This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

271710Z Apr 04

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 AMMAN 003231 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL KDEM PHUM PGOV JO
SUBJECT: JORDANIAN RESPONSE TO GME INITIATIVE: 
U.S. 
CREDIBILITY LOW BUT PROPSALS NOT TOO BAD 
 
REF: SECSTATE 86312 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (U)  In response to ref, Post solicited 
feedback from our interlocutors within the GOJ, 
academia, and the NGO community about the G-8 
Greater Middle East Initiative papers.  The 
response was generally favorable, but activists 
cautioned that implementation will be difficult 
given low U.S. credibility in the region related 
to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and Iraq. 
That said, all agreed that G-8 sponsorship for a 
regional reform initiative would make it less 
controversial than U.S. sponsorship.  Our 
contacts commended the inclusion of references to 
previous Arab reform documents as a way to show 
how the GMEI complements regional efforts, and 
offered suggestions to counter criticism that it 
is being imposed from "outside."  Activists 
appreciated the effort to involve representatives 
from all sectors of society, and cautioned 
against letting resistant governments make 
excuses to stall reform.  They suggested that 
coordinating through the G-8 would also help 
eliminate redundancies in regional reform 
programming and funding, as well as connect 
like-minded activists with a view to increasing 
cooperation and replicating successful 
approaches.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
SUGGESTIONS TO ENHANCE GMEI'S REGIONAL FLAVOR 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (U)  Interlocutors from the GOJ, NGO 
community, and academia offered suggestions to 
further enhance the Greater Middle East 
Initiative's (GMEI) "regional flavor" and counter 
criticism that the ideas are being imposed from 
the "outside."  A senior GOJ official who read 
the papers said that the initiative's inclusion 
of language from previous Arab documents on civil 
society and democratic development, including the 
Alexandria Library, Arab Business Council, and 
Sana'a Declaration, was a positive way to 
highlight the fact the GMEI is building on 
regional reform efforts.  He said that the Arab 
League should take a similar approach when they 
meet in May to devise an Arab reform document. 
 
¶3.  (U)  Regarding the idea of allocating funding 
through a board of directors, one contact 
proposed selecting "credible" intellectuals from 
the region to serve on the board.  He also 
suggested that the G-8 publicize the meetings 
held in Arab countries with local activists (such 
as the roundtable discussion in Amman with U/S 
Grossman) to show that the USG indeed is making 
the effort to consult, not impose. 
 
¶4.  (U)  They believe the proposed Foundation for 
Democracy could select the most appropriate 
models of democratic institutions that exist in 
Europe, the U.S. and other countries to follow in 
the Middle East (e.g. parliamentary as opposed to 
presidential government, or French versus 
Anglo-Saxon legal or educational traditions).  A 
professor of political science suggests creating 
equivalent bodies on the regional and national 
levels that can connect more effectively to all 
levels of the population and advance democratic 
tenets in a country-specific and culturally 
sensitive manner. 
 
------------------------------------- 
ACTIVISTS LAUD ALL-INCLUSIVE APPROACH 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (U)  Interlocutors roundly applauded the 
proposals' efforts to include government, 
business, and civil society representatives in 
developing and implementing the initiative.  With 
regard to the Forum for the Future, activists 
emphasized that no one sector should dominate, 
and government in particular should not be 
allowed to veto or stymie progress in "sensitive" 
areas such as press freedoms and women's rights. 
One suggestion is to hold in parallel to the G-8 
a conference of civil society groups from the 
region and democracy NGOs from the G-8 countries, 
which could then compare initiatives and 
assessments of progress towards democratization. 
 
-------------------------------- 
AVOIDING DONOR REDUNDANCY IS KEY 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (U)  Our contacts also approve of the effort 
to coordinate donor support among G-8 members. 
"There is too much money flying around in 
different directions" which is funding often 
redundant projects, according to one activist. 
With regard to the Democracy Assistance Group, 
the NGO representatives like the idea of a 
clearing house which would ensure donors are not 
double-funding the same project.  They also 
support creating a data bank which would register 
projects aimed at strengthening democratic 
institutions in different countries, so that 
civil society groups could benefit from similar 
experiences in the region. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
HOW TO MAKE IT ALL WORK: STRUCTURAL SUGGESTIONS 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶7.  (U)  NGO representatives and academics like 
the idea of forming committees composed of civil 
society representatives from participating Arab 
countries to start the Foundation for Democracy, 
Democracy Assistance Group, and the Forum for the 
Future,   They say it is important that these 
representatives be independent of their 
governments, but enjoy broad trust among their 
constituents.  However, the challenge will be 
determining participation.  They warn that 
identifying appropriate activists could 
inadvertently spur individual competition and 
jealousies between community leaders.  To avoid 
this common problem, one solution might be to 
include a wide gathering of civil society 
representatives, possibly chosen by independent 
but outside organizations like the National 
Endowment for Democracy or the German foundation 
Stiftungen, which have experience and contacts in 
the region.  This large gathering could elect a 
smaller regional steering committee of civil 
society representatives, which could set regional 
goals, brainstorm, coordinate funding and oversee 
the screening and selection of project proposals. 
 
¶8.  (U)  One academic said it is essential that 
the reform program have measurable indicators so 
it does not devolve into a tool that enhances the 
(undesirable) status quo or that the reform 
effort stalls at the initial dialogue stage. 
Obviously, dialogue is essential to make 
connections and start the ball rolling, but the 
initiative will have to identify and empower 
specific means and tools for change to maintain 
momentum.  Clear criteria defining progress would 
help ensure that projects translate into real 
reform (and societal progress). 
 
------------------------------------------- 
ALL ROADS LEAD BACK TO PALESTINE (AND IRAQ) 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (U)  Activists worry that low USG credibility 
in the Middle East and ongoing turmoil in Iraq 
and the West Bank/Gaza will continue to hinder 
even a G-8 backed initiative.  One warned that 
many regional leaders will try to use Iraq and 
Palestine as an excuse not to deal with reform in 
their countries.  For the badly needed reform 
efforts to succeed, the people, according to our 
interlocutors, must be convinced that the U.S. is 
committed to a just solution to the conflicts, 
and they must see a sincere effort underway to 
fight what many perceive as anti-Arab and 
anti-Islam feelings/activities in the West. 
Failure to do so, according to our Jordanian 
contacts, will only increase extremism in the 
region and make the G-8's reform efforts 
infinitely more difficult in the long run. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶10.  (U)  Our NGO and civil society interlocutors 
in this project -- many of whom met with U/S 
Grossman in March to discuss the GMEI -- provided 
positive and concrete suggestions not colored by 
a political message.  That said, all pointed to 
low U.S. credibility on the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict and Iraq as the main obstacles to wide 
acceptance of the much-needed GMEI.  We note that 
the positive and constructive reaction from 
Embassy contacts -- some of whom are interested 
in USG funding for their own related democracy 
and civil society projects -- is not 
representative of most Jordanians, who we expect 
would calibrate their reaction more closely with 
the negative political climate in the region. 
 
Visit Embassy Amman's classified web site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman or access 
the site through the State Department's SIPRNET 
home page. 
GNEHM