This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

121227Z Nov 04

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 002802 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL BR
SUBJECT: PMDB PARTY AGAIN THREATENS TO LEAVE BRAZIL'S 
GOVERNING COALITION 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. Brazil's PMDB party, a large but unreliable 
member of President Lula's ruling coalition, is going through 
another bout of angst about whether to leave the coalition. 
A November 10 meeting of the party's leadership left such a 
threat --made by the party's "oppositionist wing"-- hanging 
in the air.  Meanwhile, the party's "governist wing" would 
rather remain in Lula's administration and enjoy the fruits 
of collaboration, which include government appointments and 
pork spending.  The PMDB has teetered between government and 
opposition for the two years of Lula's term, and threats by 
party leaders to pull out are widely seen as an attempt to 
extort more perks.  The PMDB's unreliability is a running 
headache for the administration, whose leaders never know how 
the party's 78 Deputies and 23 Senators will vote.  On 
December 12, the PMDB will hold a national convention to 
decide its future.  In the meantime, administration leaders 
will look for ways to appease the dipterous party.  In the 
past, decision-points such as this have always resulted in 
the PMDB's remaining in the coalition but making more demands 
for perks.  If the party pulls out of the coalition, it would 
be a significant blow to Lula's legislative agenda.  But with 
its fractiousness, the PMDB weakens the coalition nearly as 
much from the inside as it would from outside.  END SUMMARY. 
 
THE PMDB'S "PHYSIOLOGY" 
----------------------- 
¶2. (SBU) The Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement 
(PMDB) defines the Brazilian term "physiologist", a 
pejorative denoting a person or party for sale, always 
seeking personal advantage.  The party survives on a vast 
grass-roots apparatus built around regional chiefs and 
patronage networks, which it nurtures by joining the 
governing coalition at the state or federal level whenever 
possible.  This pattern results in some incongruous 
alignments.  For example, the party struggles bitterly 
against President Lula's Workers' Party (PT) in some states 
while working in coalition with it in others.  The PMDB was a 
member of former-President Cardoso's administration, but 
within months after Lula took office in 2003, the PMDB had 
worked its way into his administration.  The party's status 
as a full coalition member was cemented in January 2004 when 
Lula shuffled his cabinet to create two vacancies 
(Communications and Social Security) for PMDB ministers. 
 
MOTIVES OF THE "OPPOSITIONISTS" 
------------------------------- 
¶3. (SBU) It has been a rocky two years.  Lula needs the PMDB 
because of its size (78 Deputies and 23 Senators).  But the 
party is guided by a large "oppositionist wing" that votes 
against the administration in Congress, criticizes it in 
public, and incessantly begs for more perks.  Lula typically 
gets only 50-70% of the PMDB's floor votes.  The 
oppositionists are not guided by principle, but by fluid 
assessments of their own interests, which range from the 
parochial in local party struggles to decisions about the 
2006 presidential race:  whether the PMDB will support Lula, 
or will support the PSDB challenger, or will run its own 
candidate.  Each option carries risk.  The PMDB will never be 
more than an unrespected junior partner in Lula's coalition, 
and while staying with Lula brings certain benefits and may 
even yield the vice-presidential slot on Lula's 2006 slate, 
it would also doom many PMDB candidates in state and 
congressional races who will be facing PT opponents.  By the 
same token, leaving the coalition now would mean giving up 
the cherished cabinet slots and hundreds of mid-level 
government appointments.  As for the third option, despite 
Anthony Garotinho's self-promotion, the party has no national 
stars capable of making a credible challenge to Lula in the 
2006 presidential race. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Among the "oppositionists", none clamors louder than 
Garotinho, who runs the party's Rio branch and needs to open 
some daylight between himself and Lula if he is to launch 
another run at the presidency.  Similarly, some PMDB 
governors (e.g., in Rio Grande do Sul, Pernambuco, and Rio de 
Janeiro) face tough struggles with their local PT opponents 
and need to clarify the battle lines before 2006.  Party 
president and Federal Deputy Michel Temer of Sao Paulo, has 
suggested looking for a third way, whereby the party becomes 
"independent" rather than joining either the government or 
opposition.  This approach is ridiculed by Senate President 
Jose Sarney, who comments, "A position of 'independence' 
means to sit on the fence, and in politics there are no 
fences." 
 
 
"GOVERNISTS" LIKE THE STATUS QUO 
-------------------------------- 
¶5. (SBU) The party's "governists" include Senate President 
Jose Sarney, leading Senator Renan Calheiros, and 
Communications Minister Eunicio Oliveira.  All are 
northeasterners, and all have benefited from a close 
relationship with the administration.  Sarney's machinations 
in the Senate have helped the administration out of more than 
one jam in the past two years.  But his desire to remain as 
Senate President, and Calheiros' desire to replace him in 
February 2005, have left both in an unseemly scramble for 
administration support.  The "governists" command only a 
minority in the PMDB leadership, and Sarney's 
pro-administration speech at the November 10 party leadership 
meeting was met with a thunderous silence.  Oliveira, 
however, notes that October's municipal elections raised the 
adrenaline all around, and once tempers have cooled, the PMDB 
should remain in the governing coalition. 
 
COMMENT - THE MORE THINGS CHANGE... 
----------------------------------- 
¶6. (SBU) The "oppositionist" and "governist" wings are 
sometimes referred to as "(former-President) Cardoso's 
widows" and "Lula's courtesans".  The real outcome of the 
November 10 meeting was to call a national convention for 
December 12.  In the past two years, decision points such as 
this have always had one result:  the PMDB remains awkwardly 
in Lula's coalition but insists on getting more perks in 
order to solidify its wavering loyalties.  It is possible 
that this time will be different.  October's municipal 
elections reanimated many of the local PT-PMDB party 
struggles that had lain dormant earlier in Lula's term.  And 
the elections also marked Lula's halfway point, meaning the 
parties must begin in earnest their jockeying for the 2006 
national elections. 
 
¶7. (SBU) In advance of the December 12 PMDB convention, look 
for the administration to throw some bones to the party, 
ranging from pork spending (Lula has queued up some USD$200 
million in funding for "congressional amendments" to be 
disbursed by year's end), to a promise of more policy 
influence within the administration, to an offer of the 
vice-presidential slot on Lula's 2006 campaign slate.  If, on 
December 12, the PMDB chooses to remain in the coalition, 
look for this same crisis to erupt again in 2005. 
 
¶8. (SBU) It would be a blow to Lula if the PMDB were to pull 
out of the coalition and leave his legislative agenda in 
limbo.  But the PMDB has never pretended to be more than a 
high-maintenance ally-of-convenience whose constant sniping 
often exposes coalition fissures.  If the party were to bolt, 
it would leave a power vacuum and empty cabinet seats that 
could be filled by other parties, while Lula could win over 
many PMDB votes in Congress with special favors.  At this 
moment we do not judge that the PMDB is any more likely to 
leave the coalition than it was in the past.  But if the 
balance of power should turn by the December 12 party 
convention, the coalition would be damaged but not crippled 
by the party's departure. 
DANILOVICH