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Viewing cable 04ANKARA5996, TURKEY: MFA NON-PAPER ON SECURITY CONCERNS OF

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04ANKARA5996 2004-10-21 14:38 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Ankara
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

211438Z Oct 04
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 005996 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MOPS ECON PREL PTER IZ TU
SUBJECT:  TURKEY:  MFA NON-PAPER ON SECURITY CONCERNS OF 
TURKISH DRIVERS IN IRAQ 
 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED 
 
1.  (SBU) During an October 20 meeting (reported Septel) to 
discuss steps the GOT is taking to address security concerns 
of Turkish truck drivers, Turkish MFA DDG for Economic 
Affairs presented EconCouns with a non-paper listing a 
number of concerns and suggestions for operational 
improvements in the provision of security to Turkish 
truckers.  The non-paper is based primarily on reports from 
truckers.  It includes a number of previously-reported 
complaints about the adequacy of military escorts and or 
difficulties receiving compensation for damage and theft. 
It also raises some new issues, including reports that U.S. 
military personnel have burned broken-down trucks to prevent 
them from falling into the hands of Iraqi groups and that 
drivers were beaten by U.S. military personnel.  We have no 
factual basis on which to judge the accuracy of these claims 
and allegations, but since the GOT provided the paper to us 
as part of their dialogue with us on trucker security, we 
felt it necessary to pass it on to addressees. 
 
2.  (SBU) Begin text of non paper: 
 
Despite lack of security and threats to their lives, and a 
mounting increase in the kidnapping and killing of Turkish 
truck drivers recently, they are continuing to transport 
humanitarian supply and other goods to the Iraqi people, and 
are also transporting the necessary supplies to the 
Multinational Force. 
 
On the whole, the reinforcement of security measures by the 
US Government under difficult conditions, by providing 
escorts for convoys driven by Turkish truck drivers is 
appreciated, knowing that not all Turkish trucks are 
provided with security. 
 
Yet, we have received information from our truck drivers 
that the stepping up of security measures has been only of a 
temporary nature; namely, at times when our drivers have 
boycotted voyaging (traveling), or when large-scale attacks 
have occurred. 
 
In April 2004 every 3-4 trucks were said to have been 
accompanied by one escort, as well as with a military 
helicopter.  It would be useful to continue this practice. 
 
We would welcome the US keeping the number of vehicles at no 
more than 20 in each convoy. Unloaded trucks on their return 
trip should not travel at night and should enjoy the same 
level of security along the whole route, not just in and 
around Baghdad. 
 
We have also been informed that there has been a return to 
the three-car escort system once again.  It should be noted 
however that three escorts are not sufficient to provide 
security for a convoy of half a kilometers' length (up to 20 
vehicles). 
 
Turkish citizens have let us know that, in the event of an 
attack on the convoys, the first to leave the scene of the 
event have been the escorts, and that the trucks have been 
used as shields to protect the escort vehicles and their 
military personnel. 
 
We have even heard that the lorries are being utilized as 
shields against attacks around the military camps at night 
while the drivers sleep in them. 
 
For example, when trucks unload their cargo in Iraq and set 
out on their return trip, although the number of vehicles in 
the convoy numbers 40-50, only 3 escorts are said to be 
provided, the voyage is done at night, with no head lights 
allowed to be turned on. 
 
Although the security measures have been increased 
relatively in and around Baghdad where there are more US 
military units or other related organizations, the same 
protection measures have not been extended to other areas, 
especially for convoys which have unloaded and are on their 
way back. 
 
When a vehicle is in need of being repaired, the drivers are 
forced to leave their trucks. The cargo is then collected by 
another towing vehicle while the original one is abandoned 
on the road. 
On some occasions, in order to prevent the trucks from 
falling into the hands of Iraqi groups, it has been reported 
that the lorries are burned along with their towing vehicles 
by US military personnel. 
 
In other instances, the trucks are handed over to the Iraqi 
police, the whereabouts of which are later never determined. 
 
The reports drawn up by the US officials in Iraq about such 
incidents are said to reflect only a part of the reality and 
seem to be insufficient, and allegedly lately these reports 
have not even been prepared. 
 
As a result, problems arise about compensation and other 
rights. 
 
It is clear from the examples of the contracts signed 
between the US firms and the Kuwaiti subcontractors, that 
the US firms such as PWC do not assume any responsibility 
concerning the lorries. Instead responsibility is 
transferred over to the subcontracting firm. The Kuwaiti 
subcontractors in turn turn over this responsibility to the 
Turkish firms from which they rent the trucks and drivers. 
 
In the delivery form which is to be signed by the drivers 
before going on their trip, it is indicated that the US firm 
PWC is not to be held responsible for any losses or theft 
incurred by the drivers or trucks in Kuwait or Iraq. 
 
Thus in practice, the whole responsibility concerning the 
lorries is left to the drivers. 
 
It is for this reason that some drivers are unwilling to 
leave their vehicles, when a reparation is necessary. The 
concerned drivers claim to have been coerced out of their 
vehicles, even beaten by US military personnel, as a result 
of which have had broken limbs. 
 
The above-mentioned occurrences have led to unrest among 
Turkish drivers who are already working under very hard 
circumstances, and have increased their unwillingness to 
resume work. 
 
It is requested that these matters are taken up with the 
relevant US authorities, in order to enhance security 
measures, and to prevent these unfortunate acts displayed by 
US troops. 
 
It would be appreciated if the involved companies' contracts 
could be altered to include clauses on the compensation of 
drivers and their vehicles, as well as a clause on financial 
support to be disbursed to the families of the drivers in 
case of death as a result of abduction or attack. 
 
3. (U) Baghdad minimize considered.