This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

091133Z Nov 04

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 HO CHI MINH CITY 001400 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREF PREL PHUM KIRF VM HUMANR ETMIN
SUBJECT: MONTAGNARDS, RELIGION AND DEVELOPMENT IN CENTRAL 
HIGHLANDS: VO VIET THANH BRIEFS CG ON GVN PROGRESS 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  Special Advisor to the Prime Minister for the 
South Vo Viet Thanh told the Consul General that the GVN wants 
U.S. support to solve the problem of ethnic Montagnards in the 
Central Highlands fleeing to Cambodia.  He suggested that Vietnam 
could establish an "in-country" program similar to how the GVN 
successfully concluded the "boat people" crisis in the early 
1990s.  More broadly, Thanh said that the GVN recognizes that 
"sometimes mistakes were made" in treatment of religion and ethnic 
Minorities; "conservatives" and inept local party officials were 
at fault.  The ordinance on religion and new socio-economic 
initiatives in the Central Highlands were evidence of a new GVN 
approach.  While welcoming this "new thinking," the CG emphasized 
that GVN must ensure that its policies are implemented at a local 
level to have real impact.  The CG also encouraged the GVN to 
facilitate USG development assistance in the Highlands and to 
solve problems surrounding the applications of Montagnard family 
members "following to join" relatives already in the United 
States.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) On November 8, CG and PolOff met with "Special Advisor to 
the Prime Minster for the South" Vo Viet Thanh.  Lieutenant 
General Thanh was Vice Minister of Public Security and later 
served as Chairman of the HCMC People's Committee.  At Thanh's 
initiative, the discussion centered on freedom of religion, the 
Central Highlands, and cross-border flight of ethnic minorities to 
Cambodia. 
 
Religion, Development and the Central Highlands 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶3. (SBU) While sticking to the usual GVN talking points that 
ethnic unrest in the Central Highlands was "incited from abroad," 
Thanh said that the GVN had realized that local authorities had 
made significant mistakes in their handling of religion and of 
ethnic minorities in the Central and Northern Highlands.  These 
mistakes, he suggested, helped foster the conditions that gave 
"outside extremists" opportunities to create problems.  Thanh was 
critical of the past GVN policy on religion. In his view, there 
was no reason why the GVN needed to regulate the internal affairs 
of religious organizations.  Such a policy merely inserted the GVN 
into the internecine rivalry of various religious sects without 
enhancing GVN security, he argued.  He said that in the past, he 
had pushed this argument in Hanoi, but "conservative elements 
scattered throughout the GVN" hadtorpedoed this approach. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The GVN's new legal framework on religion, due to come 
into effect November 15, is proof that the GVN now recognizes that 
it is counter to national interest to intervene deeply into 
religious affairs, Thanh argued.   Thanh agreed with the CG that 
Vietnam's growing Protestant house church movement was not 
consistent with the hierarchical and centralized structure that 
the GVN demanded of religious organizations.  Thanh said the 
religious ordinance was designed to resolve some of these issues. 
Further refinements in the law were possible as the GVN continues 
to "learn from its mistakes," he suggested. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Thanh said that, in the Central Highlands, the GVN 
already has authorized local authorities to register all branches 
of protestant religious organizations "without discrimination." 
According to Thanh, the only exception is the "Dega Protestant 
church," which the GVN considers to be a reincarnation of the 
Montagnard separatist movement.  (GVN officials have long argued 
that a number of ethnic Montagnards were using the "Dega" church 
as a platform for overtly political and anti-Vietnam messages.) 
 
¶6.  (SBU) The GVN is serious about resolving the decades-long 
problems of ethnic minority economic and social disenfranchisement 
in the Highlands, Thanh maintained.  Hanoi recognizes that many of 
its ongoing economic and educational initiatives will take at 
least a decade to show significant results.  That is why, inter 
alia, the GVN recently issued a directive banning all land 
transactions involving ethnic minorities and majority Kinh.  While 
even some minority representatives protested this approach, the 
GVN believes it is needed to stem the pernicious practice of 
economically-backward Montagnards selling their land to ethnic 
Vietnamese (Kinh) to raise cash only to be left with nothing after 
a few years, forcing them to repeat the process, further 
disenfranchising the Montagnards from their land. 
 
Montagnards in Cambodia 
----------------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Thanh said that he was tasked to "independently 
research" the problem of ethnic minority flight from the Central 
Highlands to Cambodia.  In his view, the majority of the 
Montagnards are economic migrants, who believe that they would 
have a better life overseas.  Many are encouraged to flee by 
overseas "Dega" activists, who hope to use the refugee issue to 
embarrass Vietnam.  He alleged that many Montagnards in Cambodia 
were instructed by overseas Montagnard groups to refuse UNHCR 
offers of resettlement to third countries, as the Dega movement 
sought to have the refugee problem fester in Cambodia. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Thanh appealed for U.S. cooperation to resolve the 
problem of Montagnard cross-border flight.  He said that the GVN 
is examining the possibility of creating an in-country program 
that would facilitate Montagnard legal migration.  Such a program 
could be modeled on the effort the GVN had launched to end the 
boat people crisis when he was Vice Minister of Public Security. 
During this effort, he said 400,000 Vietnamese were given 
passports and allowed to leave Vietnam in an orderly manner. 
Vietnam, he said, would be willing to treat the Montagnards in the 
same fashion.  Similarly, those Montagnards who wished to return 
to Vietnam would be welcomed back with no repercussions, as the 
GVN had done when it accepted boat people who had failed to secure 
third country resettlement from camps in Hong Kong and elsewhere 
in the region. 
¶9. (SBU) In this regard, the GVN now recognized that the UNHCR was 
"not the enemy," but was itself a victim of manipulation by the 
"Dega" movement.  Thanh said he was not aware that some 
Montagnards who wished to leave and join their families in the 
United States were not being allowed to apply for passports or 
were having their applications buried in procedure.  He pledged to 
clarify the matter if we could provide him with additional 
information. 
 
U.S. Assistance in the Highlands 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) CG agreed with Thanh that the problem of ethnic 
minorities in Vietnam had deep social, economic and political 
roots that predated 1975.  He noted that the issue of the status 
and human rights of indigenous peoples was not unique to Vietnam. 
In this regard, the GVN approach of focusing on long-term 
education and economic development of the Highlands is an 
important element in fostering stability in region.  The CG added 
that the USG supports the GVN's efforts to economically-revitalize 
the Highlands and to better integrate the Montagnards into 
Vietnamese society.  The CG said that the USG is prepared to 
provide financial and technical assistance, in close coordination 
with the GVN, local officials and NGO's, to promote these shared 
objectives.   The CG also noted that the GVN must be much more 
rigorous in ensuring that its directives are implemented at the 
provincial and local levels, where many religious freedom and 
human rights violations arise. 
 
Reaching out to the Viet Kieu 
----------------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) Thanh also said that he was playing an active role in 
GVN efforts to build better ties with the overseas Vietnamese 
community.  The GVN's policy is clear in trying to encourage 
economic, cultural and social participation of Viet Kieu.  In this 
regard, he had met twice with former Vice President of South 
Vietnam Nguyen Cao Ky.  Thanh informed CG that Ky was in HCMC for 
a second working visit.  Thanh also said that he was in contact 
with other senior officials of the pre-1975 Saigon government, 
many of whom had made significant investments in Vietnam. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Comment:  If the company he keeps is any indication, 
Thanh has some pull within the political elite in the South. 
During the meeting, Thanh was flanked by two senior members of the 
HCMC External Relations Office and another senior functionary of 
the HCMC branch of the Prime Minister's Office.   Nguyen Cao Ky 
separately told us on November 9 that Thanh is one of his primary 
contacts with the GVN and Party.  (More on our conversation with 
Ky septel.) 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Bio Notes: Born in Ben Tre province, Thanh, 62, was 
active in the NLF in the Mekong Delta from 1964-75.  After the war 
he studied in the Soviet Union.   Thanh was Vice Minister of 
Public Security from 1987-91 and holds the rank of Lieutenant 
General. A protege of former Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet, Thanh 
served as Chairman of the HCMC People's Committee from 1997-2001, 
when he was forced out in the inter-Party feuding between 
supporters of Vo Van Kiet and Party Secretary Le Kha Phieu.  The 
Southern faction of the party reportedly brought him back to HCMC 
to be the PM's "Special Representative for the South." 
 
¶14.  (SBU) Thanh is an avid golfer.  He is married with three 
children, at least one reportedly studying in the U.S. He speaks 
passable French and limited English. 
 
 
WINNICK