This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

101654Z Feb 05

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 000393 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: NL PREL EUN
SUBJECT: NL/EU CONSTITUTION:  DUTCH REFERENDUM CAMPAIGN OFF 
TO SHAKY START 
 
REF: "POLITICS IN THE NETHERLANDS" FOR 2/8/05 (E-MAIL) 
 
THIS MESSAGE IS SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED.  PLEASE HANDLE 
ACCORDINGLY. 
 
¶1. (SBU)  SUMMARY:  The Dutch government is committed to 
holding a referendum on the EU Constitutional Treaty -- most 
likely in late May or early June -- and also to obtaining a 
positive outcome.  Some members of parliament have criticized 
the government for setting aside funds for a "yes" campaign 
while it is also responsible for executing an impartial "get 
out the vote" campaign.  Recent polls suggest that 50 percent 
of the Dutch public is undecided about how to vote in the 
referendum, while an even larger percentage claims to have 
little or no knowledge about the treaty.  A "yes" vote is far 
from certain, and a "no" could have serious domestic and 
international political consequences for the Balkenende 
government.  END SUMMARY. 
 
TWO STEPS FORWARD...AND A POSSIBLE FOUL. 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU)  On January 25, the First Chamber of the Dutch 
Parliament approved the law establishing a one-time 
referendum on the Constitutional Treaty, overcoming 
last-minute challenges from some members of the 
(conservative) Liberal Party (VVD) which threatened to derail 
the entire process.  Subsequently, the Second Chamber of 
Parliament on February 1 selected the five members of a 
"neutral" independent committee tasked with framing the 
question for the referendum and setting a date for it.  With 
these two hurdles successfully cleared, the Dutch are moving 
forward with plans to hold a referendum this spring, most 
likely at the end of May or beginning of June. 
 
¶3. (SBU)  Although the referendum law was initiated by the 
parliament, rather than the Dutch government (two of the 
three governing coalition parties oppose referenda on 
principle), the government is now locked into holding the 
referendum and committed to obtaining a "yes" vote.  On 
February 7, the Foreign Ministry sent a letter to the Second 
Chamber spelling out the government's plans for supporting a 
non-partisan "get out the vote" drive (for which 1.45 million 
Euro has been allocated) and, separately, for convincing the 
public to vote "yes."  The letter notes that an additional 
1.5 million Euro has been set aside for the government to 
draw on, on a contingency basis, to counter the efforts of 
those working for a "no" vote.  News of this supposedly 
secret "slush fund" had earlier been leaked to the press, 
 
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embarrassing the government last week as members of 
Parliament, including many who support ratification of the 
treaty in principle, questioned the ethics of using taxpayer 
money to influence the outcome of a referendum the government 
is tasked to carry out impartially.  The government's 
response -- that the funds would only be used in a 
transparent and proportional manner and only after the 
emergence of a well-funded opposition campaign -- appears to 
have satisfied most critics for now. 
 
FLYING BLIND 
------------ 
 
¶4. (SBU) The flap over the "slush fund" is almost certainly 
just the first of many anticipated hazards on the road to a 
"yes" vote.  The government is operating in largely uncharted 
territory; the last (and only previous) national referendum 
held in the Netherlands took place in 1815, so it is 
virtually impossible to predict how voters will act. 
According to a recent survey conducted at the request of the 
MFA, nearly 80 percent of those polled planned to vote in the 
referendum -- even though two thirds of them did not know 
that a referendum would be held until told so by the 
pollster.  According to the same poll, more than 80 percent 
of those polled claimed to have little to no idea what the 
treaty was about, with about a third believing the treaty 
would replace the Dutch Constitution.  Asked how they planned 
to vote, 30 percent said "yes," 20 percent said "no," and -- 
most disturbingly for the government -- 50 percent "didn't 
know." 
 
¶5. (SBU) In a meeting with POLCOUNS on February 2, Thijs van 
der Plas, who heads the MFA's internal task force on the 
referendum (which tasked the poll), acknowledged that lack of 
basic information about the EU Constitutional Treaty was 
considered the most serious challenge to the "yes" campaign. 
Opponents on both the left and the right, he noted, were 
finding it easy to mount effective "no" campaigns based on a 
handful of emotionally resonant themes not directly linked to 
the treaty.  For example, former VVD member Geert Wilders, 
has already declared his intention to turn the referendum 
into a vote on whether or not Turkey should be part of 
Europe, while the Socialist Party has seized on public 
frustration with the Euro economy and alleged militarization 
of the union to rally opposition to the treaty.  A solid 
majority in parliament -- including all three coalition 
parties and two major opposition parties -- supports the 
treaty, he noted, but opponents see the referendum as an 
opportunity to build popular support for their own separate 
agendas.  According to van der Plas, the government's 
strategy (as outlined in the letter to parliament, which he 
drafted) will be to focus on the new treaty's improvements 
over previous EU agreements in the areas of "transparency, 
democracy, and efficiency."  Van der Plas noted, however, 
that as most voters don't understand how this treaty differs 
from the earlier agreements, this will be a hard sell.  At 
some point, he added, the government needs to develop a more 
emotionally appealing pitch the lines of "vote yes to Europe" 
or "vote yes for Holland in Europe." 
 
TIMING IS EVERYTHING 
-------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Van der Plas was cautiously optimistic that the 
"yes" camp would ultimately prevail, but recognized that the 
government has a long way to go with not much time.  While 
the "no" camp has yet to coalesce around a single leader or 
issue, he said, the potential is clearly there for an 
effective, grass-roots anti-treaty movement.  Van der Plas 
stressed that the government is also carefully considering 
the issue of timing, preferring to hold the vote before the 
EU discussion of its multi-year budget for 2007-2013, the 
so-called Financial Perspectives, scheduled for June (as this 
is a touchy issue for the Dutch as a net-contributor) and as 
far from the October 3 start of Turkish accession talks as 
possible.  Finally, van der Plas said that the Dutch would 
prefer to hold their vote after the anticipated French 
referendum if possible, arguing that a "yes" vote in France 
would have a positive ripple effect in the Netherlands, while 
a "non" would at least spare the Dutch blame for scuttling 
the treaty.  (According to van der Plas, the French 
referendum, while not the first, would have the greatest 
impact on Dutch perceptions of the viability of the treaty.) 
 
¶7. (SBU) Some of the treaty's strongest supporters are most 
skeptical of the government campaign.  Lousewies van der 
Laan, a member of parliament for the liberal-progressive D66 
party, told POLCOUNS on January 31 that she believed a public 
campaign led by the government could do more harm than good. 
The Balkenende government (of which D66 is a coalition 
partner) is both unpopular and inept at public diplomacy, she 
said -- as evidenced by the flap over the funding question. 
Van der Laan hopes to establish a separate foundation, with 
funding from the five political parties (three coalition 
members and two opposition parties), labor groups, social 
organizations, and individuals to mount a "yes" campaign 
outside the government's efforts.  Van der Laan said the next 
step after establishing funding would be to identify a 
high-profile public spokesman -- such as Dutch soccer hero 
Johan Cruijff, who is currently playing a similar role in the 
Spanish referendum -- to promote the treaty. 
 
WHAT COMES AFTER "NO"? 
---------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Van der Laan and van der Plas agreed that a "no" 
vote would be a major blow to the Balkenende government, 
especially if there is a respectable turnout.  While he 
dismissed poll results showing nearly 80 percent 
participation as ridiculous, van der Plas said that turnout 
was now expected to be at least comparable to elections to 
the European Parliament (roughly 30 percent, the lowest in 
Europe).  Under such circumstances, simply dismissing a 
negative vote as non-representative would not be a realistic 
option, he said.  Although the referendum is legally 
non-binding, both van der Laan and van der Plas predicted 
that parliament would not ratify the treaty in the face of a 
strong "no" vote.  One option in that case would be to hold 
new national elections to bring in a parliament and 
government that could ratify the treaty without a referendum; 
another would be for the parliament to pass new legislation 
calling for a second referendum -- a politically risky 
strategy considering the ambivalence of many parties towards 
referenda in general.  A third, more likely, possibility 
would be for parliament to instruct the government to 
negotiate some "concession" regarding the treaty (on 
Financial Perspectives, for example) and then revisit the 
issue.  In any case, van der Laan stressed that the prestige 
of the Netherlands as a founding member of the EU could be 
seriously, perhaps irreversibly, damaged if it were seen to 
be turning its back on Europe.  On February 10, State 
Secretary for Europe Atzo Nicolai, speaking to a group of 
 
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resident diplomats, acknowledged openly that the Dutch "have 
no plan B" for dealing with a negative vote. 
 
COMMENT: 
------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Last summer, at the start of the Dutch EU 
presidency, many predicted that the Dutch would be the first 
EU country to hold a referendum on the new treaty.  PM 
Balkenende was reportedly eager to translate the anticipated 
goodwill generated during the Dutch EU presidency into a 
positive "vote for Europe."  Six sobering months later, the 
Dutch government is starting to realize that convincing a 
skeptical Dutch public to support the treaty will entail more 
effort -- and potential political risk -- than it may have 
anticipated. 
SOBEL