This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

090819Z Jul 04

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 001139 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AID FOR DCHA/FFP LANDIS, CRUMBLY, MUTAMBA, PETERSEN 
DCHA/OFDA FOR KHANDAGLE, BORNS 
AFR/SA FOR LOKEN, COPSON, MACNAIRN 
EGAT FOR HOBGOOD, THOMPSON 
DEPT FOR AF/S ARORIAN 
PRETORIA FOR, DISKIN, HALE, SINK, REYNOLDS 
GABORONE FOR THOMAS, BROWN 
ROME FOR FODAG FOR LAVELLE, DAVIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREL US ZI
SUBJECT: HOLDING ZIMBABWE ACCOUNTABLE FOR FOOD 
 
REF: (A) HARARE 00768; (B) HARARE 00944 
 
-------------------------- 
Summary and Action Request 
-------------------------- 
 
1.The Food and Agriculture Organization/Rome 
(FAO) of the United Nations (UN) recently released a 
special report on Zimbabwe, dated 5 July 2004.  This 
report estimates the country's cereal production for 
the 2003-2004 agricultural year to be about 950,000 
metric tons (MT), compared to a need of around 1.9 
million MT for human consumption.  This special 
report was issued by the FAO, without concurrence of 
the Government of Zimbabwe (GOZ), because the GOZ 
canceled a joint crop and food supply assessment 
mission (CFSAM) in May, which was expected to 
provide the most authoritative estimates of the 
country's grain harvest (Reftel A).  FAO's estimate 
of Zimbabwe's grain harvest is roughly consistent 
with other independent estimates, but significantly 
lower than the GOZ's claimed bumper harvest.  The 
GOZ continues to use the claimed bumper harvest as 
justification for its insistence that Zimbabwe 
neither wants nor needs significant amounts of 
international food assistance (except for small, 
targeted programs), which would give the GOZ nearly 
total control of food stocks in the period leading 
up to the scheduled March 2005 Parliamentary 
elections. 
 
2.FAO's special report and other independent 
assessments make a credible case that this year's 
cereal deficit will be roughly as large as last 
year's, during which the international community 
operated a large food distribution program. 
Given the lack of transparency and information- 
sharing by the GOZ, it is unclear to what extent the 
GOZ will be able to import significant amounts of 
grain to close the country's cereal gap, although 
the FAO report estimates that the GOZ could import 
as much as 620,000 MT, leaving a cereal deficit of 
around 320,000 MT.  The Zimbabwe Vulnerability 
Assessment Committee (ZimVac) is also expected on 
Monday to release its vulnerability assessment 
report, which we have been informed will estimate 
that 2.3 million Zimbabweans are food insecure (See 
Septel).  Given this continuing uncertainty and the 
likely precarious situation of Zimbabwe's vulnerable 
population, the international community should 
question both the ability of the country to import 
sufficient food, and the GOZ's intentions for 
procuring and distributing food.  Action Request: 
We recommend that the US work with the United 
Nations (UN) and with other United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) members to orchestrate a UNSC session 
in which the FAO is called upon to outline the 
unfolding food situation in Zimbabwe and GOZ would 
be asked to respond.  End Summary. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
CEREAL PRODUCTION IN ZIMBABWE FOR 2004-5 
----------------------------------------- 
 
3.The (GOZ) officially proclaimed a "bumper" 
harvest this year with maize production of about 2.4 
million MT and total grain production of 2.8 million 
MT (Reftel B). But other reports, including those by 
independent experts, FAO, and FEWSNET, refute those 
figures.  Most estimate less than half of what the 
GOZ claims, and all predict a food deficit. 
 
4.The most comprehensive crop and livestock 
assessment in Zimbabwe is usually carried out by the 
GOZ, FAO and WFP together, an exercise referred to 
as the Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission 
(CFSAM).  The 2004 CFSAM to Zimbabwe was curtailed 
d 
by the abrupt and unexplained GOZ withdrawal of 
participating staff (Reftel A).  As a result, the 
FAO and WFP teams visited only three of the 
country's eight provinces.  Based on this limited 
field work, and supplemented by information from a 
number of sources, including GOZ statistics, 
rainfall data, satellite imagery and discussions 
with experts during and after the CFSAM, FAO/Rome 
recently issued a special report on Zimbabwe 
estimating the country's cereal production. 
 
5.The following summarizes the 2003-4 
agricultural season production estimates for 
Zimbabwe by various entities/sources: 
 
- GOZ:  Maize production 2,431,182 MT, other cereals 
374,813 MT, total cereal production 2,805,995 MT. 
 
- FEWSNET:  Maize production 1,400,000 MT, other 
cereals 260,000 MT, total cereal production 
1,660,000 million MT. 
 
- Zim Consult:  Maize production 650-850,000 MT, 
other cereals 100-200,000 MT, total cereal 
production 750,000-1,050,000 MT. 
 
- FAO Rome, Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission: 
Maize production 708,073 MT, other cereals 243,341 
MT, total cereal production 951,414 MT. 
 
- Food Security Brief, March 2004 (FAO, WFP, 
FEWSNET, UNDP):  Maize production 800,000-1,200,000 
MT, other cereals 200,000 MT, total cereal 
production 1.1-1.3 million MT. 
 
-------------------------------- 
CEREAL REQUIREMENTS IN ZIMBABWE 
-------------------------------- 
 
6.Estimated cereal requirements for human 
consumption in Zimbabwe for 2004-5, according to the 
FAO/Rome report released this week, are about 1.94 
million MT (based on 2002 census, as amended, and 
163 kg cereals per person/yr).  Thus, for human 
consumption alone, nearly 1.3 million tons would 
need to be imported to meet the deficit. 
 
7.The quantity of cereals to be used for animal 
feed is likely to be lower than last year, due to 
high cost, grain shortages, and reduced numbers of 
animals. FAO/Rome estimates a requirement of 125,000 
MT for animal feed. 
 
---------------------- 
IMPORT REQUIREMENTS 
---------------------- 
 
 
 
8.A cereal balance sheet is used to predict the 
supply and demand for cereals within a country, 
providing a basis for calculating importation 
requirements.  In Zimbabwe, the completion of a 
balance sheet is severely hampered by the GOZ's lack 
of transparency and withholding of information. The 
GOZ refuses to share with donors any information on 
the domestic availability of food stocks, including 
the amounts stored and location, planned food 
procurement or import figures. 
 
9.Using various calculations and assumptions 
regarding stocks held by the GOZ, FAO/Rome estimates 
a total import requirement for Zimbabwe of 1,290,286 
MT cereals for 2004-5 (995,927 MT of maize, 9,359 MT 
sorghum, 276,100 MT wheat and 8,900 MT rice).  World 
Food Program reportedly has 60,000 MT cereals 
pledged and available within the country, which 
lessens the import requirement to 1,230,286 MT. 
 
10.Whether the GOZ will be able to import enough 
food to feed the population remains to be seen.  It 
It 
is feasible, however, for the country to meet this 
import requirement, in light of the good maize 
production in neighboring Zambia and Mozambique this 
year, especially if the GOZ eases restrictions on 
private sector maize import.  Increased cotton 
production, higher tobacco prices, and the Reserve 
Bank's improved capturing of foreign remittances, 
among other things, have improved the country's 
foreign exchange situation somewhat over last year. 
FAO estimates that the GOZ has already contracted to 
import 220,000 MT of maize, and has the ability to 
import an additional 400,000 MT (for a total import 
capacity of around 620,000 MT).  If this is correct, 
the country would still have a deficit of 325,286 MT 
of cereals. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
FEARS ABOUT GOZ POLITICIZATION OF FOOD 
---------------------------------------- 
 
11.Even if Zimbabwe is able to import the total 
1.2 million MT of cereals needed to meet the 
estimated deficit, politicization of food remains a 
serious concern.  Now that imports of international 
food have been stopped, the GOZ will be in total 
control of food distributions within Zimbabwe, and 
will be able to decide who does and does not receive 
food.  Given widespread, credible reports of GOZ 
partisan food distribution in the past, most donors 
fear that the GOZ would use political criteria for 
food distribution rather than basing food aid on 
vulnerability criteria.  This may forecast very hard 
times ahead for those perceived by the GOZ to be 
opposition supporters. 
 
--------------------------------- 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
--------------------------------- 
 
12.The FAO/Rome and other reports make a credible 
case that that this year's cereal deficit will be 
roughly as large as last year's (during which the 
international community operated a large food 
distribution program), despite the GOZ allegations 
of a "bumper" harvest.  Due to the lack of 
transparency and information-sharing by the GOZ, it 
remains unclear to what extent the GOZ will be able 
to import significant amounts of grain to close the 
country's cereal gap.  Given this continuing 
uncertainty and the likely precarious situation of 
Zimbabwe's vulnerable population, the international 
community should question both the ability of the 
country to import sufficient food, and the GOZ's 
intentions for procuring and distributing food.  UN 
offices in Zimbabwe have so far been unable to 
promote the necessary dialogue needed to address the 
food security situation. 
 
13.We recommend that the US work with the UN and 
with other United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
members to orchestrate a UNSC session in which FAO 
is called upon to outline the likely food situation 
in Zimbabwe and GOZ would be asked to respond.  The 
UN Resident Representative has told us privately 
that a UNSC session on the Zimbabwe food situation 
would be appropriate and useful. 
 
14.In the best of circumstances, such a session 
n 
could force the GOZ to acknowledge its excessive 
optimism, perhaps provide facts on its import 
intentions, and acknowledge its needs so that donors 
could assist the most vulnerable, as well as gain 
some pledges based on GOZ readiness to coordinate 
its food programs with the UN.  In the worst case, 
the UNSC could reach a conclusion that GOZ is 
neglecting the needs of its people and bears 
responsibility for any resultant food crisis. 
SULLIVAN