This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000425 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DCHA/FFP FOR LANDIS, WELLER, MUTAMBA, PETERSEN 
DCHA/OFDA FOR GOTTLIEB, PRATT, MENGHETTI, MARX 
AFR/SA FOR FLEURET, LOKEN, COPSON, HIRSCH 
EGAT FOR HOBGOOD, THOMPSON, HESS, MCGAHUEY, 
GILL, RUSHIN-BELL, HURDUS 
STATE/AF FOR NEULING, MOZENA 
GABORONE FOR CASHION, BROWN, ST.CYR, KLINE 
LILONGWE FOR RUBEY 
LUSAKA FOR GUNTHER, GRIFFITHS 
MAPUTO FOR POLAND, BLISS, THOMPSON 
MASERU FOR ALBRECHT 
MBABANE FOR DORSEY 
NAIROBI FOR ESTES, NDIRANGO, PUTNAM 
PRETORIA FOR DISKIN, HALE, REYNOLDS 
ROME FOR FODAG FOR GAST 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID EAGR PREL US ZI
SUBJECT:  POOR MAIZE HARVEST EXPECTED IN ZIMBABWE 
 
REFS: (A) HARARE 01636; (B) HARARE 00162; (C) SECSTATE 
46766 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED 
 
THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST.  SEE PARAS 3 AND 16 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (SBU) Zimbabwe's maize (corn) harvest this year will 
likely be less than last year's due to late planting, 
limited access to fertilizer and other inputs, and poor 
rainfall in many areas.  Although official information on 
cereal planting, production and stocks is closely guarded 
by the GOZ, recent articles in the state-run press, field 
visits from USAID staff, FEWSNET reports, and other 
sources, point to the likelihood of an abysmal 2005 cereal 
harvest. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Last year, the GOZ publicly announced that no 
food aid was needed because of a "supposed" bumper harvest 
of 2.4 million metric tons (MTs), despite most independent 
observers believing the harvest to have been no more than 
1.0 million MTs, against a national need of about 1.8 
million MTs.  (Note: This is far below pre-land reform 
harvest levels which often exceeded 2.0 million MTs. End 
Note.)  It remains to be seen whether the GOZ, following 
the March 31 parliamentary elections, will be more 
forthcoming with realistic estimates of area planted, 
production and food aid needs. 
 
¶3.  (U) In addition to the bad harvest, the ability of 
most poor households to access food through markets is 
expected to worsen due to continuing restrictions on 
trade, forex constraints, and progressively eroding 
household purchasing power.  The result will be continuing 
widespread food insecurity.  Mission therefore urges USAID 
Food for Peace to plan for a substantial food assistance 
program in Zimbabwe for the coming year.  It is hoped that 
details on the levels of this need will become more 
apparent following the Vulnerability Assessment Committee 
(VAC) assessment expected to be carried out in April/May. 
End Summary. 
 
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GREAT EXPECTATIONS 
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¶4.   (U) This year the GOZ launched a campaign to raise 
maize production to 4 million MTs.  If achieved, this 
would have been almost 50% above the highest production 
ever recorded in Zimbabwe (2.8 million MTs in 1981).  To 
achieve this objective, the GOZ projected a need to plant 
4 million hectares in maize, which would have required 
about 100,000 MTs of maize seed.  Reports from seed 
companies indicate that the GOZ was not able to access 
this much seed, but probably bought more than 60,000 MTs, 
nearly double the quantity usually planted (see ref A). 
In-country experts estimate that up to 67,000 MT of maize 
seed was available for planting from all sources: the GOZ, 
farmers' retained seeds, and NGOs.  If correct, this would 
have been enough to plant 2.7 million hectares, almost 70% 
above the largest area ever planted to maize in Zimbabwe 
(1.6 million hectares in 1996/97).  But it is clear that 
these expectations have not been realized. 
 
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HARSH REALITY 
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¶5.  (U) These great expectations have now given way to a 
harsh reality.   Poor rainfall and inadequate access to 
inputs have led to reduced planting and poor expected 
yields in the majority of the country.  Hardest-hit by 
failed rains have been the southernmost provinces of 
Masvingo and Matabeleland South where the rainy season, 
normally starting by early November, started more than 40 
days late in most areas, with some areas still having no 
rain by the end of January.  Thus, most maize planted in 
these provinces was planted very late, and some farmers 
did not plant at all.  In addition, dry spells have 
continued to plague these areas into February and March. 
A long-term observer commented that the rains in the south 
have been nearly as poor as he remembers from the 1991-92 
drought period, perhaps Zimbabwe's worst drought. 
 
¶6.  (U) The rainy season started out better in the 
central, northern and eastern parts of the country, and 
total rainfall in these areas has been generally between 
80-100% of normal.   But temporal distribution of the rain 
has been poor, as early heavy rains gave way to prolonged 
dry spells in January and February in many areas.   These 
dry spells adversely affected much of the maize crop at 
the critical tassling and grain-filling stages.   Worst- 
affected have been crops planted relatively later in the 
season (December and January) which account for most of 
the planted area, in large part because bureaucratic 
delays meant maize seed was not distributed until after 
the rainy season had already begun. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) While the GOZ has not released official data on 
this year's planting and harvest prospects, unofficial 
estimates have been provided by staff within the GOZ's 
Agriculture Research and Extension Service (AREX). 
According to these estimates, less than 1.0 million 
hectares of crops had been plowed as of December 23, of 
which only about 33% had actually been planted to maize. 
An AREX source also reported that by January 21, the area 
planted to all cereals (maize, sorghum and millet) was 86% 
of the area planted to these crops last agricultural 
season.  (Note: Mission is not sure of the credibility of 
these numbers. End Note.)  In addition, several sources 
have indicated that only a small percentage of the area on 
resettled former commercial farms was planted with maize. 
 
¶8.  (U) This late and relatively low level of maize 
planting was primarily due to the lack of animals and 
tractors for plowing, the high costs of fuel and machine 
tilling equipment, the late availability of maize seed, 
and of course, the late rains. 
 
¶9.  (U) Even in good rainfall years, late planting of the 
maize crop has an adverse effect on yields.  The optimum 
planting date for maize in Zimbabwe, given adequate 
moisture, is up to November 15 at the latest.  The rainy 
season usually ends in March, which means that maize 
planted in January and beyond may not have sufficient 
moisture to mature.  Last year, however, some of the maize 
planted in January did well because the rains continued 
into April.  But even if this year's rains do continue 
that long, the day length and average temperatures will 
drop significantly in March and April, thus reducing yield 
potential. 
 
¶10.  (U) Yield potential has also been adversely affected 
by fertilizer shortages.  Only about 80,000 MTs of 
compound fertilizer and 20,000 MTs of ammonium nitrate 
were sold this year, compared with an annual fertilizer 
requirement of 500,000 MTs.  A local chemical company that 
produces the majority of the country's ammonium nitrate 
shut down for three months because it was not economical 
for it to operate given pricing and foreign exchange 
constraints.  The plant opened again in October, but this 
was too late to have ammonium nitrate available on time. 
The fertilizer shortage led to parallel market selling by 
those who had access to the limited stocks at the GOZ's 
controlled price.  50-Kg bags of ammonium nitrate that 
were supposed to cost ZW$60,000 (about US$10 at the 
official auction rate) were being sold in a high-density 
market of Harare for as much as ZW$250,000 (about US$40). 
 
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TO APPEAL OR NOT TO APPEAL 
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¶11.  (U) What remains unanswered is what the GOZ response 
will be to this harsh reality.  It is unclear if or when 
the GOZ will be more forthcoming about the true state of 
agricultural production.  It is also unclear how much food 
the GOZ itself may be willing or able to import over the 
coming year or whether it might allow private sector 
imports.  There is speculation that the GOZ may feel 
secure enough after the March 31 parliamentary elections 
to launch an appeal for emergency food assistance.  There 
is also speculation that the GOZ may be more inclined to 
adopt market-friendly economic policies after the 
elections that could begin to reverse the decline in 
agricultural productivity. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) In any event, we need to be prepared to assist 
regardless of what the GOZ does or does not do.  Given the 
growing food insecurity and the impending poor harvest, 
Post urges the USAID Office of Food for Peace to plan for 
another substantial food assistance program in Zimbabwe 
for the coming year. 
 
 
 
SCHULTZ