This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 FRANKFURT 010386 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER PGOV SMIG SOCI PHUM GM NL EUN
SUBJECT: Muslim Political Observers On Risk of Extremist 
Violence in Germany 
 
REF:  A) The Hague 2864 B) Frankfurt 6156 (NOTAL) C) Hamburg 
 
60 D) 02 Frankfurt 10187, E) Frankfurt 1390 F) Frankfurt 
9141 G) Frankfurt 0567 
 
Sensitive but unclassified  not for internet distribution 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY.  Muslim political contacts in Frankfurt's 
district see the predominantly secular character of 
Germany's largely Turkish Muslim community as a bulwark 
against Islamic extremism but cite the area's growing North 
African population and the presence of far-right German 
groups as potentially destabilizing factors.  While 
fragmented religiously and politically, ethnic Turks in 
Germany are united across party and religious lines by their 
support for Turkey's entry into the European Union.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
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Turkish Secularism Makes Extremism in Germany Less Likely 
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¶2. (SBU) Consulate representatives met with Muslim 
representatives of Germany's major political parties to 
assess the danger of Islamist attacks along the lines of 
that against the Dutch filmmaker Van Gogh and potential 
reactionary violence against Germany's 3.1 million Muslims. 
Former European Parliament member Ozan Ceyhun (Social 
Democrats/SPD) underscored the largely Turkish and secular 
composition of Germany's Muslim population as a safeguard 
against religious extremism.  Ceyhun warned, however, that 
Germany's growing North African community (while still 
relatively small) harbors significant religious 
fundamentalist and anti-American elements. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Hesse Green Party caucus chief Tarek Al Wazir (of 
Yemeni descent) noted that fundamentalist Muslims -- while a 
minority -- are less inclined to integrate into local 
communities and often retain ties with like-minded groups 
outside Germany, opening the door for extremist influences 
from other parts of Europe and the Middle East.  (NOTE: 
Alleged Al Qaeda Hamburg cell member and September 11 
plotter Mounir el-Motassadeq came from Morocco, while a 
Frankfurt terror cell convicted of plotting to attack the 
Strasbourg Christmas Market in 2000 was of Algerian origin. 
A Frankfurt mosque raided by police in June on suspicions of 
extremist activity received partial funding from the 
Moroccan consulate (refs B-D) END NOTE). 
 
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Fear of Right-Wing Violence 
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¶4. (SBU) Ceyhun expressed fear that right-wing political 
groups could carry out "reprisal" attacks against Muslims in 
the wake of the Van Gogh controversy in the Netherlands. 
Local Muslims reacted with alarm to the November 18 
firebombing of a Turkish mosque in Sinsheim near Heidelberg 
(no one was hurt in the attack).  Following the December 3 
arrest of a 17-year old ethnic German of Tajik origin in 
connection with the bombing, however, Baden-Wuerttemberg 
police described the attack as an isolated incident. 
 
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Muslim Political Participation On The Rise 
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¶5.  (SBU) Muslim political participation in the region has 
increased significantly in recent years, fueled in part by 
expanded naturalization under the federal citizenship law of 
¶2000.  Over 700,000 Muslims in Germany now carry a German 
passport, and another 800,000 were born in Germany.  Turkish 
Germans are predominantly Sunni with a significant Alevi 
minority. Although socially conservative, the vast majority 
of Turkish voters (80% in 2002 national elections) back the 
SPD because of its support for Turkey's EU membership bid. 
Germany's Green Party has also seen a rise in Turkish 
membership because of a platform that is seen as friendly 
towards immigrants and opposes recent anti-headscarf laws 
(refs E-F). 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Mr. Sina Afra of the Liberal Turkish-German Union 
(a Free Democrat/FDP-affiliated group) estimated that 10-15% 
of Germany's Turkish community are non-practicing, while an 
equivalent are deeply religious.  The majority are somewhat 
observant but increasingly participate in German society: 
Afra cited as an example the increasing number of Turkish 
high school graduates in Germany (from only 2,000 in 1989 to 
around 45,000 today).  Ceyhun affirmed the positive trends 
but noted that Muslims integrate into German society at 
varying speeds;  even many with German citizenship live in 
Muslim sub-communities.  Several city governments in SW 
Germany have pioneered successful initiatives to integrate 
their large immigrant populations, particularly Frankfurt's 
"Mama learns German  and Papa too", a program providing 
German-language instruction to immigrant mothers and fathers 
(ref G). 
 
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Support for Turkey's EU Entry Trumps Party Affiliation 
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¶7.  (SBU) Our Muslim interlocutors noted broad and vocal 
support among Turkish Germans for Turkey's entry into the 
EU.  Not surprisingly, contacts made the case for Turkey to 
be judged fairly under the Copenhagen agreement, with Al 
Wazir remarking that Germany "cannot renege on promises made 
to Turkey decades ago."  Mr. Meze Zafer of the German- 
Turkish Forum (a Christian Democrat/CDU affiliated political 
group) opined that support for Turkey's EU membership tends 
to isolate Turkish CDU members from fellow conservatives and 
hinders progress on other political and religious issues. 
Ceyhun struck a rare discordant note by saying that he 
believed Turkey would end up only with the "privileged 
partnership" envisioned by the CDU, painting instead a role 
for Turkey as leader of a group of pro-western states in the 
Middle East (including Egypt, Israel, and Iraq) that could 
partner with the EU on important issues.  Ceyhun voiced his 
disappointment over Turkey's tepid participation in the 
coalition supporting a democratic Iraq. 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶8.  (SBU) Right-wing German politicians in this largely 
conservative region have used the Van Gogh incident and 
fears of Islamic extremism to score points in Germany's 
debate on integration, including Baden-Wuerttemberg 
Education Minister Annette Schavan, who declared that 
Germany should compel Muslim religious leaders to preach in 
German.  Germany's Office for the Protection of the 
Constitution (which monitors extremism) estimates that only 
0.1% of Germany's Muslims belong to radical Islamic 
movements and believe that the secular and moderate leanings 
of most Muslims in Germany mean that fundamentalist appeals 
are unlikely to gain traction within the community at large; 
although such groups pose an obvious danger. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) The economic contributions of Germany's Muslim 
immigrants (particularly given the country's aging workforce 
and dwindling birth rate) are significant; however, recent 
anti-headscarf laws show the country's struggle to integrate 
a culture seen by many as incompatible with "German" values 
(such as gender equality).  Fear sparked by the Van Gogh 
murder has added a new subtext to Germany's continuing 
debate on how to accommodate diversity.  END COMMENT.