This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 THE HAGUE 002321 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AC/CB, NP/CBM, VC/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) 
NSC FOR JOECK 
WINPAC FOR LIEPMAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WEEKLY WRAP-UP 
FOR SEPTEMBER 10, 2004 
 
REF: STATE 191103 (NOTAL) 
 
This is CWC-103-04. 
 
--------------------------- 
2005 BUDGET - U.S. CONCERNS 
--------------------------- 
 
¶1.  (U)  On September 8, Del reps met with Rick Martin, head 
of the OPCW's Budget and Finance Branch, and Ali Asghar 
Special Advisor on B&F issues, to outline substantive U.S. 
requirements outlined in reftel.  In response to the 
requirements raised, Asghar noted that there is currently 
only one "political" consultant (the South Korean) being 
funded by the Technical Secretariat.  Asghar promised to 
check on the prospect of future funding of the position, 
observing that at present only the Director General knows 
what the prospects are for continued funding of that 
position.  Asghar and Martin also said they would look into 
Verification Information System funding, and Del reps later 
got an informal response that it looked as though the VIS 
could indeed be funded as a regular item in the OPCW budget 
and not/not out of the U.S. voluntary contribution.  Asghar 
promised to provide a comprehensive list of all Temporary 
Assistance Contract (TAC) positions and the rationale for the 
positions.  Martin and Asghar said the DG had made provisions 
for increased OCPF funding in the budget and thus far they 
have not heard any objections from SP's on the issue. 
 
¶2.  (U)  With regard to the proposed increases in funding for 
the DG's travel and hospitality, Asghar noted that the level 
of funding being requested reflected the actual expenditures 
made in 2004, and is an amount consistent with the budget for 
travel and hospitality activities before the end of DG 
Bustani's tenure.  The large percentage increase is also a 
result of the fact that for the first time, the DG's travel 
and representation, which had been spread over separate 
categories, have been merged into in a single budget item. 
Asghar promised to provide a more thorough explanation for 
the requested increase in the DG's funds for these two items. 
 In separate discussions, budget co-facilitator Ian Mundell 
(Canada) indicated a personal view that the amounts requested 
by the DG for travel and hospitality for 2005 were consistent 
with what would be expected of the head of an international 
organization. 
 
--------------------------------- 
2005 BUDGET - TAC SECURITY GUARDS 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (U)  The first day of the latest round of budget 
consultations on September 7 focused on the proposed 
conversion of twenty security guards from TAC to fixed-term 
employee status, and more generally the overall use of TACs 
within the OPCW. There were no strong objections by 
delegations to the proposal, though there were several 
questions about the cost of the conversion and the impact it 
would have on the overall number on fixed-term positions 
within the OPCW. 
 
¶4.  (U) Herb Schulz (Director of Administration), Rob Simpson 
(head of security) and Asghar clarified that any personnel 
converted to fixed-term status would be local hires and would 
be hired for a period of three years with an option to extend 
their contracts annually thereafter. They would also be 
subject to a six-month probationary period and the OPCW 
performance appraisal system, but would not be subject to the 
tenure policy.  The converted employees would be entitled to 
the dependency allowance, but not other allowances granted to 
international staff. The TS reps emphasized that there is no 
guarantee that the guards currently employed as TACs would 
all be hired as fixed-term employees and that it expects to 
get a more qualified applicant pool for fixed-term positions. 
¶5.  (U)  The TS also believes that that the guard force will 
be more highly motivated and stable as fixed-term employees, 
citing the fact that the current contractor often keeps 
guards at OPCW for training purposes for only a year before 
moving them on to other assignments.  They suggested that the 
conversion of the positions would also help to protect the 
OPCW from any potential legal action from employees who were 
held in TAC positions for two years or longer, despite the 
fact that the TS's own regulations are that TACs should be 
utilized for a maximum of one year in the absence of 
compelling circumstances. 
 
¶6.  (U)  With regard to the specific questions from 
Washington on the numbers provided in the supplemental 
Information Paper, Simpson emphasized that the key numbers 
are: 
-- The 2004 cost for TACs is 830,000 Euros. 
-- The 2005 cost if the proposed change is adopted is 851,486 
Euros.  Schulz clarified that the EUR 38,583 cited in Para 3 
of the TS Information Paper #4 is included in the EUR 851,486 
figure. 
-- The estimated cost of EUR 999,359 in para. 5 of the 
Information Paper is the cost of an all-contract guard force, 
and is provided for comparison purposes only. 
 
¶7.  (U) Simpson emphasized that this last figure was based on 
the fact that there has been much consolidation within the 
security services sector in Europe over the last year, noting 
that the last time they had discussions with their current 
security firm, the firm had asked for an increase of 15%. 
Schulz added that most security companies factor in 
administrative overhead costs of 30-40% in their contracts. 
 
¶8.  (U) The U.S. asked the TS about the number of TACs and 
Special Service Agreement (SSA) personnel employed throughout 
the OPCW and the length of time that TACs have served. The TS 
said that they would provide us with the number of TACs and 
SSA staff for the organization, broken down by 
office/division, with comparisons for 2004 and 2005, and with 
length of service as a TAC. The TS conceded that some 
individuals have been serving in TAC positions for several 
years, but that the TS was making a good faith effort to 
convert these positions to fixed-term positions when 
appropriate. Currently the TS requires TAC employees to take 
a contract break short of the one-year window.  With regard 
to the issue of possible ILO suits and liability by the OPCW 
should these TAC personnel not be converted to fixed-term 
positions, the topic will be addressed after receiving the TS 
information on TACs and SSA staff, and will arise at later 
consultations which focus on consultants and General 
Temporary Assistance. 
 
¶9.  (U) Several delegations stated that they felt that it 
would be necessary for the EC to explicitly approve an 
increase in the ceiling on fixed-term positions if the 
security guard conversion is to be approved.  The TS 
responded that in the current 2005 budget request the TS was 
only asking for the funding for 482 positions so that an 
increase of 20 positions converted from TAC to fixed-term 
would only raise the total to 502 positions - below the 507 
fixed-term ceiling. 
 
------------------------------------ 
2005 BUDGET - STAFF SALARY INCREASES 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶10.  (U)  The second day of budget discussions on September 8 
focused almost exclusively on the methodology of staff costs 
in the 2005 budget.  Most delegations found the explanations 
offered by the TS of how salary increases were determined to 
be somewhat unclear at best.  After several attempts by 
Asghar to clarify and re-clarify the process, it appears that 
the TS (based on a recommendation of the Office of Internal 
Oversight) simply took the average of the salary increases 
for P staff over the last five years (3.785%) and rounded it 
down to 3.6%. Similarly the TS took the five-year average 
increase of the GS staff of 4.51% and round it up to 5%. When 
asked why 3.785 was rounded down to 3.6 and 4.51 was rounded 
up to 5, the TS response was less than clear.  Many of the 
delegations were confused by the fact that the TS had made 
reference to the proposed UN salary increase of 1.88% in the 
information paper the TS had provided delegations. In 
reality, according to Asghar, the UN 1.88% figure had no 
bearing on the salary increases proposed by the TS.  The 
chart requested by Washington for P and GS base salary 
increases over the past five years has been provided, and has 
been FAXed to AC/CB. 
 
¶11.  (U) Several delegations then requested that the TS 
provide the salaries (including post allowance) denominated 
in Euros for the last five years for both P and GS staff. 
Delegations also asked for clarification of the post 
allowance rates and the methodology for calculating them. 
Many delegations, including the U.S., were confused by the 
explanation in Para 2 of the information sheet provided by 
the TS concerning the merger of a percentage of the post 
allowance into the base salary. The Canadian delegation 
questioned why OPCW employees, who are all hired to work in 
The Hague, receive a Post Adjustment Allowance as part of the 
base salary calculation, in the first place. While 
delegations were pleased to receive a clarification of the TS 
methodology, most WEOG delegations appeared likely to push in 
the future for a more transparent and rational methodology 
for calculating future salary increases. 
 
¶12.  (U) The number of fixed-term positions at the OPCW arose 
again in this facilitation, and the TS clarified that if the 
20 security guard positions are converted to fixed-term 
positions, they would be "fenced in."  That would mean that 
these 20 new positions could never be used for anything other 
than security positions. (Note: such a distinction may be 
critical should delegations return to the DG's request for 
position reclassification authority.) 
 
¶13.  (U) In general, the discussions provided delegations 
with more information on how the TS has been calculating 
salary increases.  It was by no means satisfactory.  However, 
there was no suggestion from delegations on what alternative 
calculation method would be preferable.  Washington may wish 
to consider how it wishes to proceed in addressing this issue 
in the budget document.  The initial, informal response from 
some delegations is to consider including something in the 
budget document which notes that the TS should re-assess 
whether the salary increase calculation is acceptable, and 
leave open what would be a good alternative.  Should 
Washington have a specific proposal (such as strictly abiding 
by the ICSC standard), it may be valuable to float it 
informally with the TS outside of the budget facilitations. 
In the absence of a specific proposal, the best outcome may 
be to highlight the issue for TS consideration and 
subsequently make suggestions on what formula they may wish 
to use. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
RUSSIA: REEVALUATION OF DESTRUCTION PROGRAM? 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶14.  (U)  There has been discussion in the WEOG regarding an 
August 9 Russian News Agency report that Moscow will 
substantially increase the amount of funding for CW 
destruction, and will shift its focus regarding destruction 
facilities.  The RNA report indicates that while 175 million 
USD was allocated for CW destruction in 2004, the budget will 
provide for 433 million USD in 2005.  The increases are due 
to setbacks faced by the Russian program, as well as the fact 
that pledges of financial and technical support from other 
countries (the U.S. is the target of the accusation) have, 
according to Russian sources, not been kept.  As a result, 
completion of Shchuch'ye is going slowly and the Russian 
priority will be on completing the Maradykovo and Kambarka 
destruction facilities. 
 
¶15.  (U)  Mark Matthews (U.K.) spoke with a Russian 
delegation member who confessed that the delegation had no 
more information than what was contained in the article.  The 
Russian indicated that their understanding is that there is 
indeed a reassessment under way in Moscow, but that they had 
no details.  However they thought the proposed budget 
increase for CW destruction was exceptionally high.  Ronald 
Munch of the German delegation reported that FRG officials in 
Moscow had confirmed that there may be some increase, but 
certainly not at the level reported by the RNA.  The Russians 
also informed the Germans that destruction at Shchuch'ye only 
would begin in 2008.  (Note: WEOG delegations clearly 
indicated an interest in any additional insights Washington 
may have about the extent of Russian re-evaluation of its 
destruction program.) 
 
--------------- 
LATEST ON RABTA 
--------------- 
 
¶16.    (U) On September 10, the TS issued three voluminous 
documents comprising the Rabta conversion request; the 
destruction plans for Rabta 1 and Rabta 2, and the conversion 
request itself.  These have been DHLd to AC/CB.  Issuance of 
these documents meets the requirement of the convention that 
they be available to delegations at least 30 days prior to 
their consideration by the Council.  Delegation understands 
the combined plan for conversion and verification will be 
produced and available before the upcoming Council session, 
but with an EC 39 number since the conversion request has not 
yet been considered.  The cover note to the combined plan 
will acknowledge that the conversion request has not yet been 
approved, and clarify that the combined plan cannot be 
formally considered until the request is approved. 
 
¶17.  (U) Delegation has created a tentative schedule for 
meetings on September 21 and 22 with the UK, Italy, and 
Libya, to consider our strategy for ensuring success at the 
upcoming Council session.  In addition, at least one meeting 
will be held among U.S., UK, Italy, Libya, Germany, and the 
TS, to scrutinize the conversion request with an eye to 
 
SIPDIS 
producing a draft corrigendum before the EC.  The present 
document contains mistakes of varying significance (though 
none apparently major) that should be corrected in such a 
corrigendum.  In particular, most if not all of the items in 
the "Other Comments and Need for Clarification" section of 
our September 3 inputs still need to be incorporated.  In the 
short time available to them, the TS focused on including our 
"major deficiencies" and generally cleaning up and formatting 
the documents prior to their issuance. 
 
¶18.  (U) Delegation continues to have no solid news about 
where Russia stands with regard to the technical change 
request.  Our primary interlocutor with the Russian 
delegation, Gennadi Lutay, has been in Moscow, and his 
second, Victor Domrachev, reports they have had no 
instructions from Moscow so far, though he was expecting it 
"any day now."  When asked whether Moscow's decision would be 
informed or influenced by the DG note, Domrachev indicated 
they had not seen it yet and did not know there was one.  He 
pledged to get a copy and send it to Moscow for 
consideration.  Delegation will attempt in the next few days 
to ascertain whether ignorance of the existence of the DG 
note was an isolated instance or a generalized problem that 
needs to be corrected.  Ambassador Javits will also contact 
Russian Ambassador Gevorgian to attempt to generate some 
urgency with regard to receiving instructions from Moscow 
about how Russia will respond to the technical change. 
 
--------- 
ARTICLE X 
--------- 
 
¶19.  (U)  On September 8, Del reps met with Gabrielle Kruger 
(U.K.) facilitator for Article X.  Kruger reported that she 
had discussed the revised draft format for the annual 
reporting of information on national programmes for 
protection against CW, and that there had been "no 
show-stoppers" so far.  She noted that she had been unable to 
contact the French delegation.  Del will meet with Kruger on 
Sep. 20 to go over the proposed U.S. changes to the latest 
draft, and hopes to have differences resolved before the next 
facilitation on September 29. 
 
¶20.  (U)  Javits sends. 
 
SOBEL