This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

081044Z Dec 04

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 THE HAGUE 003197 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AC/CB, NP/CBM, VC/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) 
NSC FOR JOECK 
WINPAC FOR WALTER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC):  WEEKLY WRAP-UP 
FOR DECEMBER 3 
 
 
This is CWC-145-04. 
 
¶1.  (U) The wrap-up includes items from discussions on the 
margins of the November 24 special Executive Council session 
and the Nov 29-Dec 2 Conference of States Parties (CSP) which 
were informally reported back to Washington. 
 
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TAIWAN 
------ 
 
¶2.  (U) The application by the Taiwan Chemical Industry 
Association for observer status at the CSP was denied, on the 
recommendation of the conference organizers, on the grounds 
that Taiwan is not an entity recognized by the UN or the 
OPCW.  For that reason, an association from Taiwan could not 
be given observer status.  The real reason was that the 
Chinese delegation had made clear in the run-up to the CSP 
that it objected to the application.  Despite the message 
conveyed by the U.S. and other delegations to working level 
officials of the Taipei Representative Office in the 
Netherlands on the importance of Taiwan broaching this 
subject with the PRC, Taiwan failed to do so, and the 
rejection of observer status was inevitable. 
 
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WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT APPLICATION 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (U) On Nov. 29, the first day of the CSP, the Asian 
Group, at the request of Iran and Pakistan, objected to the 
application of the Wassenaar Arrangement as an international 
organization, specialized agency or international body 
approved to attend the CSP, claiming that it was an 
"exclusionary" body.  The U.S. objected to the position taken 
by the Asian Group.  There was no final resolution of this 
issue as Sergei Zamyatin, the representative of the Wassenaar 
Arrangement, had to depart The Hague early on Dec. 1. 
 
¶4.  (U) Zamyatin informed the Del that the Wassenaar 
Arrangement had decided a few months ago that it needed to do 
more outreach.  After receipt of the OPCW notice regarding 
the CSP, the decision was made to seek observer status.  The 
result leaves open the possibility of the Wassenaar 
Arrangement being granted observer status at the next CSP, 
and Zamyatin took the point that the prospects of approval 
would be improved it the group made an earlier application 
and addressed the objections brought by Iran and Pakistan. 
 
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ARTICLE VII 
----------- 
 
¶5.  (U) The U.S. and other delegations were informally 
notified on the margins of the CSP that the facilitator for 
Article VII, Mark Matthews (UK), has asked to relinquish this 
portfolio due to the demands of the upcoming UK Presidency of 
the EU in the second half of 2005.  There is general 
agreement that Ronald Munch (FRG) will succeed Matthews in 
handling the Article VII facilitation beginning in January. 
 
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IRAQ 
---- 
 
¶6.  (U) Ahmed N. Jewad, the new Minister at the Iraqi Embassy 
in The Hague, arrived on December 1 and attended the CSP as 
an observer.  Ambassador Javits and several members of the 
U.S. delegation met with Jewad to welcome him to his new post. 
 
---- 
DROC 
---- 
 
¶7.  (U) During the CSP, Del reps met with the two observers 
from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) Omari Lea 
Sisi, Third Vice President of the Defense and Security 
Commission of the National Assembly (e-mail: 
olsgudi@yahoo.fr, phone: 002 439 891 1076) and Paul Empole 
Losoko Efambe (Paul Empole), Director of International 
Organizations, MFA (e-mail: pelosef@yahoo.fr, phone 243-9841 
1394).  Sisi, who spoke almost no English, discussed the 
issues facing the DRC's accession effort, which include 
contested borders with its neighbors, recent civil wars, and 
a government composed of four factions.  In spite of this, 
Sisi was hopeful that the DRC would accede in the next 
several months and informally requested U.S. assistance, 
promising to follow up with an e-mail.  Del reps noted that 
France and others also are willing to assist, but Sisi 
emphasized that the DRC wants to work with the U.S. and did 
not want to ask France or Belgium for assistance. 
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UNIVERSALITY 
------------ 
 
¶8.  (U) Del reps attended a December 2 lunch hosted by the 
Technical Secretariat and Tunisia for Points of Contact 
(POCs).  Facilitator Hela Lahmar presented her initiative 
regarding creation of an internet-based network for POCs to 
exchange information regularly despite their worldwide 
locations.  A member of the Arab League attended, and made a 
long statement regarding the Arab States not Party's 
willingness to accede to the CWC, but that this would not be 
possible until Israel acceded to the NPT.  Del reps noted 
Washington's willingness to participate in 
Universality-related activities and yet again asked for the 
2005 calendar of Universality-related events. 
 
¶9.  (U) Privately, a frustrated Ioan Tudor told del rep that 
the External Relations Division had developed its calendar of 
events, but that the International Support Branch (ISP) was 
dragging its heels and not cooperating, using the just 
concluded meeting of the National Authorities as its current 
excuse.  Furthermore the DG wanted to issue just one list, so 
that ERD needed to wait for ISP.  Tudor hoped that the 
calendar would be available in another few weeks. 
 
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INDUSTRY ISSUES 
--------------- 
 
¶10.   (U) Del met with facilitator (Steve Wade/UK) for 2A/2A* 
Low Concentrations and the German technical representative 
(Manfred Ruck/Germany) to evaluate options for bringing this 
long-standing industry issue to a close.  The facilitator 
continues to prefer a .5% concentration for each of the 
chemicals and continues to not be receptive to alternative 
solutions, despite the opposition of major industrial 
players, including the U.S., Germany, France and Japan, to 
.5% for all three 2A/2A* chemicals. 
 
¶11.   (U) During the meeting, the Del and German rep offered 
the view that the assumptions underlying why these chemicals 
appear in the Schedule 2A/2A* special category may be flawed. 
 
 
¶12.   (U) Amiton appears on 2A/2A* because it was assumed at 
the time of treaty negotiation that it could not be placed in 
Schedule 1 because of its industrial applications.  Del noted 
this assumption proved false, as no State Party has declared 
any production, processing, consumption or transfer of 
Amiton.  In addition, Germany offered the view that setting a 
low concentration for Amiton is an "empty box" because, from 
a technical view, Amiton is produced at a concentration well 
above 30% and would, therefore, be captured at the highest 
default concentration applied by States Parties on a national 
basis.  For these reasons, Del reiterated its offer to the 
facilitator that Amiton be handled not by setting an 
extremely low concentration, but by recommending to the EC 
that Amiton be moved to Schedule 1.  The facilitator again 
indicated that, in his view, recommending a movement of 
chemical between the schedules is beyond his mandate for 
2A/2A* facilitation, but grudgingly noted he would consider 
such a recommendation for EC report language should he not be 
able to achieve consensus on a low concentration of .5% for 
Amiton. 
 
¶13.   (U) Regarding perfluoroisobutylene (PFIB), Del and the 
Germans again informed the facilitator that we do not support 
a low concentration for PFIB below 30% based upon the lack of 
evidence that such low concentrations of PFIB present a 
significant proliferation risk.  Again, this may be an 
instance where assumptions regarding PFIB forced it into a 
special category within the schedules.  Although PFIB has an 
industrial application as an unwanted by-product of 
tetrafluoroethylene (TFE) and hexafluoropropylene (HFP) 
production, the generally understood rationale for placing it 
on 2A/2A* was due to its potential use as a mask-breaker or 
as a chemical weapon.  It appears from the evidence collected 
nationally as well as the evidence presented by the 
facilitator, that neither of these assumptions proved 
correct. 
 
¶14.  (U) Several delegations, including the Germans, but 
notably, the Japanese have insisted that PFIB presents much 
less of a proliferation risk that its toxic kindred of 
phosgene and hydrogen cyanide, which proliferators can 
arguable more readily find, acquire, and store.  PFIB, on the 
other hand, is manufactured only in a handful of plants 
world-wide and is, in all known cases, produced and destroyed 
by continuous, in-line destruction methods (pyrolysis or 
methanolysis).  Through the discussion, the facilitator 
maintained that a low concentration is necessary because PFIB 
is highly toxic and manufacturers could, with a few 
modifications to the process, produce PFIB in large 
quantities at high concentration. 
 
¶15.  (U) Both the Del and German representative pointed out 
this was true of nearly every chemical on the schedules and 
that declarations are based on activity, not capability. 
Furthermore, since the UK position, which is being pushed by 
the facilitator, is that a low concentration is desirable so 
that all PFIB producers are declared, Del and Germany reps 
offered the view that the facilitator focus on making clear 
that TFE and HFP producers, which manufacture PFIB as a 
by-product, are already required to be declared under the 
"other chemical production facility" (OCPF) category. 
 
¶16.   (U) As a solution, Del suggested that we might consider 
setting a concentration for declaration in a range, from 
.5%-30% to uphold national legislations already in force and 
make a concentration applicable to those States Parties who 
have yet to set a designation.  Second, the suggestion is 
that the facilitator emphasize to SP that PFIB producers are 
already declarable under the OCPF regime and therefore there 
is reason to consider whether creating or designating a 
separate product group code category for fluoropolymer 
production would be useful for transparency purposes. 
 
¶17.  (U) Third, the suggestion is that the facilitator 
consider suspending discussions until after the next Review 
Conference to allow for information regarding PFIB's 
proliferation risk to be compiled and analyzed, since this is 
the primary reason for concern and what distinguishes this 
chemical from the rest of the scheduled chemicals.  As a 
tangent discussion spurred on by the mention of moving Amiton 
to Schedule 1, participants also speculated whether a future 
move of PFIB from Schedule 2A to Schedule 3 as a toxic 
chemical might be another solution.  In the end, however, the 
facilitator continues to insist that the appropriate way to 
handle PFIB is through a low concentration of .5%, and that 
he intends to continue discussions in the intersessional 
forum to achieve this low concentration goal. 
 
¶18.   (U) Regarding BZ, Germany indicated it is, officially, 
not flexible and prefers not to adopt a low concentration for 
BZ.  The facilitator indicated his interpretation that .5% is 
the appropriate low concentration.  Del offered that, while 
we have not settled on an appropriate number for a low 
concentration, we do understand the argument for a low 
concentration based on the history of BZ as a weapon, the 
technical aspects of its manufacture which appear to justify 
a sub-30% threshold, and that BZ is, with regard to 
regulatory requirements, different as it is applied as a 
disparate quantity threshold and is distinguished by an "*" 
from its other Schedule 2A colleagues. 
 
¶19.  (U) Germany informally indicated they might be flexible 
given these facts, but that .5% continues to be too low.  It 
noted that in an earlier EC decision regarding transfers to 
non-States Parties, the low concentration agreed to trigger 
reporting to the OPCW was 1% and setting a low concentration 
must be reconciled with this decision to avoid confusion to 
industry.  Germany senses that 1% might be a more appropriate 
low concentration, therefore, to adopt for production 
declarations.  The facilitator, again, insisted that .5% is 
the appropriate designation for BZ and that he has a near 
consensus on this figure. 
¶20.   (U) Del spoke briefly with the Canadian delegation 
regarding their opposition to a decision on Schedule 1 
captive use.  Canada has opposed such a decision in the past 
on the grounds that a Schedule 1 decision would be 
"regulation for regulation's sake", given that there is no 
known Schedule 1 production involving captive use situations. 
 The counter-argument, spearheaded by the FRG, but backed by 
the U.S., Japan, and France, is that a decision is necessary 
to ensure the definitions in Article II are applied evenly 
across the schedules and to dispel any notion SPs might have 
that situations exist where industrial production could occur 
above concentration and above quantity thresholds that does 
not require declaration.  The backbone of the Canadian 
argument has been that any decision clarifying such 
production as declarable would have an adverse effect on 
future research and development activities because of the one 
ton cap on Schedule 1 production in any SP. 
 
¶21.   (U) During this discussion, the Canadians clarified 
their stance and agreed that captive use production should be 
declared and verified but that such production should not 
count towards the one ton cap.  The Canadian admission that 
such activities are declarable is a significant deviation 
from previous statements made during the industry cluster 
sessions.  Del offered sympathy for the Canadian desire not 
to see medical, pharmaceutical or other legitimate endeavors 
not hampered by the one ton cap, but offered that the 
decision to clarify the consistent application of definitions 
must not be confused with this argument.  Instead, Del 
offered the comment that what may be necessary is to pursue 
to two-step approach. 
 
¶22.  (U) First, all States Parties join in language that 
reflects a common agreement that the treaty currently 
unequivocally captures all Article VI Schedule 1 production 
activities above concentration and quantity thresholds, 
regardless of Schedule.  Second, States Parties should ask 
the question "is this right?"  Since a blanket approach 
towards every possible scenario is usually never the right 
answer, SPs may want to evaluate the merits of potentially 
excluding Schedule 1 captive use production for specific, 
medical or pharmaceutical purposes from applying towards the 
one ton cap.  Certainly the intent of the treaty is not to 
derail pursuit of or hamper production of the "silver bullet" 
for cancer.  Del offered what may be needed is further 
consideration by the Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) or 
decision language that indicates the need to address such 
situations on a "case-by-case" basis in lieu of the one ton 
cap. 
 
¶23.  (U) Javits sends. 
RUSSEL