This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS  ROME 003669 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y (CORRECTING PARAS. MARKINGS) 
 
UNCLASSIFIED BUT SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FROM U.S. MISSION IN ROME 
 
STATE FOR IO/EDA AND AFR 
INFO USAID FOR DCHA, OFDA GOTTLIEB AND AFR LAVELLE 
USDA FOR FAS HUGHES 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH/USAID 
BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: EAID EAGR AF PREF UN FAO
SUBJECT: Sparring with FAO over Locusts 
 
REF: (A) Rome 722, (B) Rome 1488, (C) State 165987 
 
¶1. (U)  Summary.  Over the past several weeks we have been 
active in promoting a better international response to 
the Sahel desert locust emergency.  On September 10, 
2004, USUN Rome invited permanent representatives of 
potential donor countries and countries affected by the 
current outbreak of desert locusts concentrated in 
Northwest Africa to discuss the desert locust problem and 
what can be done about it.  The meeting gave the parties 
an opportunity to sound out their views in advance of an 
informal FAO meeting scheduled for the following Friday, 
on September 17, 2004.  In the FAO event, Director 
General (DG) Diouf blamed poor donor response, 
emphasizing the few funds "received," for FAO's slow 
progress in controlling the desert locust outbreak. 
Several affected countries lobbied for more 
contributions, and some donor countries questioned FAO's 
capacity to respond to the desert locust outbreak 
appropriately. 
 
¶2.  (U)  In a press briefing later the same day, Diouf 
reiterated the criticism of donor countries for the weak 
international response to the crisis.  In reply, 
Ambassador Hall made a statement to Reuters that 
expressed the US' serious disappointment with how FAO had 
dealt with the crisis.  The Ambassador also enumerated 
FAO failings in more detail in a non-public letter sent 
to DG Diouf.  The Reuters service piece effectively got 
through our message.  In a meeting with the Ambassador on 
September 21, Diouf agreed that there was room all around 
for a better coordinated and implemented approach to the 
crisis. On September 22, we received from Diouf a 
detailed response to our letter.  Both letters are being 
sent septel.  End summary. 
 
US Mission Discussion with Donors 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (U)  At the September 10 meeting, Ambassador Hall opened 
the meeting by inviting delegates to be candid in 
discussing how the natural calamity arose and what should 
be done now, and he also encouraged delegates to share 
information received from their missions and field 
offices. 
 
¶4. (U)  Dr. Yene T. Belayneh, USAID/DCHA/OFDA's locust expert, 
summarized the genesis of the desert locust outbreak, 
current status, extent of damage, and next steps.  Dr. 
Belayneh stated that much of the approximately $40 
million pledged to FAO was provided too late to contain 
the locusts, and he described likely scenarios in the 
near future. 
 
¶5. (U)  Discussions shifted to FAO's role in mobilizing a 
coherent and effective response to the locust crisis. 
FAO was quick to point out that its main role is to 
provide information and give advice to the governments of 
affected countries.  In addition, given FAO's mandate as 
the lead UN agency for locust control activities, some of 
the meeting's attendees were surprised that FAO did not 
act earlier and establish its Emergency Center for Locust 
Operations (ECLO) until August 25, 2004, more than ten 
months after the initial locust outbreak and six months 
after its formal appeal. 
 
¶6. (U)  FAO explained that ECLO's purpose is to avoid 
duplication of effort at headquarters, communicate expert 
guidance more effectively with the field and other 
stakeholders.  It also formalized an internal working 
 
group consisting of representatives from three 
departments: Administration and Finance (AF), Agriculture 
(AG), and Technical Cooperation (TC), along with 
coordination with the Office of the Director-General.  In 
addition, FAO stated that ECLO had been operational for 
some time and the announcement was merely a formality. 
 
¶7. (SBU)  FAO also represented that although it has received 
$24.2 million in formal commitments, only $9.5 million is 
available for expenditures.  The difference, $14.7M, 
cannot be spent because, according to FAO, "We haven't 
received the money from the donors."  In addition to 
formal commitments, FAO said that another $9.4 million is 
in the pipeline.  (Comment: These figures do not tally 
with higher figures FAO provided a day earlier, nor do 
they include funds provided in 2003 from the USAID/OFDA 
grant for emergency pest control.) 
 
¶8. (SBU)  European and USG representatives delved more deeply 
into FAO's use of available funds to respond quickly to 
emergencies.  FAO mentioned that it had established and 
is using a rapid response fund, which it characterized as 
a revolving fund of $2M.  To date, FAO estimates that it 
has used the fund to spend "in the neighborhood of $500K 
to $1M." 
 
¶9. (SBU)  The Dutch Ambassador spoke at length about "serious 
obstacles" faced by FAO in mobilizing resources and 
reporting its actions effectively.  He urged FAO to 
provide more visibility and transparency about the use of 
funds, particularly what FAO is providing in people and 
equipment, in order to permit his government to assess 
FAO's efforts to date.  "We need more information about 
how money is spent and where."  He also urged FAO to 
establish a mechanism for better regional coordination. 
 
Diouf Meeting with Donors 
------------------------- 
 
¶10. (U)  A week later, on September 17, DG Diouf provided an 
extensive chronology of FAO's actions to notify the 
international community about the locust upsurge, the 
evolution of FAO's appeal from $9 million in February, to 
$30 million in July, and now $100 million, and he also 
praised FAO's organizational capacity to deal effectively 
with the emergency. 
 
¶11. (U)  During several interventions DG Diouf stated that FAO 
has "received" only $4 million  "$2 million arrived two 
days ago from the US" -- and he tied the limited funds 
received with FAO's limited ability to respond to the 
crisis.  He also said that donor countries "committed" 
$15.8M, but because funds in such amounts have not been 
"received," (i.e., in the bank), FAO cannot "spend" or 
"transfer" them to other accounts. 
 
¶12. (SBU)  Algeria, Cape Verde, Mali, and Mauritania asked for 
more contributions, and Morocco suggested that a "new 
mechanism" might be needed to control the outbreak. 
 
¶13. (SBU)  Responding to Diouf's criticism of donors while 
neglecting his own organization's failures, Ambassador 
Hall said that all parties -- donor countries, recipient 
countries, "and the FAO -- could do better."  He also 
related that reports from the field about FAO indicate 
that in spite of late contributions, FAO should have 
responded more effectively and been better organized. 
 
¶14. (SBU)  France asked for greater visibility into all sources 
of funds allocated for the desert locust outbreak.  Italy 
 
stated that the real issue is not whether the parties 
have lived up to their responsibilities, but whether FAO 
has the right mechanisms in place to manage funds 
received.  The Netherlands recommended that FAO focus on 
limiting future crop damage because of the prospect for 
food insecurity in the area.  In addition, future 
assistance may be bilateral, not multilateral, suggesting 
that the Netherlands may provide funds to FAO at the 
country level, but not to FAO headquarters. 
 
¶15. (SBU)  IFAD has given permission to countries in the region 
to transfer a total of $1.5 million in IFAD-provided 
funds to FAO at the country level.  The EC announced that 
it is supporting a request of 30 million Euros, that a 
total of 32 million Euros for the locust outbreak will be 
approved by the end of September 2004. 
 
¶16. (SBU) Canada asked whether FAO has systems in place to use 
such large infusions of funds.  (Comment: We later 
learned that this comment from the Canadian Ambassador 
had deeply upset DG Diouf.  Immediately after the 
September 17 press conference, he chaired a two-hour 
session going through FAO's actions with his senior 
staff.  His ending comment to his staff was, "Now that we 
have the resources, we better deliver.") 
 
Press play 
--------- 
 
¶17. (U)  When Diouf took his criticism of donors to the press, 
the Ambassador, in an interview with Reuters, levied a 
barrage at FAO's own inadequacies in attacking the 
crisis. The Reuters story achieved the results we hoped 
for.  In a meeting on September 21, Diouf admitted to the 
Ambassador there was plenty of blame to share, from the 
recipient countries, to the donors, to FAO, itself.  In 
Diouf's written response to the Ambassador's letter 
criticizing FAO's performance in meeting the needs of 
this crisis, Diouf agreed to our suggestion that an 
after-action lessons-learned assessment would be useful. 
 
 
Cleverley 
 
 
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	2004ROME03669 - Classification: UNCLASSIFIED