This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 000221 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/RSP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - 
ROBERT PALLADINO 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL KPAO TW
SUBJECT: "LIBERTY TIMES" ARTICLE DETAILING SENSITIVE 
DEALINGS BETWEEN TAIWAN AND THE UNITED STATES 
 
Summary: The pro-independence Chinese-language "Liberty 
Times" Tuesday (1/18/05) carried an article written by 
journalist Tsou Jin-wen to refute information provided 
in an excerpt from the book entitled "Dialogues and 
Confrontations: Political Competition between Taiwan 
and China."  According to Tsou, President Chen Shui- 
bian was unhappy after reading Wang's account of a 
December 1, 2003 meeting and Tsou wrote the article by 
quoting President Chen's words to clarify the mistakes 
in Wang's book.  According to Tsou, Moriarty merely 
elaborated on U.S. policy and did not say anything 
beyond that.  Full text translation of the article 
follows. 
 
"High-Ranking Communications Between Taiwan and the 
United States Have Not Stagnated Due to Taiwan's 
Referendum.  Moriarty At That Time Was Polite and 
Candid When Meeting With Bian, [Moriarty] Did Not Say 
`Strong Words.' Bush Has [More Than Once] Sent Envoys 
to Taiwan Since Bian Won Re-election" 
 
[Journalist Tsou Jin-wen wrote in the pro-independence 
Liberty Times, 01/18] 
 
"December 1, 2003 President George W. Bush's special 
envoy, U.S. National Security Council Senior Director 
for Asian Affairs James F. Moriarty, came to Taipei and 
visited President Chen Shui-bian to express to Taiwan 
the sentiment that `it would be best if the referendum 
were not held.'  However, after President Chen and 
President Bush both won re-election, similar secret 
high-ranking communications never stopped, and `have 
occurred more than once,' which has led to the 
continuous construction of cooperative Taiwan-U.S. 
relationship for an additional four years. 
 
"A book scheduled to be released today [1/18/05] has 
touched on some details of Taiwan-U.S. high-ranking 
interactions [back then], and some contents of that 
book have recently been revealed by a newspaper, 
beneath the headline: `Moriarty Met With Bian and Said 
Strong Words; the [Atmosphere of] U.S.-Taiwan Mutual 
Trust Suddenly Changed.'  President Chen Shui-bian read 
it recently and was unhappy with the content, hence, he 
could not help but want to say something. 
 
"President Chen considers that `I was the one who 
personally conducted the dialogue, but the descriptions 
in the book are far from the fact.'  Core staff members 
[to the President] believe that the author is a 
journalist focused on cross-Strait relations and 
obviously does not [have the ability to] grasp the 
information regarding the Taiwan-U.S. envoy issue 
accurately.  Since the issue has become a historical 
event, it is necessary to recover some truth to stop 
the rumors from spreading. 
 
"What actually did Moriarty and Bian talk about?  A 
high-ranking Presidential Office official said 
President Chen met with Moriarty in the early evening 
that day at the Mt. Jade Residence and the talk lasted 
a little more than an hour.  Moriarty was accompanied 
by AIT Director Douglas Paal, [and held in] the 
presence of the then Presidential Office Secretary- 
General Chiu Yi-jen and two other core staffers to the 
President.  The new book said `National Security 
Council Consulting Member Ke Cheng-heng personally 
welcomed the visitors in front of the Presidential 
Residence,' but Ke was not only not at the scene, but 
also completely unaware of its occurrence. 
 
"A Presidential Office official pointed out that 
Moriarty handed over President Bush's personal letter 
when he arrived.  It was after President Chen finished 
reading the letter that Chen and Moriarty started the 
dialogue.  Moriarty explicitly stated information, but 
with a polite attitude.  Moriarty stressed that the 
Bush administration supported Taiwan, but Bush was 
extremely concerned about the possible negative impact 
that Taiwan's referendum might cause on cross-Strait 
relations.  It was extremely probable that China would 
react radically. 
 
"The President and Moriarty also discussed the question 
whether [the referendum] was involved in a change of 
the status quo.  Moriarty believed that both sides of 
the Strait should avoid moves that might possibly cause 
any changes to the status quo in order to maintain 
regional stability. 
 
"Moriarty candidly said that the referendum made the 
United States uncomfortable, and also made the position 
of the United States difficult on cross-Strait 
relations, `It would be best if the referendum were not 
held.' 
 
"After saying these words, Moriarty was afraid that 
Taiwan would misunderstand the United States as putting 
pressure solely on Taiwan and he, thus, explained that 
the United States not only was concerned about Taiwan 
but also putting pressure on China often to ask China 
not to make any moves.  The purpose was to maintain the 
peace across the Taiwan Strait, and the United States 
was unwilling to see any [cross-Strait] arms races. 
Hence, the United States hoped that Taiwan would not 
have the impression that the United States [wanted to 
only] persuaded Taiwan [of these things]. 
 
"According to a related message, President Chen 
stressed to Moriarty that the purpose of pushing for a 
referendum was to contribute to the strengthening and 
deepening of democracy; the construction of a new 
constitution was to increase government efficiency and 
to enhance [Taiwan's] competitive ability.  Both [the 
referendum and the new constitution] had nothing to do 
with unification/independence, and did not disobey the 
`Five Nos.' 
 
"President Chen spent a lot of time explaining that the 
constitution, constructed in Nanjing, China, was not 
suitable for the current situation in Taiwan.  He also 
told Moriarty that `we understand the concern of the 
United States and the sensitivity of this issue to 
China. Hence, when designing the questions for the 
defensive referendum, we have proposed them in a very 
gentle way.'  It was a domestic question whether we 
agreed to improve cross-Strait relations or to accept 
U.S. arms procurements. 
 
"The President also expressed that `my point of view 
does not differ from that of the United States.'  We 
all hope that the status quo of Taiwan would not be 
changed by The People's Republic of China.  In fact, we 
could also hold referendums on issues such as whether 
[the Taiwan] people support unification, or one country 
but two systems.  We, however, did not do so, which 
showed that we had cautiously dealt with this matter 
from the beginning. 
 
"The President also stressed to Moriarty that `I am one 
who keeps his promises. I will not drag the United 
States down, but I hope that the United States 
understands that the defensive referendum has actually 
nothing to do with unification or independence.' 
 
"The President pointed out to Moriarty at the end of 
the dialogue that [Taiwan] was willing to listen 
further to the opinions of the United States, [and 
said] `if you think the questions for the peace 
referendum are not good enough, you may propose 
suggestions.' 
 
"A Presidential Office official said that President 
Bush's personal letter to President Chen used leader-to- 
leader words.  Moriarty elaborated on the policy of the 
U.S. government, and, hence, there was no problem that 
`Moriarty passed along messages for Bush beyond what he 
was authorized to say.'  Moreover, Moriarty was polite 
and candid and he did not `say strong words.'  He told 
President Chen that Bush was an old friend of Taiwan 
and Bush's support to Taiwan was unquestionable. 
 
"As to the latter visit paid by Wen Jiabao to the 
United States and [the fact that] Bush used strong 
words when talking about Taiwan's referendum during the 
meeting with Wen -- the Presidential Office believes 
that Wen Jiabao stepped through the front gate of the 
United States at that time, which meant that China put 
the maximum amount of pressure on the United States, 
and China had to achieve something regarding the Taiwan 
problem.  Looking back on history, China put pressure 
on the United States, and Taiwan indirectly felt the 
pressure through the United States.  Unless Taiwan 
surrendered its arms at the scene, [China's demands] 
could not be appeased.  The question, however, is would 
it suit Taiwan's interests if President Chen did [or 
does] accordingly? 
 
"According to our understanding, President Bush has 
continuously sent officials back and forth to Taiwan 
`more than once' after sending Moriarty and after 
President Chen won reelection March 20, 2004. The 
communication, on an official or ad hoc basis, between 
high-ranking officials in the two countries has not 
stagnated due to Taiwan's first referendum. 
 
"When President Chen and President Bush both won 
reelection, new envoys sent by President Bush came to 
Taiwan several times. When the envoys talked to 
President Chen, they mentioned nothing about the 
disturbances of the past.  Both countries are concerned 
about the future and the question of how both countries 
will strengthen communications and interactions to 
tighten their collaborations. 
 
"A Presidential Office official, hence, said that even 
the 'fraternal countries' like the United Kingdom and 
the United States have different opinions; it is 
impossible to say that there are no problems between 
Taiwan and the United States.  It is, however, totally 
wrong if one evaluates the development of present 
Taiwan-U.S. relations by using the relationship between 
the two countries before the presidential election [in 
Taiwan].  Taiwan and the United States have currently 
started another stage of harmonization." 
 
PAAL