This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 004075 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/RSP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - 
ROBERT PALLADINO 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: CHINA'S "ANTI-SECESSION LAW," AND U.S.-TAIWAN 
RELATIONS 
 
 
A) "The Premises Have Been Destroyed and How Can the 
Four Nos Remain Unchanged" 
 
An article in the pro-independence "Liberty Times" said 
(12/27): 
 
". China's `anti-secession law,' if correctly expected 
by the government, provides the basis to use force 
against Taiwan, then the law explicitly challenges the 
premises President Chen Shui-bian set for the promises 
of `Four Nos and One Will Not.' 
 
"The Taiwan government is forced to face a critical 
problem, that is whether President Chen Shui-bian's 
promises on `Four Nos and One Will Not' still be 
effective in the future? 
 
"To answer the question is extremely difficult for 
Taiwan, especially when current U.S-China relations 
consistently improve `to the best status for the last 
30 years.'  Since there are several unexpected 
situations in U.S-Taiwan relations, however, the 
question would more easily irritate the sensitive 
nerves of the United States. 
 
"After all, this is not a question concerning the 
fundamental position of cross-Strait relations.  If the 
grand direction is not ascertained, any repairing or 
mending [the cross-Strait relations] will end up with 
no rewards.  If Taiwan ignores this question, the next 
challenge [from China] is the position of Taiwan's 
sovereignty. ." 
 
B) " `Anti-Taiwan Independence' Does Not Equal `Anti- 
Taiwan'- the Crisis and the Turning Point in the `Anti- 
Secession Law'" 
 
Political Critic Nan Fang-suo said in the centrist, pro- 
status quo "China Times" (12/27): 
 
". The purpose [of China] is not to legislate the 
`Unification Law,' but to legislate the negative, 
passive, and even the defensive `anti-secession law.' 
On one hand, to legislate from a negative sense is 
technically easier; and on the other hand, the `anti- 
secession law' may stimulate the independent faction in 
Taiwan, but expresses good will toward the non- 
independent faction in Taiwan and by so doing reduces 
the negative effect of the legislation to the minimum. 
Most important of all, to abandon the `unification law' 
and to choose the `anti-secession law' reflects that 
other than `anti-independence,' Beijing currently is 
not urgent on `promoting unification' since there is no 
time table and, thus, there is elasticity toward 
unification. 
 
"As the degree of internationalization increases, 
Beijing knows more and more each day how to utilize the 
international environment.  In the `anti-secession 
law,' Beijing's action has been defined as a kind of 
`defense,' instead of `offense.'  More critically, 
President Chen Shui-bian in the past year made several 
moves intended to make use of the disparity that the 
United States at the same time asserts `One China' and 
upholds the `Taiwan Relations Act.'  President Chen 
tried to manipulate the `Taiwan Relations Act' in the 
hope that the United States will change its `One China' 
policy.  However, President Chen's intention caused 
negative feelings in the United States, and forced 
Secretary of State Colin Powell to say `Taiwan is not 
 
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an independent sovereign state,' and Deputy Secretary 
of State Richard Armitage to say `there is no need to 
defend Taiwan,' and `Taiwan is a part of China.'  All 
of these indicate that China and the United States have 
become consistent on the position of `anti-Taiwan 
independence.' It is a signal worth noting that China 
informed the United States before drafting the `anti- 
secession law,' and to some extent China got the 
`understanding' from the United States.  At the current 
stage, the United States' `anti-independence' not only 
focused on the perspective of `de-jure Taiwan 
independence,' but started to pay attention to 
`contextual Taiwan independence' as well.  When China 
and the United States moved toward the same position of 
`anti-Taiwan independence,' the space in which to 
manipulate `Taiwan independence' is incrementally 
decreased. 
 
"President Chen Shui-bian has used up the credit that 
U.S. diplomacy afforded, and left the United States 
with no choice but to stand together with China 
regarding the issue of `anti-independence.'  In the 
past few years the DPP government persistently, 
implicitly or explicitly, played the `Taiwan 
independence card' and now it is `game over.' 
 
"As to Taiwan independence, however, the situation that 
the `Taiwan independence card' leads to a dead end may 
be the biggest crisis.  Not only does Taiwan 
independence lose the legitimacy in the international 
community, it also becomes an illegal activity as well. 
But the situation is a major turning point for the non- 
independent fraction. 
 
"Hence, the `anti-secession law' and the statements by 
Secretary of State Colin Powell and Deputy Secretary of 
 
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State Richard Armitage may cause the end of Taiwan 
independence, but certainly not the end of Taiwan. 
 
"People in Taiwan are not allowed to hate the same 
enemy [i.e. China] with the DPP under DPP's dominance. 
People in Taiwan should realize with optimism that 
whenever Taiwan independence diminishes, that is the 
time for the hope of Taiwan to actually start. ." 
 
C) "This Legislation Hands the Hot Potato Back to the 
United States; China Will Have More Room for 
Manipulation and the Right to Define the `Cross-Strait 
Status Quo' Will Be the Target for Bilateral Struggle 
in the Future" 
 
Journalist Sun Yang-ming wrote in the conservative, pro- 
unification "United Daily News" (12/26): 
 
". The real issue is that once this anti-secession bill 
becomes a law, there will be a struggle between 
Washington and Beijing over who has the dominant right 
to define the so-called `status-quo' in the future. 
The basic strategic thinking and attitude of China 
toward how to deal with the Taiwan issue has changed. 
As a result, which direction Taiwan will be moving and 
the issue of independence will become a burden for the 
United States.  The concept of an anti-secession law 
coincides with this [new] attitude. 
 
"The Neo-Conservatives of the Bush administration have 
been trying to use Taiwan as a means to delay China's 
rise [as a power] and let Taiwan become a burden for 
China.  However, China is passing back this hot potato 
and having the United States accountable for the 
consequences should Taiwan cross the red line.  This is 
why Beijing only wants an `anti-secession law' rather 
than a `unification law.'." 
 
D) "Criticizing Chen Shui-bian? Taiwan is not the 
problem, but China is" 
 
The pro-independence "Liberty Times" said in its 
editorial (12/27): 
 
"The United States is caught in between the democratic 
Taiwan and despotic China.  China always has used 
international negotiation and its domestic market to 
threaten the United States for concessions on the issue 
of cross-Strait relations. The United States 
consequently faces a dilemma in choosing between the 
two. 
 
"Theoretically, the United States is a democratic 
country, it should enhance its interaction with the 
democratic Taiwan and should express the respectfulness 
of the basic human rights to the people of Taiwan. 
Unfortunately, as leaders 
in the United States and Taiwan lack direct 
communication, unnecessary misunderstandings have 
occurred.  Such misunderstanding would be reduced 
significantly if the ban on contacts of high-ranking 
leaders were lifted. But if [the United States] 
continuously lets the `One-China'policy stymie 
arbitrarily, the situation could not be improved.  This 
is the structural problem between the United States and 
Taiwan. 
 
"Anyway, Taiwan is not the problem, but the China is. 
In the past twenty years, the long-term goal of the 
international investments to China, including 
investment from Taiwan, seeks to promote political 
reforms through economic development, and to push China 
to fulfill its international obligations.  The foreign 
capital brings the economic growth [in China], but it 
becomes the resources for China to build its military. 
In the meantime, China increases its political control 
internally, and prepares to use force to solve 
international disputes.  Furthermore,  China is playing 
`big nation diplomacy.'  By making use of the United 
States' needs for cooperation on North Korea, Iraq and 
anti-terrorism issues, China manipulates the United 
States with `cooperation but faction' strategy.  Taiwan 
is among the gains from this strategy." 
E) "U.S. Support for Taiwan May Not Be a Sure Thing" 
 
Chin Heng-wei commented in the pro-independence "Taipei 
Times"(12/26): 
". The U.S. true focus is not the Taiwan question but 
the threat of China, and Taiwan is merely a landmine 
placed between the two giants. It is only when the 
situation is looked at in this light that one can 
understand the U.S. standpoint on the Taiwan question, 
the TRA and U.S.-China-Taiwan relations. 
 
"Naturally, America has the choice of not defending 
Taiwan, should it relinquish its interests in the West 
Pacific Region. To put it more clearly, if the U.S. 
sells the `Taiwan landmine' down the river, and scraps 
the TRA, they will be losing the Western Pacific Region 
as a sphere of influence. This will be tantamount to 
making the same errors they committed 50 years ago, and 
creating a monster that they cannot control. ." 
 
PAAL