This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 HARARE 001829 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AID FOR DCHA/FFP LANDIS, CRUMBLY, MUTAMBA, 
PETERSEN 
AID FOR DCHA/OFDA FOR PRATT, KHANDAGLE, HALMRAST- 
SANCHEZ, GOTTLIEB 
AFR/SA FOR FLEURET, LOKEN, COPSON, MACNAIRN 
STATE/AF FOR NEULING 
BRUSSELS FOR PATRICIA LERNER 
PRETORIA FOR, DISKIN, HALE, SINK, REYNOLDS 
NAIROBI FOR SMITH, BROWN 
GABORONE FOR CASHION, BROWN 
ROME FOR FODAG FOR GAST 
 
REFTEL: HARARE 1416 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREL US ZI
SUBJECT: GROWING FOOD INSECURITY IN 
ZIMBABWE 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.   There is still great uncertainty about 
both the quantity of maize (corn) produced in 
Zimbabwe during the past season and the 
magnitude of imports by the GOZ.  Regardless 
of the quantities, however, re-distribution of 
in-country stocks from surplus to deficit 
rural areas is an immediate problem.  Those 
who have already consumed their own harvest 
must travel to the nearest surplus area to get 
maize, either through purchase or barter.  The 
price they pay reflects local production - the 
cost is higher in or near deficit areas.  Food 
for Work programs implemented by the NGO 
consortium operating under the name C-SAFE 
improved food availability in eight districts; 
but the most vulnerable households, who lack 
able-bodied workers, could not directly 
benefit.  The expansion of school feeding, the 
core activity of the international community's 
planned program to combat household food 
insecurity, has been largely paralyzed by the 
delay in written approval from the Ministry of 
Education, despite persistent attempts by the 
World Food Programme and individual NGOs to 
obtain permission.  The humanitarian 
environment will remain extremely challenging 
over the coming months, as we approach the 
March 2005 Parliamentary elections.  The 
international community's ability to 
effectively address the needs of the most 
vulnerable in this environment is questionable 
at best.  End Summary 
 
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BACKGROUND 
----------- 
 
¶2.   During September, the USAID/Zimbabwe Food 
for Peace (FFP) Food Monitor traveled through 
14 districts of 5 provinces and talked with 
residents about maize availability, prices and 
access.  He covered areas of deficit and 
surplus production.  The following summarizes 
his findings.  An informal discussion with the 
World Food Programme about data collected in 
September by its Vulnerability Assessment and 
Monitoring unit, which are being summarized 
for reporting, confirmed the findings. 
 
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HOUSEHOLD MAIZE PRODUCTION 
--------------------------- 
 
¶3.   While the aggregate maize production in 
the country is still undetermined, inquiries 
in different parts of the country show great 
disparity in individual household production 
due to patchy rainfall patterns, differences 
in soil fertility and varying access to 
inputs.  Generally, production was higher in 
large parts of the provinces of Mashonaland 
and Midlands.  Production was poor in most of 
Matabeleland, Masvingo and Manicaland. 
 
¶4.   Within a geographic area, newly resettled 
farmers produced more than farmers on communal 
lands or older resettlement areas.  This was 
due largely to better soil conditions in newly 
resettled areas and because the new farmers 
received loans of seed and fertilizer from the 
GOZ. 
 
¶5.   In deficit areas, some households used up 
their production as early as May.  Large 
numbers in deficit areas had nothing left 
after September.  All of their maize was not 
necessarily eaten.  Some farmers, even though 
they faced a deficit, sold maize to satisfy 
immediate cash demands, e.g., to pay medical 
bills, to repay a loan, or to cover school 
fees. 
 
¶6.   In surplus areas, a number of farmers 
produced many times what they needed for their 
own families.  Some sold part of their surplus 
to the parastatal Grain Marketing Board (GMB) 
to assure eligibility to borrow inputs for the 
coming season or to avoid seizure where the 
GMB was policing heavily.  Others who would 
have liked to sell to the GMB did not due to 
lack of transportation.  Some sold to private 
traders.  Most farmers in surplus areas still 
held more than they needed for their own 
consumption this season.  They will use the 
surplus to pay for labor during the coming 
agricultural season, to sell later when prices 
are higher, or to keep a reserve to assure 
food security next year. 
 
 
------------------------------ 
MAIZE PRICES AND AVAILABILITY 
------------------------------ 
 
¶7.   In September, the official GMB selling 
price for maize grain was Z$32,000 per 50 kg. 
In the rural areas, most households purchased 
maize from sources other than the GMB (mostly 
direct from farmers), purchasing by the bucket 
(17.5-20 kg).  Reports for September from the 
FFP Food Monitor and World Food Programme 
(WFP) monitors indicate wide variation in the 
availability and price of unmilled maize grain 
across the country.  Prices relate directly to 
local production, i.e., higher where 
production was poor (Z$20,000-40,000 per 
bucket), and lowest where production was best 
(Z$10,000-15,000 per bucket). 
 
¶8.   In deficit production areas, few GMB 
depots were selling maize, even those with 
small stocks of locally purchased grain. 
There was no evidence of significant movement 
of grain from the surplus rural areas to the 
deficit areas.  In the southern part of the 
country, erratic deliveries to GMB depots had 
brought in only small quantities that 
disappeared in a day, leaving latecomers with 
nothing.  Residents near one depot in Chivi 
district reported that the last GMB delivery 
brought in old stock of yellow maize that was 
rotten. 
 
¶9.   The urban markets of Harare and Bulawayo 
have been well stocked with maize meal (ground 
maize), indicating that the GMB has sold some 
grain to the private millers who supply these 
cities.  In September, the price of maize meal 
in the urban markets was in the range of 
Z$12,500-13,000 per 10 kg, much lower than the 
August price of Z$20,000. 
 
¶10.  In deficit areas, residents traveled to 
the nearest surplus areas to buy or barter 
their labor for maize grain.  The distances 
they must travel increase as the stocks 
diminish of those farmers who reside in nearby 
pockets where production was better.  Some 
farmers in these pockets still had a surplus, 
but our Food Monitor found that most were 
holding the remainder to pay for labor during 
the upcoming agricultural season. 
 
¶11.  Even in the provinces where production 
was best, there were pockets where erratic 
rains or poor soil conditions resulted in 
little or no maize harvest.  Compared to those 
living where production was generally poor, 
residents in these pockets are better off 
because they find more opportunities to work 
for food. A few communities in deficit areas 
organized purchases from the GMB, but the 
quantities they managed to acquire were 
insufficient to meet their needs. 
 
¶12.  The sources of cash for maize purchased 
by rural households vary according to local 
opportunities.  Some households sold cash 
crops (particularly cotton).  Others depended 
on sales from their gardens, casual labor, 
cutting and sale of thatch, handicrafts, beer 
brewing, gold panning, charcoal making, or 
small trade.  In some locations, informants 
expressed concern that their opportunities for 
casual labor will diminish in November and 
December. 
 
¶13.  Over the past five months, Food for Work 
(FFW) activities operated by CARE and World 
Vision under the USAID-supported Consortium 
for Southern Africa Food Security Emergency (C- 
SAFE) provided the majority of households in 
targeted wards in eight maize-deficit 
districts with about one month's maize supply 
of cereal, beans, oil and corn soy blend. 
However, despite C-SAFE and community efforts 
to find low-intensity tasks for weaker 
workers, many of the most vulnerable 
households did not benefit because they 
included no able-bodied member capable of 
working.  Local authorities prohibited FFW 
activities planned by the third C-SAFE 
partner, Catholic Relief Services (CRS), due 
to local political disputes unrelated to CRS. 
As the agricultural planting season approaches 
in November, and farmers are occupied with 
tending their own fields, FFW activities in 
rural areas will fall off drastically. 
 
¶14.  So far, many households that cannot 
access enough maize are substituting other 
starchy foods, especially potatoes and sweet 
potatoes, or eating more vegetables and less 
starch.  Some report that they have already 
reduced the number of daily meals from three 
to two. 
 
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FOOD AID PROGRAMS 
------------------ 
 
¶15.  Because of the GOZ's refusal to allow 
free food distribution to vulnerable 
households, the international community 
planned to alleviate household food insecurity 
by expanding emergency school feeding in the 
districts where food insecurity is greatest. 
This would assure that all children aged 3-14 
years in these areas could access at least one 
nutritious meal daily. 
 
¶16.  The World Food Programme (WFP) actively 
pursued the approval of the Ministry of Social 
Welfare (MSW) to expand school feeding for 
several months.  At the end of August, the GOZ 
shifted responsibility for food aid from the 
MSW to relevant line ministries - in the case 
of school feeding, to the Ministry of 
Education (MOE).  WFP immediately opened new 
negotiations and, recently, individual NGOs 
began negotiating independently.  Although WFP 
received verbal consent in early September as 
the new school term opened, as of late October 
CARE is the only NGO to receive written 
approval. Without written approval, provincial 
and district authorities have been unwilling 
to allow the expansion of emergency school 
feeding.  Hence, at midterm, the program has 
not expanded.  The GOZ's proposed NGO bill 
that, if enacted, would substantially restrict 
NGO activities, is a significant complicating 
factor in these negotiations. (Reftel) 
 
------------ 
CONCLUSIONS 
------------ 
 
¶17.  As the 2003/2004 harvest is consumed, 
household access to maize in areas where 
production was low is becoming increasingly 
difficult.  Opportunities to work for cash or 
maize have dwindled.  They will likely improve 
only when the new agricultural planting season 
begins in November, and farmers who had 
relatively better production release more of 
their surplus to pay workers. 
 
¶18.  The GMB lacks either the will or capacity 
to move local surplus to the deficit areas 
and, regardless of the officially controlled 
price, local availability is the key 
determinant of maize prices, making it most 
expensive in areas where households are most 
vulnerable. 
 
¶19.  Long delays in obtaining written approval 
from the Ministry of Education for expanding 
school feeding have severely hampered the 
international community's attempts to 
alleviate food insecurity.  The likelihood of 
increasing restrictions on NGOs is another 
worrying prospect.  Zimbabwe's acute 
humanitarian crisis of 2002 and 2003 has 
evolved into a situation of deepening and 
expanding poverty, necessitating a protracted 
response to save lives and secure livelihoods 
of the most vulnerable.  With GOZ obstruction 
expected to increase as we approach the March 
2005 Parliamentary elections, the 
international community's ability to 
effectively address this complex humanitarian 
situation is questionable at best. 
 
 
DELL