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Diana T Fritz  12/06/2006 03:13:05 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  Search Results

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UNCLAS        ABU DHABI 01091

SIPDIS
CXABU:
    ACTION: ECON
    INFO:   PAO P/M AMB DCM POL

DISSEMINATION: ECON
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: AMB:MJSISON
DRAFTED: POL:SRADDANT
CLEARED: DCM:RALBRIGHT POL:JMAYBURY ECON:OJOHN CG:JDAVIS PA:HOWINDECK

VZCZCADI232
PP RUEHC RUEHZM RUEHTA RUEHAH RUEHKB RUEHBJ
RUEHCH RUEHLM RUEHKA RUEHIL RUEHJA RUEHML RUEHSK RUEHMO
RUEHNE RUEHNT RUEHSI RUEAWJA RUEHC RUEATRS RUEAUSA
DE RUEHAD #1091/01 0671246
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 081246Z MAR 05
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8585
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ALMATY 0085
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 0036
RUEHKB/AMEMBASSY BAKU 0027
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0139
RUEHCH/AMEMBASSY CHISINAU 0009
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 0105
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 0210
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1347
RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 0062
RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA 0597
RUEHSK/AMEMBASSY MINSK 0007
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0371
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1241
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 0184
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI 0030
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAUSA/DEPT OF HHS WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 19 ABU DHABI 001091 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR G, G/TIP, INL, DRL, PRM, IWI, NEA/RA AND NEA/ARPI 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC ELAB KCRM KFRD KWMN PHUM PREF SMIG TC
SUBJECT: UAE: 2005 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 
 
REF: 04 STATE 273089 
 
¶1.  Embassy TIP points of contact are PolOff Susan Raddant 
and PolChief Joel Maybury, office: 971-2-414-2444, fax: 
971-2-414-2639; email: raddantsk@state.gov, 
mayburyjf@state.gov. 
 
¶2.  OMB Reporting Requirements: One FS-04 officer spent 
approximately 40 hours preparing for and writing the report. 
One FS-03 officer spent approximately 6 hours reviewing and 
clearing the report.  One FS-02 officer spent approximately 
one hour reviewing and clearing the report.  Three FS-01 
officers spent approximately four hours reviewing and 
clearing the report.  One FEMC officer spent one hour 
reviewing and clearing the report. 
 
¶3.  Following is Post's submission of the 2005 Trafficking in 
Persons Report for the United Arab Emirates, covering the 
reporting period of March 2004 through March 2005.  Responses 
are keyed to relevant sections of reftel paragraphs 18-22. 
 
    --------------------------------------- 
¶4.  OVERVIEW OF ACTIVITIES TO ELIMINATE TIP 
    --------------------------------------- 
 
-- A.  The UAE was a destination country for internationally 
trafficked persons.  There were no reliable numbers or 
demographic breakdowns available as to the extent of the 
problem.  There were widely varying reports, primarily by 
NGOs, IGOs, and source countries, that estimate the number of 
trafficking victims currently in the UAE from a few thousand 
to tens of thousands.  Trafficking generally did not occur 
within the UAE,s borders, however, foreign victims were 
sometimes moved from emirate to emirate once trafficked to 
the country.  There was no UAE mainland territory outside of 
the Government's control.  Since 1971, the UAE and Iran have 
both claimed three islands in the Arabian Gulf ) Abu Mousa 
and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs ) as their own territories. 
 The islands are currently under Iranian control.  Post has 
no information on the human trafficking situation on these 
islands. 
 
Groups of persons that were at risk of being trafficked to 
the UAE were young South Asian and East African boys for use 
as camel jockeys, and women and teenage girls, primarily from 
East Europe, Russia, other Middle Eastern countries, 
particularly Iran, East African countries, and Central, 
South, Southeast, and East Asian countries, for the purpose 
of sexual exploitation.  There were a far smaller number of 
men, women and teenage children who were trafficked to the 
UAE to work as forced laborers, primarily as domestic 
servants and construction workers. 
 
There were no reliable estimates of how many prostitutes 
working in the UAE (primarily in Dubai, with somewhat fewer 
numbers in Abu Dhabi and significantly fewer numbers in the 
Northern Emirates) were trafficking victims as opposed to 
those who came voluntarily to perform this work.  Many women 
currently or formerly engaged in prostitution admitted to 
voluntarily traveling to and from the UAE for temporary 
stays, during which time they engaged in prostitution and 
possibly other activities connected with organized crime. 
Many of these women stated that they traveled to the UAE for 
this purpose due to extreme economic hardship in their own 
countries, and they often used smugglers and false documents 
to gain entry into the UAE. 
 
UAE police stated that they typically arrest and deport 
between 5,000-6,000 prostitutes annually.  The latest figures 
available from Dubai police on the number of traffickers and 
brothel owners arrested and prosecuted in Dubai cover the 
period of January 1, 2002, through December 31, 2003.  There 
were a total of 14 cases of &management and practice of 
prostitution,8 with 40 brothel owners and traffickers 
arrested and prosecuted.  Of those 40, 22 were deported 
without imprisonment or fines. 
The Government reported that the number of boys who were 
trafficked to the UAE to work as camel jockeys declined over 
the reporting year due to improved immigration screening 
measures, including DNA testing, medical screening, and fewer 
visas issued to potential camel jockeys.  From October 2002 
to January 2005, UAE immigration officials blocked 26,000 
foreigners who attempted to re-enter the country illegally, 
using iris recognition biometric technology at airport ports 
of entry.  Dubai authorities stated that they issued no visas 
for camel jockeys over the reporting year.  However, a number 
of people, including NGO and source country representatives, 
journalists, G/TIP visitors, and Mission staff members, 
witnessed first-hand on several occasions the continued use 
of the underage foreign camel jockeys who were already living 
here.  Some of these boys appeared to be as young as two or 
three years old. 
 
In December 2004, the UAEG opened a camel jockey shelter and 
rehabilitation center in Abu Dhabi Emirate to assist rescued 
underage camel jockeys.  The shelter has housed between two 
to three dozen boys since its opening, and at least 16 boys 
from the shelter were repatriated to their home countries. 
However, several NGOs and one local individual who follows 
the issue estimated that between 5,000 and 9,000 children 
continued to work in the UAE as camel jockeys. 
 
-- B.  See 4A above for the countries of origin. 
 
The great majority of sex trafficking victims were brought to 
Dubai, although a significant number were trafficked to Abu 
Dhabi City, and others traveled frequently between the two 
cities.  A smaller number were trafficked to other cities in 
all seven emirates.  According to Pakistani NGO director 
Ansar Burney, approximately 5,000 underage camel jockeys 
remain in Abu Dhabi Emirate.  He estimates approximately 
2-3,000 underage camel jockeys are working in Dubai, and 
another 1,000 are working in the remaining five emirates.  No 
other independent first-hand assessments were available, 
however, an Anti-Slavery International representative (please 
protect) and a shelter operator who follows the TIP issue 
closely gave rough estimates that were similar to these 
results.  Victims trafficked for the purpose of forced labor 
were located throughout the UAE. 
 
There were no reports of people being trafficked from the UAE. 
 
-- C.  Since research and verifiable statistics on the issue 
of trafficking in persons to the UAE were limited, it was 
impossible to reliably report changes in the direction or 
extent of trafficking.  There were some reports from 
Government officials, source country missions and NGOs that 
there was a decrease in the number of boys trafficked over 
the reporting period to work as camel jockeys. 
 
-- D.  Two mid-level Ministry of Interior officials stated 
that the UAE did not have the capacity to survey or document 
the extent and/or nature of human trafficking to the UAE. 
There was no information available from similar reports or 
surveys this reporting period that was not available last 
year.  From October 2002 to January 2005, UAE immigration 
officials blocked 26,000 foreigners who attempted to re-enter 
the country illegally, using iris recognition biometric 
technology.  The data base contains approximately four 
million iris scan results, including the results of 297,000 
illegal immigrants who have been deported.  However, 
authorities kept no data documenting how many individuals 
were real or potential human trafficking victims. 
 
Post and G/TIP visitors repeatedly encouraged the UAEG to 
consider working more closely with the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM), which has the capacity to 
conduct such surveys.  UAEG officials and IOM representatives 
met on several occasions during the reporting year to discuss 
closer relations, and potentially the opening of an IOM 
office in Dubai and/or Abu Dhabi.  Permission to open an IOM 
office in the UAE was not granted by the end of the reporting 
period. 
 
-- E.  NGO, IGO, source country, and anecdotal reports 
indicate that conditions for trafficking victims are varied. 
 
Credible Government, NGO, IGO, and diplomatic source country 
sources reported that most trafficked camel jockeys were 
South Asian or East African boys aged between 3 and 10 years. 
 Some boys as young as six months old were reportedly 
kidnapped or sold to traffickers and raised to become camel 
jockeys.  Most camel jockeys were trafficked to the country 
by small, organized gangs headed by individuals from the 
source countries.  The traffickers obtained the youths from 
impoverished families by kidnapping, or in some instances by 
buying them from their parents outright or taking them under 
false pretenses, then smuggling them into the UAE. 
Increasingly, parents were paid to bring their children to 
the UAE to circumvent the DNA testing mandate, and the 
children were turned over to traffickers after the medical 
procedures were cleared. 
 
There were multiple NGO, IGO, source country, and media 
reports, including an October 2004 HBO &Real Sports8 
feature, showing camel jockeys subjected to harsh living and 
working conditions.  Some boys claimed to be physically and 
sexually abused by their traffickers and/or trainers. 
Children were frequently beaten for losing races or 
disobeying their trainers.  Some were injured seriously 
during races and training sessions.  At least one child was 
killed at a camel race during the reporting period, and there 
were several allegations by NGOs and one source country 
diplomat that other boys were also killed while racing or 
training camels, but their deaths went unreported.  Boys were 
reportedly underfed to make them as light as possible, worked 
long hours in extreme weather conditions without water or 
rest, were regularly deprived of sleep, and were afforded 
inadequate shelter and little or no access to medical care 
and educational opportunities.  Generally the traffickers, 
not the boys or their families, received compensation for 
their work.  However, sometimes the parents lived in the UAE 
and claimed their children,s salaries. 
 
Multiple reports and anecdotal evidence from Government, 
NGOs, IGOs, media and diplomatic sources, indicated that many 
women trafficked to the UAE for the purpose of sexual 
exploitation were lured to the UAE by small gangs originating 
in the source country, often under the false pretense of 
legitimate employment, but were then forced into prostitution 
through physical abuse, including rape, extreme mental abuse, 
and other threats against themselves or their families. 
Observers believe that trafficking activity was generally 
conducted with the complicity of some of the women,s UAE 
citizen sponsors and with non-UAE citizen traffickers who 
were exploiting the UAE,s sponsorship system to engage in 
illicit activity. 
 
Traffickers seized victims, passports, restricted their 
movements, and imposed steep (thousands of U.S. dollars) 
&debts8 incurred from their travel and other expenses, to 
be &paid off8 by working as prostitutes and forfeiting 
their earned income.  Usually, when the debt was paid, the 
trafficker &sold8 the victim to another trafficker, who in 
turn forced the victim to pay off yet another debt. 
Some trafficked women were imprisoned in private residences 
and inexpensive hotels.  Others worked in dance clubs, bars, 
hotels (from one- to five-star quality), massage parlors, and 
other public venues, primarily in Dubai, but also in larger 
cities in Abu Dhabi Emirate and, in smaller numbers, cities 
in the Northern Emirates.  Some trafficking victims, 
primarily women and teenage girls, were held in private 
residences in all seven emirates for sexual and/or labor 
exploitation. 
 
Other forms of labor trafficking existed in the UAE, although 
they were not commonplace.  Some women and teenage girls were 
trafficked to work as domestic servants, and some men were 
trafficked to work as laborers, primarily construction 
workers, and, less frequently, agricultural workers.  Labor 
conditions in the UAE can be harsh for all unskilled workers, 
and more so for trafficking victims. 
 
There were reports from NGOs, IGOs, source country diplomatic 
representatives, and media, that some employers abused 
domestic servants, both trafficked and voluntary workers. 
Allegations included excessive work hours, nonpayment of 
wages, verbal, mental, physical, and sexual abuse, and 
restriction of movement.  There were some additional local 
media (including internet) and anecdotal reports of a few 
isolated cases of domestic servants committing suicide or 
dying while trying to escape from their employers, homes 
after being locked inside for weeks or months at a time.  The 
Ministries of Interior and Labor have expended considerable 
effort to prevent and resolve these problems. 
 
The UAE economy is heavily dependent on foreign labor.  An 
estimated 85 percent of the total UAE population, and roughly 
98 percent of the private workforce, is expatriate.  The 
majority are workers from poor source countries who are drawn 
to the UAE hoping for a better life.  While some achieve this 
goal, many are left vulnerable to human traffickers, both in 
their own countries and after arriving in the UAE. 
 
The media regularly reported on strikes by construction 
workers protesting harsh working conditions and unpaid 
salaries, and on Labor Ministry efforts to resolve these 
disputes.  Legally employed construction workers are covered 
by the existing UAE labor law.  However, legally employed 
domestic servants and agricultural workers are not covered by 
the labor law, and must appeal to the Ministry of Interior 
regarding disputes with their employers. 
 
In 2004, the Ministry of Interior took action against 
hundreds of employers who abused or failed to pay their 
domestic employees.  According to new regulations, ministry 
officials can ban an employer from further sponsorship of 
domestic employees after receiving four reports of abuse. 
Police officials, particularly in Dubai, assisted trafficking 
victims once they identified themselves as such.  However, 
victims were often reluctant to approach police due to their 
illegal status and the risk of losing their jobs and being 
arrested, charged and deported. 
 
Traffickers normally seized their victims, passports upon 
entry into the UAE.  This practice, common among employers in 
all professions, including public sector jobs, was outlawed 
in July 2003.  Employers may now only legally hold 
employees, passports long enough to take care of 
administrative business, after which time the employers are 
required to return the passports to their employees. 
However, there were numerous reports that the practice 
remains commonplace in both the private and public sectors. 
The UAEG engaged in a public relations campaign to inform 
workers and employers that the practice is illegal.  There 
were numerous instances, widely reported by the media, in 
which police and embassies or consulates intervened to 
collect passports from employers and return them to the 
employees. 
 
-- F.  The UAE is not a TIP country of origin. 
 
-- G.  Over the reporting period, senior government 
leadership on several occasions voiced its strong political 
will to combat trafficking in persons.  The highest levels of 
leadership have detailed good faith efforts to address human 
trafficking.  However, there continued to be a significant 
presence of child camel jockeys and prostitutes.  Throughout 
the reporting year, USG officials and NGO representatives, on 
several occasions, reported seeing dozens of young boys, some 
estimated to be as young as two or three years old, working 
publicly as camel jockeys, and dozens of women and teenage 
girls, some of them likely trafficking victims, working in 
public venues as prostitutes. 
 
There was no evidence that corruption of public officials was 
a systemic problem.  There were no verifiable reports of 
government officials being linked to TIP activity during the 
reporting period.  In the past, the UAEG investigated and 
prosecuted government officials suspected of committing 
criminal offenses, such as embezzlement and fraud.  This 
willingness to take action against government officials 
suspected of illegal activity indicated that the UAEG would 
likely take action against government officials linked to 
trafficking in persons, if identified. 
 
In February 2005, G/TIP and PolOff were refused entry to a 
camel race, on the orders of the director of the Camel Racing 
Federation, despite the fact that the race was open to the 
general public. 
 
The same USG officials were also refused entry to the Dubai 
Immigration Detention Center in February 2005 by the deputy 
director of the center.  The officials planned to talk to 
potential sex trafficking victims awaiting deportation.  The 
ostensible reason for the refusal was a lack of prior 
coordination, although the Embassy had made numerous attempts 
to coordinate in advance with federal and Dubai officials. 
 
A senior police official confirmed allegations made by an NGO 
that some emirates, primarily Abu Dhabi, were moving large 
numbers of child camel jockeys deeper into the desert and to 
neighboring countries, including Oman, Saudi Arabia, and 
Qatar, to &hide8 them until public attention on the issue 
died down.  One reliable source country official told Poloff 
and G/TIP representative that he had 78 trafficking cases 
pending with the UAEG; however, each time he asked for 
Government law enforcement and repatriation assistance, he 
was flatly refused by officials at different ministries. 
 
The UAEG devoted significant time and resources to 
sensitizing law enforcement and immigration officials to the 
subject of trafficking in persons, as well as practical 
training techniques to protect victims and prevent future 
trafficking incidents.  Abu Dhabi and Dubai police and the 
Ministries of Interior, Health, and Justice have all held 
anti-TIP training courses throughout the year. 
 
In May 2004, the Abu Dhabi Police College, with guidance from 
the IOM, Post, and G/TIP, conducted an anti-TIP training 
seminar for approximately 100 law enforcement and ministry 
officials.  In November 2004, the Abu Dhabi Police College 
conducted a human rights symposium for approximately 200 law 
enforcement and ministry officials.  The police college 
requires all students to complete human rights and anti-TIP 
courses before graduation. 
 
From May 20 ) June 10, 2004, a representative from the 
Ministry of Interior,s Legal Affairs Department participated 
in an anti-TIP Multi-Regional Program in the U.S. 
 
The Dubai Immigration and Residency Department regularly 
offered training for arrival and departure inspectors in 
identifying fraudulent documents, often used by trafficking 
victims.  The UAEG also supplied ports of entry and source 
country embassies and consulates with brochures to try to 
warn off potential trafficking victims, as well as to inform 
victims where they can go to receive assistance. 
The UAEG senior leadership repeatedly asked the USG for 
training information and opportunities that would further 
their efforts to combat trafficking in persons, and help law 
enforcement officials, prosecutors and judges to better 
identify, investigate and prosecute trafficking in persons 
cases.  Embassy is working with LegAtt to arrange training 
opportunities for UAE law enforcement in interview techniques 
to help elicit information from victims and traffickers to 
build stronger cases against human traffickers. 
 
In December 2004, the UAEG opened a shelter and 
rehabilitation center for rescued underage camel jockeys, 
located on a military compound near Abu Dhabi.  The center, 
which is run by the Ministry of Defense in coordination with 
the Ministry of Interior and Pakistani human rights activist 
Ansar Burney, offers the children medical care and basic 
education while awaiting repatriation.  Approximately 30 boys 
on average have lived in the center since its opening.  The 
center could easily hold 100 children, and could be expanded 
to shelter 400 boys.  At least 16 children who were sheltered 
in the center have been repatriated. 
 
UAEG officials are also working with Government officials and 
NGOs in Pakistan, Bangladesh and India to launch UAE-funded 
shelters in those countries, intended to house repatriated 
children who do not know or are unable to be reunited with 
their families. 
 
Before the shelter opened, the UAEG worked with Ansar Burney 
and source country missions to repatriate an additional 400 
former camel jockeys.  Several NGOs and IGOs estimate that 
between 5,000 and 9,000 boys remain in the UAE working as 
camel jockeys. 
 
The Government provided some assistance to trafficking 
victims, once identified as such.  Counseling services are 
available in public hospitals and jails, and human rights 
care departments are present in all Dubai police stations. 
There is an anti-TIP unit in the Dubai police central 
investigative division, and a Dubai police Human Rights Care 
Department that handles human trafficking cases.  In 2004, 
this department handled 18 TIP complaints, out of over 5,000 
arrests and deportations for prostitution and similar 
violations. 
 
While UAEG law enforcement generally did a good job of 
protecting and assisting TIP victims, once identified, it 
generally did not proactively investigate trafficking cases, 
nor did it regularly arrest, prosecute, and punish 
traffickers, brothel owners, pimps, customers of prostitutes, 
and camel owners who used foreign children as camel jockeys. 
However, the UAEG regularly deported both traffickers and 
prostitutes and banned them from returning to the country. 
During a February 2005 visit by G/TIP,s Senior Reports 
Officer, a senior officer with the Dubai police stated that 
law enforcement officials UAE-wide did not view the September 
2002 ban on the use of foreign children as camel jockeys as 
legally enforceable, to explain why no cases had been 
prosecuted under the ban.  Other federal officials agreed 
with his assessment, giving this as the principal reason why 
the UAEG was pressing ahead with a federal law to criminalize 
the use of children as camel jockeys.  A number of officials 
stated that the law would be passed by Spring/Summer 2005. 
 
-- H.  There is no evidence that corruption of public 
officials was a systemic problem. 
 
In the past, the UAEG has investigated and prosecuted 
government officials suspected of committing criminal 
offenses, e.g., embezzlement and fraud.  Because of this 
willingness to take action against government officials 
suspected of illegal activity, we would expect that the UAEG 
would take action against government authorities who 
facilitated trafficking, condoned trafficking, or were 
otherwise complicit in such activities, or that received 
bribes from traffickers or otherwise assisted in their 
operations. 
 
-- I.  As a wealthy country, the UAEG theoretically was not 
limited financially in its ability to fight TIP.  But as a 
young country with a largely inexperienced public work force, 
it required continued personnel training to educate and 
sensitize officials on the issue.  Funding for police 
services was generally adequate, although, as a loose 
federation, there were sharply different budget levels in the 
seven emirates which led to varied ability to fund police 
programs and aid victims.  Additionally, like many countries, 
federal ministry and local department budgets were determined 
on an annual basis.  Consequently, new programs may be 
required to wait until the next budget grant when new monies 
can be allocated. 
 
As stated above, overall corruption was generally not a 
problem in the UAE.  However, certain factors limited the 
UAEG's ability to take quick action on all facets of its 
trafficking problem. 
 
The UAE gained its independence from the UK in 1971. 
Although a young country, it has developed rapidly from an 
undeveloped country to a dynamic regional economic power with 
an advanced infrastructure and a diverse urbanized population 
with residents originating from over 200 countries.  Out of a 
population of just over four million, approximately 85 
percent of all residents are non-citizens.  The UAE is an 
open country with a vibrant tourism industry, and is the 
preeminent transit hub for international travel and trade in 
the Gulf.  This open atmosphere is especially important in 
Dubai, where major efforts have been underway for a number of 
years to diversify its economy and reduce its reliance on oil 
reserves, which are rapidly dwindling and expected to be 
depleted in approximately a decade. 
 
As a result of the country's rapid modernization and growth, 
the federal government and the governments of the individual 
emirates are increasingly tasked with responding to complex 
transnational challenges, many of which involve foreign 
organized criminal groups, including terrorism and money 
laundering, as well as trafficking in persons, drugs, illegal 
arms, and weapons of mass destruction components.  These 
complex issues stretch the human resources of UAEG law 
enforcement, which lacks overall institutional knowledge and 
experience due to the country,s young age and small national 
population.  Ministry and law enforcement officials at all 
but the very top levels are often young and lack appropriate 
levels of formal training and/or on-the-job experience to 
assist them in the performance of their jobs.  Therefore, it 
is not realistic to expect the majority of UAEG officials to 
tackle all facets of a difficult, multi-dimensional global 
problem such as trafficking in persons in a short amount of 
time. 
 
A loose federation comprised of seven individual emirates, 
the UAE is governed by consensus of the seven emirates' 
rulers.  The federal Government asserts primacy in matters of 
foreign and defense policy, some aspects of internal 
security, and increasingly in matters of law and the supply 
of some government services.  However, the loose federal 
structure and requirement for consensus prohibits quick 
action on matters with any level of controversy, such as TIP. 
 
 
The federal Ministry of Interior oversees the Police General 
Directorates in each of the seven emirates; however, each 
emirate maintains its own police force and supervises the 
police stations in that emirate.  While all emirate police 
forces theoretically are branches of the federal Ministry of 
Interior, in practice they operate with considerable 
autonomy. 
 
The bureaucratic process to pass legislation, accede to 
international treaties or create national strategies can 
often be lengthy.  The Justice Ministry oversees the passage 
of new legislation and accession to bilateral or multilateral 
treaties.  An inter-ministerial technical committee works to 
draft agreed language, which is then submitted for approval 
to a second inter-ministerial Political Committee that 
includes representatives from each emirate.  The Political 
Committee is charged with achieving consensus on the draft 
language from the seven emirates.  Once consensus is 
achieved, the draft language is presented to the Federal 
National Council (FNC) for debate and consideration.  After 
the FNC concludes its consideration, it recommends draft 
language to the Federal Cabinet, which then conducts its own 
review and considers the draft language for passage into law 
after ratification by the Supreme Council (comprised of the 
rulers of all seven emirates). 
 
Consistent enforcement of laws throughout the country is 
sometimes affected by the relative independence of security 
and police forces in each emirate.  While all emirate 
internal security organs theoretically are branches of one 
federal organization, in practice they operate with 
considerable independence.  Each emirate maintains its own 
independent police force at different budget levels.  Civil 
courts are generally a part of the federal system, except in 
the Dubai and Ras Al Khaimah emirates, and are accountable to 
the Federal Supreme Court.  Dubai and Ras Al Khaimah do not 
refer cases in their courts to the Federal Supreme Court for 
judicial review, although they maintained a liaison with the 
federal Ministry of Justice, Islamic Affairs and Endowments. 
 
Some cultural characteristics also hamper the Government's 
ability to immediately address TIP.  For example, camel 
racing is a traditional sport.  In the past, camel owners or 
their sons raced camels.  Over the past few decades, young 
foreign boys had been increasingly used as camel jockeys as 
local interest in the sport waned and prizes for winning the 
races increased dramatically.  Many foreign boys who worked 
as camel jockeys were offered for employment to camel owners 
by their impoverished parents, which, in the minds of some, 
condones the activity.  As a Muslim country, discussion of 
sex is culturally taboo, which makes it difficult to talk 
about sex trafficking, despite the fact that Dubai is 
reported to be the Gulf,s preeminent sex tourism center. 
Also, due to a cultural emphasis on privacy regarding matters 
of the home, discussion of abuse of trafficked domestic 
servants is often avoided publicly. 
 
-- J.  The Government generally does not keep and/or publicly 
share data and statistics showing the verifiable results of 
its anti-TIP efforts. 
 
-- K.  Prostitution is illegal in the UAE, punishable by up 
to three years of imprisonment followed by deportation.  The 
activities of prostitutes, brothel owners/operators, clients, 
pimps, and enforcers are criminalized. 
 
    ---------- 
¶5.  PREVENTION 
    ---------- 
 
-- A.  The UAEG acknowledges that trafficking in persons is a 
problem.  The senior leadership has noted a number of times 
that this global crime must be addressed for humanitarian as 
well as national security reasons.  UAEG officials recognize 
that a failure to attack any type of organized crime opens 
the country to organized crime in other areas, such as drugs 
or weapons. 
 
The UAEG repeatedly acknowledged its trafficking problem 
during the December 2004 and February 2005 visits by G/TIP 
officials.  G/TIP met with high-ranking officials from the 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Interior, Justice, and Health. 
 They also met with officers from the Dubai and Abu Dhabi 
Police Department, source country embassies and consulates, 
and NGOs.  Emirati officials acknowledged that trafficking in 
persons to the UAE is a problem, sought engagement on the 
issue, and requested assistance in training and other areas 
in order to combat the problem. 
 
-- B.  Both federal ministries and local emirate departments 
are involved in anti-trafficking efforts.  On the federal 
level, the Ministries of Interior, Foreign Affairs, Justice, 
Health, Labor and Social Affairs, and Information are 
involved actively in anti-trafficking efforts.  On the local 
level, police and immigration departments, public 
prosecution, and social services departments are also 
involved.  Police and other government officials have worked 
more closely with members of the media to draw more public 
attention to the problem. 
 
In December 2004, the Ministry of Interior took over the TIP 
portfolio from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  This move 
was beneficial, as the new Interior Minister, Sheikh Saif bin 
Zayed, who was appointed in November 2004, has taken a strong 
interest in addressing trafficking issues.  Interior will be 
responsible for enforcing the camel jockey law, once passed, 
in addition to caring for sex trafficking victims and helping 
Ministry of Justice officials prosecute traffickers. 
 
-- C.  Despite social sensitivities, there was an increase in 
the number of articles in English-language newspapers about 
trafficking in persons.  There were occasional articles on 
these subjects in Arabic-language newspapers. 
 
The local press highlighted cases of child camel jockeys 
rescued and repatriated by local authorities, source country 
embassies and consulates, and NGOs.  The local press also 
increased its reporting over the past year on cases of sex 
trafficking, despite the taboo nature of the subject.  The 
media highlighted a number of cases of domestic servants who 
were abused by their employers or committed suicide while 
trying to escape their employers, homes.  Some local 
newspapers included regular columns with advice on worker 
rights, including articles on the July 2003 law prohibiting 
employers from holding their employees, passports.  The 
media highlighted several incidents of police assistance with 
retrieving passports from employers. 
 
-- D.  In addition to government ministries and departments, 
charitable and other organizations funded by the Government 
and individual ruling family members are also involved in 
programs that help to prevent trafficking.  The Government 
maintained its efforts to address humanitarian needs and 
concerns in the UAE and worldwide through government-funded 
charitable organizations. 
 
Within the UAE,s borders, the government-funded UAE Red 
Crescent Authority, an affiliate of the International 
Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 
provided assistance to widows, divorced women, prisoners' 
wives, orphans, prisoners and students from poor families. 
Internal projects funded by the Red Crescent Authority 
included maintaining schools and mosques, digging wells, 
building health units, and training people with special 
needs. 
 
Outside the UAE, the UAE Red Crescent Authority and other 
charitable organizations funded by individual ruling family 
members, such as the Zayed Foundation and the Mohammed Bin 
Rashid Al-Maktoum Humanitarian and Charity Establishment, 
conducted humanitarian relief projects and provided 
reconstruction and other types of assistance to a number of 
countries worldwide. 
 
Many of the countries that received aid from UAE charitable 
organizations were source countries or were at risk of 
becoming source countries for human trafficking because of 
poor socio-economic conditions.  These charitable projects 
were anti-trafficking in nature because they help to support 
people and communities vulnerable to trafficking. 
 
The UAEG cooperated with the office of the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian 
organizations in assisting refugees.  The UAEG also 
cooperated with Medecins Sans Frontieres (Doctors Without 
Borders), which maintained offices in the UAE.  UAEG 
officials regularly met with visiting NGO representatives, 
such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.  Over 
the reporting year, the UAEG worked with the IOM to conduct 
Iraqi out-of-country voting, and met with IOM officials on 
several occasions to discuss the possible opening of an IOM 
branch in Abu Dhabi and/or Dubai.  Additionally, after the 
October 2004 HBO expose on the continued use of child camel 
jockeys in the UAE, senior level Government officials from 
the Ministries of Defense, Interior and Labor forged close 
relations with Ansar Burney, the head of the self-named NGO 
that was prominently featured in the program.  The Government 
gave Burney a residency permit, housing, transportation, and 
permission to facilitate the rescue work he previously 
undertook clandestinely.  The Government also offered to 
assist Burney in any way he required within the bounds of the 
law, and offered him the lead management position at the Abu 
Dhabi Emirate-based camel jockey shelter and rehabilitation 
center, which opened in December 2004.  To date, 16 boys from 
the shelter have been humanely repatriated.  The Government 
is also working with Governments and NGOs in Pakistan, India 
and Bangladesh to establish UAE-funded shelters to receive 
former UAE-based camel jockeys after their repatriation. 
-- E.  The government is able to and does support prevention 
programs both in the UAE and in source countries.  See 
paragraphs 4C and 4D above. 
 
-- F.  The UAEG works with foreign embassies, consulates and 
ministries, and source country NGOs, to provide shelter and 
assistance to victims and facilitate their repatriation, as 
well as to stop the flow of trafficking victims at the 
source.  The UAEG has a good working relationship with the 
local branch of the UNDP.  The Dubai Human Rights Care 
Department has worked with a number of source country and 
U.S.-based NGOs.  The Abu Dhabi Police College has worked 
with the IOM, Amnesty International, and Interpol to develop 
its anti-TIP training program. 
 
-- G.  The UAEG monitors its borders against illegal 
migration and smuggling.  The Armed Forces are responsible 
for guarding and monitoring the UAE's coast and land borders. 
 Border guards have the legal authority to stop and inspect 
individuals at the border or points of entry, especially if 
there is suspicion of illegal activity.  The UAE is erecting 
a fence barrier that will run for roughly 525 miles along its 
land borders with Oman and Saudi Arabia, in an effort to curb 
land-based smugglers and illegal immigration. 
 
The federal and emirate-level immigration authorities are 
responsible for controlling the influx of people at the 
country's international airports.  Immigration authorities 
regularly conducted training to detect fraudulent documents, 
often used by trafficked persons, for arrival and departure 
inspectors. 
 
The authorities have long since recognized that illegal 
immigration and the violation of residency laws is a problem 
in the UAE, where only about 15% of its residents are 
citizens.  To that end, the Ministry of Interior's Department 
of Naturalization and Residency created a central operations 
room in 2000, including an integrated federal data center to 
track the arrival and departure of individuals in the 
Federation's seven emirates.  In 2003, the UAEG instituted 
the use of iris recognition scans to add biometrics 
identification information to its databases, to better 
monitor migration and combat document fraud by visitors and 
illegal immigrants, some of whom are trafficking victims. 
UAE immigration authorities have stopped 26,000 potential 
illegal immigrants, some of whom were likely trafficking 
victims, using iris scan technology, from October 2002 to 
January 2005.  The data base contains approximately four 
million iris scan results, including the results of 297,000 
illegal immigrants who have been deported. 
 
During the reporting period, the media regularly reported on 
crackdowns on illegal residents.  In February, Abu Dhabi and 
Dubai emirates began campaigns to arrest and deport thousands 
of individuals overstaying their visas and absconders from 
their employers, encouraging citizens and legal immigrants to 
turn in their illegal neighbors.  A Dubai police official 
stated to the media that, from February 1 to 15 alone, 2,855 
illegal men and women were caught.  There was no mention of 
whether police were making efforts to identify trafficking 
victims from this crowd, and provide them with care and 
assistance, in order to identify their traffickers and 
dismantle international trafficking rings. 
 
-- H.  The UAEG does not have a public corruption task force. 
 Beginning in December 2004, the Ministry of Interior took 
the lead in combating the daunting UAE human trafficking 
problem, and immediately developed a national strategy to 
address the problem.  It also created and activated a 
designated anti-child trafficking unit within the Ministry of 
Interior, and established a shelter for rescued camel 
jockeys.  Over the reporting year, the Ministry of Justice 
drafted an anti-trafficking law specifically addressing the 
use of child camel jockeys.  The draft is expected to become 
law by April 2005.  Representatives from the Ministries of 
Foreign Affairs, Interior, Justice, Labor, and the Dubai 
Police meet when required. 
 
-- I.  Throughout the reporting year, police and Ministry of 
Interior officials continued to develop channels with source 
country governments to exchange information on organized 
crime, including trafficking in persons. 
 
UAEG authorities worked closely with authorities and NGOs in 
Pakistan and Bangladesh to prevent and control trafficking in 
boys to the UAE by stemming the seizure and recruitment of 
these children at the source.  Law enforcement officials 
coordinated with foreign NGOs and source country governments 
on trafficking in women cases. 
 
Immigration authorities also worked with source country NGOs, 
embassies and consulates, to repatriate trafficking victims, 
including 400 former camel jockeys to Pakistan, Bangladesh 
and Sudan. 
 
-- J.  The UAEG developed an inter-ministry group, including 
representatives from Interior, Justice, Labor, Foreign 
Affairs, and Dubai police, in late 2004, to coordinate and 
communicate on trafficking in persons issues and develop a 
national strategy to address the problem. 
 
-- K.  Beginning in December 2004, the Ministry of Interior 
took responsibility to coordinate all anti-TIP programs. 
 
    -------------------------------------------- 
¶6.  INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF TRAFFICKERS 
    -------------------------------------------- 
 
-- A.  The UAE does not have one law specifically 
criminalizing trafficking in persons.  However, traffickers 
can be prosecuted under a number of laws that, taken 
together, may be adequate to cover the full scope of 
trafficking in persons.  Those laws criminalize child 
smuggling, prostitution, and forced and compulsory labor. 
 
UAE Penal Law Article 346 states: "Whoever brings into or out 
of the country any person intending to possess or dispose of 
and whoever possesses or purchases or sells or offers for 
sale or transacts in any manner of any person as a slave 
shall be punished with provisional imprisonment." 
Provisional imprisonment is a sentence of 3 years minimum and 
15 years maximum. 
 
Justice Ministry officials indicate that traffickers can also 
be prosecuted under other penal laws, including:  kidnapping; 
 rape;  sodomy;  sexual abuse;  sexual exploitation;  immoral 
acts;  exploitation of someone for immoral acts;  physical 
abuse;  false imprisonment;  juvenile endangerment;  forced 
labor;  child labor;  forced prostitution;  indecency; 
enticement, inducement or deceiving someone to commit immoral 
acts or prostitution;  aiding or facilitating the commission 
of immoral acts or prostitution;  keeping or operating a 
place for immoral acts or prostitution;  and money 
laundering. 
 
Ministry of Labor officials also report that the UAE Labor 
Law contains penalties for labor law violations.  UAE Labor 
Law Art. 181 provides for a fine from 3,000 dirhams (about 
$820) to 10,000 dirhams (about $2700) and/or imprisonment up 
to six months per labor law violation or for obstructing, 
preventing or threatening labor inspectors. 
 
UAE law appears to adequately cover the full scope of 
trafficking in persons in a piecemeal fashion, if properly 
applied.  However, Ministry of Justice officials are 
currently reviewing U.S. trafficking in persons model 
legislation and evaluating current UAE laws to determine 
whether there are gaps in existing legislation.  If so, 
Justice Ministry officials will determine whether 
supplemental legislation will be adequate or if comprehensive 
trafficking in persons legislation will be necessary.  Also, 
several UAEG officials have informed USG officials that a 
draft anti-child camel jockey law, based on the tenets of the 
2002 presidential decree banning the practice, will be passed 
into law by April 2005. 
 
-- B.  There is no single law specifically criminalizing 
trafficking.  The punishment for child smuggling is 
imprisonment plus a 1,000 dirham (USD 270) fine.  For child 
smuggling that results in child abuse, the fine is increased 
to 10,000 dirhams (USD 2700).  UAE Penal Law Art. 346 (see 
paragraph 6A above), which comes closest to the USG 
definition of trafficking in persons, provides for 
imprisonment from 3 years minimum to 15 years maximum. 
 
-- C.  Sentencing for rape ranges from 15 years plus lashings 
to capital punishment.  The penalty for rape that leads to 
the death of the victim or for rape with extenuating 
circumstances is capital punishment. 
 
-- D.  The UAE does not keep and share data on how many 
trafficking cases the Government has arrested and prosecuted. 
 The Dubai Police Human Rights Care Department reported 18 
TIP-based complaints in 2004.  Dubai police also reported 
that, from January 1, 2002, to December 31, 2003, it arrested 
40 suspects on charges of &management and practice of 
prostitution.8  Of those 40, nine received imprisonment and 
fines, followed by deportation.  Twenty-two others received 
administrative deportation only. 
 
-- E.  IGO, NGO, and media reports, as well as UAEG and 
source country officials, indicate that small, organized 
crime syndicates, almost all of them originating from source 
countries, were behind the great majority of human 
trafficking cases to the UAE.  Employment and travel agencies 
had been used as fronts for traffickers, although in many 
cases these organizations handled legitimate business as well 
as participated in trafficking.  These observers believe that 
trafficking activity was generally conducted with the 
complicity of some of the victims, citizen sponsors and with 
noncitizen traffickers who were exploiting the sponsorship 
system to engage in illicit activity.  There were no verified 
reports that government officials were involved, although 
there have been anecdotal reports that some lower-level 
officials may have turned a blind eye to the problem, and 
some observers questioned the sincerity of UAEG officials, 
political will to combat human trafficking in light of the 
long-term lack of appreciable progress on the issue.  There 
were no reports of where the profits are being channeled. 
 
-- F.  Law enforcement officials reported that they 
investigated cases of trafficking in persons and assisted 
trafficking victims, once cases were brought to their 
attention.  However, there is no indication that police 
regularly used proactive law enforcement methods, such as 
sting operations of places known to harbor potential 
trafficking victims, or internationally accepted interview 
techniques to differentiate trafficking victims from those 
who choose to work in illegal activities, to ferret out sex 
trafficking cases.  Also, although the Camel Racing 
Federation mandated the use of DNA testing to prove familial 
ties and the ID card system at racetracks to prevent the use 
of trafficked children as camel jockeys, lack of adequate 
enforcement allowed the problem to continue.  However, 
several victims, source country officials, and NGOs stated 
that police provided excellent care and assistance once a 
victim or other interested party lodged a complaint.  Police 
officials repeatedly stated that investigating trafficking 
cases was extremely challenging when trafficking was 
suspected but victims refused to cooperate. 
 
Electronic surveillance and undercover operations are 
permitted under UAE laws.  Police officials often recommend 
sentence mitigation for cooperating suspects and are not 
prohibited from engaging in covert operations.  However, due 
to restraints on properly trained and experienced law 
enforcement staff, police take more of a reactive role in 
investigating trafficking cases. 
-- G.  The UAEG has devoted a significant amount of time and 
resources to sensitizing law enforcement and immigration 
officials on the subject of trafficking in persons, as well 
as practical training techniques to protect victims and 
prevent future trafficking incidents.  Abu Dhabi and Dubai 
police and the Ministries of Interior, Health, and Justice 
have all held anti-TIP training courses throughout the year. 
 
In May 2004, the Abu Dhabi Police College, with guidance from 
the IOM, Post, and G/TIP, conducted an anti-TIP training 
seminar for approximately 100 law enforcement and ministry 
officials.  In November 2004, the Abu Dhabi Police College 
conducted a human rights symposium for approximately 200 law 
enforcement and ministry officials.  The police college 
requires all students to complete human rights and anti-TIP 
courses before graduation. 
 
From May 20 ) June 10, 2004, a representative from the 
Ministry of Interior,s Legal Affairs Department participated 
in an anti-TIP MRP program in Washington, D.C., and other 
locations in the U.S. 
 
The Dubai Immigration and Residency Department regularly 
offered training for arrival and departure inspectors in 
identifying fraudulent documents, often used by trafficking 
victims.  The UAEG also supplied ports of entry and source 
country embassies and consulates with brochures to try to 
warn off potential trafficking victims, as well as to inform 
victims where they can go to receive assistance. 
 
The Ministry of Justice Institute of Judicial Training and 
Studies conducts mandatory classes for prosecutors and judges 
on proper victim care and assistance.  The Institute also 
conducts mandatory specialized classes on the following 
topics: human rights (14 hours); sexual offenses (20 hours); 
offenses against life (20 hours); immigration offenses (20 
hours); juvenile protection and delinquency (30 hours); labor 
violations and offenses (12 hours). 
 
The UAEG senior leadership repeatedly asked the USG for 
training information and opportunities that would further 
their efforts to combat trafficking in persons, and help law 
enforcement officials, prosecutors and judges to better 
identify, investigate and prosecute trafficking in persons 
cases.  Embassy is working with LegAtt to arrange training 
opportunities for UAE law enforcement in interview techniques 
to help elicit information from victims and traffickers to 
build stronger cases against human traffickers. 
 
-- H.  UAEG officials stated, and several source country 
embassies and consulates confirmed, that they cooperated to 
investigate, care for, and repatriate trafficking victims, 
and prevent future trafficking incidents.  Officials, 
primarily in law enforcement, reported that they also worked 
with NGOs and IGOs on trafficking issues when cases were 
brought to their attention. 
 
Ministry of Interior officials have indicated that they 
continue to work on developing new channels with source 
country governments to exchange information on organized 
crime, including trafficking in persons. 
 
The UAEG generally does not keep and share trafficking 
statistics, therefore, Post can not relay the number of 
cooperative international investigations on trafficking. 
 
-- I.  The UAEG has extradition treaties with India, Sri 
Lanka, Armenia, Canada (for drugs and money-laundering 
charges), China, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, 
Syria, Somalia, Jordan and Egypt.  Post does not have 
statistics covering extraditions over the reporting year.  In 
the past, the UAE has agreed to extradite cases to and from 
countries with which the UAEG does not have extradition 
treaties.  UAEG authorities have discussed the UAE,s 
interest in pursuing an extradition treaty with the U.S., 
most recently in February 2005. 
 
The UAEG also has mutual legal assistance treaties (MLAT) in 
criminal matters with a number of countries.  In some cases, 
mutual legal assistance was exchanged with countries with 
which the UAEG did not have an MLAT.  MLAT negotiations 
between the USG and UAEG are currently underway. 
 
To Post,s knowledge, the UAEG has not requested or granted 
extradition in a human trafficking case.  Based on the UAEG's 
record on extradition and mutual legal assistance in criminal 
matters, it would be fair to expect that the UAEG would 
request or grant extradition and mutual legal assistance in 
human trafficking cases. 
 
UAEG extradition of a UAE citizen to another country is 
highly unlikely absent extreme extenuating circumstances. 
For example, there was reportedly a clause in the UAE-India 
extradition treaty, included at the UAEG's request, wherein 
both nations agreed not to extradite their own nationals to 
the other country. 
 
-- J.  There is no firm evidence of government involvement in 
or tolerance of trafficking, whether on a local or 
institutional level.  Some NGO, IGO, source country and 
internet sources alleged that some lower-level officials may 
look the other way as traffickers bring their victims into 
the country.  Some also alleged that some police may &tip 
off8 certain clubs, bars or hotels before a sting.  Post 
cannot corroborate these allegations. 
 
-- K.  There have been no credible cases reported of 
government officials involved in trafficking.  Based on 
previous cases of investigation and prosecution of government 
officials for criminal offenses, it is expected that the UAEG 
would investigate and prosecute government officials 
suspected of trafficking or trafficking-related corruption. 
 
 
-- L.  Although there have been a number of media, source 
country, NGO and IGO reports that some teenage girls, almost 
all of whom are trafficking victims, work as prostitutes in 
the UAE, there have been no reliable reports of the UAE being 
a child sex tourism destination.  There have been no reports 
of foreign pedophiles being prosecuted, deported or 
extradited to their countries of origin. 
 
-- M.  Following is a rundown of the UAE,s position on 
relevant international instruments: 
 
¶A.  ILO Convention 182 Concerning the Prohibition and 
Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of 
Child Labor:  The UAEG ratified ILO Convention 182 Concerning 
Worst Forms of Child Labor on 28 June 2001. 
 
¶B.  ILO Conventions 29 and 105 on Forced or Compulsory Labor: 
 The UAEG ratified ILO Convention 29 Concerning Forced Labor 
on 27 May 1982, and the UAEG ratified ILO Convention 105 
Concerning Abolition of Forced Labor on 24 February 1997. 
¶C.  Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution, and Child 
Pornography:  The UAEG ratified the UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child on 3 January 1997, but has not ratified 
its supplemental Option Protocol on the Sale of Children, 
Child Prostitution, and Child Pornography. 
 
¶D.  The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking 
in Persons, especially Women and Children, Supplementing the 
UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime:  The UAE 
acceded to the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized 
Crime in December 2002.  Justice Ministry officials report 
that the UAE is reviewing and will likely sign the following 
supplemental protocols soon:  (1) the Supplemental Protocol 
to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
Especially Women and Children; and (2) the Supplemental 
Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and 
Air. 
 
¶E.  Other Instruments: 
 
The UAEG has also ratified or acceded to the following 
international instruments that help directly or indirectly 
guard against trafficking in persons. 
 
--UN International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination (acceded 20 June 1974). 
 
--Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) (ratified October 2004) 
 
--Convention Against Slavery (ratification date unknown). 
 
--ILO Convention 1 Concerning Hours of Work for Industry 
(ratified 27 May 1982). 
 
--ILO Convention 81 Concerning Labor Inspection (ratified 27 
May 1982). 
 
--ILO Revised Convention 89 Concerning Night Work for Women 
(ratified 27 May 1982). 
 
--ILO Convention 100 Concerning Equal Remuneration (ratified 
24 February 1997). 
 
--ILO Convention 111 Concerning Discrimination in Employment 
and Occupation (ratified 28 June 2001). 
 
--ILO Convention 138 Concerning Minimum Age for Employment 
(ratified 2 October 1998). 
 
    ------------------------------------ 
¶7.  PROTECTION AND ASSISTANCE TO VICTIMS 
    ------------------------------------ 
 
-- A.  The Government provides assistance and protection to 
victims, including victims of trafficking in persons. 
Counseling services are available in public hospitals.  While 
the UAE has no &safehouses,8 authorities have worked with 
embassies and NGOs to provide shelter facilities for victims, 
either in hotels or in embassies and consulates.  Police 
departments also claim to provide shelter facilities for 
victims separate from the general prison population.  Those 
sheltered in police facilities receive free medical care. 
Police provide victims who agree to testify against their 
traffickers with housing, employment opportunities, 
counseling, medical care, and any other necessary support. 
 
 
UAE Code of Criminal Procedures Arts. 14 and 22 provide for 
legal assistance for victims. 
 
Each Dubai police station is staffed with a human rights care 
officer and a social worker/counselor from Dubai Police's 
Human Rights Care Department. 
 
In 2002, the Dubai Police Human Rights Care Department 
developed a Crime Victims' Assistance Program, which includes 
the creation of Victim Assistance Coordinators and police 
training in victim protection and assistance.  In March 2003, 
Victim Assistance Coordinators were assigned to police 
stations.  Victim Assistance Coordinators' responsibilities 
include advising victims about the criminal justice system 
and criminal procedure; encouraging witness testimony, 
especially in cases like sexual abuse and trafficking in 
persons where victims are reluctant to speak out; advising 
victims of their rights; providing counseling and medical 
care; placement in a hotel or shelter; and follow-up with 
victims as the case proceeds to trial. 
 
The Dubai Tourist Security Department operates a 24-hour 
toll-free hotline telephone number to assist visitors with 
inquiries or problems.  The Department publishes information 
on the hotline and precautionary measures for visitors in a 
brochure that is distributed at all ports of entry and other 
locations, including source country missions. 
 
The Women's Da'waa Administration in the Dubai Department of 
Awqaf and Islamic Affairs also operates a hotline especially 
geared toward women and children.  Operating since July 2002, 
the hotline is open to all nationalities living in all 
emirates.  The hotline is open from 8:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m., 
Saturday to Wednesday, but will take emergency calls on 
Thursday and Friday (the UAE weekend). 
 
Post does not have statistics showing how many victims used 
any of the above services over the reporting year. 
 
-- B.  The Government provides funding for most or all local 
NGOs, and works with foreign NGOs to provide assistance to 
trafficking victims. 
 
-- C.  Authorities regularly work with source country NGOs to 
assist in the humane repatriation of victims to their home 
countries.  Beginning in November 2004, UAEG authorities 
worked closely with Pakistani human rights activist and 
self-named NGO director Ansar Burney to help rescue, care 
for, and repatriate child camel jockeys. 
 
Police state that they do follow screening and referral 
processes to determine if individuals suspected of or 
arrested for crimes may be trafficking victims or 
perpetrators.  However, in practice, police admit that they 
do not often identify human trafficking victims or 
perpetrators through interviewing techniques alone.  Often 
victims must identify themselves as such, after which time 
police provide necessary assistance.  While law enforcement 
regularly transferred trafficking victims to the protective 
care of NGOs outside the UAE, there were no reports in 2004 
of police officials transferring custody to officially 
sanctioned local NGOs.  Dubai police worked with one local 
victim assistance organization, although that organization 
has not received official government recognition. 
 
-- D.  Rights of victims are generally respected, once 
identified as victims.  There were NGO, IGO, and source 
country reports, however, of cases where victims were never 
identified as such, and were treated as criminals. 
Individuals identified as victims receive assistance, 
including medical care and counseling, and those who agree to 
testify against their traffickers are afforded housing, 
employment opportunities, and any other care required. 
However, police reported that in most cases, victims choose 
to be immediately repatriated to their home countries rather 
than stand up to their traffickers. 
 
-- E.  Law enforcement officials report that they advise 
victims of their rights and encourage witness testimony, 
especially in cases like sexual abuse and trafficking in 
persons, where victims may be reluctant to speak out.  Police 
will assist victims who choose to stay in the UAE during 
court proceedings with locating appropriate housing and 
temporary employment opportunities. 
 
Before or during a criminal trial, a victim may claim 
financial compensation, or "diya," which can be granted as 
part of a defendant's sentence.  Victims may also file civil 
suits for damages. 
 
Foreign diplomats indicate that victims have been permitted 
to give sworn testimony and leave the country before judgment 
was rendered. 
 
-- F.  The government is able to provide protections for 
victims and witnesses, and does provide these protections in 
practice. 
 
UAE Code of Criminal Procedures Arts. 14 and 22 provide for 
legal assistance for victims. 
 
Authorities have worked with NGOs and source country 
embassies and consulates to provide shelter for trafficking 
victims.  Police departments claim to provide shelter 
facilities for victims separate and apart from jail 
facilities, and have also arranged for shelter in hotels. 
The UAEG does not operate a safe house system.  Post is not 
aware of how much money the UAEG spent on sheltering victims 
over the reporting year. 
 
-- G.  The UAEG has devoted a significant amount of time and 
resources to sensitizing law enforcement and immigration 
officials on the subject of trafficking in persons, as well 
as practical training techniques to protect victims and 
prevent future trafficking incidents.  Abu Dhabi and Dubai 
police and the Ministries of Interior, Health, and Justice 
have all held anti-TIP training courses throughout the year. 
 
In May 2004, the Abu Dhabi Police College, with guidance from 
the IOM, Post, and G/TIP, conducted an anti-TIP training 
seminar for approximately 100 law enforcement and ministry 
officials.  In November 2004, the Abu Dhabi Police College 
conducted a human rights symposium for approximately 200 law 
enforcement and ministry officials.  The police college 
requires all students to complete human rights and anti-TIP 
courses before graduation. 
From May 20 ) June 10, 2004, a representative from the 
Ministry of Interior,s Legal Affairs Department participated 
in an anti-TIP MRP program in Washington, D.C., and other 
locations in the U.S. 
The Dubai Immigration and Residency Department regularly 
offered training for arrival and departure inspectors in 
identifying fraudulent documents, often used by trafficking 
victims.  The UAEG also supplied ports of entry and source 
country embassies and consulates with brochures to try to 
warn off potential trafficking victims, as well as to inform 
victims where they can go to receive assistance.  UAE 
Missions in source countries closely screen visa applications 
and deny visas to potential trafficking victims and 
prostitutes. 
 
The Ministry of Justice Institute of Judicial Training and 
Studies conducts mandatory classes for prosecutors and judges 
on proper victim care and assistance.  The Institute also 
conducts mandatory specialized classes on the following 
topics: human rights (14 hours); sexual offenses (20 hours); 
offenses against life (20 hours); immigration offenses (20 
hours); juvenile protection and delinquency (30 hours); labor 
violations and offenses (12 hours). 
 
The UAEG senior leadership repeatedly asked the USG for 
training information and opportunities that would further 
their efforts to combat trafficking in persons, and help law 
enforcement officials, prosecutors and judges to better 
identify, investigate and prosecute trafficking in persons 
cases.  Embassy is working with LegAtt to arrange training 
opportunities for UAE law enforcement in interview techniques 
to help elicit information from victims and traffickers to 
build stronger cases against human traffickers. 
 
Post is unaware of any specific UAEG-provided training on 
protection and assistance for staff members located in source 
countries. 
 
-- H.  There were no reports of UAE nationals being 
trafficked outside of or within the UAE.  Considering the 
UAEG's record of numerous services provided to citizens at 
little to no cost, it is expected that the UAEG would provide 
generous assistance to repatriated UAE nationals who were 
victims of trafficking, if such a situation were to occur. 
 
-- I.  The Government cooperates and coordinates with NGOs 
and IGOs in providing assistance to trafficking victims, as 
cases come to their attention.  Some examples are the United 
Nations, Pakistan-based Ansar Burney International Welfare 
Trust, the Bangladesh National Women,s Lawyers Association, 
the IOM, The Protection Project, and any other NGOs, 
including small source country NGOs, that request UAEG 
assistance with cases or request meetings during 
familiarization missions. 
SISON