This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

121552Z May 04

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 002686 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
 
STATE FOR EUR/SE, EB/EPD, AND EB/TPP/ABT 
DEPT PLEASE PASS USTR FOR CNOVELLI, JHOFEMEISTER, LERRION 
USDA FOR FAS FOR ITP/BERTSCH, MACKE, POMEROY, HANSEN, 
FLEMMING 
USDOC FOR DEFALCO 
 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETRD EAGR KPAO TU
SUBJECT:  NEW QUOTA SYSTEM NOT SOLUTION FOR RICE BAN 
 
 
Sensitive but Unclassified.  Not for Internet Distribution. 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary.  On April 27, TMO announced the creation 
of a quota system intended to liquidate their stocks and 
allow limited rice imports.  Rice importers who purchase TMO 
stocks will be allowed to import an equivalent (paddy 
equivalent) quantity.  Since August of 2003, the Turkish 
Ministry of Agriculture has refused to issue import licenses 
for rice.  As a result of high procurement prices, the 
Turkish Grain Board (TMO) purchased 148,000 MT of domestic 
paddy rice in 2003, which was approximately 35 percent of 
the domestic crop.  The rice import ban remains in place 
because TMO has not been able to resell its rice at such 
high prices.  End Summary. 
 
 
¶2.   Under the announced quota system, TMO will allow 
approximately 70,000 MT of milled rice equivalent imports. 
It is important to note that there is already significantly 
more rice held in bonded warehouses that has not been able 
to clear customs due to the ban.   Those importers who 
purchase TMO stocks in order to import rice will be simply 
clearing rice from their own stocks, which are currently in 
bonded warehouses.  Since the amount that they will be 
allowed to bring in from their bonded warehouses is limited, 
these companies will likely import their milled rice first. 
Note:  Traditionally, the United States exports 
predominantly paddy rice to Turkey.  End Note. Thus, in the 
current marketing year, no opportunities will exist for U.S. 
paddy rice to enter the market.  As a result of TMO actions 
and resulting high domestic prices, rice consumption in 
Turkey is forecast to decline by approximately 15 percent in 
the current year. 
 
 
¶3.   According to trade sources, the importers proposing to 
purchase TMO stocks have also requested that TMO keep the 
market closed so that they have protection to sell their 
rice.  The market is not expected to be reopened for 
commercial imports until early in 2005 at the earliest. 
 
 
¶4.   During the last week of April and first week of May, 
Agriculture Attache met with officials at the Turkish Under 
Secretariat of Foreign Trade, Agreements Branch (USFT), and 
 
SIPDIS 
the Director General of the Turkish Grain Board (TMO) and 
the Under Secretariat of Foreign Trade, Imports Branch.  The 
meetings were quite informative, although neither office 
appears concerned that the current import regime is 
violating WTO commitments.  On one hand, TMO clearly 
indicated that the ban would be in place into early 2005. 
Officials at the Under Secretariat of Foreign Trade, 
however, actually denied there was a ban, and indicated that 
anyone could import rice, as long as they met the import 
license requirements (which they indicated were plant health- 
related). Foreign Trade claims that Turkey has not violated 
any of its WTO commitments. Note:  Foreign Trade officials, 
who have a better understanding of WTO commitments, have 
made this denial in recent years as well.  They have, and 
will continue to argue that the import license is actually a 
plant health control certificate, and unrelated to 
quantitative import control measures.  Technically, this may 
be true, but the Ministry of Agriculture abuses this system 
to control imports of a variety of products.  End Note. 
 
 
------------------- 
A Long History 
------------------- 
 
 
¶5.   For the past four years, as early as August, Turkey's 
Ministry of Agriculture has stopped issuing import licenses 
for paddy rice.  Generally, this import ban lasts until 
January, thereby compelling Turkish millers to buy rice 
exclusively from Turkish farmers, and thus supporting the 
price of rice during harvest season.  By February, Turkish 
importers (largely rice millers) are usually granted import 
permits. Importers in Turkey and their U.S. suppliers have 
traditionally adjusted their marketing plans to accommodate 
the annual import ban and shortened import season. 
 
 
¶6.   The situation in 2003/04 is quite different.  The 
import ban, as expected, went into effect in August 2003. 
To date, the GOT continues to restrict imports due to large 
stocks held by the Turkish Grain Board (TMO).   TMO 
purchased about 35 percent of the 2003 domestic crop, or 
approximately 148,000 MT of paddy rice.  According to TMO, 
they are required to purchase any domestic crop, at their 
announced prices, that is not purchased by the private 
sector.  According to TMO, large commercial imports during 
the Sept 2002 to Aug 2003 marketing year resulted in 
relatively high commercially held domestic stocks and 
reluctance on the part of local millers to purchase Turkish 
rice.  TMO, and USFT have each indicated that this is a 
sensitive domestic issue. 
 
 
¶7.   To date, no rice imports from the 2003 U.S. crop have 
entered the Turkish market. Several shipments from the 
United States have been canceled altogether.  Exports of 
U.S. rice to Turkey in Sept 2003 to Feb 2004 were 39,300 
tons, 71 percent below the same period in 2002/2003.  None 
of this rice has actually entered the Turkish market for 
consumption, since the rice is being held in bonded 
warehouses (in Turkey) pending the issuance of import 
permits.  As this is paddy rice, and milled rice is expected 
to clear customs first under the quota system, it is 
unlikely that any U.S. rice will enter Turkey until 2005. 
 
 
----------------------- 
A Circular Problem 
----------------------- 
 
 
¶8.   It is easy to see how the actions of TMO actually 
precipitated this crisis.  Traders have reacted to the 
predictable and short import season by procuring more rice 
than needed, as they did in 2002.  Large commercial stocks 
resulted in limited domestic procurement, which was 
subsequently done by TMO.  Now the millers and importers are 
being forced to purchase the rice at prices set by TMO.  As 
a result of high prices, domestic consumption of rice is 
forecast to be lower by approximately fifteen percent.  Even 
if the quotas were lifted today, the stocks held in bonded 
warehouses are sufficient to meet domestic demand.  There is 
also speculation that Egyptian rice would benefit most from 
the current market conditions if all quotas were lifted. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
Equal Treatment for Wheat and Corn? 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
 
¶9.   The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs, under 
the guidance of TMO, and with the objective of supporting 
domestic producers, controls the imports of wheat and corn 
in a similar manner.  For wheat, import licenses are only 
granted for about 300,000 MT of wheat under a bilateral 
quota system with the EU, or against exports of wheat 
products such as flour or pasta.  No import licenses have 
been issued for U.S. wheat in several years.  For corn, 
Turkey uses very high tariffs (currently eighty percent) to 
seasonally control imports and guarantee that domestic 
production is procured first at higher-than-world prices. 
This creates a short import season, and much uncertainty for 
local feed millers and poultry producers.  As with rice, 
once the import window opens, corn traders and end-users 
rush to cover their needs well into the future. 
 
 
EDELMAN