This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 001256 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ENRG OTRA ETTC MNUC PARM PREL NL
SUBJECT: DOE Second Line of Defense Megaport Initiative - 
Completion of Dutch Brinker Project in Rotterdam Port 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1.  A U.S. DOE team managed by David D. Martin, Deputy 
Director of the DOE/NNSA/Office of the Second Line of 
Defense (SLD), completed successful installation, testing, 
training and handover of radiation detection equipment to 
screen incoming and outgoing cargo containers at the Port of 
Rotterdam.  This two-year project represents the first 
installation of radiation detection equipment to combat 
nuclear smuggling in Western Europe and at a world 
"Megaport."  Approximately 48% of containers shipped from 
Rotterdam to the U.S. will now be screened for illicit 
nuclear and radiological material.  Extension of the project 
to the rest of Rotterdam Port, covering an additional 45-50% 
of U.S.-bound shipments, is expected by 2006, bringing the 
total coverage to 93-98%.  End Summary. 
 
History 
------- 
 
¶2.  Rotterdam is the largest port in Europe, handling an 
estimated 40% of all European shipments bound for the U.S. 
through four dedicated terminals.  In 2002, against a 
background of growing concerns about international 
terrorism, discussions began between the Dutch Ministry of 
Finance and U.S. Department of Energy about installing U.S. 
equipment at Rotterdam to prevent illicit trafficking in 
nuclear and other radioactive materials (the DOE Second Line 
of Defense Megaport Initiative).  While the Dutch valued 
improving port security and counterterrorism (CT) measures 
in general, they had serious reservations about the 
proposal: 1) EU accusations of creating an unfair 
competitive edge for Rotterdam could arise as happened when 
the Dutch were first to implement DHS/CBP Container Security 
Initiative (CSI); 2) installation and operation of the 
equipment would slow the flow of commerce; 3) operations 
would require burdensome staff increases; 4) the political 
climate in the Netherlands decried the perception of Dutch 
being too ready to acquiesce to U.S. law enforcement and CT 
requests; and 5) sharing information generated by the 
equipment with the U.S. would violate Dutch and/or EU 
privacy laws and standards. 
 
¶3.  Through close coordination among DOE, DHS/CBP CSI 
office, Embassy The Hague, the Dutch Customs Service, and 
Ministries of Finance, Health (VWS) and Environment (VROM), 
each of these concerns were met and resolved.  Technical, 
staffing and operational concerns were allayed during a 
visit to D.C. by the head of the Dutch Customs Service where 
she was able to meet with experts and use simulation 
equipment.  The parties agreed to a compromise creating 
limited phases of the project and allowing Dutch ownership 
and control over all but the start-up phase where U.S. 
expertise and training was most critical.  The Dutch agreed 
to accept DOE equipment, installation and training for one 
key Port terminal and to equip the remainder of the Port at 
their own expense through EU bid processes drawing on 
experience and knowledge gained from the U.S. installations. 
Calling the project the "Brinker Project" and emphasizing 
local CT protections also encouraged Dutch buy-in. 
 
¶4.  On August 13, 2003, U.S. Secretary of Energy Abraham and 
Dutch State Secretary of Finance Joop Wijn signed a Mutual 
Declaration of Principles ("MDP") reflecting the agreement 
and allowing closer cooperation between the two countries. 
 
Information Sharing and CSI Plus 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  The installed radiation detection systems will allow 
Dutch Customs to target for search, detect and interdict 
illicit trafficking in nuclear and radioactive materials. 
U.S. DHS CBP, already in place in Rotterdam for CSI, wanted 
notification of all alarms and seizures of nuclear or 
radioactive materials made with this equipment.  To meet 
concerns about information sharing standards, the MDP refers 
to established agreements to which the U.S. and Netherlands 
are signatories:  the Agreement between the European 
Community and the United States of America on Customs 
Cooperation and Mutual Assistance in Customs Matters of 28 
May 1997 and the Agreement on Mutual Administrative 
Assistance for the Proper Application of Customs Law and for 
the Prevention, Investigation and Combating of Customs 
Offenses between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the 
United States of America of 28 October 1996.  These 
agreements were sufficient to get the Dutch to allow the CSI 
Team in Rotterdam to be notified in near-real-time of 
containers entering or exiting the Port that cause a 
radiation alarm. 
Construction Summary 
-------------------- 
 
¶6.  On September 12, 2003, the engineering work began to 
equip the ECT Delta Terminal in the Maasvlakte (the largest 
of Rotterdam's four terminals which ships an estimated 87% 
of all of Rotterdam's U.S.-destined cargo) with four monitor 
control points.  This terminal handles 2.5 million TEUs/year 
of container throughput.  After local authority review of 
the designs and permitting, construction began on November 
19, 2003.  By early February 2004, three of the four control 
points had been equipped and tests began on the sensors 
themselves to establish functionality and the baseline for 
types of normal cargo (ceramic tile, fertilizer, etc.) 
causing alarms because of naturally occurring radiation.  In 
late February and March, the communication system to alert 
officials offsite of alarms was installed, tested and 
upgraded.  By mid-April 2004, all four sites in the ECT 
Delta Terminal were functioning and had been tested allowing 
turnover to the Dutch Government on April 21, 2004. 
 
Training 
-------- 
 
¶7.  The U.S. provided three training classes to 50 Dutch 
Customs officers at the HAMMER Facility in Richland, 
Washington as well as ad hoc training on the equipment at 
the Port.  Members of the Environment Ministry (VROM) also 
participated in the training.  Dutch Customs officers were 
required by VROM to be tested for their proficiency in basic 
radiation health and safety before traveling to the United 
States.  The Dutch organized their own ongoing training 
program as well as "Red-Team" systems tests to keep their 
response officers proficient.  Response procedures for 
discovery of illicit materials specific to the Netherlands 
were developed with input from DOE, Dutch Customs, VROM and 
the Ministry of Health. 
 
Follow-On 
--------- 
 
¶8.  The Dutch are proceeding to procure equipment, 
architectural and engineering services, and communications 
systems and services to equip the rest of Rotterdam Port 
with similar radiation detection systems.  An estimated 31 
additional radiation detection portal monitor sets will be 
procured and installed under this project.  Dutch Customs 
estimates the project will continue until the end of 2006. 
An ongoing dialogue on training issues, consultations about 
equipment specifications with Los Alamos National Laboratory 
radiation detector expert Dr. Rob York, and general nuclear 
smuggling issues will continue.  DOE and Embassy The Hague 
continue to work with the Dutch as they develop equipment 
specifications to ensure efficacy in detection and 
compatibility with American monitoring standards. 
 
¶9.  Private and official representatives of other countries 
- French, Belgian, Russian, Canadian, Germans and British - 
have recently visited Rotterdam to view the equipment in 
action and are considering developing similar systems to 
protect their own boundaries. 
 
Lessons Learned 
--------------- 
 
¶10.  While at times Dutch concerns seemed insurmountable, 
acceptable compromises were reached through constant and 
open communication.  For posts that may be engaged in 
similar land or water border protection projects, we offer 
the follow tips: 
 
-- Engage the host nation at several levels from the 
Ambassador down to the working level and maintain that 
engagement in order to ensure that bureaucratic 
concerns/impediments are understood and dealt with and that 
a high level of focus on the project is sustained to 
completion. 
 
-- Look seriously at broader regional considerations of 
importance to the host country, such as EU regulations and 
directives. 
 
-- Seeing and touching real equipment and speaking with 
actual operators and analysts made all the difference in 
resolving technical and staffing concerns.  After seeing 
actual monitors, viewing computer simulations of alarm data 
and talking with designers and technicians in D.C., the Head 
of Dutch Customs said the radiation detection monitors were 
as simple as airport magnetometers for passengers and 
baggage.  Her concerns of staffing needs and inspection and 
alarm obstructions to flow of trade were allayed. 
 
-- The training provided in the U.S. for Dutch staff was 
extremely valuable in making the staff comfortable with the 
equipment and appreciative of its capabilities.  Initial 
plans were to send only 2 officials for training at U.S. 
cost.  After seeing its value, the Dutch sent an additional 
48 on training with U.S.-Dutch cost sharing. 
 
-- The project only succeeded because the Dutch understood 
the mutual benefit of protecting all our borders from 
illicit trafficking in radiological material.  This is the 
key to starting any discussion.  After that point, Dutch 
ownership of the project - from giving the project a Dutch 
name to designing a Dutch controlled and financed phase-in 
schedule for the balance of the port - met Dutch needs to 
manage port security on their terms. 
 
SOBEL