This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001811 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG AND USAID 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM NI SU
SUBJECT: ROCKY BEGINNING FOR DARFUR TALKS IN ABUJA 
REF:  ABUJA 1797 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED.  NOT FOR POSTING ON THE INTRANET 
OR INTERNET. 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY:.  After a brief opening ceremony on 
October 21 (reftel), tThe second round of Darfur peace talks 
in Abuja has  started slowly, as key Move.  After a brief 
opening ceremony on August 21, the delayed arrival of 
several members of the SLM and JEM delegations  and lack of 
a well-articulated AU gameplan postponed the first 
substantive negotiations until October 25.  The Special 
Representative of the UN Secretary General for Sudan, Jan 
Pronk, addressed a special session of the talks on October 
24, advising the parties that as the security issues had 
been "resolved for them," they should move immediately to 
address political issues.  If the rebel movements were not 
ready to sign the humanitarian protocol at the outset, they 
should consider an exchange of letters on intent to sign, 
and pledge to implement the substance immediately.  The AU 
leadership subsequently decided to pursue the political 
agenda in the plenary, and work in a smaller committee to 
hammer out an acceptable security protocol.  The rebel 
movements will not, however, meet directly in committee with 
the GOS, and the mediation will have to shuttle texts and 
ideas. 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  Summary continued:  The Sudan Liberation Army 
(SLA) and Movement for Justice and Equality (JEM) have been 
seriously angered by the lengthy delays incurred in getting 
them to the talks.  They blame this on the AU.  The late 
arrivals may also have contributed to a festering rift 
within the SLA, which has led to a 24 hour suspension of the 
talks on October 26; the SLA will not likely be ready to 
engage further on substance until the leadership crisis is 
resolved.  SLA Secretary General Minowi is expected on 
October 27. In-fighting within the SLA is exacerbated by 
further distancing between the movements and the government 
on the one hand, and between SLA and JEM on the other. 
Absence of senior Nigerian participation may be remedied on 
October 27 with the anticipated return of the foreign 
minister.   End Summary. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) The failure of the AU to get both movements' 
representatives and its own key staff to Abuja - for 
whatever reason - has contributed to a slow start in getting 
to substance.  The rebels are incensed about what they see 
as incompetence at best, and design at worst.  Key members 
of the AU mediation team still remain in Addis where they 
are needed to ensure that the deployment of the expanded AU 
monitoring force goes forward.  The absence of senior 
Nigerian presence on the floor has also been apparent.  The 
situation may improve now, as the rest of the AU mediation 
team arrives today, and Nigerian FM Adeniji returns to Abuja 
tomorrow.  SLA General Secretary Minowi is also expected to 
arrive Wednesday. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) During a pre-plenary planning session October 24, 
the AU mediation team announced its intention to focus on 
moving immediately to the political agenda.  SRSG Pronk's 
admonition, plus the AU's own unhappy experience with the 
security protocol during Abuja I, both contributed to a 
reluctance to engage immediately on the security protocol. 
The U.S., backed by the EU (Dutch presidency, Swedish 
advisor for the EC, and France), pushed back strongly that 
security must be addressed successfully in this round, and 
the mediator agreed to ask the parties to form a committee 
to address outstanding security issues parallel to plenum 
discussion of political issues.   The parties agreed to the 
formula during the opening plenum October 26, but the 
movements refused to engage directly with GOS reps when they 
realized they would be doing so in a smaller format.  They 
required instead that either the security issues be taken 
back to the plenum, or that the mediation pursue a shuttle 
between the parties in a committee context.  Anxious to move 
to the political agenda, the mediation has chosen the latter 
option. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) The October 25 opening plenum appears to have 
demonstrated that the Government intends to pursue its 
earlier strategy that minimizes the situation, exaggerates 
its readiness to work with the international community, and 
places almost all responsibility for violence on the rebels. 
JEM, surprisingly, took a "responsible" line, avoiding 
blanket accusations and seeking a frank dialogue.  SLA 
President Abdel Wahid, on the other hand, built up in the 
course of a rambling denunciation of the government to 
requesting "invasion" of Sudan by the international 
community. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Abdel Wahid's lack of realism in what might and 
might not be anticipated from the international community 
has contributed to the open rift within the SLA.  Tribal 
affiliations also play a role, as do allegations by the 
Minowi faction that JEM is seeking to divide the SLA by 
urging Abel Wahid to assume a more aggressive, radical 
posture.  Minowi's anticipated arrival tomorrow may enable 
the leadership here to resolve the crisis, but until there 
is a resolution, the SLA will find it hard to come back to 
the table effectively, if at all.  Wahid has clouded the 
already hazy waters with nonsensical and unhelpful speeches, 
embarrassing even his own men.  SLM reps explained to us 
that they want Wahid to leave, as he was a problem at Abuja 
I and is a problem now.  However, as he is from the Fur 
tribe, they fear an accusation that the Zaghawa are trying 
to grab control.  Thus they anxiously await Minawi, who will 
try to sort it out or use the opportunity to push Wahid to 
one side. 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  The JEM is more forceful than previously and as 
always well organized.  Although they have little impact in 
the field, they have good political and at times PR skills. 
They appear to have taken some of the charm school the 
Center for Humanitarian Dialogue and the International 
Crisis Group have been making available to both movement 
delegations to good use.  JEM has its own problems with the 
newest spin off group now demanding recognition. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Comment:  The international observers are 
determined that the security situation - at a minimum - must 
be successfully addressed in the second round at Abuja.  All 
parties, including the GOS, appear to agree.  The mediator 
hopes to close on November 4, to prepare for the Eid and to 
report to the UN Security Council in Nairobi later in the 
month.  However, the collapse of the SLA's decision-making 
structure is a serious setback.  When SLA spokesman Sharif 
Harir asked for a day's postponement on October 26, it was 
obvious that al-Gabeid was unaware of the internal disarray 
within the movement, and mistook the request to be related 
solely to policy issues.  He now understands that there is a 
fundamental issue that the movement must resolve before it 
can return effectively to the negotiations.  In the 
meantime, he intends to seek input on both the political and 
security agenda from the GOS and the JEM.  The international 
observers are looking to the AU to uptake the draft security 
protocol from the first round at Abuja to take into account 
the measures now required by UNSCR 1564, which resolved some 
of the key issues that prevented closure during the previous 
round.  The talks are also waiting for the arrival of key 
members of the AU mediation team, who are needed to provide 
better organization and more focused direction.  Finally, we 
hope that the return of Nigerian FM Adeniji will lead to 
more senior and more active Nigerian participation.  End 
Comment. 
 
¶9. (U) Minimize considered. 
CAMPBELL