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Viewing cable 05ANKARA464, IRAQ: FONMIN GUL'S LETTER TO UNSYG ANNAN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05ANKARA464 2005-01-27 16:49 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Ankara
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000464 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV AORC TU IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQ: FONMIN GUL'S LETTER TO UNSYG ANNAN 
 
1. (SBU) On Jan. 27, the Turkish MFA forwarded us the text of 
a Jan. 19 letter from FonMin Gul to UNSYG Annan regarding the 
elections in Iraq and specific Turkish concerns regarding 
Kirkuk.  (Text at para. 2.)  Gul's concerns mirror closely 
those that Turkish policymakers have expressed privately to 
us and publicly as well: Fear of a low Sunni turnout and the 
potential they may be shut out of the constitutional drafting 
process, claims that large Kurdish inflows to Kirkuk will 
alter the situation on the ground there and hinder the ITG's 
ability to carry out an equitable final determination of 
Kirkuk's status under Article 58 of the TAL, and concern that 
the election will also serve as an opportunity for a 
referendum on independence in KRG areas. 
 
2. (SBU) BEGIN TEXT OF LETTER: 
 
19 January 2005 
 
As I have done in the past, I would like to share some of my 
Government's thoughts and concerns on Iraq with you. 
 
We are again approaching a critical turning point in the 
trying process of Iraqi political transition. The first free 
elections in many decades are only days away. The United 
Nations mission, with its limited staff and scope, has been 
doing exemplary work. I have always stated that a clear 
United Nations seal on the elections would make its results 
more legitimate in the eyes of the Iraqis and beyond. The 
Iraqi authorities are similarly deploying great effort in the 
preparation of these elections. 
 
But we are equally aware of the circumstances in which this 
popular experiment is to take place. Security, especially in 
central Iraq, is ever more elusive, and one large segment of 
Iraqi society is either unwilling or feels unable to take 
part in the elections. Turkey's own efforts to persuade this 
group to make a strong showing in this electoral process has 
also had a limited effect. 
 
Thus, the results of the 30 January elections may well be 
below our expectations. When endorsing the current political 
timetable contained in Security Council resolution 1546 
(2004), the objective of the international community had 
been, and still is, to transfer sovereign authority to a 
transitory government conferred by popular mandate. In simple 
percentages, these elections can still deliver that. But 
qualitatively, there will likely be a gap which will need to 
be bridged effectively later in the process. As the drafting 
of the new Iraqi constitution will get under way in the next 
phase, the participation of all Iraqis in this undertaking 
will become all the more important. Absence in the 
Transitional National Assembly should not result in exclusion 
from the drafting process. Turkey will work with the Iraqis, 
with the United Nations and with all players of the 
international community in helping to forge national 
reconciliation in Iraq up to the point at which the 
transition is brought to its successful conclusion. 
 
On the other hand, we will have to deal, with equal resolve, 
with more immediate challenges that may stifle the entire 
project of a territorially integral, politically united, 
democratic and peaceful Iraq. These challenges manifest 
themselves in different ways. We have all along focused, and 
rightly so, on the security threats and terror posed by 
myriad groups. Those who see no future for themselves in a 
peaceful and democratic Iraq must be confronted in the most 
determined fashion. But defeating the physical threat alone 
cannot bring about the harmony we are all striving for. The 
inherent security of the Iraqi political and social fabric 
lies in the ability of all Iraqi groups to reconcile their 
own priorities and interests with those of Iraq as a whole. 
There is apparently a way to go on this account. 
 
At a time when all of us are trying hard to help the common 
national agenda of Iraq to prevail over individual and 
sectarian ones, we see persistent efforts to the contrary. 
Despite the fact that no major clashes of an ethnic or 
sectarian nature have occurred so far, the international 
community cannot remain complacent about what it is 
witnessing now. 
 
In this respect, Kirkuk is a case in point. Attempts to 
drastically change the demographic structure of the city and 
the province of Kirkuk continue unabated. There are certainly 
claims and issues to be addressed in conjunction with 
property ownership and resettlement in Kirkuk, as well as in 
a number of other places. The need to bring these matters to 
a satisfactory conclusion was also highlighted in the 
Transitional Administrative Law drawn up by the now defunct 
Iraqi Governing Council. However, what was suggested in that 
temporary document, and what should naturally be the way, is 
that these issues have to be settled collectively in Baghdad, 
in a national framework, and not through the illegitimate 
unilateral transfer of a sizeable population to the disputed 
areas and by taking hold of those areas by sheer projection 
of force. The latest accounts about the number of new 
settlers in Kirkuk are alarming, and are now estimated in the 
hundreds of thousands. 
 
Because of the election law applicable for 30 January, this 
population shift may not have as much of an impact on the 
results of the balloting for the Transitional National 
Assembly as it would on province-level voting. It is worrying 
that certain political groups have been tampering with the 
demographics of Kirkuk to claim supremacy of power through 
elections. 
 
An equally worrying tendency is an effort to turn the 
elections also into a referendum for independence in northern 
Iraq. A campaign with outside involvement has been going on 
for some time now, and most recently a group has also 
approached the United Nations to file a petition for such a 
referendum. 
 
Let us be totally clear here. There can be no charting of 
Iraq's future partially. If those who instigate such an 
outcome invest in the hope that Iraq may after all not be 
able to hold together under the current circumstances, they 
will be making a fatal error of judgement. I am confident 
that the Iraqi nation as a whole will not allow that to 
happen. And, given the recent history, the Iraqi issue is not 
an Iraqi one alone. It has impacted, is impacting and will 
impact the region. And the region, as evidenced by two full 
years of the Neighbouring Countries Initiative, will stand 
firmly behind Iraq's integrity. 
 
Abdullah Gul 
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs 
 
END TEXT 
 
3. (U) Baghdad and REOs minimize considered. 
EDELMAN