This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

071139Z Jun 04

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000944 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AID FOR DCHA/FFP LANDIS, CRUMBLY, MUTAMBA, PETERSEN 
DCHA/OFDA FOR PRATT, AUSTRENG, KHANDAGLE, MENGH 
ETTI, BORNS, MARX, HALMRAST-SANCHEZ 
AFR/SA FOR FLEURET, LOKEN, COPSON, MACNAIRN 
EGAT FOR HOBGOOD, THOMPSON 
STATE/AF FOR RAYNOR 
PRETORIA FOR, DISKIN, HALE, SINK, REYNOLDS 
NAIROBI FOR SMITH, BROWN 
LILONGWE FOR RUBEY 
LUSAKA FOR GUNTHER, NIELSON 
MAPUTO FOR POLAND, BLISS, THOMPSON 
MASERU FOR AMB LOFTIS 
MBABANE FOR KENNA 
GABORONE FOR THOMAS, BROWN 
ROME FOR FODAG FOR LAVELLE, DAVIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREL US ZI
SUBJECT:  ZIMBABWE MAIZE PRODUCTION 2004, FEAST OR FAMINE 
 
 
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Summary 
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¶1.   In recent weeks, the Government of Zimbabwe (GOZ) 
officially proclaimed maize production of about 2.4 
million metric tons (MT) and firmly stated that it will 
not need food aid.  The GOZ withdrew from the FAO/WFP Crop 
and Food Assessment by ordering its staff back from the 
field, thus scuttling the joint effort to estimate crop 
production.  Knowledgeable experts have independently 
estimated maize production, and these estimates range from 
slightly less than last year's maize harvest of around 
800,000 MT to around 1.2 million MT.  None approach the 
GOZ estimate.  Notwithstanding the GOZ's alleged bumper 
harvest, the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) is buying 
substantial quantities of grain.  At this point, it 
remains unclear if there will be a need for food 
assistance in Zimbabwe and, if so, whether the GOZ will 
permit the international community to mount such an 
effort. 
 
¶2.   The Mission recently held a working session to update 
its humanitarian strategy and develop contingency plans to 
address the rapidly changing situation.  This humanitarian 
strategy is being finalized and will be sent to Washington 
for comment/review.  The proposed strategic approach, 
coordinated with other donors, will be to (1) gather all 
available information to make the best estimate of 
humanitarian needs, (2) maintain a field presence of NGOs 
through highly targeted humanitarian assistance programs 
to the most vulnerable, allowing for rapid scale up if a 
humanitarian crisis arises, and (3) closely and carefully 
monitor and document the situation so that instances of 
politicization can be publicized and condemned. End 
Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
2003/2004 maize production and food insecurity 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶3.   With the cancellation of the UN Crop and Food Supply 
Assessment Mission (CFSAM) in early May, there is no 
definitive estimate of this year's maize harvest in 
Zimbabwe.  The GOZ estimates a bumper crop of around 2.4 
million MT.  This is significantly at variance with 
estimates of 0.8 to 1.2 million MT projected by 
independent analysts.  FAO recently reported, based on the 
CFSAM's visits to three main provinces, their observations 
along the travel routes and interviews with informants at 
local level, that this year's total food production (maize 
plus small grains) would be even lower than last year's 
980,000 MTs. (Note: a rough estimate of area planted based 
on seed sales and use of retained seed is 1.2 to 1.4 
million hectares.  With an average yield of anywhere from 
0.6, the yield level last year, to 0.9 MT per hectare, the 
production of maize and small grains could therefore be 
anywhere from 720,000 to 1.14 million MT. End Note.) 
 
¶4.   Zimbabwe's annual requirement for human consumption 
of maize and small grains is 1.8 million MT.  The 
shortfall, based on estimates of 0.8 - 1.2 million MT 
production, would be 600,000 to one million MT.  Last year 
the GMB imported 400,000 metric tons.  The UNDP reported 
in February that GOZ officials told them they were being 
tasked with securing enough foreign exchange to purchase 
800,000 metric tons of grain. Available information 
suggests that the Government of Zimbabwe may very well 
have the capability this year to fill the cereal gap from 
its own resources, or at least a significant part of the 
gap, should it so choose. Compared to last year, the GOZ 
is capturing more foreign exchange and presently is `in 
the market' buying grain.  There are numerous rumors that 
GMB officials recently went to Australia to buy grain with 
foreign exchange derived from cotton and tobacco sales. 
Local and international media have also reported that U.S. 
companies are purchasing grain for the GOZ secured by 
tobacco receipts. 
 
¶5. At this point in time, it is not possible to estimate 
how many Zimbabweans will be food insecure over the coming 
year, requiring some level of food assistance.  The 
recently completed ZIMVAC, which is still being analyzed, 
will hopefully provide an accurate estimate. Comments from 
ZIMVAC observers point to improvement from last year in 
certain areas, but note that some households will exhaust 
their own production sometime between August and September 
2004 -- three months after harvest.  Economic conditions 
have made the staple grain, maize, unaffordable for a 
large number of Zimbabweans.  The WFP and FAO are 
compiling district level data on crop production, food 
availability and affordability from NGO sources and their 
own monitors.  This exercise will help to identify areas 
of greatest need, but will not, however, include an 
estimate of total production. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
International food assistance in 2004-2005 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶6. All major donors and UN agencies anticipate that the 
participation of international organizations, donors and 
NGOs in food assistance this coming year will be greatly 
restricted.  The World Food Program (WFP) suspended 
general food distribution for May and June, on the 
assumption that there would be enough food to meet 
immediate post-harvest needs.  Beneficiary figures dropped 
from 4.5 million in April, when general feeding was in 
operation, to 545,000 in May for targeted distribution 
only.  WFP's regional Emergency Operation (EMOP) that 
concludes the last day of June is being extended through 
December.   WFP has 65,000 tons of carryover stocks that 
can cover targeted feeding to the chronically ill (i.e., 
those likely suffering from AIDS), children and other 
highly vulnerable groups through that period.  WFP's 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the GOZ, that 
covers the operation of NGOs in household food 
distribution, expires at the end of June.  WFP is 
approaching the GOZ to negotiate a new MOU that will deal 
specifically with targeted feeding. 
 
¶7. Options for the international community are limited. 
The NGOs have developed a substantial infrastructure and 
field capability to deliver food for general distribution 
and targeted feeding.  Current information on the likely 
harvest and GOZ imports does not justify the continuation 
of a large-scale food aid program.  Nonetheless, by 
continuing targeted feeding programs the international 
community can maintain a presence and be poised to respond 
rapidly to humanitarian needs if a crisis arises.  The GOZ 
has left the door open for targeted feeding which is 
continuing under WFP and the USAID-funded C-SAFE 
(Consortium for Southern African Food Emergency) program. 
C-SAFE's Market Assistance Program (MAP), that sells 
subsidized sorghum meal through retail shops in high- 
density urban areas in Bulawayo, is planning to expand to 
other poor urban communities.  However, it will be 
difficult to rationalize allocation of additional food 
donations to these programs with a reported surplus in 
country.  Also, the GOZ would have to grant import and bio- 
safety permits for donor importation of any additional 
food, even for targeted feeding programs. 
 
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Discussion 
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¶8.   The Government of Zimbabwe is publicly acknowledging 
its primary responsibility for feeding of its own 
population, which is commendable.  On the other hand, by 
restricting international food operations the GOZ will 
have nearly total control of food distribution.  In light 
of widespread, credible reports of partisan food 
distribution by the GOZ and its Grain Marketing Board, it 
will be essential for the international community to try 
to monitor the situation closely, publicizing and 
condemning all instances of politicization of food 
distribution.  International oversight will be especially 
crucial as the country enters its election cycle, with 
Parliamentary elections still scheduled for March 2005. 
However, with growing GOZ harassment of NGOs and a reduced 
presence of WFP, it may become increasingly difficult for 
the international community to keep on top of developments 
in the country's rural areas.  It will also be necessary 
to document the evolving situation carefully, so that 
responsibility is appropriately assigned for any 
humanitarian crisis that arises due to inadequate 
planning. 
 
¶9. The Mission recently held a working session as a first 
step in updating its Humanitarian Assistance Strategy. The 
strategy, which is still being finalized and will be sent 
to Washington for comment/review, will incorporate 
contingency plans to address the rapidly changing 
situation within the country.  The proposed strategic 
approach, coordinated with other donors, will be to (1) 
gather all available information to make the best estimate 
of humanitarian needs, (2) maintain a field presence of 
NGOs through highly targeted humanitarian assistance 
programs to the most vulnerable, allowing for rapid scale 
up if necessary, and (3) closely and carefully monitor and 
document the situation so that instances of politicization 
can be publicized and condemned.  SULLIVAN