues, economics, 
and security in the coming years: 
 
-- First, Canada is searching for a greater role to play in 
the world and might be willing to commit more resources and 
possibly even troops to the right missions, or might be 
willing to lead certain international processes.  There is 
general embarrassment here over the slippage in Canada's 
international position, and many Canadians would accept a 
more assertive.  We should quietly urge, and openly support 
Canada to fully take stewardship of a hemispheric or 
international problem such as Haiti. 
 
 
-- Second, in the short-term we should continue to increase 
our law enforcement and border engagement.  We have achieved 
substantial coordination with Canada in information sharing 
and law enforcement liaison but need to continue to develop 
our programs and increase personnel to ensure a seamless 
flow of information and close operational coordination.  We 
also need to continue to develop the physical infrastructure 
on the border to allow for faster and more secure movement 
of goods and people.  Specifically, we want to support the 
new DHS staffing for the Container Security Initiative, but 
find ourselves looking at reducing support staff at the same 
time. 
 
-- Third, over the long-term we should continue to pursue a 
new framework for economic and security integration with 
Canada and where possible with Mexico which will help solve 
the two largest problems of border delays and business 
costs.  A package of policies that includes enhanced border 
infrastructure (physical and technical), improved economic 
productivity, and shared security measures would strengthen 
security while expanding trade.  If such a partnership is to 
succeed, we need to see it as a source of real change in a 
long-term, strategic framework, and not shy away from 
addressing issues that may require legislative changes. 
 
-- Fourth, we need more visitors.  I have been surprised by 
how little interest there is in Canada by the U.S. Congress. 
This is unfortunate.  We have excellent Executive Branch 
Agency-to-Agency ties and strong State-Provincial contacts, 
but the crucial middle link between the Congress and 
Parliament is largely missing.  It would help us on a number 
of levels if we could increase the volume of U.S. Senators 
and Representatives who are knowledgeable about Canada based 
on their travel here.  It would also help us immensely to 
have more visits and exchanges on the crucial issue of 
energy, which has similarly been shortchanged. 
 
 
-- Fifth, we need to guard against the narrow protectionist 
tendencies that are clouding this very beneficial trade 
relationship.  Allowing narrow interests in the U.S. to 
dominate certain markets and issues, e.g. softwood lumber, 
increases the cost of products to American consumers and 
harms the larger economic relationship while also making it 
more difficult for Canadian leaders to deliver on political 
issues of concern to us.  Canada wants to work with us to 
solve trade disputes, but the legalistic path we have 
pursued over the past several years has eroded Canadian 
faith in NAFTA, and that erosion may have long-term costs 
for us.  We should explore ways to focus trade remedy 
actions in a manner which yields resolution, whether we like 
it or not. 
 
The Fight for Resources 
----------------------- 
 
¶12.  Protecting the 5,000 miles of American borders that we 
share with Canada is Mission Canada's highest priority. 
About 70 percent of our personnel resources are focused on 
law enforcement and border security.  Yet the financial 
resources provided to us are clearly not commensurate with 
the importance and needs of the goals we have outlined in 
our Mission Performance Plan.  As I depart Canada I leave 
behind a major funding problem that threatens to unravel 
much of the fine work we have accomplished since 9/11.  Our 
State Program funding target is equal to the target we had 
two years ago even though the US dollar has depreciated 
almost 30 percent.  We have enacted extreme travel 
restrictions, a hiring freeze and have squeezed savings out 
of every aspect of our operations.  Yet we are faced with 
the strong likelihood of layoffs unless our funding level is 
significantly increased. 
 
To Watch For 
------------ 
 
¶13.  I have found that one other role of an Ambassador is to 
sound an early warning to Washington on problems ahead.  In 
a relationship so large and integrated, there is a certain 
sense of permanence to irritants.  I remember when I first 
did my briefings for Congressional testimony, these items 
included Pacific salmon, PEI potatoes and acid rain.  Now, 
although the specific issues have changed, there is also a 
new feature:  time.  The time it has been taking to attend 
to these irritants seems to have been increasing.  Neither 
side has total wisdom in these disputes, but our broader 
national interests have fallen victim to the concerns of an 
isolated, small group seeking specific protection. 
 
¶14.  No better example of this exists than softwood lumber, 
but there are also a couple of others on the horizon:  BSE, 
Devil's Lake.  Their cost to our overall bilateral 
relationship outweighs their potential and often narrow 
benefit.  Over time, these relatively minor irritants 
fester, undercutting public support and undermining the 
ability of political leadership to support our policies.  We 
need to recommit to solve disputes and not allow them to 
drag on with no hope of resolution. 
 
Closing 
------- 
 
 
¶15.  It has been an honor and privilege to serve my country 
these past four years.  I have had but one consistent 
message for people all over Canada which is that the United 
States is a force for good around the world.  I leave with 
this unshakable belief.