This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 GUATEMALA 000699 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM ETRD ASEC ELAB SNAR MASS EAID GT
SUBJECT: GUATEMALAN ANTI-CAFTA DEMONSTRATORS INCITE 
VIOLENCE, VANDALISM 
 
 
¶1.  Summary.  Having failed to head off congressional 
approval of CAFTA through democratic means, a small group of 
Guatemala's CAFTA opponents sought to tarnish the agreement 
by staging violent protests over the last week.  From March 
8-14, demonstrators turned out mostly in the capital, where 
they threw rocks, set small fires, blocked roads, and 
destroyed property.  Injuries were minor, there were fewer 
than two dozen arrests, and (contrary to some allegations) no 
"disappearances."  Although police generally showed 
restraint, some demonstrators claimed they were the victims 
of excessive force.  Demonstration organizers did not condemn 
the violence.  Meanwhile, demonstrations in rural areas 
outside the capital also turned violent.  On March 15, 
gunfire in the remote department of Huehuetenango left one 
demonstrator dead and nearly a dozen others injured.  Despite 
the regrettable casualties, the intensity of the violence of 
the anti-CAFTA demonstrators does not reflect public 
sentiment toward CAFTA as much as the March 10 congressional 
vote (126-12) in its favor.  End Summary. 
 
Five Days of Violent Demonstrations in the Capital 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶2.  Attempting to disrupt congressional consideration of 
CAFTA, relatively small anti-CAFTA groups surrounded Congress 
March 8 in what was the first of several days of 
intermittently violent demonstrations.  Participants included 
students of the public University of San Carlos (USAC), 
members of the small leftist political party URNG, trade 
unions, and peasant and indigenous rights groups.  Organizers 
claimed their voices had not been heard on CAFTA, and some 
insisted CAFTA should be submitted to a national referendum. 
In addition to these organized groups, some of which appeared 
determined to provoke police retaliation, the demonstrations 
were clearly a magnet for non-ideological vandals and thugs. 
 
¶3.  On March 8, a few demonstrators threw rocks, bottles, 
water, and manure at Congress representatives trying to enter 
or leave the Congress, an act which prompted the civilian 
police (PNC) to erect barriers on the streets adjacent to 
Congress, effectively barring access to Congress.  PNC were 
instructed to respond only if demonstrators attempted to 
breach those barriers. 
 
¶4.  While demonstrations on March 8-11 were marred by violent 
clashes between demonstrators and PNC, there were relatively 
few injuries, little property damage, and only one confirmed 
arrest.  Violence intensified, however, in the wake of 
CAFTA's March 10 approval by an overwhelming (126-12) margin 
of victory in Congress. On March 14, after a weekend break, 
demonstrators resumed with the largest turnout and most 
militant demonstrators.  While some demonstrators remained 
peacefully in the central square, others fanned out across 
the city, shifting their focus from Congress and toward the 
Presidential Palace, the Ministry of Defense, and the U.S. 
Embassy.  There were no organized demonstrations in the 
capital on March 15; on the morning of March 16 demonstrators 
returned in much smaller numbers and without incident. 
 
Road Blocks in the Provinces 
---------------------------- 
 
¶5.  In addition to the demonstrations in the capital, on 
March 14 and 15 anti-CAFTA groups organized at least 15 road 
blocks on highways throughout Guatemala.  Most disbanded 
peacefully within a few hours.  However, in a few isolated 
incidents, there was gunfire.  Reports vary; however, at this 
time it appears possible that at least one demonstrator was 
killed and as many as eight others injured by bullet wounds 
in the rural department of Huehuetenango.  It remains unclear 
who instigated the shooting and whether demonstrators were 
shot by PNC or hit by stray bullets fired from within their 
own ranks.  The PNC stated it would send investigators from 
the Office of Professional Responsibility (ORP) to determine 
who fired the first shots and whether the lethal shot was 
fired by police.  On March 16, violence erupted in Quiche, 
where PNC used tear gas against demonstrators.  A reporter, 
accused of being undercover police, was severely beaten by 
crowds before being rescued by PNC.  As of COB March 16, the 
Embassy was unable to get from the PNC or the Army their 
accounting of events in Huehuetenango. 
 
Allegations of excessive force by Military and PNC 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶6.  Press photos and video of events in the capital between 
March 8 and 14 show the PNC armed only with batons and 
plastic barriers under assault by demonstrators setting 
fires, hurling rocks and bottles, and wielding long sticks, 
identical in length and shape.  The sticks, which could not 
have been found in the street, belied organizers' claims that 
their intentions were merely to protest peacefully.  Many 
eyewitness accounts assert that certain protesters arrived at 
the demonstrations carrying backpacks filled with stones, or 
worse, carrying "Molotov cocktails," and that they 
deliberately sought to provoke a violent, repressive reaction 
from the PNC.  Other acts of aggression included setting fire 
to protective plastic barriers, hijacking and destruction of 
city buses, and random destruction of private property.  Many 
wore ski masks to hide their identities. 
 
¶7.  In one of the ugliest scenes caught by television 
cameras, demonstrators moved from the U.S. Embassy to the 
Ministry of Defense, where they cornered six soldiers who 
attempted to hide behind their plastic shields while 
demonstrators pelted them with bricks.  Two were injured. 
 
¶8.  Most sources agree that the PNC acted with admirable 
restraint under the circumstances.  Newspapers reported that 
tear gas and water cannons were used against protesters, but 
not until protesters assaulted police with fire, bottles, and 
bricks.  Some witnesses claimed that the PNC reacted with too 
much force and, in certain specific cases, severely beat 
demonstrators.  In one such case, we have confirmed that the 
alleged victim was brandishing a machete and was further 
found in possession of a knife and fragmentation grenade.  He 
was taken to hospital in police custody, but no broken bones 
or other injuries were found. 
 
¶9.  Embassy contacted several prominent human rights 
organizations for comment, including the Guatemalan 
Commissioner for Human Rights, the office of the Human Rights 
Ombudsman (PDH), the Center for Human Rights Legal Action 
(CALDH), the Mutual Support Group (GAM), the Constitution 
Defense Center (CEDECON), and the Archbishop's Office for 
Human Rights (ODHAG).  Generally, these groups could summon 
no more than mild disapproval of police actions.  For 
example, several complained that the PNC violated 
demonstrators' rights by prohibiting them from entering 
Congress.  None could cite specific examples of excessive 
force by the police.  In a conversation with the Ambassador, 
the Presidential Commissioner for Human Rights, Frank La Rue, 
commented that he believed the PNC had reacted appropriately. 
 
¶10.  Leading daily Prensa Libre reported that a photographer 
was attacked by police to prevent his photographing police 
abuses but did not elaborate.  Newspapers have detailed 
accounts of aggressive tactics employed by protesters against 
the PNC.  Weekend editorials in three leading newspapers 
condemned the violent attempt to intimidate and disrupt the 
work of Congress, noted that the demonstrations infringed on 
the rights of others, and called on the police to maintain 
law and order.  As a rule, these same newspapers are quick to 
criticize any instances of police brutality or use of 
excessive force. 
 
¶11.  None of our sources report any military involvement in 
the capital.  The military was deployed in some locations 
outside the capital, with instructions to support police. 
There is no evidence at this time that the military engaged 
demonstrators. 
 
Property Damage, Injuries, Arrests 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶12.  Many shops and vendors in the conflictive zones, fearing 
violence and vandalism, remained closed throughout most of 
the demonstrations, and many area schools were closed as 
well.  On March 9, demonstrators hijacked and burned a bus. 
A car was also partially damaged by straying projectiles.  On 
March 14, two more buses were hijacked, possibly with the 
intention of running them without drivers through the police 
barriers.  Instead, both veered off the road and crashed into 
downtown buildings.  The press also reports that patrons of a 
Pollo Campero restaurant were held hostage in the restaurant 
while a splinter group destroyed the restaurant facade. 
Diners were later rescued by emergency workers and the 
vandals disbanded by the PNC. 
 
¶13.  From March 8-11, we confirmed only one arrest and heard 
unconfirmed rumors of a second.  On March 14, 16 arrests were 
made in the capital. 
 
¶14.  Reports of injuries vary; however, it appears that 
between 40 and 50 individuals have been injured, which 
includes both PNC and demonstrators.  At least one 
demonstrator was killed (see paragraph 5). 
 
¶15.  There are no credible reports of "disappearances" of 
protesters during or after the demonstrations.  Early on, a 
number of demonstrators, including a full busload from one 
town in the Peten, were reported missing.  As it turned out, 
those individuals were simply delayed in returning home, 
provoking unfounded allegations of "disappearances." 
Demonstration organizers with whom we spoke March 11 
confirmed their members were accounted for and unhurt.  The 
PDH filed habeas corpus motions for two missing observers, 
but they were neither to be found in police custody nor at 
any hospital (nor did demonstrators report that the two 
missing individuals were seen being taken into custody).  We 
suspect that, as in the case of the busload from Peten, their 
"disappearance" was a matter of miscommunication. 
 
Who's to Blame for the Violence? 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶16.  Some leaders of labor, peasant, and indigenous groups 
sought to distance themselves from the more violent 
demonstrators, primarily USAC students and members of the 
URNG. 
 
¶17.  Demonstration organizers accepted no responsibility for 
the violence, either blaming the PNC for inciting it, or 
blaming unknown infiltrators in their ranks.  However, none 
have publicly called on protesters to end the violence. 
Instead they have justified it as a "natural expression" of 
unhappiness with CAFTA.  The URNG issued a statement in which 
it denounced the "repression against the people of Guatemala 
by the government of Oscar Berger... in response to a 
peaceful demonstration." 
¶18.  President Berger made several public statements in 
support of PNC actions, in which he affirmed the right of 
citizens to demonstrate but not to incite violence, damage 
property, or impede the movement of other people. 
 
Stein Attempted Conciliation with Demonstration Organizers 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
¶19.  Late March 14, in an attempt to end the violence, Vice 
President Stein and Minister of Government Vielmann met with 
six demonstration organizers in the office of the Human 
Rights Ombudsman, which may account for the next day's 
absence of demonstrators in the capital.  Cardenal Quezada 
Toruno was also present. Another meeting was held March 15 
and, by all accounts, both sides left unsatisfied. 
Demonstration leaders promised more protests if their demands 
were not met.  The vice president, who originally took a 
conciliatory stance, has since stated that organizers' 
demands leave little room for dialog. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶20.  Having failed to muster large numbers of protesters for 
peaceful demonstrations, some CAFTA opponents sought to use 
violence to mislead people -- particularly outside Guatemala 
-- about the extent of opposition to the trade pact. 
Although there is much anxiety in some sectors about CAFTA, 
polls indicate most Guatemalans support CAFTA, a view 
reflected in the congressional vote of 126-12 in its favor. 
End Comment. 
HAMILTON