This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 GUATEMALA 000376 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/26/2015 
TAGS: PINR SNAR KCRM PGOV PHUM PARM PTER SMIG MASS ASEC EAID KCOR KFRD GT
SUBJECT: GANG VIOLENCE THREATENS GUATEMALAN SECURITY 
 
REF: A. 04 STATE 227915 
     ¶B. 03 GUATEMALA 2288 
     ¶C. TEGUCIGALPA 0261 
     ¶D. SAN SALVADOR 236 
     ¶E. 04 SAN SALVADOR 2232 
     ¶F. 04 TEGUCIGALPA 1843 
     ¶G. 04 MEXICO 09185 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY.  With the implementation of hardline 
policies against gangs in neighboring Honduras and El 
Salvador (reftels), Guatemala is searching for ways to combat 
its own gang problem.  The GOG blames the gangs for the 
continued upswing in homicides, which have increased each 
year for the last three.  Gang membership, activity, and 
violence are certainly on the rise.  Estimates on the number 
of youth associated with gangs in Guatemala vary wildly -- 
from 8,000 to 175,000.  Though gangs are centered in the 
capital, there are also reliable reports of activity 
throughout the rest of the country.  Gangs have organized 
complex extortion operations, charging buses, taxis, 
businesses, and even private citizens "war taxes" in 
dangerous "red zones" of the capital.  They also retail 
narcotics and prey on illegal migrants on the border with 
Mexico.  They also constitute a serious problem for a 
judicial system that already suffers from incompetence, 
corruption, and intimidation.  Programs aimed at prevention 
and increased police professionalism could reduce some gang 
violence.  To combat gang activity in Villa Nueva (the 
highest crime district in Guatemala City), AID and NAS have 
complementary pilot programs involving collaborated efforts 
between justice authorities, police, and community members, 
along with intense training of the police on how to mount 
complex investigations of gangs' organized criminal 
activities.  Ultimately, Guatemala needs to find transparent 
methods to curb gang activity (and other organized crime) or 
the public will call for hard-line repression.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Gory Violence:  Attributable to Gangs? 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (U) A woman's decapitated head was found wrapped in a 
book-bag on a bus commuting through one of the most dangerous 
neighborhoods in Guatemala City on the afternoon of January 
¶22.  Over the following days, body parts appeared around the 
city.  The victim was a 16-year-old girl, allegedly a member 
of the gang Mara 18.  This murder, like 97% of homicides in 
Guatemala, will probably remain unsolved and the perpetrators 
unpunished.  And by no means is this an isolated event.  On 
any given day, you can glance at the front page of any of the 
local tabloid papers and literally see multiple photos of 
bloody corpses or bodies wrapped in nylon bags, evidence of 
the, on average, 9 murders that take place daily in the 
Guatemala City metro area.  In a survey published by national 
daily "El Periodico" on January 11, respondents 
overwhelmingly identified public security as the biggest 
problem facing Guatemala. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Homicides increased by 6% in 2004, from 4,237 in 
2003 to 4,507   (Source: National Civil Police (PNC)), 
continuing a five year upswing.  Murders of women (to which 
the press dedicated front-page headlines throughout the past 
year) also rose, from 383 in 2003 to 497 (Source: PNC). 
(Note:  Statistics vary widely from source to source.  The 
Supreme Court, which oversees all the national morgues, 
reported that 3,038 individuals were murdered in 2002, 4,058 
in 2003, and 5,069 individuals from January 1-November 30 
2004, only 159 of whom were women.  Daily "Prensa Libre" 
reported that there were 3,325 murders in 2003, 4,346 in 2004 
and 527 killings of women in 2004.  We use the PNC numbers, 
which are based on police reports, only to indicate 
trendlines.  End note.) 
 
Gaping Holes in Intelligence 
---------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) An absence of reliable information hinders solid 
analysis of gang activity in Guatemala.  Though a few studies 
have been conducted, their methodologies were not systematic 
and the conclusions vary widely.  Therefore, much of the 
information available to us and local authorities is 
anecdotal.  Without inside sources, the National Civil Police 
(PNC)  has extremely limited data about the structure, 
membership and criminal activities of gangs.  A weak justice 
system exacerbates the difficulty of gathering intelligence: 
witnesses refuse to testify for fear of reprisals; police do 
not methodically collect information from gang members in 
custody; the police and prosecutors fail to investigate or 
build prosecutions effectively; and crimes (committed by gang 
members or other criminals) rarely lead to convictions. 
 
Size and Locations 
------------------ 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Estimates on the number of gang members in 
Guatemala vary wildly.  The PNC have, in different reports or 
public statements over the last six months, given estimates 
ranging from 8,000 to 86,000.  A study conducted by NAS and 
the Executive Secretariat Commission Against Drug Addiction 
and Trafficking (SECCATID) conducted in 2002 calculated that 
between 68,000 and 97,000 Guatemalan youth had participated 
in gangs.  A (USAID-funded) NGO coalition for crime 
prevention (APREDE) interviewed youth around the country in 
early 2003 and estimated that at least 175,000 individuals 
either belonged to or directly supported the gangs.  Everyone 
agrees, however, that membership is on the rise. 
Additionally, there is open speculation that, following the 
crackdown on gangs under Honduras and El Salvador's "mano 
dura" (hardline) policies, many gang members from those 
countries have moved their operations into Guatemala. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) The two most notorious gangs in Guatemala are the 
Mara Salvatrucha and Mara 18 (both of which also exist in 
neighboring Central American countries and the U.S.). But 
numerous others have also been identified by police and NGOs 
(including:  Mara Five, Mara 32, the Wafers, the Cholos, the 
Batos Locos, the Duendes).  Gangs are most active in 
Guatemala City and the surrounding suburbs (Mixco, Villa 
Nueva, San Juan Sacatepequez).  Police additionally estimate 
that 7-10% of all gang members in Guatemala live in the 
departments of Huehuetenango, Quetzaltenanago, and 
Retalhuleu, along with smaller numbers in Totonicipan and 
Chimaltenango.  NGOs report some activity in southwestern 
departments and other cities.  Several of the eastern 
departments -- where there are high levels of 
narcotrafficking activity -- have few reports of gang 
activity. 
 
Organization 
---------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Gangs in Guatemala are believed to be loosely 
organized, and it is unclear how much internal discipline is 
excercised.  Small groups of "cliques" report to a leader. 
Profits from gang activities are turned over to that leader, 
who in turn provides material support and housing for all the 
members under his control.  In a NAS project in the Guatemala 
suburb of Villa Nueva, police and NAS consultants believe 
that a central figure oversees all the cliques in the area. 
Unfortunately, we do not have any reliable information about 
the strength of links between gangs in different regions of 
Guatemala or the existence of a hierarchy of leadership 
linked to the US, Mexico, or other Central American 
countries. 
 
Why Youth Turn to Gangs 
----------------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Similar to the dynamics in most of Central America 
and the US, gangs in Guatemala are divided along clear 
territorial lines.  Youth generally join the gang that 
controls their neighborhood.  In 2003, the PNC reported the 
following territorial divisions within Guatemala City: 
 
 
Zone          Gang              Members 
----          ----              ------- 
Zone 18       Mara 18           3540 
Zone 5        Mara Five         2856 
Zone 19       Mara Salvatrucha  1530 
Zone 6        Mara 33           975 
Villa Nueva   Mara Salvatrucha  1985 
Mixco         Burguese          875 
Sacatepequez  Colos             990 
 
 
In all of these areas, graffiti marks out gang territories. 
 
 
¶9.  (SBU) The after-effects of the civil conflict and other 
social factors in Guatemala have influenced the increasing 
number and power of youth gangs.  Poor access to education, 
endemic poverty, and lack of job opportunities make crime an 
attractive economic option.  As has been amply reported, 
experienced gang members deported from the US in the 1990s 
quickly reformed their criminal organizations in Guatemala. 
New deportees add to the growth of gangs. 
 
¶10.  (U) Approximately a quarter-million guns left in private 
hands after the civil conflict provide a cheap and easily 
obtained supply of weapons.  Adult Guatemalans who immigrated 
illegally to the US over the past twenty years left behind 
thousands of children with broken families.  Domestic 
violence and child abuse push alienated youth with no social 
support into gangs.  (Note:  According to a micro-study by 
APREDE, 98% of gang members have suffered domestic abuse and 
30% were victims of sexual abuse.) 
 
¶11.  (U) NGO representatives tell us that, for Guatemalan 
youth facing these social obstacles, gangs are frequently the 
only option.  They offer children (the illusion of) security, 
a social identity, a sense of belonging and power, and the 
ability to earn easy money.  According to APREDE, Guatemalan 
gangs recruit children as young as 6, but most frequently 
youth (primarily males) from 13-15.  By the age of 21, many 
gang members have been killed in territorial wars or in other 
violence.  Therefore, gangs need to replenish membership 
constantly, which they are doing easily.  In October 2004, 
Casa Alianza (Covenant House), an NGO that works with abused 
children, reported to PolOff that the number of children 
living on the streets of Guatemala City had decreased 
significantly due to increased gang recruitment. 
 
¶12.  (U) Impunity in a weak justice system offers a free 
field and almost certain escape from punishment for any 
criminal enterprise.  Guatemala currently has a 36 per 
100,000 homicide rate, but less than 3% of violent criminal 
offenses result in investigation, trial, and conviction. 
With little expectation of punishment, gangs are uninhibited 
by government measures.  Newspaper "Siglo XXI" recently 
reported the case of a 26 year-old gang member who has been 
arrested 27 times since 1995 for robbery, drug possession and 
illegally carrying a weapon -- but, for "lack of evidence," 
has never been brought to trial. 
 
Deadly Initiations and Impossibility of Resignation 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶13.  (SBU) In order to become a full member of a gang, youth 
generally must complete an assigned task, which include 
bloody murders, rapes, or other violent crimes.  Many tattoos 
symbolically represent incidents of delinquency (i.e. a tear 
drop represents a murder).  According to APREDE, CEIBA (two 
organizations that work directly with currently and former 
gang members), and NAS consultants, once initiated, members 
are reportedly allowed to drop out of gang activities for 
only one of two reasons:  family or religion.  If a member's 
wife or girlfriend has a child or if they become active 
members of an Evangelical church (notably, participation in 
the Catholic faith is not considered sufficient cause for 
leaving the gang), they are permitted to step down.  However, 
these individuals reportedly retain their association and 
loyalty to the gang.  Apart from these justifications, gang 
members are never allowed to quit.  Those who try are quite 
often tortured and killed.  Ex-members who try to hide 
elsewhere in Guatemala or Central America are frequently 
located and murdered. 
 
The New Mafias:  Extortion Tactics 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶14.  (SBU) President Oscar Berger and Minister of Government 
Vielmann recently claimed that up to 80 percent of violent 
crime committed during 2004 in Guatemala was attributable to 
gangs.  Although it is unlikely that the GOG has collected 
enough reliable intelligence to legitimately back up that 
claim, the PNC and APREDE have found that 18-22 year-old 
males are the most common criminal aggressors.  Though 
tattoos can assist in identifying gang members, we have 
received anecdotal reports that Guatemalan gangs are now 
purposely leaving some recruits unmarked in order to 
infiltrate other levels of society. 
 
¶15.  (SBU) Gangs have organized widespread and thorough 
extortion schemes, demanding money, or "war taxes," on a 
daily basis from market vendors, taxi drivers, small family 
stores, large corporations, and even neighborhood residents. 
By focusing on petty crimes on a broad scale and using minors 
to commit many of the misdemeanor acts, the gangs minimize 
arrests and prosecutions (which are already almost 
nonexistent) and maximize profits in extortion. 
 
¶16.  (SBU) In Villa Nueva, an outlying suburb of Guatemala 
City, NAS estimates that gangs earn up to almost $1.7 million 
(13.5 million quetzals) annually through extortion.  The gang 
has at least 1500 extortion posts in one market, each of 
which earns $3-$12 (20-100 quetzals) daily.  The gangs 
operate extensive intelligence systems and monitor major 
purchases and sales in their territory.  As soon as residents 
have cash on hand, gangs move in and steal it. If the police 
interfere, the gang members return to collect twice as much 
from the person originally extorted and to beat and/or kill 
him. 
 
Gangs Mix with Drugs and Migration 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶17.  (SBU) Gang members are major consumers and retailers of 
drugs.  However, with the exception of occasionally acting as 
the "muscle" for existing narcotraffickers in local 
operations, we have not seen evidence that Guatemalan gangs 
have become involved in the international drug trade ) yet. 
(Comment:  Based on the organized, Mafia-like structures that 
Central American gangs are developing internationally, the 
next step for them could be to move into managing major 
trafficking operations of drugs and arms.  End comment.) 
 
¶18. (SBU) There have been press reports that Guatemalan gangs 
regularly benefit from illegal migration by preying on 
migrants on the border with Mexico.  In addition, APREDE 
claims that 95% of gang members deported from the US return 
within 10 days of their arrival in Guatemala, usually acting 
as a "coyote" for 2-3 other members to finance their trip. 
We have also heard that gang organizations have taken control 
of illegal immigration routes for regular immigrants, but 
have no evidence to verify this information. 
 
No Known Gang Links to Al Qa'ida 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶19.  (SBU) Though we are aware of reports from Honduras about 
possible links between Al Qa'ida and Central American gangs, 
we see no evidence of this. 
 
Obstacles for Police and Prosecutors 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶20.  (SBU) The PNC have few resources to employ against 
organized crime structures like the gangs.  The police force 
is understaffed, underpaid, and poorly trained and motivated. 
 In 2004, there were 21,382 PNC officers, but a UNDP 
contractor told PolOff in November 2004 that only 5,000 
officers were on active duty nationwide at any given time. 
On average, officers earn 2,500 quetzals a month ($312). 
Prensa Libre, the largest daily in Guatemala, recently 
reported that narcotraffickers will pay PNC officers up to 
15,000 quetzals ($1,875) a month in bribes.  Gangs also can 
and certainly do use either bribery or intimidation against 
the police, especially interactions with officers and chiefs 
on a local level.  In addition, some areas of Guatemala City 
are so violent that the police won't even enter. 
 
¶21.  (SBU) Joint police-military patrols of "red zones" in 
Guatemala (a former practice brought back by the Berger 
administration in early 2004 in response to increasing public 
outcry over violence in the capital) may deter open violence 
while they are present.  However, though it is a strong 
collaborator with the U.S. on drug trafficking and alien 
smuggling, the GOG struggles with effective investigation and 
prosecution of crime. 
 
¶22.  (SBU) The Guatemalan Constitution requires that a 
court-issued arrest warrant be presented to a suspect prior 
to arrest unless he is caught in the act of committing a 
crime.  Police may not detain a suspect for more than six 
hours without bringing the case before a judge.  Once a 
suspect has been arraigned, the prosecutor generally has 3 to 
6 months to complete his investigation and file the case in 
court or seek a formal extension of the detention period. 
 
¶23.  (SBU) Many arrests of youth made by the police are based 
on suspicion or visible evidence of participation in gangs 
(i.e. tattoos).  The charges are often minor and arbitrary, 
such as misdemeanor drug consumption, public scandal, public 
drunkenness, or misdemeanor assault.  In practice, arresting 
officers frequently fail to satisfy legal requisites for 
prosecution, particularly in arrests of gang members, so 
charges rarely stick. 
 
¶24.  (SBU) Also, judges are generally more lenient with 
youth, including gang members, than adults.  The NGO 
Institute of Comparative Legal Studies reports that the 
majority of youth arrested on drug charges is released in 
8-10 days.  Forty percent remain in detention for the full 
phase of investigation (three months).  At this stage, 
neither the police nor the prosecutors of the Public Ministry 
(MP) are building effective legal cases against the organized 
activities of gang members.  Therefore, gang members are 
frequently shuffled through the legal system, but are rarely 
imprisoned for substantial amounts of time. 
 
Prisons Facilitate Gang Recruitment 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶25.  (SBU) Guatemalan prisons are, to a significant degree, 
run by the prisoners.  Sixty percent of those incarcerated 
are in pretrial detention and remain in prison up to six 
months.  According to the national penitentiary system, there 
were 8,698 detainees being held in 40 prisons and jails 
throughout the country in 2004, though the official capacity 
of the system was only 6,974.  The average guard-to-prisoner 
ration is 1 to 18. 
 
¶26.  (SBU) Both the Institute for Comparative Legal Studies 
and the leadership of the penitentiary system itself reported 
to PolOff that discipline in Guatemalan prisons is handled 
primarily by detainee "Committees of Order and Discipline." 
There are widespread reports of corruption among prison 
guards and the so-called "Committees."  According to the 
Institute, detainees who cannot pay "initiation fees" or 
other bribes are subject to abuse and beatings by fellow 
prisoners. 
 
¶27.  (SBU) Deplorable conditions in the prisons make them a 
powerful breeding ground for gang recruitment of minors and 
young adults.  Youth who are not yet gang members and are 
imprisoned for brief stints, sometimes based on arbitrary 
arrests, are sent into dangerous situations, where gang 
membership can offer life-saving protection.  Instead of 
eliminating gang activity, the constant flow in and out of 
the prison system (due to the inability of the system to 
sentence suspects), in effect, exacerbates the problem of 
gangs and increases membership.  Therefore, the imprisonment 
of gang members as an isolated measure is unlikely to succeed 
in reducing gang activity. 
 
Gang Members: Victims of Violence? 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶28.  (SBU) In addition to being the most common criminal 
aggressors, males aged 16-25 are the most frequent victims of 
homicides.  In 2004, 41% of all murder victims (1830 of 4507) 
fell within this age range.  Therefore, the increasing rates 
of violent crime in Guatemala suggest that gangs may be 
growing larger and more violent ) against each other as well 
as against the public.  In addition, prosecutors from the 
Public Ministry and some NGOs have theorized that some of the 
increase in murders of women can be attributed to growing 
female participation in gangs and other criminal enterprise. 
 
¶29.  (SBU) Some Guatemalan NGOs, such as APREDE, the 
Institute of Comparative Studies and CEIBA, allege that the 
PNC exaggerate the power gangs actually have, and that 
organized crime is, in fact, orchestrating much of their 
activity to distract security forces.  They also claim that 
the police frequently arrest and abuse youth without the 
benefit of evidence.  The PNC's Office of Human Rights 
reported to PolOff that the most common complaints against 
police officers are illegal arrests and planting fake 
evidence.  In January 2004, MINUGUA reported one case in 
which a former gang member and another man were found shot to 
death after reportedly receiving threats from the police. 
The following day, a witness to the murder was also found 
killed.  Some human rights activists, including influential 
Congresswoman Nineth Montenegro (ANN), have wondered aloud to 
PolOff whether elite businessmen hire police or others to 
undertake "social cleansing" against suspected gang members. 
MINUGUA also speculated in their final report (August 2004) 
that the PNC committed incidents of "social cleansing," but 
did not provide details to defend the allegation. 
 
USG Efforts Focused on Gangs 
---------------------------- 
 
¶30.  (SBU) We have long recognized this growing problem and 
are searching for the most effective methods to combat gangs. 
 In the last two years, NAS and AID have begun a pilot 
project, the coordination of programs in Villa Nueva 
(mentioned in paras 4, 5, and 16) that target the 
investigation, and prosecution of crime.  Since gangs are a 
serious problem in Villa Nueva, this issue receives much 
attention and special focus.  Though it is too soon to be 
certain about the impact of our efforts, if they prove 
successful, the Guatemalans and we will certainly want to 
expand these programs. 
 
¶31.  (U) AID has a justice center in Villa Nueva (one of 
fifteen that they support around the country) that brings 
together prosecutors, police leadership, NGOs, the courts, 
and community members-at-large to improve coordination in the 
justice sector and synergize everyone's efforts to combat 
violence with a particular focus on gangs.  These programs 
aim to combine improved police training and tactics with 
better coordination between the justice sector and the 
community to control violent crime, with special attention to 
gangs. 
 
¶32.  (U) APREDE began as a coalition of NGOs that focuses on 
crime prevention and rehabilitation of gang members (it has 
since become independent).  USAID has supported the 
organization for two years.  APREDE is one of the only 
organizations that works directly with Guatemalan gang 
members and is, as such, a valuable source of information. 
Their projects work with over 750 ex-gang members or youth 
identified as at-risk in Antigua, Guatemala City, Villa 
Nueva, San Marcos, Huehuetenango, and at a former 
presidential retreat, now a youth training center, in the 
department of Escuintla.  The projects focuses on providing 
options to participation in gangs: job training, arts and 
recreational activities.  Through the President's Commission 
on Human Rights, the Government has given the Coalition some 
material support, and one of President Berger's first 
official acts was the inauguration of APREDE's "Casa Joven" 
(Youth House) in Guatemala City. 
 
¶33.  (U) NAS has created a Model Precinct Project with the 
PNC force in Villa Nueva.  NAS staff and other consultants 
have provided intense training to improve the PNC's 
investigative capacity, particularly in the investigation of 
the gangs' structure and operations.  The police in Villa 
Nueva are learning how to build a complex, RICO-style case 
against an entire gang organization for extortion and violent 
crime. 
 
GOG Focuses on Gangs 
-------------------- 
 
¶34.  (SBU) The PNC recently told NAS that they have formed a 
Crime Prevention Unit (UPREDE), which will make contact with 
and transparently monitor the activities of up to 4,000 gang 
members with records of multiple arrests. 
 
¶35.  (SBU) Congress is currently considering several 
proposals to deal with gang-related crime.  One gives police 
a broad mandate to arrest suspected gang members and sets 
6-12 year jail penalties for any type of association with 
gangs.  Another authorizes preventative measures with 
high-risk populations and disarmament and rehabilitation 
measures for youth associated with gangs.  A third, 
introduced at the beginning of February, specifically 
criminalizes extortion of bus drivers, grants police the 
authority to use undercover agents to infiltrate gangs, and 
authorizes other anti-gang measures, including greater 
discretion for judges to expedite criminal proceedings 
against racketeers.  The bill also allows minors (12-18) to 
be tried as adults for violent crimes. 
 
Conclusions 
----------- 
 
¶36.  (SBU) Guatemala's efforts to confront gangs are limited 
by lack of information and capacity to pursue complex 
criminal investigations.  GOG efforts in Villa Nueva are a 
beginning, but the MOG and Public Ministry realize that these 
must be stepped up considerably.  There is a shortage of 
trained investigators, and the police lack the computers and 
relational databases necessary to analyze such information. 
There is also no capacity to share information regionally:  a 
necessity in a region where gang members cross borders with 
ease.  Police and prosecutors are open to developing the 
needed capabilities, but they will need our help to do so. 
Further information is vital in order for the GOG or USG to 
develop effective strategies to combat gang violence. 
 
¶37.  (SBU) The social problems that cause youth to join 
violent gangs are highly complex, so no isolated measures 
will significantly curb their activities.  However, programs 
aimed at improving police professionalism in building 
concrete cases against youth and appropriate treatment of 
gang members would help, as would continued reforms and 
training of the Public Ministry.  Prevention programs like 
APREDE and efforts to reform control of the prisons could 
also have a positive impact.  We could use additional ESF 
funding to develop and expand these types of programs and are 
again requesting additional funding in our MPP submission. 
 
¶38.  (SBU) Ultimately, though, gangs are likely to expand 
until Guatemala improves its justice system.  Guatemalan 
gangs demonstrate unrestrained violence, the potential to 
increase membership (typical throughout Central America), and 
the capability to expand into major drug, migrant, and 
weapons trafficking.  They threaten Guatemalan stability.  In 
addition, if local gangs are or become tightly organized with 
their American and Central American counterparts, their 
activities jeopardize our own security. 
 
¶39.  (SBU) At this time, none of the legal initiatives under 
consideration by the Guatemalan Congress is close to 
approval.  However, continued public outcries about crime 
could easily push them to the top of the agenda.  The 
potential for increased human rights abuses in Guatemala 
exists if the public, frustrated by the weak justice system 
and rising crime rates, chooses a candidate in the 2007 
elections who, under the pretext of fighting violence, would 
give the police a free rein to crack down. 
HAMILTON