This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 THE HAGUE 002052 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR G, INL, INL/T, EUR/UBI 
ONDCP FOR AGRESTI 
DEA FOR OFE/MORALES, COLEY 
DOJ FOR OIA/FRIEDMAN 
BRUSSELS FOR USEU, LEGATT 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SNAR KCRM NL
SUBJECT: CORRUPTION AND DRUG TRAFFICKING AT SCHIPHOL AIRPORT 
 
REF: (A) THE HAGUE 293; (B) THE HAGUE 1784 (C) 2003 THE 
HAGUE 3199 (D) PARAMARIBO 546 
 
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Summary 
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¶1.  The Schiphol 100% control measure, designed by Justice 
Minister Donner to stop drug trafficking into the 
Netherlands from the Netherlands Antilles, Aruba, Suriname, 
and later Venezuela, is now in its ninth month.  Donner 
touts the measure as a success, citing declining cocaine 
seizures at Schiphol as an indicator The measure deters drug 
trafficking.  Based on this assessment, the Minister plans 
to continue the policy indefinitely.  Widely publicized 
attempts by drug traffickers to circumvent the 100% 
controls, however, have raised questions about their 
efficacy.  Recent investigations at Schiphol, for example, 
led to the arrests of fourteen baggage handlers and four 
shop assistants accused of smuggling drugs through 
uncontrolled airport channels.  In addition, Dutch local law 
enforcement and press claim the Schiphol controls have led 
to large-scale diversion of drug trafficking to other 
regions.  Donner disagrees and has stated law enforcement is 
on alert for possible diversion.  Post is contacting law 
enforcement elsewhere to make an assessment. 
 
¶2.  Summary Con't: U.S. continues to express concern about 
the "catch and release" of low-level couriers component of 
the Schiphol control policy.  Dutch law enforcement 
officials do not interrogate couriers prior to release.  Nor 
do they share basic identifying information with the U.S., 
inhibiting international investigations and discovery of 
underlying criminal networks.  Embassy (including DEA) 
officers are pushing for access to data on drug couriers 
arrested or detained at Schiphol.  End Summary 
 
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Corruption 
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¶3.  The arrest in Suriname on July 26 of a Dutch national 
ended an investigation into a drug trafficking organization 
engaged in the import of cocaine through the secured baggage 
handling area at Schiphol.  The suspect was recently 
deported to the Netherlands.  In April 2003, Schiphol 
Customs officers discovered two baggage containers 
containing 40 kilos of cocaine.  An investigation by the 
CargoHarc team, comprised of Kmar military police, fiscal 
investigation/control service (FIOD-ECD) and Customs and led 
by the Haarlem public prosecutor, showed criminals in 
various South American countries, including Curacao and 
Brazil, had been hiding shipments of cocaine in suitcases 
and baggage containers.  Upon unloading at Schiphol, the 
drugs were removed and taken outside to avoid screening. 
Since August 2003, 19 Dutch suspects have been arrested, 
including 14 baggage handlers.  In addition to seizures of 
more than 60 kilos of cocaine, the police have seized 
firearms, 750,000 euros in cash, jewelry, cars and a boat. 
In December 2003, the Schiphol court convicted and sentenced 
the first six suspects to seven years imprisonment.  The 
case against the other 13 is scheduled for Fall 2004. 
 
¶4.  On July 14, 2004, the Kmar military police reported a 
Kmar/Customs investigation had proven personnel of tax-free 
shops at the airport had played an important role in cocaine 
trafficking.  Four shop assistants and five drug couriers 
have been arrested so far.  According to Kmar, they had been 
working in the "See Buy Fly" shops where security passes are 
required.  Baggage of shop assistants is searched on entry, 
but only randomly upon departure.  The case confirms the 
image of the airport as a prominent transit point for 
cocaine. 
 
¶5.  The issue of drug corruption at Schiphol has also earned 
parliamentary attention.  In April 2004, Justice Minister 
Donner said in reply to Lower House (Second Chamber) 
questions that investigations had shown organized crime was 
trying to press and bribe employees and law enforcement 
personnel into criminal drug activities.  Donner said, over 
the past three years, 18 employees of private organizations 
working at Schiphol had been prosecuted, in addition to the 
14 KLM baggage handlers arrested in February.  Donner could 
not state how many public sector employees had been arrested 
and prosecuted because the information is not public. 
 
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Prevention and Investigation of Corruption 
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¶6.  According to Donner, the "Schiphol Integrity Platform," 
a public-private partnership at Schiphol meant to reduce 
crime at the airport, encourages companies established at 
the airport to adopt National Crime Squad recommendations 
about general crime prevention measures.  The chief 
prosecutor of the Haarlem court district chairs the 
Integrity Platform.  Participants are airlines, Schiphol 
airport, retailers, freight companies, the local government 
of Haarlemmermeer, Customs, the Kmar military police, the 
prosecutor's office, and the Amsterdam Chamber of Commerce. 
Participation is voluntary.  According to Donner, the 
companies themselves are responsible for implementing the 
recommendations about prevention. 
 
¶7.  In Parliament, Donner said the Kmar, Customs and 
National Crime Squad were charged with controls and 
investigations at the airport.  The special Unit Randstad 
Noord (URN), which is part of the National Crime Squad, has 
been actively operating at Schiphol since 1999.  The URN, a 
70-member joint team of Kmar, police, and FIOD-ECD, is 
responsible for Schiphol's overall law enforcement. 
According to Donner, the team, now located a half-hour drive 
from Schiphol in Heemskerk, will be physically housed at the 
airport in August 2004.  The Schiphol team task force, set- 
up in 1993 to fight drug trafficking, is also active at the 
airport.  The team, made up of Customs and Kmar, is 
responsible for incoming and outgoing passenger controls. 
DEA agents from The Hague Country Office who have visited 
the Schiphol team site report the operation is efficient, 
the detectives are professional, and all pertinent services 
- including evidence processing, detention facilities, two 
court rooms and a prosecutor's office - are available on- 
site. 
 
¶8.  Earlier this year, two URN leaders reported it would be 
impossible to make Schiphol drug-free.  Schiphol handles 
some 41 million passengers and 1.2 million tons of freight 
per year, or 120,000 suitcases per day.  The URN leaders 
estimated some 40,000 kilos of cocaine were annually 
smuggled via Schiphol, of which only 5,000 were for domestic 
use.  The URN has set up the High Tech Crime Initiative 
Schiphol (HTCIS) project to address the vulnerability of the 
digital infrastructure at Schiphol.  According to project 
leader Eikelenboom, criminals obtain and manipulate business 
information through IT to facilitate drug smuggling. 
Outgoing URN chief Van Dorp pleaded for closer cooperation 
by government organizations and between government and 
companies at the airport.  He noted the fight against 
criminals would be served by allowing prior consultation of 
passenger lists by his team.  Since its establishment in 
1999, the URN has arrested 25 criminals, who together have 
been sentenced to more than 170 years in prison. 
 
¶9.  Below are Justice Ministry statistics about cocaine 
seizures by Schiphol Customs in airfreight (including mail 
and courier shipments): 
 
2000: 1,692 kilos (274 findings) 
2001:   734 kilos (382 findings) 
2002:   858 kilos (456 findings) 
2003: 2,211 kilos (612 findings) 
 
According to the Justice Ministry, by far the most drug 
freight comes from the Netherlands Antilles and Suriname. 
 
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Drug Trafficking: 100% Controls 
------------------------------- 
¶10.  On June 3, the Telegraaf newspaper reported, according 
to an internal Justice Ministry document, drug runners would 
not be deterred by the 100% controls.  The Ministry 
published a clarification stating the document had been 
based on a discussion about possible preventative effects of 
media campaigns.  The conclusion was the few drug runners 
still daring to come through the Netherlands would not be 
deterred by media campaigns as they had already made a 
conscious choice to smuggle drugs.  The Ministry praised the 
positive effects of the 100% controls, including "the sharp 
decrease in the number of bolita swallowers, and the near 
elimination of cocaine on airlines." 
 
¶11.  Reports from Embassy Paramaribo support skepticism that 
the Schiphol policy deters drug trafficking from countries 
of origin.  Recent cable traffic indicates the number of 
narcotraffickers caught leaving Suriname for the Netherlands 
dropped only slightly following the institution of the 100% 
controls (reftel D).  DEA agents at Post are also skeptical 
of the policy's deterrence value. 
 
¶12.  In his reply to parliamentary questions relating to 
negative reports about his Schiphol interdiction policy, 
Donner said the 100% controls had had a noticeable and 
positive effect.  He noted criminal organizations were 
obviously hindered by the controls.  According to Donner, 
the Schiphol team was watching possible diversions in 
smuggling routes.  He said more than 1,200 kilos of cocaine 
have been seized so far this year by the Schiphol team.  The 
monthly cocaine seizures are dropping rapidly, from more 
than 500 kilos in January to 80 kilos in May.  According to 
Donner, the number of drug mules has dropped, but more 
"bolita swallowers" are being found.  Donner noted, however, 
they could only swallow a limited quantity of drugs. 
Overall, Donner considers the Schiphol policy a success.  He 
will continue it for now, including the "temporary" measure 
of turning back "bolita swallowers" carrying less than three 
kilos ("catch and release"). 
 
¶13.  Donner said, up to mid-June, some 2,875 persons had 
been arrested at Schiphol on suspicion of cocaine smuggling. 
Of this group, 1,108 (38.5%) were sent away without a 
subpoena.  Donner concluded "the consequent use of the 100% 
controls on risk flights has clearly led to a drop in the 
number of couriers and cocaine seizures."  According to 
Donner, the measure may well be a useful and desirable 
instrument to fight Schiphol drug trafficking on the longer 
term. 
 
¶14.  Donner also provided an overview of the number of drug 
cases under Art. 2 of the Dutch Opium Act handled by the 
court in Haarlem (Schiphol): 
 
2002:      2,312 
2003:      2,630 
June 2004: 1,632 
2004 Est.: 3,917 
 
Number of Subpoenas Issued under Art. 2 of Opium Act 
(since December 2003, drug couriers with less than 3 kilos 
are not issued a subpoena): 
 
Dec. 2003     : 125 
Jan. 2004     :  99 
Feb.          : 123 
March         : 125 
April         : 128 
May           : 134 
June thru 6/11: 106 
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Diversion 
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¶15.  Despite Donner's assurance to the contrary, chief 
public prosecutor Swagerman of the Roermond region (near the 
German and Belgian borders) reported in July the 100% 
controls were so predictable drug criminals were massively 
diverting to other locations and smuggling methods.  He now 
observed many Antillean drug gangs operating in his region. 
He warned the 100% controls, which take up a lot of police 
and customs capacity, had created opportunities for 
traffickers to use other, less controlled routes. 
 
¶16.  Various drug addiction experts believe the successful 
approach of stopping "bolita swallowers" at Schiphol doesn't 
mean less cocaine is entering the country.  They think 
insufficient attention is being paid to imports through 
other channels, such as the Rotterdam port.  The Volkskrant 
daily quoted Jellinek clinic drug expert Roel Kersemakers: 
"The market price of cocaine has not gone up; drug smuggling 
via Schiphol is too insignificant to be able to achieve a 
price drop."  Rotterdam criminologist Damian Zaitch 
estimated last year drug smuggling via Schiphol was not even 
10% of total drug imports.  He suggested a majority of drugs 
entered the country via Rotterdam and Amsterdam ports and 
through airfreight.  In reaction to these criticisms, an MoJ 
spokesman denied port controls were being neglected and said 
this remained a MOJ priority. 
 
¶17.  A day after the Ministry's denial (June 28), the 
Volkskrant paper reported despite increasingly sharper 
controls and security measures, drug smugglers were again 
choosing large seaports to import/transit drugs.  After 
years of steadily dropping drug seizures, ports such as 
Rotterdam and Antwerp have shown increases over the past six 
months.  Dutch Seaport Police Commissioner In `t Veld, noted 
a "considerable rise" in Rotterdam drug transits.  Only six 
months previously, he had pressed success stories in the 
fight against drug smuggling on the media.  For instance, 
cocaine seizures in 2003 in Rotterdam dropped significantly 
to less than 1,000 kilos, whereas in previous years, much 
more was seized in a single month.  At the time, he 
attributed the drop to better controls and investigation 
techniques.  In `t Veld had no explanation for the rising 
seizures. 
 
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The Stopover Problem 
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¶18.  On June 10, the Telegraaf pointed out a way around the 
Schiphol controls by using Schiphol as a stopover to another 
Schengen country.  A European baggage rule bans controls of 
baggage on stopovers, allowing controls only at the final 
destination.  In addition, if Schiphol is the final 
destination, baggage on these Schengen flights is hardly 
checked because Customs and Kmar personnel are too busy 
checking the direct flights from Suriname, Aruba and the 
Antilles.  The paper also noted, with the recent Air France 
takeover of KLM, there were no longer direct flights between 
Venezuela and Schiphol - they now go to Paris.  This means 
controls on Venezuelan flights, which Donner instituted in 
April (reftel B), are not taking place. 
 
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Missed Opportunities 
-------------------- 
¶19.  DEA liaisons in The Hague cite additional problems with 
the Schiphol policy involving lost opportunities to gain 
intelligence on drug runners and the organizations for which 
they work.  First, the names of detained couriers are only 
shared with certain airlines and selected countries, (the 
Dutch exchange passenger data with Belgium, Germany, France 
and the U.K.), but not with the U.S.  Because there is no 
central database flagging those caught and turned back under 
the Schiphol policy, a repeat offender will only be caught 
if they travel again on one of the select airlines using the 
same name.  Embassy and DEA are currently engaged in 
negotiations to obtain weekly summaries of couriers detained 
and/or arrested at Schiphol for inclusion in DEA and other 
US databases.  We have argued that sharing this information 
enhances international investigations and leads to the 
disruption and dismantling of drug trafficking 
organizations.  According to Schiphol team agents, the 
intelligence database employed by Schiphol law enforcement 
is computerized and could be shared easily with the US given 
a green-light from both the prosecutor and Justice Ministry. 
 
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Comment 
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¶20.  Despite indications drug seizures at Schiphol are 
decreasing, the broader impact of the Schiphol 100% 
interdiction policy remains unclear.  Post will investigate 
other drug routes to assess the scope of diversion and 
continue to develop a clearer picture of drug traffic into 
the Netherlands.  Embassy officials will also continue to 
press the Dutch for access to information on couriers 
detained at Schiphol.  End Comment. 
 
Russel