Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 64621 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 04ANKARA1448, TURKEY AND THIRD COUNTRY TRANSFERS: REQUEST FOR

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #04ANKARA1448.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04ANKARA1448 2004-03-11 09:28 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Ankara
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

110928Z Mar 04
UNCLAS ANKARA 001448 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR PM/RSTA, EUR, L 
 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MASS TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY AND THIRD COUNTRY TRANSFERS:  REQUEST FOR 
DETAILED LIST OF INFORMATION REQUIRED TO PROCESS REQUESTS 
 
 
1. (U) This is an action request.  See para 4. 
 
 
2. (U) During the February 18 US-Turkey Joint Staff Talks in 
Ankara, Turkish Air Force officers expressed interest in 
exploring ways the US and Turkey could expedite the 
processing of Turkey's requests to provide US-origin 
equipment and services (including training) to third 
countries.  We responded positively to TUAF's request and 
have offered to meet with GOT officials. 
 
 
3. (U) One of our objectives during the meeting will be to 
outline what steps the GOT can take to expedite processing of 
third-country requests.  One of the first suggestions that we 
intend to offer involves information.  In our experience, GOT 
requests oftentimes do not contain all of the necessary 
information the Department requires to process the request. 
As a result, the Department oftentimes asks for additional 
information before it can continue processing the request. 
This leads to delays and frustrations on both sides. 
 
 
4. (U) Action request:  In order to help the Turks help 
themselves, we request the Department provide us a detailed 
list of the information the GOT needs to include with its 
requests to transfer US-origin equipment or services 
(including training) to a third country.  This will allow us 
to better "educate" the GOT on what information the 
Department and other agencies require to process Turkey's 
requests, and reduce the instances where we are required to 
stop the review process and go back to the Turks to request 
additional information.  It is especially important that we 
be able to provide the Turkish Air Force detailed and 
consistent guidance for those requests involving training. 
As we recently observed in the case involving TUAF's desire 
to provide F-16 training to Chilean pilots, these cases 
receive high-level attention within the GOT and, if not 
processed in a timely and consistent manner, can lead to 
unnecessary irritants in the US-Turkish defense relationship. 
EDELMAN