This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 003484 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS ECON MARR TU
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR CODELS FRIST, LUGAR, AND BEREUTER 
ATTENDANCE AT NATO SUMMIT IN ISTANBUL 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: PM Erdogan's ruling AK Party (AKP) appears 
unassailable, with a two-thirds majority in Parliament and no 
viable opposition party.  GOT legal reforms have improved the 
chances for an accession negotiation start date from the EU 
in December.  Yet AKP struggles with corruption, ad hoc 
responses to key issues, lame implementation of reforms, and 
the entrenched opposition of an Establishment that views 
Islam-oriented AKP as a threat to core Kemalist principles of 
Turkey's "secular" republic. 
 
¶2. (U) Turkish anti-terrorism cooperation remains solid; the 
GOT has permitted transit of supplies to our troops, and 
other forms of support for our efforts, in Iraq; and Turkey 
contributes troops to Afghanistan, Bosnia and Kosovo 
operations. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Ankara views restoration of Turkish-Armenian 
relations as linked to Armenian withdrawal from occupied 
territories in Azerbaijan and recognition of the 
Turco-Armenian border.  Turkey's Georgia policy is uneven, 
although Turkey provides humanitarian aid and, in cooperation 
with the U.S., assists the Georgian military.  The GOT has 
pushed to improve relations with Arab states and Iran, but 
the Turks overlook their negative image in the Arab world. 
Turkish-Israeli relations have hit a low point following PM 
Erdogan's harsh criticism of recent Israeli actions in Gaza, 
though military and intelligence ties remain strong.  Strong 
improvement of relations with "Eurasia" (i.e., Russia) 
remains an interest of a heterodox range of officials, 
businessmen, and academics. 
 
¶4. (U) The Turkish economy has made an impressive recovery 
from the financial crisis of 2001 and near-crisis of 2003, 
but a high public debt and serious structural problems ensure 
continued vulnerability. End Summary. 
 
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Ruling Party In Control, But Facing Challenges 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶5. (U) With a two-thirds majority in parliament, control of a 
majority of municipalities, and no viable political 
opposition, PM Erdogan and his AKP government appear firmly 
in control.  AKP's passage of major legal reform packages and 
constitutional amendments appears to have put Turkey more 
firmly on track to get a negotiation start date from the EU 
in December.  In his meetings with foreign leaders, Erdogan 
projects confidence, power, and a pragmatism that seems to 
belie his Islamist firebrand past. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Yet, while seemingly at the peak of their power, 
Erdogan, his party, and his government face fundamental 
political challenges.  AKP has not yet consolidated itself as 
a party and its leadership and the Cabinet increasingly 
struggle to impose direction on the parliamentary group. 
Erdogan's frequent travel interferes with his control of 
party policy-making and the Cabinet, and he stretches himself 
thin trying also to oversee Istanbul (he retains an intense 
interest in the management of the city he dominated as mayor 
from 1994-98 until forced out by the State). 
 
¶7. (SBU) AKP's policy intentions remain hard to read and many 
of its legislative initiatives, while reasonable in 
principle, have foundered on bad drafting and fierce 
opposition from the establishment, an opposition which is 
able to prevail partly owing to AKP's unwillingness to take 
the lead in the public debate, especially on TV.  AKP's 
anti-corruption promises, a major factor in its general 
election victory, have faded as corruption has infected the 
party and Cabinet.  AKP has not yet come to grips with the 
deeply entrenched State bureaucracy or established a solid 
modus vivendi with the judiciary, armed forces, and 
presidency. 
 
¶8. (SBU) AKP also faces unremitting resistance and pressure 
from an establishment which sees Erdogan and AK Party as 
direct threats to their definition of Turkey's "secular 
republic".  The judiciary continually overturns government 
initiatives and President Sezer continues to reject many AKP 
nominees for posts in the bureaucracy.  The establishment 
press and academic world cling to ill- or undefined concepts 
of "secularism" and "fundamentalism" as they charge AKP with 
a Sharia agenda.  The Turkish military and other elements of 
the "secular" establishment continue to assert that AKP 
intends to undermine Turkey,s "secular" structure.  The 
recent controversy over a government proposal to reform 
higher education and give graduates of vocational high 
schools (including religious high schools) greater access to 
university education intensified establishment suspicion; 
core elements of the establishment appear committed to using 
indirect methods to keep Erdogan and his party and government 
so off balance that he loses credibility and power and AKP 
splits. 
 
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EU-Related Reforms Adopted, Implementation Lags 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶9. (U) The AKP government has passed three packages of 
wide-ranging political and constitutional reforms aimed at 
bringing Turkey into compliance with the Copenhagen Criteria 
for EU membership.  The reforms apply to areas such as 
torture, free expression, religious freedom, the role of the 
military in government, and freedom of association. 
 
¶10. (U) While praising the reform effort, EU officials have 
repeatedly noted that implementation to date has been slow 
and uneven.  There has been an apparent reduction in the 
number of people prosecuted for controversial speech, though 
such cases continue.  The controversial State Security Courts 
have been officially abolished but their replacement by new 
heavy penal courts has not yet been completed.  There has 
also been anecdotal evidence that local authorities have 
become more flexible in allowing the use of the Kurdish 
language in public announcements and written statements.  The 
State-owned broadcasting company on June 7 began broadcasting 
in Kurdish and other previously restricted minority 
languages, albeit under tight time limitations.  The 
Government has also loosened restrictions on the freedoms of 
association and assembly, though Turkey still falls short of 
EU norms.  However, there has been little progress on 
religious freedom, particularly for those other than Muslims. 
 The Ecumenical Patriarchate,s Halki Seminary remains 
closed.  Parliament in 2002 adopted legislation allowing, in 
principle, certain non-Muslim foundations to acquire property 
for the first time since 1936, and to reclaim property 
expropriated by the State since that date.  However, the 
State has continued a burdensome and capricious set of 
procedures and approved few applications.  Non-Muslim groups, 
especially Protestants, continue to face difficulties in 
building churches and worshipping. 
 
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Global War on Terrorism and Iraq 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (U) Turkey has been a solid ally in the global war on 
terrorism.  Since the Iraq war, Ankara has permitted the 
transit of supplies for our forces and humanitarian goods, 
offering to send troops to Iraq, approving the operation of 
tanker aircraft from Incirlik Air Base to support missions 
to/from both Iraq and Afghanistan, authorizing the transit of 
US troops from Iraq, and training Iraqi diplomats.  This 
despite our actions in Iraq being highly unpopular among the 
Turkish public and our lack of military action against the 
PKK/Kongra Gel terrorist group,s camps in northern Iraq.  In 
Afghanistan, Turkey is contributing troops and helicopters, 
has offered to sponsor a Provincial Reconstruction Team in 
the north, and is prepared to send 1500 additional troops if 
NATO designates the Istanbul-based NATO High Readiness Force 
as the next commanding organization of ISAF.  Turkey also 
contributes troops to operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, and is 
supportive of a number of nonproliferation activities, such 
as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). 
 
¶12. (SBU) Traditionally favoring US military hardware, the 
GOT last month canceled three major tenders (for attack 
helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles, and main battle 
tanks), all of which had attracted bids from American firms. 
Frustration over technology transfer restrictions and 
IMF-mandated fiscal restraint were generally seen as 
prompting the move, although there is some speculation that 
the GOT's plans to restructure these programs could also be 
an effort to improve European companies, prospects prior to 
an EU decision to begin accession negotiations with Turkey. 
 
-------------- 
Foreign Policy 
-------------- 
 
¶13. (U) In Ankara's view restoration of Turco-Armenian 
diplomatic relations depends on Armenian withdrawal from 
occupied territories in Azerbaijan (a Turkish ally) and 
Armenian recognition of the Turco-Armenian border, moves that 
appear unlikely in the short and medium term. 
Turkish-Armenian diplomatic contacts continue, but without 
significant progress on substance. 
¶14. (U) Initially favoring Ajara and looking backward to 
Turkish-Russian agreements on the region, the Turks 
subsequently leaned more toward President Saakashvili and 
urged a peaceful resolution of the Ajara crisis.  The Turks 
provide humanitarian aid to Georgia and, in cooperation with 
the U.S., assist the Georgian military with equipment and 
training.  Georgia would like to increase bilateral economic 
activity, but aside from truck traffic and the 
Baku-Ceyhan-Tbilisi oil pipeline route, there are few 
prospects on the horizon. 
 
¶15. (U) The GOT has pushed to improve relations with Arab 
neighbors and Iran.  Turks believe their Ottoman past gives 
them insight and influence in the region, but underestimate 
their negative historical baggage.  Turkey,s strongly 
"secular" state structure also limits its influence with Arab 
or other more Islamic-oriented neighbors.  "Secular" Turks 
look askance at close ties with Islamic states. 
 
¶16. (U) Turkish/Israeli political and public relations have 
hit a low point in the wake of Israeli targeted killings, 
Israeli killing of Palestinian civilians in Rafah, and PM 
Erdogan's public condemnation, in which he said Israeli 
actions could be viewed as "state terror."  Turkey's 
Ambassador in Tel Aviv traveled to Ankara in early June for 
"routine consultations" but returned after a week.  Turkey 
views itself as a potential mediator between Israel and the 
Palestinians.  Turco-Israeli military and intelligence ties 
remain strong in some areas and the Turkish MFA is trying to 
maintain an even keel in relations.  Defense industry 
cooperation may be increasing, as the Turkish procurement 
bureaucracy looks to less-restrictive Israelis for technology 
transfer, especially upgrades to U.S.-origin equipment. 
 
¶17. (U) Some circles in the military, academe, the 
bureaucracy, the press and business world advocate 
development of strong relations with "Eurasia" (read Russia) 
as an alternative to the U.S. or EU. 
 
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Economy Improving, Still Vulnerable 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶18. (U) Helped by a massive IMF program, the Turkish economy 
has made an impressive recovery from the financial crisis of 
2001 and the near-crisis of early 2003, with inflation 
dropping to single digits, interest rates falling sharply, 
and growth in the 5 percent range in both 2003 and 2004. 
Still, the economy is not out of the woods, with a high 
public debt and serious structural problems ensuring 
continued vulnerability.  The government has implemented 
sound fiscal policy, but has moved slowly to implement 
structural reforms, such as privatizations and strengthening 
of independent regulatory agencies, needed to ensure 
sustained growth.  Turkey has not yet ratified the bilateral 
financial agreement governing the $8.5 billion U.S. loan, nor 
has it moved to resolve the numerous investment disputes and 
problems that are deterring additional U.S. investment.  The 
U.S. and Turkey continue to cooperate well in the development 
of the East-West energy corridor, designed to bring Caspian 
oil and gas to Western markets. 
EDELMAN