This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ADANA 000104 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PTER PHUM ASEC TU ADANA
SUBJECT: DIYARBAKIR'S DEHAP MAYOR BURNS BRIDGES WITH CONDOLENCE VISIT 
TO PKK MILITANT'S FAMILY 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  After a nine-day security operation and 
killing of two alleged PKK/Kongra-Gel members reportedly 
involved in a deadly July 28 attack on a Diyarbakir police 
station, greater Diyarbakir Mayor Osman Baydemir (DEHAP) paid a 
condolence visit to the family of one of the alleged PKK 
members.  The Diyarbakir Governor's Office subsequently 
requested an investigation of Baydemir and four local mayors for 
that visit, citing among other things the Mayor's improper use 
of an official vehicle.  In August 11 meetings, DPO relayed to 
Baydemir strong U.S. disapproval of his action, and extended 
condolences on the death of the security guard in the July 28 
attack to Diyarbakir's Deputy Governor and Security Director. 
Several human rights contacts in Diyarbakir privately called 
Baydemir's condolence visit a mistake, and despite their 
optimism about human rights developments in recent years, all 
are concerned about backsliding on the GOT's implementation of 
human rights reforms in the region in the wake of the PKK's June 
2004 abandonment of its ceasefire and the tension it has created 
between the people and security forces in the region.  End 
summary. 
 
¶2.  (U) On July 28, a PKK/Kongra-Gel attack against a police 
station in the Mardinkapi neighborhood of Diyarbakir resulted in 
the death of one security guard and the wounding of two other 
security officers.  The Diyarbakir security directorate 
subsequently launched a nine-day operation to apprehend PKK 
militants who had fled the scene and taken refuge in a wooded 
area just outside the city known as Hevsel Gardens.  During the 
operation, citizens living within the area of the dragnet were 
reportedly blocked from leaving, and non-security personnel were 
prevented from entering the area.  According to Turkish 
officials, the operation netted two PKK militants and three 
individuals charged with abetting the PKK. 
 
The Official View of Events in Mardinkapi 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  Diyarbakir Deputy Governor told DPO on August 12 that 
the July 28 attack had been perpetrated against a police station 
some 300-400 meters away from a music festival that had been 
organized that evening.  He claimed that the grenades launched 
at the police had come out of the festival.  He confirmed that 
one security officer was killed in the attack and that at least 
three others were wounded (Note:  In addition to two security 
officers, the wounded included the Deputy Mayor of Sur 
Municipality.  End note.)  While outlining the operation on a 
map, he explained to DPO that forces had surrounded a wooded 
area, used thermal cameras in their search for the perpetrators 
of the attack, and arrested two persons the morning following 
the attack.  The brother of one of the militants was also 
arrested and provided information; two others were arrested for 
providing shelter for the militants.  Despite these five 
arrests, two militants involved in the attack had escaped, he 
said, and for nine days the government called for their 
surrender.  A group of forces organized to comb the area came 
upon them and engaged them in a firefight; the two armed PKK 
members were killed, according to the Deputy Governor, and their 
fingerprints supposedly confirmed involvement in the attack on 
the police station.  (Note: there was no additional information 
provided on how this confirmation was made.  End note.) 
 
¶4.  (U) On August 9, Turkish dailies reported that Diyarbakir 
Mayor Osman Baydemir (DEHAP) along with mayors of four smaller 
townships had paid a condolence visit to the family of one of 
the PKK members who had fled the attack scene and been killed in 
the operation.  The Diyarbakir Governor's Office responded to 
the visit of Baydemir and the other mayors by requesting an 
investigation of the five DEHAP politicians for their action, 
citing among other things their improper use of official 
vehicles for the visit.  The Interior Ministry has also been 
called upon to investigate the case. 
 
The Mayor Makes His Case 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  During a trip that had been scheduled before news of 
Baydemir's visit to the PKK member's family had surfaced, DPO 
met with the mayor on August 11 to inform him of our strong 
disapproval of his action, and to reiterate that the U.S. 
considers the PKK a terrorist organization and opposes any 
action that appears to support the PKK, especially this case 
where a security officer was killed. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Baydemir told DPO that he learned about the Mardinkapi 
incident while participating on a television program.  He 
stressed that under normal circumstances he would have been 
attending the festival that had been organized that evening for 
local singers and that it was only the previous TV engagement 
that prevented him from going.  This is significant, he said, 
because five or six minutes before the explosion at the police 
station cars carrying other local mayors had passed by it. 
There was a lot of activity on the road in the vicinity of the 
police checkpoint that evening, and he questioned "who was 
really targeted in that attack." 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  After receiving news of the attack, Baydemir claims 
he went to the hospital and visited the wounded security 
officials, expressing his concern.  He stayed for approximately 
one hour, he said, along with other government officials.  He 
claims the family of the guard was there, and he told them he 
shared in their suffering.  He also visited the municipal 
official who had been wounded.  As he exited the hospital, he 
told DPO, members of the press were present and he told them 
while he didn't have all the information about the incident, he 
was against all attacks and did not want blood to be shed. 
(Note:  Press accounts have contradicted his account of the 
guard's family members being present.  End note.) 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  Baydemir together with several other local officials 
had plans to travel the following day (July 29) to Tunceli for a 
cultural festival.  The night of July 28 he asked government 
officials if he should stay out at the hospital and in 
Diyarbakir out of courtesy, and they responded that there was no 
need to stay.  He went to Tunceli as planned the following day 
and upon his return two days later he found "great tension," 
especially at the area of the operation.  Baydemir stated that 
he received numerous complaints from citizens inside the area 
affected by the operation about such things as food shortages, 
health problems, and the effect the operation was having upon 
children.  He met with the Diyarbakir Governor in an 
unsuccessful attempt to gain access for himself and NGO 
representatives to the scene of the operation.  "Normally I 
should be getting information about such operations from the 
Security Directorate," he said, underlining that they were 
requesting access to a civilian area.  After being denied access 
by security officials, he claims he spoke with the Minister of 
the Interior, who had been supportive. 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  After the operation was concluded and news of the 
"extrajudicial killing" got out, he said, Baydemir expressed his 
condolences in a visit to the PKK member's family and shared 
their grief, asking that this be the final victim.  "It's our 
tradition," he said; "If you don't do such a thing you'll be 
ashamed.  Crime is an individual thing; it does not belong to 
the family."  Baydemir ended his lengthy defense by underlining 
his view that the violence must stop unconditionally.  "I could 
have been killed that night," he pleaded, "how could you think I 
support that?"  He stressed that it is difficult to work on the 
underlying problems of poverty and unemployment in a poor 
security environment.  Turkey has shown its preference for the 
EU, he said, and substantial development is taking place in 
democracy. 
 
¶11.  (SBU)  DPO relayed to Baydemir that:  the U.S. government 
considers the PKK a terrorist organization and PKK members 
terrorists; the EU has also listed the PKK as a terrorist 
organization; and that terror is not a legitimate way to work 
for political, social, economic or cultural rights.  DPO 
informed Baydemir that we oppose any action that even appears to 
support the PKK, especially in the killing of a security 
officer.  Regardless of his intentions, his visit gave that 
appearance, DPO continued, adding that such actions foster 
anger, suspicion and tension, not reconciliation.  Baydemir 
maintained until the end of the meeting that he was "at peace 
with his conscience." 
 
Security Director:  "All Diyarbakir NGOs tied to PKK" 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
----------------- 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Hours after meeting Mayor Baydemir, DPO called on 
Diyarbakir Security Director Orhan Okur and presented a wreath 
and condolences on the loss of a member of the security 
personnel in the July 28 attack.  DPO reiterated the USG 
position that the PKK is a terrorist organization and told Okur 
of the call on Baydemir, adding that the visit had been used to 
convey a message of strong disapproval for Baydemir's action. 
 
¶13.  (SBU)  Rather than dwelling on the Mardinkapi incident and 
the Mayor's controversial visit, Okur - using European Court of 
Human Rights publications and internet postings by human rights 
groups as visual aids - proceeded to lecture DPO about the 
misinformation campaign being waged by NGOs against the 
government.  "We know Article 17 very well," he said, "It 
prohibits us from violating and limiting rights - don't worry 
about our taking care of human rights."  But all NGOs in town 
have ties with the PKK, he argued, and he produced two examples 
where NGO reports alleging misdeeds by security forces were 
eventually proved wrong.  Such reports help the PKK and their 
recruitment efforts he said, and are not results of a lack of 
professionalism, but the product of ill-intentioned individuals. 
 
 
¶14.  (SBU)  Comment:  With this visit, Baydemir overstepped the 
parameters of GOT tolerance for pro-Kurdish activities in the 
Southeast, which have expanded in the past two years.  Even 
contacts at both Diyarbakir's activist pro-Kurdish Bar 
Association and in local private business agreed, and said they 
had told the Mayor as much.  Baydemir's actions have dimmed any 
potentially positive effect that he might have been able to have 
as a bridge between the Kurdish community and government 
officials, especially given attitudes such as that displayed by 
Security Director Okur and shared by many other officials. 
 
¶15.   (SBU)  Comment, cont'd:  Regardless of whether or not the 
charges against him move forward, the press seems intent on 
keeping this issue alive and Baydemir has given them ample fuel 
for the fire. August 16 media reports point to a June 2004 
incident in which Baydemir allegedly dispatched a municipal 
ambulance to retrieve the corpse of a PKK militant after his May 
28 shooting and subsequent death in Adana, bringing the body 
back to Diyarbakir for the burial ceremony.  Such acts, even 
without the use of official vehicles, at best show poor judgment 
and at worst provide comfort and support to a terrorist 
organization.  Contacts ranging from leftist Kurdish human 
rights activists to wealthy local businessmen agreed that the 
past 5 years had felt like "detente" and that the human rights 
situation had improved in very important ways (septel).  All are 
now concerned about backsliding on the GOT's implementation of 
human rights reforms in the region in the wake of the PKK's 
abandonment of its five-year ceasefire and increasing tension 
between the public and security forces about how security forces 
are responding.  In this context Baydemir's apparent indulgence 
of the PKK/Kongra-Gel is all the more ill-conceived and 
potentially inflammatory.  Baydemir's actions are also a 
discouraging reminder that DEHAP and other regional political 
leaders in the Southeast have not yet found the will to break 
with the PKK. 
 
 
 
REID