This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 000192 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/RSP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - 
ROBERT PALLADINO 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: CROSS-STRAIT CHARTER FLIGHTS, 
U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS 
 
¶1. Cross-Strait Charter Flights 
 
A) "[We] Sincerely Hope that Cross-Strait Two-way 
Charter Flights for the Chinese New Year Will Fly 
through Clouds and Open a New Page for Win-win 
Situations for Both Sides [of the Taiwan Strait]" 
 
The conservative, pro-unification "United Daily News" 
editorialized (1/16): 
 
". The cross-Strait charter flight plan for the Chinese 
New Year, which concerns the transportation rights of 
more than 300,000 Taiwan businessmen who want to return 
from China to Taiwan, is just a small step in the 
interactions between two sides of the Taiwan Strait. 
Everyone is watching closely the long-term effects of 
this chess move, hoping that it will not disappear 
quickly like a beautiful fireworks show.  Starting from 
the charter flights for the Chinese New Year, the cross- 
Strait policies that the government needs to deal with 
are trade issues such as the three links, financial 
controls, and the protection of investments across the 
Taiwan Strait.  With these issues as a foundation, the 
other political `keynote' issues that need to be dealt 
with include Taiwan's constitutional design, national 
identity, and Taiwan's role and status in the region. 
The charter flight plans for the Chinese New Year may 
seem like a small matter, but if rumors that `the 
United States and Japan also had a hand in pushing for 
the charter flight plans behind the scene' did appear, 
it also showed that regional security is an issue of 
common concern for the international community.  If 
President Chen Shui-bian could realize that he should 
act proactively in seeking to play a role in the 
peaceful development of cross-Strait ties rather than 
waiting until being forced by international pressure, 
he could then be regarded as a wise leader. ." 
 
B) "A-Bian and Hu [Jintao] Each Make Concessions, 
Starting a New Opportunity for Cross-Strait Situations" 
 
Journalist Wang Ming-yi noted in the centrist, pro- 
status quo "China Times" (1/16): 
 
". The two-way charter flights across the Taiwan Strait 
have indeed created an improved atmosphere in the 
Taiwan Strait and an opportunity for both sides of the 
Taiwan Strait to resume talks.  But while both sides 
are acting under the concept of `strategic clarity,' 
the populist atmosphere triggered by [Taiwan's] 
`referendum law' and [Beijing's] `anti-secession law' 
is still the shadow that keeps haunting the Taiwan 
Strait.  The flexible communication model demonstrated 
by the talks between Taipei and Beijing over the 
charter flights will be a whole new political effort 
for Hu Jinato and Chen Shui-bian, who are eager to 
create a new situation across the Taiwan Strait." 
 
C) "Is a Model for Air Links at Hand?" 
 
The pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" 
commented in an editorial (1/16): 
 
". Actually, the two sides gradually and tactfully 
reached consensus about the substantive model of the 
air links before yesterday's talks.  The significance 
of the talks in Macau were [sic] not only to make the 
deal official, but also in the model of negotiation 
established.  Many believe that this latest model of 
negotiations may very well be the model used for talks 
on more permanent cross-strait direct links. 
 
"Indeed, this model is the bottom line beyond which the 
Taiwan government must not go.  Any further concessions 
risk reducing cross-strait talks to negotiations over 
`domestic affairs.'  While the government officials 
involved in negotiations went in `unofficial' 
capacities, they were government officials nonetheless. 
These aviation talks, practically speaking, cannot 
proceed without officials' involvement to begin with, 
since none of the issues being discussed can possibly 
be decided by members of the private sector.  This 
demonstrates that cross-strait links are in reality 
international links and not domestic links.  As for the 
flight routes agreed on yesterday, they are in fact 
international air routes from Chinese cities to Hong 
Kong and then from Hong Kong to Taiwan.  In this 
regard, the Taiwan government has not compromised the 
public interest. . 
 
"While both the Chinese and Taiwan government claim 
that the charter flights are isolated cases tailored to 
serve Taiwanese businessmen, the question on everyone's 
mind is nevertheless this: Will cross-strait direct 
links be made official soon?  However, the question 
that the Taiwan Government should really ask itself is 
this: Is it ready to face up and deal with the 
potential problems of such official direct links?" 
D) "Air Pact Marks Step to Official Talks" 
 
The pro-independence, English-language "Taiwan News" 
said in an editorial (1/18): 
 
". If the charter flights proceed smoothly, they may 
provide a favorable basis for future interaction, but 
it would be nave to expect that solutions to political 
differences between Taiwan and the PRC can be realized 
so long as inherent political obstacles continue to 
exist, such as Beijing's insistence on acceptance of 
its `one China principle' as a precondition for talks. 
 
"Nevertheless, the talks show that Beijing can no 
longer avoid the involvement of the two governments in 
consultations and that a significant step toward the 
resumption of officially authorized consultations 
between Taipei and Beijing has been taken." 
 
¶2. U.S.-China-Taiwan Relations 
 
A) "Getting to Know China Again on a Global Scale" 
 
Professor Chu Yun-han of National Taiwan University's 
Department of Political Science said in the centrist, 
pro-status quo "China Times" (1/17): 
 
". Even though Washington tried to persuade [them 
otherwise] by all means [possible], the major members 
in the European Union reached a consensus that they 
will withdraw the arms ban on China this year.  The 
policy shift will put another scar on the relationship 
between the United States and her European traditional 
allies after the chasm caused by the war in Iraq, and 
the strategic meaning goes even beyond the former one. 
This means that there will be structural slack in the 
unipolar security dominated by the United States in the 
`post-Cold War era.'  . [W]hat matters is apparently 
the different judgment, incrementally formed, [that the 
E.U. takes] on the critical question whether the rise 
of China constitutes strategic chance or threat. 
 
"More surprisingly, China started to shake the U.S. 
exclusive position in the sphere of ideology.  The 
`Foreign Policy Center' established under the 
leadership of British Prime Minister Tony Blaire, 
published a book entitled `Beijing Consensus' written 
by Goldman Sachs senior consultant Joshua Ramo in 2004. 
The book has [had many repercussions].  The contrast of 
the `Beijing Consensus' is the `Washington Consensus,' 
which is an important symbol of the `post-Cold War era' 
and the core content is the neo-liberalism centered by 
capitals and markets.  For more than the past decade, 
the United States has promoted this policy prescription 
all around the world wholeheartedly, and several 
developing countries proactively (or were forced to) 
conducted reform under the neo-liberalism.  The 
globalization led by the United States is almost 
equivalent to the spread of the `Washington Consensus.' 
In recent years, several countries started to re-think 
about the `Washington Consensus,' and they received 
different implications from the experience of the 
development of China.  For several policy elites in the 
Third World, the `China model' indicates that it is 
possible to remain autonomous development during the 
process of getting involved in globalization.  China 
adopts the pragmatic philosophy of `touching stones in 
order to pass a river' in its development policy, and 
is willing to try every innovative system.  China, 
however, does not blindly believe in economics 
textbooks or wholly adopts the western model, but 
starts from the practical situation of itself.  The 
essence of the `Beijing consensus' is the co-existence 
of multiple models, and the re-evaluation of the 
experiences of the development of China means that the 
thinking of one `paradigm' has started to fade away. 
 
"Currently, the cross-Strait relationship is at the 
turning point in history, and [Taiwan's] policy toward 
China is on the eve of change.  During the process of 
figuring out a new thinking in the policy, Taiwan's 
political figures and press should not understand the 
change by a `Taiwan-centered' perspective, otherwise 
Taiwan will get deeper and deeper in deadlock.  It is 
necessary to start learning how to measure China again 
by a global scale, think again about the challenges, 
opportunities, and alternatives that Taiwan will face." 
 
B) "Why Can't [Taiwan] Change Its National Name?" 
 
The pro-independence "Liberty Times" editorialized 
(1/15): 
 
"Former Mainland Affairs Council Chairwoman Tsai Ing- 
wen days ago pointed out at a think tank in the United 
States that the status quo of Taiwan is that it is 
independent, and there is no need to declare 
independence again.  Moreover, even if Taiwan changes 
its name in the process of amending the constitution, 
it has nothing to do with a change in the status quo. . 
 
"The Taiwan people amended the R.O.C. constitution in 
1991 and explicitly distinguished the cross-Strait 
relationship as being of one country on each side of 
the Taiwan Strait.  Ever since, democratic reform, 
including the overall elections in the congress and 
direct presidential elections regulated that Taiwan's 
authority will be elected by Taiwan people through 
democratic procedures, and will have nothing to do with 
the 1.3 billion people on the other side of the Taiwan 
Strait.  Some call the process 'peaceful revolution,' 
and some call it 'peaceful nation-building.'  No matter 
what [it is called], the process explains that although 
we keep on using the Republic of China as the name of 
the country, the R.O.C. after 1991 is quite different 
from the R.O.C. of the past, especially the R.O.C. 
after 1945.  Under these circumstances, there are even 
fewer connections between Taiwan and China. 
 
"The population of People's Republic of China consists 
of 1.3 billion people on that side of the Taiwan 
Strait, while there are 23 million people in Taiwan on 
this side; China is a sovereign independent country, 
and so is Taiwan.  This is the status quo in the Taiwan 
Strait.  Under the domestic principle of 'sovereignty 
should be owned by the people' and the international 
principle of 'self-determination,' 2.3 million Taiwan 
people are the masters of Taiwan and are, thus, sources 
of the legitimacy of the R.O.C.  Taiwan's political 
changes and international participation should respect 
the choices made by the 2.3 million people.  Therefore, 
referendums, revises on the constitution, the plan to 
change the country's name, flag, and anthem are the 
presentation of Taiwan's internal democracy, which does 
not involve in any change in the status quo across the 
Taiwan Strait. As long as Taiwan continues on 
fulfilling her international obligations, the 
international community has no reason refusing to 
recognize Taiwan. ." 
 
PAAL