This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 000767 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/21/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL ECON SOCI BR
SUBJECT: SEVERINO CAVALCANTI LEADS BRAZILIAN CONGRESS IN 
UNEXPECTED DIRECTIONS 
 
REF: A. BRASILIA 387 
 
     ¶B. BRASILIA 573 
     ¶C. BRASILIA 043 
 
Classified By: POLOFF RICHARD REITER, REASON 1.4B AND D. 
 
1 (C) SUMMARY.  In February, Severino Cavalcanti was elected 
Speaker of Brazil's Chamber of Deputies.  Thus, an unknown 
with an undistinguished career built on small-state 
clientelism was thrust improbably into the national 
spotlight.  Cavalcanti is already having a strong, if 
somewhat peculiar, influence on Brazilian politics.  His 
unpredictability and independence have alternately irritated 
and delighted the governing coalition and the Lula 
administration.  Cavalcanti's priorities are not exactly at 
odds with President Lula's, but he is intent on making the 
Chamber more independent of the executive branch.  His 
election as Speaker is both a cause and a consequence of the 
administration's inability to strengthen the governing 
coalition, and his rise will complicate Lula's efforts to 
push his agenda through Congress.  The jury is still out on 
whether Cavalcanti is in over his head or is a clever 
tactician outmaneuvering his opponents.  In any event, he 
represents a return of clientelist politics rooted in social 
assistance programs and pork-barrel projects that do little 
to advance the broader national debate.  Cavalcanti, though, 
has an affection for Abraham Lincoln and President Bush.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
CAVALCANTI'S STYLE -- NO STYLE AT ALL 
------------------------------------- 
¶2. (C) On February 14, the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies 
(lower house) elected Severino Cavalcanti, an undistinguished 
back-bencher from the right-wing Progressive Party (PP) as 
its new Speaker (ref A).  In his ten years in Congress (after 
three decades in state politics), Cavalcanti --a 74-year old 
with no college education-- had never chaired a committee or 
sponsored significant legislation.  His support base in the 
northeastern state of Pernambuco comprises religious 
conservatives and small towns in the state's interior that 
benefit from the largesse of their local "colonel". 
Presiding over the Chamber for a month now, Cavalcanti has 
left a strong impression with his untailored speaking style, 
his unabashed quest for Congressional perks, and his 
insistence that the congressional agenda be independent of 
the administration's (although his PP party is a member of 
Lula's coalition).  He has alternately irritated the 
administration, the coalition, the opposition, the Senate, 
and his own party.  Until, or unless, Cavalcanti settles into 
a more predictable pattern, it is impossible to say how the 
legislative agenda will fare in the coming months.  In his 
first five weeks, Cavalcanti has scored some unexpected 
victories and suffered some unnecessary defeats. 
 
ACTIVE LEGISLATIVE AGENDA... 
---------------------------- 
¶3. (C) Cavalcanti has announced his intent to dust off old 
bills, even over the administration's protests, that were 
stalled for political reasons.  He also seems poised to 
advocate an expensive populist agenda that could threaten the 
GoB's fiscal austerity.  In short order, he has: 
 
- pushed hard for a raise in Congressional salaries, only to 
be rebuffed by the Senate.  Piqued, he responded with a 
decree raising Deputies' office stipends by 25%; 
 
- reluctantly sent the Biosafety law to the Chamber floor, 
where it passed on March 2 (ref B).  A religious 
conservative, Cavalcanti opposed the bill because it 
authorizes stem-cell research, but he allowed it to come to a 
vote under heavy pressure from both sides of the aisle; 
 
- forced the Lula administration to back down and revise 
Presidential Decree 232, a controversial measure that would 
raise taxes on the agricultural and service sectors; 
 
- sent the "Parallel Pension Reform" to the floor where it 
passed and went to the Senate.  This bill was part of the 
compromise that allowed the passage of the broad 2003 pension 
reform.  But the administration (and the former Speaker) kept 
the parallel bill off the floor because it waters down the 
original reform.  Far from reducing the US$14 billion deficit 
in the pension system predicted for this year, the parallel 
bill would add another US$480 million in expenses; 
 
- took advantage of an inattentive coalition leadership to 
pass a budget-busting US$10 billion increase in social 
assistance benefits.  If the measure survives the Senate, 
Lula will be forced to veto it. 
 
...AND UNPREDICTABLE POLITICAL MANEUVERS 
---------------------------------------- 
¶4. (C) Meanwhile, Cavalcanti's blunt speaking style, 
throwback political positions and sheer lack of shame have 
made for some interesting moments.  He has: 
 
- entertained the press with his colorful comments ("Congress 
is not a suppository") and his political incorrectness 
(remarks that excuse slave labor "in certain situations"); 
 
- used his influence to get drunk driving charges dropped 
against a hometown constituent; 
 
- been visibly bewildered by a noisy demonstration of gay 
activists in his office, which elicited his promise to send a 
gay rights bill to the floor even though he himself would 
vote against it; 
 
- irritated his own party by acting without consulting party 
leaders; insisting that his personal favorite (Federal Deputy 
Ciro Nogueiro) get the PP's cabinet slot in Lula's upcoming 
cabinet shuffle; 
 
- irked the opposition PSDB by trading insults with a PSDB 
Deputy as he buried the Deputy's attempt to sue President 
Lula; and irritated the opposition PFL when he tried to 
negotiate directly with the administration changes to 
Presidential Decree 232 (see above). 
 
A LOOK AHEAD - POOR VISIBILITY 
------------------------------ 
¶5. (C) Congress has a full plate of important bills ranging 
from tax and political reform to abortion and gay rights (ref 
C), but Cavalcanti's unpredictable behavior makes it 
impossible to assess how the agenda will fare.  His PP party 
had always been a docile coalition member, but as soon as he 
was elected Speaker, PP leaders began demanding a greater 
policy role and cabinet seats, suggesting that the PP is 
unlikely to help the coalition overcome its deep disarray. 
Indeed, much of the uncertainty in Congress stems from the 
coalition's self-inflicted wounds.  Lula's Workers' Party 
(PT) has been negligent in coordinating or disciplining its 
allies, and Lula has dragged out the cabinet shuffle for 
three months, aggravating the disorder.  Brazil's political 
parties are notoriously undisciplined, so coalition 
maintenance is an ongoing struggle.  Thus, Cavalcanti's 
influence on the Chamber agenda has been amplified precisely 
because coalition leaders have been AWOL.  By now, 
significant numbers in all the coalition parties, including 
the PT, see no need to make political sacrifices on tough 
votes or to hew to administration wishes --even where these 
wishes are made clear.  As a result, the administration was 
unable to muster even the 40% of floor votes required to kill 
the Parallel Pension reform (see above).  One observer noted 
that "the administration is watching, with its arms crossed" 
as Congress passes budget-busting bills.  It remains to be 
seen whether these bills will survive more sober debate in 
the Senate and then whether President Lula will directly 
confront Cavalcanti by vetoing them. 
 
COMMENT - POPULIST BUMPKIN OR CLEVER TACTICIAN? 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
¶6. (C) After five weeks as Speaker of the Chamber, it is too 
soon to judge Severino Cavalcanti, but his two-year mandate 
coincides with the second half of Lula's term, so their fates 
are bound together.  Friends insist that Cavalcanti's 
indelicate demeanor disguises a savvy tactician. "Someone 
who's been in public life for forty years and never lost an 
election has got to be pretty clever", observes PP president, 
Pedro Correa.  Indeed, within one month Cavalcanti got 
himself elected to the third highest job in the country over 
Lula's own candidate, boosted the profile of his party, 
imposed his own man on Lula's cabinet, and is driving the 
federal legislative agenda. 
 
¶7. (C) Others see Cavalcanti's rise as a sign that something 
is broken in Brazilian politics.  Party discipline has never 
been weaker, so policy initiatives are often hamstrung by 
unexpected (and some argue unhealthy) compromises, while 
debate is reduced to demagoguery.  Cavalcanti merely signals 
the reemergence of clientelist politics, he is not the cause. 
 The GoB for years has fed the populist culture by offering 
assistance programs instead of economic growth as a 
development policy.  When, as now, fiscal constraints impose 
cuts on the social handouts, then dissatisfied citizens turn 
to populists for quick fixes.  Brazilians are accustomed to 
looking to the state to solve individual problems, creating a 
fertile field for Cavalcanti's brand of clientelism. 
Cavalcanti was elected Speaker with a decisive 60% of the 
floor votes, many of them unknowns like him, more interested 
in funneling pork to their constituents than national debates 
over the greater good. 
 
¶8. (C) While he is neither widely-traveled nor well-read, 
Cavalcanti has a certain affection for some well-known US 
Republicans.  In a recent interview, Cavalcanti named as his 
favorite politician Abraham Lincoln "who bears a certain 
resemblance to me. He came up from the bottom and defended 
the oppressed. I am his reflection".  To an interviewer who 
raised Cavalcanti's conservative politics he said, "I 
disagree with some of (President Bush's) positions, but I 
always praise those who voted for him because he defends 
things that need to be defended, like the family". 
 
DANILOVICH