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Viewing cable 04MANAMA756, BAHRAINI SHI'A DEMONSTRATION TURNS VIOLENT -- YET

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04MANAMA756 2004-05-22 10:12 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Manama
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS MANAMA 000756 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR DS/IP/NEA, DS/ITA, DSERCC, DS/ATA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PTER
SUBJECT: BAHRAINI SHI'A DEMONSTRATION TURNS VIOLENT -- YET 
AGAIN 
 
REF: MANAMA 00750 
 
1.  By Wednesday, 05/19/04, Post had anticipated a large 
demonstration in Bahrain for Friday, 05/21/04.  Our 
projection was based on calls by Hassan Nasrallah and 
Ayatollah Ali Sistani for Shi'a to rise up and demand the 
withdraw of U.S. forces from Karbala and Najaf.  Multiple 
Embassy contacts corroborated our information that Bahraini 
Shi'a planned to demonstrate, adding that many intended to 
wear symbolic white "death shrouds," an ominous gesture.  As 
noted in RefTel, Post issued a warden message on 05/19/04 
that warned Americans of the potential disturbances. 
 
2.  As expected, at 1600 on Friday, 05/21/04 following 
afternoon prayers, a large crowd began to gather in the Seef 
district of Bahrain (approx. 6km from the Embassy).  Several 
eyewitnesses reported to RSO that some of the individuals 
appeared to be carrying "sticks and rocks."  The stated 
intention of the demonstration's organizers, the Islamic 
Enlightenment Society and the Al Wefaq National Islamic 
Society, was to march peacefully along a simple circular 
route. 
 
3.  By 1615, the number of protesters quickly swelled to 
around 4,000 - 5,000.  What happened next is somewhat 
nebulous because the police closed all streets approaching 
the demonstration area.  From our understanding of reports 
from multiple sources, GOB riot police stopped the protesters 
from continuing along their desired route.  This stoppage 
incited the crowd to violence including rock throwing.  By 
1630, RSO received the first reports of tear gas launches. 
As the main body of the crowd began to flee from the gas, a 
senior Shi'a leader and march organizer, Shaikh Isa Qassim, 
was reportedly knocked down and injured. 
 
4.  Shaikh Isa Qassim's injury apparently incited the crowd 
to higher levels of violence.  By 1700, the momentum had 
shifted to the protesters, who charged and dispersed the riot 
police.  Moments later, RSO received reports that a group of 
hooligans had commandeered a police vehicle (Land Rover 
Defender), overturned it, and set it afire.  Chaos and 
violence followed for the next thirty minutes until the riot 
police regrouped at around 1730.  Additionally at 1730, Al 
Wefaq leader, Shaikh Ali Salman, addressed the frenzied crowd 
and called for control and an end to the violence.  Between 
the riot police re-deployment and Shaikh Ali Salman's 
appeals, the violence subsided and calm was restored by 1800. 
 
5.  On Saturday, 05/22/04, local newspapers were reporting 13 
people injured during the demonstration.  One daily printed a 
photograph of flag-waving youths rejoicing next to the 
burning police vehicle.  King Hamad was quoted as saying he 
was "not pleased" with the violence.  At no time was the U.S. 
Embassy approached or targeted by this group of protesters. 
 
6.  COMMENT:  Post is not at all surprised by the violence 
that erupted at this demonstration.  As we have seen during 
the last several planned "peaceful" marches, there is 
consistently an element in these crowds intent on engaging 
the police and inciting violence.  RSO believes that 
trouble-makers from previous demonstrations are neither 
detained beyond a few days nor punished beyond a nominal BD 
50.000 fine (about USD $133.00).  This apparent lack of 
punishment has encouraged repeat offenses.  Also, Post 
harbors genuine concern about potential future 
demonstrations.  When influential Shiite leaders call for 
action, the Bahraini Shi'a majority (approx. 80 per cent) 
feel obligated to comply.  END COMMENT. 
NEUMANN