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Viewing cable 04TAIPEI4125, MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04TAIPEI4125 2004-12-30 06:47 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 004125 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/RSP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - 
ROBERT PALLADINO 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS 
 
 
A) "China Is Missing Another Opportunity for [Cross- 
Strait] Peace" 
 
Lin Cheng-yi, research fellow at the National Chengchi 
University's Institute of International Relations, said 
in a commentary in the centrist, pro-status quo "China 
Times" (12/30): 
 
". On one hand, Beijing said it will deal with Taiwan 
independence at all costs; it lashed out at the United 
States' arms sales to Taiwan, saying the move did not 
contribute to cross-Strait stability; and it continues 
increasing ground-to-ground missile deployment against 
Taiwan.  On the other hand, however, Beijing said it 
wants to pursue `four environments,' namely, a peaceful 
and stable international environment, a friendly 
neighboring environment, an environment for equal and 
reciprocal cooperation, and an environment for 
objective and friendly public opinion.  In fact, it is 
highly difficult for Beijing to seek to strike a 
balance between these two contradictory directions. 
But Taiwan is so occupied with internal struggle and 
dealing with three battlefields at the same time - the 
battlefield between the ruling and opposition parties 
in Taiwan, between two sides of the Taiwan Strait, and 
between the United States and Taiwan - that it has 
provided Beijing with a wonderful opportunity to 
isolate the island.  Other countries such as France, 
the United States, Singapore and Australia, have all 
made strongly-worded statements against Taiwan and 
commented on Taiwan's political development from 
Beijing's perspective. . 
 
". While seeking to make its national defense 
transparent, Beijing is also releasing a signal that it 
will `fight against the United States and intimidate 
Taiwan.'  But the more Beijing emphasizes the use of 
force and the more high-handed it gets, the more it 
proves that its Taiwan policy has failed to work and 
that both sides of the Taiwan Strait are moving apart 
from each other. 
 
"To address China's `anti-secession law,' Taiwan's top 
priority is not to split from the inside.  The DPP 
government must first try to coordinate between Taiwan 
and the United States and between the ruling and 
opposition parties inside Taiwan if it wants to reduce 
its three battlefields and three rivals to one 
battlefield (the cross-Strait one)." 
 
B) "Can Washington, Beijing and Taipei Get off the 
Train and Talk for a While?" 
 
Wu Yu-shan, research fellow and director of the 
preparatory office for the Institute of Political 
Science, Academia Sinica, said in an op-ed piece of the 
centrist, pro-status quo "China Times" (12/30): 
 
". When the train that Taiwan is riding [i.e. Taiwan's 
constitutional re-engineering] starts to crash into the 
train on which Beijing is riding [i.e. China's anti- 
secession law], Washington is actually sitting on 
Taiwan's train.  Given its powerful strength, the 
United States could add great weight to Taiwan's train. 
But Washington does not want to see the train crash, so 
it started to warn Taiwan's train driver using harsh 
words like `Taiwan's leader is trying to destroy the 
status quo,' or `Taiwan is not a sovereign state.'  The 
question is whether Washington values Taiwan's 
strategic position and if it sees Beijing as a long- 
term hypothetical enemy of the United States. 
Washington has natural feelings in favor of the 
democratic Taiwan, so it does not want to get off the 
train.  As a result, for the Taiwan train driver, no 
matter how harsh Washington scolds him, as long as it 
still stays on the train, the Taiwan train is much 
stronger than that of Beijing's and it does not fear 
crashing against Beijing's train.  If Beijing keeps its 
senses, it will not go into a showdown with the United 
States.  In other words, Beijing might be the one that 
steps on the brake eventually during this train crash 
incident. . 
 
". Since both sides of the Taiwan Strait have walked 
away from the hypothetical framework of the `interim 
agreement,' will Washington be able to re-gain control 
of the [cross-Strait] situation?  For Washington, the 
best way to remove the ultimate cause of trouble is to 
say clearly that it will not support Taiwan when the 
latter declares independence and thus triggers a war 
across the Taiwan Strait.  In other words, the United 
States is saying that it is ready to get off the train 
and does not want to play games together with Taiwan 
any more.  This is the real meaning behind [Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State Richard] Armitage's 
`landmine' remarks and his statement that [Washington] 
`is not required to defend Taiwan.'  Armitage's words 
have created a great impact in Taiwan because if 
Washington gets off the train, the whole situation will 
change.  But since the American officials like 
[Secretary of State Colin] Powell and Armitage who 
recently made statements criticizing Taiwan will get 
off the train of the Bush administration first, Taiwan 
is still watching and waiting [for further 
development].  Nonetheless, it will still be very 
dangerous no matter whether the situation turns out to 
be that the United States stays on Taiwan's train which 
crashes with the train of Beijing or the United States 
gets off the train and leaves Taiwan's train to crash 
with Beijing's. ." 
 
PAAL