This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 OTTAWA 000774 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR WHA, WHA/CAN (Wheeler) 
 
DHS OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (Marmaud) 
 
FOR SECRETARY CHERTOFF FROM AMBASADOR CELLUCCI 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL ETRD ECIN EWWT ASEC CA
SUBJECT:  SCENESETTER:  SECRETARY CHERTOFF'S VISIT TO OTTAWA, MARCH 17, 
2005 
 
¶1.  (U) As you prepare for your first meeting in Ottawa 
     with Deputy Prime Minister Anne McLellan, I want to 
     extend my welcome and the Embassy's continuing support 
     for the dialogue.  At a time when Canadians are voicing 
     concern about the growing role of "border risk" in the 
     bilateral economic relationship, continued close, 
     senior-level cooperation between DHS and PSEPC is vital 
     to keeping up progress in creating the Smart Border. 
     The Smart Border Action Plan has been one of our most 
     important policy successes in the past three years, and 
     I welcome your early visit to our biggest economic 
     partner and the neighbor with whom we share our longest 
     and most heavily traveled border.  I believe that one 
     of the most crucial challenges you will face during 
     your tenure will be to ensure that we implement the 
     most efficient and secure solution to the 
     infrastructure crisis looming at the Windsor-Detroit 
     Gateway, and that we do so as quickly as possible. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) You will find the working relationships 
     between DHS and PSEPC close, professional and 
     productive.  While we tend to look at the border with 
     security concerns, our counterparts here see the border 
     as fundamental to their economic prosperity.  The 
     government has therefore stepped up its actions to 
     ensure we have confidence in the security of our 
     shared border. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Two constants underlie the government's close 
     cooperation.  First is that their own population does 
     not share the same sense of concern about the threat or 
     the urgency in dealing with it, and few in government 
     are prepared to make the political case to their own 
     public.  Second is that we find the government is very 
     good at moving through the pieces of the border agenda 
     which make sense for them, such as Halifax pre- 
     clearance or a pilot land pre-clearance program (both 
     of which I support), but it takes a long time for them 
     to focus on our concerns, such as a shiprider agreement 
     or security for DHS airport pre-clearance personnel. 
 
     --------------------------------------------- ------ 
     Martin's Liberals Experience the Limits of Minority 
     Government 
     --------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶4.  (SBU) After governing in majority for more than ten 
     years under the leadership of Jean Chretien, the 
     Liberals went to elections June 28, 2004 under the 
     leadership of Paul Martin.  Hurt by a Chretien-era 
     scandal involving the illegal disbursement of federal 
     monies in Quebec, the Liberal Party was reduced to 
     minority status, the first in Canada since 1979.  The 
     Parliamentary session that ended in December 
     established early on the limits of minority government. 
     On paper, the normal alignment of the left-of-center 
     New Democratic Party with the Liberals puts Martin neck- 
     and-neck with the Conservatives and the Bloc Quebecois. 
     It became obvious, however, that neither coalition was 
     automatic; the standard "dictatorship" of the executive 
     branch under a majority government no longer holds, and 
     the back bench and opposition enjoy increased clout, 
     slowing considerably the business of government. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) PM Martin's legislative agenda has therefore 
     been modest so far.  Canadians have made it clear that 
     they do not want elections this year, but if the 
     government loses a key vote, ready-or-not elections 
     will follow.  Rather than risk this, Martin has decided 
     to avoid controversial issues such as missile defense, 
     which he announced to our surprise that Canada will not 
     participate in, and will tread carefully in the 
     upcoming vote on same-sex marriage. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Canada's international agenda has been 
     similarly modest.  There is a growing sense among 
     Canadian elites and certain political circles that the 
     country should return to its traditional position as a 
     middle power on the global stage, reversing the 
     slippage in clout as its attention and resources have 
     turned inward.  This view was strong enough (and the 
     budget surplus large enough) that Martin announced a 
     significant increase in defense spending over the next 
     five years, which should help shore up Canada's 
     depleted military capabilities.  Canada has also been 
     active in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, and while 
     domestic politics precluded a direct role in Iraq, 
     Canadian election officials led the international 
     observer mission in the January elections, and the 
     Canadian government has pledged USD 800,000 for the 
     NATO train and equip mission for the Iraqi military. 
 
     --------------------------------------------- --------- 
     National Security Policy, International Policy Review, 
     and the Security Budget 
     --------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶7.  (U) As incoming Prime Minister in the fall of 2003, 
     Martin aggressively reorganized Canadian security and 
     border agencies into a structure similar to that of 
     DHS, putting Minister McLellan in charge of CBSA, RCMP 
     and CSIS under the overarching Department of Public 
     Safety and Emergency Preparedness (PSEPC) and giving 
     her the title of Deputy Prime Minister.  In April 2004, 
     the government announced a National Security Policy for 
     Canada, the country's first-ever comprehensive 
     articulation of its national security interests.  These 
     include the protection of Canada; the safety and 
     security of Canadians at home and abroad; ensuring that 
     Canada is not used as a base for threats to her allies; 
     and contributing to international security 
     (peacekeeping, nonproliferation). 
 
¶8.  (U) Arguing that Canada's international engagement 
     must merge with national aspirations to deal with a 
     world where "time and distance have lost their 
     isolating effect," the government promised to release 
     an International Policy Statement that would integrate 
     the country's defense, security, diplomacy, and 
     trade/development efforts.  However, that statement has 
     not yet emerged, possibly bogged down in interagency 
     disputes over future resources. 
 
¶9.  (U) Nevertheless, border security issues are likely 
     to remain a priority.  The government's 2005 budget, 
     passed last week, contains an additional CAD 1 billion 
     (approx. USD 800 million) for the goals outlined in the 
     National Security Policy.  CAD 222 million over five 
     years is earmarked for maritime security, including 
     patrol vessels for the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence 
     Seaway, additional inspections, Emergency Response 
     Teams for the Great Lakes and increased police presence 
     in ports, and an additional CAD 88 million will go to 
     work on the bilateral Container Security Initiative. 
     Another CAD 433 million over five years will go to 
     "strengthening the capacity of the Government to 
     deliver secure and efficient border services." 
 
     --------------------------------------------- --- 
     The Ridge-McLellan Dialogue and the Smart Border Action 
     Plan 
     --------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶10.  (SBU) In a relationship colored by Canadian 
     ambivalence and some perplexing policy reversals, the 
     Smart Border Action Plan, announced in 2001, has been 
     one of our greatest bilateral policy successes in my 
     time here.  I encourage you to keep up the pressure for 
     results -- with the full support of Mission Canada. 
     Driven by high-level contacts between your predecessor 
     and Deputy Prime Ministers Manley and McLellan, the two 
     sides have achieved many of the goals set out in the 
     Action Plan and have used the framework to develop 
     productive informal relationships, with important knock- 
     on effects at local levels. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) As a third of Canada's GDP derives from 
     trade with the U.S., the operation of the border is a 
     burning issue to government and industry alike.  The 
     "Smart Border" concept enjoys broad support among 
     business and local governments on both sides of the 
     border as well as in Ottawa, and has been an important 
     element in rebuilding public confidence that security 
     and trade can go hand in hand.  In some places, such as 
     Vancouver, the private sector is driving innovative 
     pilot programs under the Smart Border framework.  I am 
     optimistic that the security and prosperity agenda 
     announced by President Bush and PM Martin in December, 
     to be rolled out later this month, will build on both 
     the policy and operational achievements and the can-do 
     approach of the Smart Border process. 
 
¶12. (SBU) We have made progress on a number of fronts 
     in the past year.  In large part because of the efforts 
     of Mission DHS/CBP officers, most Canadian exporters 
     successfully navigated the implementation last year of 
     FDA's prior notice rules under the Bioterrorism 
     Reporting Act (BTA).  FAST uptake is growing, and extra 
     resources committed to FAST processing should show 
     concrete results at the borders. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Infrastructure issues, which result as much 
     from trade growth as from new security requirements, 
     are likely to remain a challenge.  Detroit-Windsor is 
     the critical choke point and the one that attracts the 
     most Parliamentary and press attention.  In my view, 
     however, the federal government in Ottawa has not 
     accorded the problem adequate importance or urgency. 
     The debate over new border crossings in the region has 
     been enlivened with publication of the Schwartz Report 
     recommending an alternative route, but building 
     consensus among multiple stakeholders on both sides of 
     the border is likely to be an arduous process, with the 
     binational study of the issue due to be finished by 
     2007 at the earliest.  In the shorter term, I look 
     forward to the joint efforts of U.S. and Canadian 
     agencies to meet the "25% Challenge" posed by Secretary 
     Ridge and DPM McLellan in December, to reduce border 
     waiting times by 25% at the Detroit-Windsor crossing. 
     I hope this initiative will showcase the improvements 
     already made as well as identify remaining bottlenecks. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Creating a seamless security net at the 
     border will be a complex and long-term process, which 
     will have to navigate the legal and sovereignty issues 
     posed by reverse inspection and other efforts to 
     develop joint processing, as well as both the technical 
     and privacy issues surrounding information sharing. 
     Making it work is a top priority for Mission Canada as 
     a whole, and I hope that your meeting with DPM McLellan 
     will lay the foundations for a long and productive 
     relationship that can effectively drive progress. 
 
CELLUCCI