This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 KINSHASA 000283 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR CA/FPP/ENAF, CA/VO 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CMGT CG
SUBJECT: CONGO-KINSHASA NIV FRAUD OVERVIEW 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.   Nonimmigrant visa (NIV) fraud in Congo-Kinshasa is 
commonplace, but on the whole not highly sophisticated. 
Fake or falsified documents from private and government 
applicants are its main sources. The ease with which 
passports and other state-issued documents such as birth 
certificates and diplomas can be obtained or forged demands 
careful examination of all papers.  Bank statements and 
attestations of employment from businesses and NGOs also are 
easily fabricated or falsified rendering untrustworthy much 
of the support documentation submitted by Congolese visa 
applicants. Furthermore, post has not been immune to 
internal fraud.  All these factors call for vigilance to 
detect NIV malfeasance and facilitate the travel of bona 
fide applicants.  The challenges that fraud presents for the 
NIV process in Congo-Kinshasa will carry over to the 
immigrant visa (IV) process when post this year resumes 
issuing IVs after a seven-year suspension.  End summary. 
 
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BACKGROUND 
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¶2.   Post currently processes only NIV applications.  The IV 
function was suspended in 1998 in response to repeated 
Embassy evacuations due to civil war and resulting 
instability.  IV issuance, however, is scheduled to resume 
in April 2005. 
 
Post NIV workload is relatively small for a nation the size 
of Congo -- the third largest country in Africa. 
Approximately 4,500 NIV applications were received in FY 
2004, a 33 percent increase compared to FY 2003.  Post 
attributes the rise in applications to several factors, 
including an increase in demand for official GDRC travel 
following the installation in 2003 of a large government of 
transition, increased stability in the country brought on by 
the peace process, and the overall worldwide increase in 
visa applications following the decline witnessed after the 
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.  The NIV refusal rate 
averages about 54 percent.  Post believes this relatively 
low rate of refusal for a developing country reflects the 
high proportion of official travelers from the GDRC and the 
local United Nations peacekeeping operation (MONUC) as well 
as decreased numbers of frivolous applications deterred by 
the $100 non-reimbursable application fee and post's 
reputation for stringent adjudication. 
 
There has been significant progress in advancing the peace 
process in Congo following the installation of the 
transitional government and plans for national elections in 
¶2005.  Nevertheless, the security situation remains tenuous. 
Armed military activity by rebel militia continues 
sporadically in the east.  In 2004 rioting and looting 
occurred in several cities throughout the country. 
Likewise, while the DRC economy has registered moderate 
growth in recent years, Congo remains one of the poorest 
nations in the world.  Personal income is extremely low, 
public institutions are weak and much of the country's 
infrastructure either does not function or has been 
destroyed.  The general population copes with inadequate 
basic education, substandard health care and few job 
opportunities.  These factors cause many Congolese to seek 
better conditions elsewhere, including the United States. 
These compelling incentives to emigrate lead to pervasive 
fraud in nonimmigrant visa applications. 
 
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DOCUMENT FRAUD 
-------------- 
 
¶3.   False documentation is the principal form of fraud 
among Congolese NIV applicants.  From passports to birth 
certificates, all documents can be forged or falsified 
whether by corrupt officials, professional forgers or clever 
visa applicants.  This necessitates scrupulous inspection of 
all credentials and, where possible, cross checking with 
local authorities to confirm authenticity. 
 
In 2000, the DRC introduced a newly designed passport and 
pronounced all previous versions invalid.  The new passport 
has a security laminate feature, but is not machine 
readable, rendering it relatively unreliable. Cases of photo 
substitution have been detected.  Usually this entails 
imposters placing their photos into legitimate passports 
that show a documented history of prior travel to the United 
States or Europe.  The donor passport can be from a friend 
or relative. However, there are confirmed instances where 
male fide applicants have paid as much as several thousand 
dollars on the street for photo-substituted travel 
documents.  Suspicious passports are usually evaluated using 
three tactics: (a) the document is rigorously examined by 
the naked eye and under UV light for signs of alteration; 
(b) the supposed traveler is asked to provide details about 
their prior trips; and (c) the applicant is asked to 
reproduce the bearer's signature in the passport. 
 
Another persistent concern is that Congolese birth 
certificates and other forms of identity can be easily 
obtained with fake names and biographic information, thereby 
facilitating the issuance of genuine passports containing 
the same false biodata.  The extent to which Congolese 
applicants submit valid passports containing false 
identities cannot easily be discerned, though several such 
cases have been detected.  Post has relied on reviewing the 
CLASS name-check results for similar name variations and 
close dates of birth.  Often an applicant will apply under 
the name of a sibling.  For possible matches, the photos and 
handwriting from the two application forms can be compared 
to determine if the person has previously applied under 
another identity.  The launching last year of biodata 
collection for all applicants will go a long way toward 
detecting imposters.  Already, post has identified two 
applicants whose fingerprint results showed that they had 
previously applied under different identities. 
 
Another concern is that Congolese civil certificates, 
including birth, death, marriage and divorce documents, 
rather than being centralized, are issued at the local 
level.  This decentralized system poses serious difficulties 
when verifying authenticity.  Because of the impracticality 
of collecting vast numbers of specimens of authorizing 
signatures and stamps from town officials (except perhaps 
for the most common issuing authorities in the capital 
Kinshasa), most civil documents must be individually checked 
at the local level. However, the huge size of Congo 
(approximately the same area as the United States east of 
the Mississippi River) and the lack of road and 
communication infrastructure, make verification nearly 
always impossible. 
 
Moreover, civil authorities issue two types of certificates, 
an "acte" (of birth, marriage or death), or an "attestation" 
of the same.  An "acte de naissance," or certificate of 
birth, for example, is issued at the time and place of the 
actual birth.  However, an "attestation de naissance," or 
attestation of birth, could be recorded and issued years 
later at any location.  Thus, a birth that occurred in a 
remote area of the country 25 years ago could be 
"registered" in the capital Kinshasa based simply on 
testimony, and an accompanying "attestation" of birth would 
then be issued by Kinshasa officials. 
 
Additionally, Congolese civil documents are not necessarily 
uniform in design, nor do they contain the simplest anti- 
forgery elements.  Birth certificates, for example, are 
typed on plain common paper.  The town hall insignia or seal 
can be easily printed on any home or office printer, and wet 
seals can be made or altered to appear genuine.  This ease 
of forgery combined with the decentralized system of 
archiving and the wide use of "attestations" calls into 
question the legitimacy of nearly all Congolese civil 
records. 
 
Private-sector documents are also highly susceptible to 
forgery in Congo.  A good example is pay stubs, which NIV 
applicants could submit in order to demonstrate income. 
Because there are no payroll companies in Congo, most pay 
stubs are issued by the organization using a home or office 
computer.  Often they will be stamped with a corporate seal 
and signed by a supervisor or financial officer.  Because 
they are so easily produced in any variation, post is forced 
to give them little weight as convincing proof of income. 
The same can be said for attestations of employment.  Any 
letterhead and rubber seal can be fabricated to issue a 
letter from any company attesting to employment and salary. 
 
Congolese NIV applicants have the best chance of proving 
income and financial assets by submitting bank records. 
Unfortunately, however, Congo has a history of an unreliable 
banking system.  Under the Mobutu regime many people 
regularly lost funds deposited in banks.  As a result, and 
despite reform in recent years, most Congolese do not trust 
the banking system and have no bank accounts.  High fees are 
a further deterrent to their widespread use.  But even those 
banking statements that are submitted must be scrupulously 
examined for authenticity.  The statements issued by local 
banks are not sophisticated and are regularly forged with 
quality color laser printers.  Post has made efforts to 
visit the most popular local banks to learn how best to 
determine the genuineness of statements.  This usually 
entails observing the statement for clarity and conformity 
while paying particular attention to the letterhead color to 
ensure that it matches exactly the sample provided by the 
bank.  Nonetheless, periodic checking for accounts and 
balances remains a necessity. 
 
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NGO FRAUD 
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¶4.   Post sees occasional fraud stemming from real or 
fictitious Congolese NGOs.  Development, health and human 
rights NGOs are the most frequently cited in this type of 
fraud, which usually takes one of two forms - forged 
documents from legitimate organizations, or documents from 
phantom groups.  The purpose of travel is usually to attend 
a conference or to receive training. For legitimate NGOs, 
genuine letterhead can be used to produce documents alleging 
employment and travel orders.  The letterhead may have been 
obtained and used either with or without the knowledge of 
organization officials.  With the availability of high- 
quality printers, official-looking letterhead can be easily 
reproduced or forged.  Likewise, documents from imaginary 
NGOs can easily be created and are frequently submitted in 
support of visa applications. 
 
The conference destinations themselves can be either real or 
fictitious.  Male fide travelers search the Internet for 
conferences, workshops or trade shows for which anyone can 
register on line, often for a nominal fee.  Legitimate NGO 
conferences in the U.S. also attract male fide applicants as 
"tag ons" with legitimate attendees.  This can often be the 
case with large well known yearly conferences, such as the 
Lions Club or Rotary Club. Verification is key to 
determining the legitimacy of the purported conference.  The 
venue and theme must be verified as must the employment of 
the applicant.  In addition, post must rigorously question 
applicants to verify their expertise in the field of NGO 
work and the value that would come to the organization out 
of the proposed travel. 
 
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STUDENT VISA FRAUD 
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¶5.   Student visa fraud in Kinshasa is not generally of the 
type that is organized or systemic.  There was, however, one 
such instance in 2004 that stemmed from the Brazzaville side 
of the house.  [Note: Post shares office space with Embassy 
Brazzaville, which processes visas for Republic of Congo 
(ROC) applicants every Monday in Kinshasa].  The case 
involved a pastor in Brazzaville who was helping prospective 
students prepare their visa applications for a particular 
college in Nebraska.  Approximately eight applications for 
the same school were submitted within one month -- two of 
them from Congo-Kinshasa and six from Congo-Brazzaville. 
After remarking the similarities of the applicants' 
supporting documents, a fraud investigation revealed that 
while the students' admission letters and I-20s were 
legitimate, the financial support documents, including bank 
statements, were forged.  Additionally, all the students 
produced letters from various government ministries 
promising employment after finishing their education in the 
United States.  The unlikely possibility of a government 
ministry promising employment four or five years down the 
road further raised suspicion of an organized scheme. The 
pastor who organized the fraud was never found, but 
interviews of the student applicants as well as admissions 
officials at the college in the United States revealed that 
he apparently took payment for helping young Congolese 
procure student visas to this particular college. 
 
Other student visa fraud concerns individual cases of 
applicants submitting fraudulent supporting documentation. 
These include financial papers such as bank statements and 
employment letters, as well as state-issued baccalaureate 
(high school) diplomas.  Like other Congolese documents, the 
"diplome d'etat" can be easily forged or falsified.  In 
addition, grade reports, though fairly standardized, are not 
sophisticated and are easily susceptible to forgery or 
alteration. 
 
Many Congolese student applicants have sponsors who reside 
in the United States.  Oftentimes they are family members 
who pledge financial support.  Other times, the relationship 
of the prospective student and the U.S. sponsor is less 
clear.  There are instances where students have applied with 
letters from sponsors whom they have never met in person, 
but with whom they had corresponded over the Internet. 
Sometimes students produce financial support documents of 
colleagues of close or extended family whom they have never 
met.  As with all applications, rigorous questioning and 
document verification is necessary to determine the 
prospective student's seriousness, academic ability and 
financial resources. 
 
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OFFICIAL FRAUD 
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¶6.   Visa fraud at the official level occurs in three 
general categories: passport fraud, travel order fraud, and 
imposters.  GDRC ministries and agencies have in the past 
issued passports and travel orders to male fide applicants 
and presented imposters as legitimate government workers. 
The establishment in 2003 of a large interim government of 
transition poses further concern.  With four vice 
presidents, dozens of ministers and vice ministers, a 
sizable parliament and accompanying staff, the prospects for 
fraud at the official level have increased concomitantly. 
 
Official GDRC passports have only marginally better issuance 
criteria and control that do regular passports.  Congolese 
service passports are issued to anyone connected to the 
government, from ministry and presidential staff members to 
professors at state universities and employees of 
parastatals. Moreover, for a fee official passports can be 
obtained by just about anyone with a connection to the 
government.  Diplomatic passports have a stricter issuance 
criteria.  However, there have been instances from the past 
where diplomatic passports were issued to unqualified 
bearers such as extended family of Congolese diplomats or 
other high-level government officials.  Again for the right 
price or with the right connection it is possible to gain 
access to these more prestigious travel documents. For these 
reasons, post rarely waives the personal appearance 
requirement for Class A or Class G visas for Congolese 
officials.  Only for cases where the applicant has a history 
of documented prior travel and/or is known to the consular 
officer or other Embassy personnel might the interview 
requirement be waived. 
 
For official government travel, applicants must submit two 
documents with their applications: an "ordre de mission" and 
a "note verbale."  The "ordre de mission," or travel order, 
is issued by the relevant ministry or department and 
outlines information about the mission, including who is 
traveling, their position, the dates of travel and the 
purpose of travel.  The "note verbale" is a pro forma note 
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs requesting that the 
Embassy issue the visa. 
 
Here again, fraud takes two tracks - forged documents or 
legitimate documents issued to male fide applicants. 
Usually, it is the latter, particularly the "ordres de 
missions" as few forged ones have been detected.  Post has 
little faith that the GDRC authorities issuing the documents 
go to any great lengths to verify the validity of the 
proposed mission.  Again, for a price authentic travel 
orders can probably be easily obtained.  The "note verbale" 
issued by the MFA is usually of poor quality, the original 
having been photocopied many times over.  Mistakes are often 
corrected with liquid paper and retyped.  The "ordres de 
missions" vary from each ministry and can be either of high 
quality with a raised or embossed ministry seal and clearly 
typed, or they too can be faded photocopies with liquid 
paper corrections. 
 
More often than not, conoff must take the time to verify 
that the meeting or conference stated in the travel order is 
in fact taking place.  For example, the applicant will be 
asked to provide the name and telephone number of the person 
at the World Bank in Washington, D.C., with whom they are to 
have "consultations" as stated in the "ordre de mission." 
Those that never call back to submit the information -- 
which happens -- were most likely male fide travelers. 
 
Finally, because official passports can be obtained with 
ease, government staff has in the past presented 
questionable applicants as legitimate government works with 
bona fide travel orders.  Additionally, there have been 
instances where diplomats have claimed extended family or 
others as children or dependents entitled to derivative 
status.  In another instance of fraud at the official level, 
the permanent representative to the United Nations of a west 
African nation supported the G1 application of a Congolese 
citizen to work as the receptionist at that country's 
mission in New York.  Inquiries revealed that the applicant, 
who had no office work experience, was the relative of a 
close Congolese friend of the permanent representative. 
Large official delegations to UN conferences and workshops 
must be thoroughly screened to determine that applicants are 
legitimate employees, have worked at the relevant ministry 
for a reasonable length of time, and that each applicant has 
a clear purpose for attending the conference. 
 
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POST VALIDATION STUDY 
--------------------- 
 
¶7.   Post uses a validation callback procedure to ascertain 
levels of nonreturn to Congo of NIV travelers.  Selected 
participants are asked to choose a convenient day shortly 
after their projected return to country in order to present 
in person at the Consular Section and verify their return. 
At the time their visas are issued, participants are given a 
dated ticket, which permits access to the Consular Section 
on that day.  Criteria for selecting participants vary. 
Some are selected completely at random.  Others are chosen 
due to particular circumstances, such as a first-time 
traveler to the United States.  Post periodically places 
GDRC delegations on callback to ascertain the legitimacy of 
official travel. 
 
Callback results are tabulated quarterly.  The total number 
of participants due to report for a given quarter are 
reviewed to determine the percentage that reported back as 
required.  Attempts are then made to contact "no-shows" to 
either encourage them to present at the Consular Section, or 
to at least verify by other means their return.  "No-shows" 
that cannot be contacted are assumed to be overstays.  "No- 
show" rates have varied from as low as 4 percent to as high 
as 14 percent.  Post reviews the DS-156 of each "no-show" to 
discern any patterns or commonalities that could be useful 
for future adjudication.  For the most part, they are 
individuals traveling for business or pleasure.  Recent 
studies have revealed no notable group patterns of intending 
immigrants. 
 
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INTERNAL FRAUD 
-------------- 
 
¶8.   Another area that must be continually monitored is 
internal fraud.  Last year two incidents at Embassy Kinshasa 
underscored the vulnerability of any Consular Section to 
fraud from the inside.  In the spring, post discovered that 
one of the local guards was coaching applicants on how to 
answer certain questions posed by the consular officer.  In 
one instance he had instructed an applicant not to reveal a 
prior visa refusal on the application form.  The guard was 
dismissed, and as a result conoff redrew guard duties and 
organized a staff meeting, which included the guards, to 
review their duties and to emphasize the expectation that 
staff must report any and all suspicious activity, even 
among fellow staff members.  Post recognizes the importance 
of officers monitoring the activities of FSNs, including the 
local guard force.  However, the current physical design of 
the Consular Section makes this difficult, a problem that 
will be improved with a planned renovation of the Consular 
Section this year. 
 
More disquieting was the discovery this past summer that a 
Kinshasa FSN consular clerk had been accepting money as part 
of a broader scheme by others outside the Embassy to procure 
NIVs from Congo-Brazzaville by introducing false documents. 
The scheme was discovered when the employee was arrested 
following an investigation by local police.  Police were 
tipped off by a Congolese who paid to benefit from the 
scheme, but who apparently became concerned when he was 
given a photo-substituted Congo-Brazzaville passport in 
order to make his application.  Following an investigation 
by the RSO and Congolese authorities, the FSN was 
terminated.  Post could not ascertain the exact number of 
visas that might have been secured under the scheme. 
However, it was determined that the extent of collusion by 
the FSN was limited to providing advice on what types of 
fake mission orders and other supporting documents were 
likely be accepted by the Congo-Brazzaville consular 
officer. As a result, that officer now routinely verifies 
all government travel orders from the Republic of Congo. 
 
These two examples of internal malfeasance underscore the 
need for vigilance and spot checks of consular functions. 
The Consular Section works closely with the RSO and reports 
any unusual activity. 
 
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IMPLICATIONS FOR IV FRAUD 
------------------------- 
 
¶9.   Post has not processed IVs since 1998, but clearly 
understands that the fraud patterns that make NIV work so 
challenging in Congo-Kinshasa will carry over to this 
process when post resumes issuing IVs visas in April 2005. 
Post already has a feel for some of the specific areas of 
IVs that will require scrutiny.  Where possible, Embassy 
Kinshasa has helped neighboring posts that are processing 
IVs for Congolese applicants to verify the authenticity of 
local Congolese documents.  (Note: Embassy Yaounde has been 
processing the largest number of Congo IV cases during the 
past seven years). This assistance usually takes the form of 
verifying birth and marriage certificates for applicants as 
well as diplomas and other academic credentials for DV 
winners and dependents. 
 
Relationship verification and the authentication of academic 
records will be the foundation of IV fraud work and 
investigation in Congo-Kinshasa.  The recent hiring of an 
EFM Consular Associate will allow post to conduct more 
investigations and to establish better contacts with local 
issuing officials.  In addition, post plans to build an 
extensive library of document samples, including, where 
possible, exemplars of authorized signatures and seals of 
principal issuing authorities.  Post's fraud FSN has 
attended a fraud workshop at FSI, but post would welcome a 
regional fraud seminar that would bring together FSN 
investigators from eastern, central and southern Africa to 
share information and experiences. 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶10.  In general, NIV applicant fraud in Congo-Kinshasa is 
both prevalent and, to a large extent, ineffective.  The 
bulk of fraud consists of the submission of bogus documents 
purporting employment, salary and assets, or travel orders. 
Post sees examples daily of applicants submitting what are 
presumed to be fabricated, or least suspicious, support 
documents.  Because false credentials are so pervasive in 
Congo-Kinshasa, they usually carry little weight when 
adjudicating a visa applicant's ties to Congo.  In general, 
only bona fide prior travelers with convincing documentation 
of employment and financial assets from an established bank 
-- sometimes verified by the consular officer -- are issued 
nonimmigrant visas. 
 
Against this background, the visa interview is key to the 
adjudication process.  Even applicants that appear well 
qualified on paper must talk convincingly to the officer of 
their employment, purpose of travel and other ties to Congo 
in order to be issued an NIV.  For detecting NIV fraud, 
there is no substitute for meticulous adjudication in 
conjunction with document verification.  The same vigilance 
will be required with the resumption of the IV process this 
year.  End Comment. 
 
¶11. Bujumbura minimize considered. 
 
Meece