This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

091200Z Jan 05

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DJIBOUTI 000034 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PARIS/LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHER 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON EAID PHUM SCUL DJ
SUBJECT: DECENTRALIZATION 
 
 
  REF: DJIBOUTI 31 
 
  ¶1. (U) Summary: Decentralization has been a topic of debate in 
  Djibouti since the country's civil war in the early 1990's. At 
  that time, the disparity between regions and the capital led 
  the opposition Front for Restoration of Unity and Democracy 
  (FRUD) to take up arms against the government. The peace accord 
  between the two parties in February 2000 created a legal basis 
  for granting districts greater autonomy. Since the creation of 
  the decentralization law in 2002, the population of Djibouti 
  has eagerly awaited elections for Regional Councils. In January 
  2004, President Ismail Omar Guelleh announced that elections 
  for regional governing councils would be held before year's 
  end. However 2004 has come and gone without any indication of a 
  specific date for the elections. Post recently looked at 
  decentralization, using discussions with parliamentarians, 
  political opposition members and NGOs as an opportunity to 
  examine political leanings, economic issues and potential 
  outcomes of regional elections in each of Djibouti's four 
  districts. End summary. 
 
 
  ¶2. (U) Decentralization has been a topic of debate on the local 
  political scene for more than a decade. It first appeared in 
  the early 1990s, as one of the main issues of the Djiboutian 
  civil war. A platform item of the Afar opposition party Front 
  for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy(FRUD) was greater 
  autonomy for the districts of Djibouti in order to alleviate 
  some of the economic and social discrepancies between the 
  districts and the capital. The issue is especially important to 
  FRUD and the northern districts, as nearly two-thirds of the 
  north is inhabited by Afars and greater autonomy of their 
  regions is seen as giving political weight in the face of 
  Djibouti's "Issa supremacy." The ruling party's "disinterest" 
  in decentralization, among other complaints, eventually led to 
  FRUD's rebellion in 1992. The second, and final, peace accords 
  signed between the armed wing of FRUD and the Government in 
  February 2000 provided for the creation of a law to grant more 
  autonomy to the districts via regional councils. The National 
  Assembly wrote and passed a law forming regional councils on a 
  provisional basis for a period of two years, at which time 
  popular elections would be held to choose permanent councils 
  member. President Ismail Omar Guelleh signed this law, making 
  it official, in 2002. (Note: The Government of Djibouti sought, 
  in the Spring of 2004, U.S. and other donor financial 
  assistance to help bring about these elections. The Department 
  did not respond, but there have also been no follow up 
  inquiries from the Djiboutian government. End Note). 
 
  ¶3. (U) Each of the four districts of Djibouti currently has a 
  provisional regional council made up of 14 government-appointed 
  members. The two-year transitional period of limited power was 
  intended to give the districts the time to learn how to govern 
  themselves. This, in theory, would make a smoother transition 
  to full governing responsibility. Each region manages a budget 
  of 50 million Djiboutian francs (280 000 USD). Each budget is a 
  grant from public funds, as none of the districts has 
  mechanisms in place to generate their own income. The general 
  sentiment is that the performance of the provisional councils 
  over the past two years has been less effective than hoped. The 
  population's expectations for alleviation of poverty and an 
  improved quality of life have remained unmet (reftel). 
 
  ¶4. (U) The most significant power holder in each regional 
  council is the District Commissar (DC). The DC heads the 
  provisional regional council, controls law enforcement agents, 
  and has command of military forces assigned to the district. He 
  also signs birth certificates and conducts primary immigration 
  investigations. The DC is not autonomous. Rather, he is a 
  servant of the ruling party and his investigations are often 
  directed by the central administration. The role of the DC 
  becomes more significant as elections approach. He gives first 
  authorizations to identity cards and can approve ad hoc voting 
  cards. Once implemented, the new decentralization law will 
  restrain functions of the DC, and he will serve merely as 
  representative of the State. The administrative and financial 
  control of the regions will be turned over to the elected 
  regional councils. 
 
  ¶5. (U) Although regional elections were promised for 2004, 
  officials are reluctant to discuss why they have yet to 
  materialize. A major concern may be the financial implications 
  of decentralization. Both government officials and experts from 
  international organizations agree that no viable autonomy can 
  be expected from regions unless a degree of financial autonomy 
  accompanies it. That would mean local authority to collect 
  direct, indirect and property taxes for the region, rather than 
  for the central government. It is not clear yet whether the 
  rate of each tax would be determined locally or by the central 
  administration. International donors such as European Union 
  said they will back the decentralization process, but no solid 
  commitments of financial support have been made. 
 
  ¶6. (U) The decentralization division of the Ministry of 
  Interior has done studies to determine how best to implement 
  regional governance. The result, according to the Ministry, is 
  that it is necessary to improve education levels among the 
  populace before district residents will be capable of governing 
  themselves. Much of the district population remains illiterate. 
  Local governance managers should be able to meet minimum 
  standards of knowledge and awareness, the Ministry says, and 
  for the time being, these expectations are far from being 
  realized. 
 
  ¶7. (U) Government senior officials with whom post met seem to 
  understand that participation of local governments will enhance 
  democracy; however, these officials cannot give a deadline or 
  timeframe for making decentralization a reality. In Djibouti, 
  the President currently sets policy and he remains sole 
  individual capable of moving decentralization forward. Such a 
  move could entail relinquishing some of his control over the 
  country's day-to-day operations. 
 
  ¶8. (SBU) The Djiboutian government is blaming international 
  donors, especially the European Union, for delaying 
  decentralization while the opposition community accuses the 
  government of stymieing establishment of regional governments 
  to serve its own power needs. President Guelleh understands 
  that he may be unable to stem the move toward decentralization, 
  but he may want to delay the process until after the coming 
  presidential elections. Regional elections have the potential 
  to increase significantly the influence of opposition parties, 
  and a regional council that does not fully support Guelleh 
  could have tremendous effect on the outcome of presidential 
  voting in some districts. 
 
  ¶9. (SBU) Although decentralization is a solid step toward 
  democratization and may be good for districts in the long run, 
  it is doomed to failure without additional planning. There are 
  currently no mechanisms in place to train newly elected leaders 
  and the central government has failed to budget financial 
  resources in 2005 to support regional councils.