This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

271608Z Apr 04

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 003227 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL KDEM PHUM PGOV JO
SUBJECT: JORDANIAN RESPONSE TO GME INITIATIVE: U.S. 
CREDIBILITY LOW BUT PROPSALS NOT TOO BAD 
 
REF: SECSTATE 86312 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (U)  In response to ref, Post solicited feedback from our 
interlocutors within the GOJ, academia, and the NGO community 
about the G-8 Greater Middle East Initiative papers.  The 
response was generally favorable, but activists cautioned 
that implementation will be difficult given low U.S. 
credibility in the region related to the Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict and Iraq.  That said, all agreed that G-8 
sponsorship for a regional reform initiative would make it 
less controversial than U.S. sponsorship.  Our contacts 
commended the inclusion of references to previous Arab reform 
documents as a way to show how the GMEI complements regional 
efforts, and offered suggestions to counter criticism that it 
is being imposed from "outside."  Activists appreciated the 
effort to involve representatives from all sectors of 
society, and cautioned against letting resistant governments 
make excuses to stall reform.  They suggested that 
coordinating through the G-8 would also help eliminate 
redundancies in regional reform programming and funding, as 
well as connect like-minded activists with a view to 
increasing cooperation and replicating successful approaches. 
 End Summary. 
 
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SUGGESTIONS TO ENHANCE GMEI'S REGIONAL FLAVOR 
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¶2.  (U)  Interlocutors from the GOJ, NGO community, and 
academia offered suggestions to further enhance the Greater 
Middle East Initiative's (GMEI) "regional flavor" and counter 
criticism that the ideas are being imposed from the 
"outside."  A senior GOJ official who read the papers said 
that the initiative's inclusion of language from previous 
Arab documents on civil society and democratic development, 
including the Alexandria Library, Arab Business Council, and 
Sana'a Declaration, was a positive way to highlight the fact 
the GMEI is building on regional reform efforts.  He said 
that the Arab League should take a similar approach when they 
meet in May to devise an Arab reform document. 
 
¶3.  (U)  Regarding the idea of allocating funding through a 
board of directors, one contact proposed selecting "credible" 
intellectuals from the region to serve on the board.  He also 
suggested that the G-8 publicize the meetings held in Arab 
countries with local activists (such as the roundtable 
discussion in Amman with U/S Grossman) to show that the USG 
indeed is making the effort to consult, not impose. 
 
¶4.  (U)  They believe the proposed Foundation for Democracy 
could select the most appropriate models of democratic 
institutions that exist in Europe, the U.S. and other 
countries to follow in the Middle East (e.g. parliamentary as 
opposed to presidential government, or French versus 
Anglo-Saxon legal or educational traditions).  A professor of 
political science suggests creating equivalent bodies on the 
regional and national levels that can connect more 
effectively to all levels of the population and advance 
democratic tenets in a country-specific and culturally 
sensitive manner. 
 
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ACTIVISTS LAUD ALL-INCLUSIVE APPROACH 
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¶5.  (U)  Interlocutors roundly applauded the proposals' 
efforts to include government, business, and civil society 
representatives in developing and implementing the 
initiative.  With regard to the Forum for the Future, 
activists emphasized that no one sector should dominate, and 
government in particular should not be allowed to veto or 
stymie progress in "sensitive" areas such as press freedoms 
and women's rights.  One suggestion is to hold in parallel to 
the G-8 a conference of civil society groups from the region 
and democracy NGOs from the G-8 countries, which could then 
compare initiatives and assessments of progress towards 
democratization. 
 
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AVOIDING DONOR REDUNDANCY IS KEY 
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¶6.  (U)  Our contacts also approve of the effort to 
coordinate donor support among G-8 members.  "There is too 
much money flying around in different directions" which is 
funding often redundant projects, according to one activist. 
With regard to the Democracy Assistance Group, the NGO 
representatives like the idea of a clearing house which would 
ensure donors are not double-funding the same project.  They 
also support creating a data bank which would register 
projects aimed at strengthening democratic institutions in 
different countries, so that civil society groups could 
benefit from similar experiences in the region. 
 
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HOW TO MAKE IT ALL WORK: STRUCTURAL SUGGESTIONS 
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¶7.  (U)  NGO representatives and academics like the idea of 
forming committees composed of civil society representatives 
from participating Arab countries to start the Foundation for 
Democracy, Democracy Assistance Group, and the Forum for the 
Future,   They say it is important that these representatives 
be independent of their governments, but enjoy broad trust 
among their constituents.  However, the challenge will be 
determining participation.  They warn that identifying 
appropriate activists could inadvertently spur individual 
competition and jealousies between community leaders.  To 
avoid this common problem, one solution might be to include a 
wide gathering of civil society representatives, possibly 
chosen by independent but outside organizations like the 
National Endowment for Democracy or the German foundation 
Stiftungen, which have experience and contacts in the region. 
 This large gathering could elect a smaller regional steering 
committee of civil society representatives, which could set 
regional goals, brainstorm, coordinate funding and oversee 
the screening and selection of project proposals. 
 
¶8.  (U)  One academic said it is essential that the reform 
program have measurable indicators so it does not devolve 
into a tool that enhances the (undesirable) status quo or 
that the reform effort stalls at the initial dialogue stage. 
Obviously, dialogue is essential to make connections and 
start the ball rolling, but the initiative will have to 
identify and empower specific means and tools for change to 
maintain momentum.  Clear criteria defining progress would 
help ensure that projects translate into real reform (and 
societal progress). 
 
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ALL ROADS LEAD BACK TO PALESTINE (AND IRAQ) 
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¶9.  (U)  Activists worry that low USG credibility in the 
Middle East and ongoing turmoil in Iraq and the West 
Bank/Gaza will continue to hinder even a G-8 backed 
initiative.  One warned that many regional leaders will try 
to use Iraq and Palestine as an excuse not to deal with 
reform in their countries.  For the badly needed reform 
efforts to succeed, the people, according to our 
interlocutors, must be convinced that the U.S. is committed 
to a just solution to the conflicts, and they must see a 
sincere effort underway to fight what many perceive as 
anti-Arab and anti-Islam feelings/activities in the West. 
Failure to do so, according to our Jordanian contacts, will 
only increase extremism in the region and make the G-8's 
reform efforts infinitely more difficult in the long run. 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶10.  (U)  Our NGO and civil society interlocutors in this 
project -- many of whom met with U/S Grossman in March to 
discuss the GMEI -- provided positive and concrete 
suggestions not colored by a political message.  That said, 
all pointed to low U.S. credibility on the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Iraq as the main obstacles 
to wide acceptance of the much-needed GMEI.  We note that the 
positive and constructive reaction from Embassy contacts -- 
some of whom are interested in USG funding for their own 
related democracy and civil society projects -- is not 
representative of most Jordanians, who we expect would 
calibrate their reaction more closely with the negative 
political climate in the region. 
 
Visit Embassy Amman's classified web site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman or access the site 
through the State Department's SIPRNET home page. 
GNEHM