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Diana T Fritz  03/15/2007 03:04:03 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  Search Results

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UNCLASSIFIED

SIPDIS
TELEGRAM                                           March 22, 2004


To:       No Action Addressee                                    

Action:   Unknown                                                

From:     AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI (ABU DHABI 814 - ROUTINE)          

TAGS:     PHUM, PREL                                             

Captions: None                                                   

Subject:  TRIP READOUT - G/TIP VISIT TO UAE                      

Ref:      None                                                   
_________________________________________________________________
UNCLAS        ABU DHABI 00814

SIPDIS
CXABU:
    ACTION: AMB 
    INFO:   POL DCM 

DISSEMINATION: AMB
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: AMB:MWAHBA
DRAFTED: POL:SRADDANT
CLEARED: DCM:RALBRIGHT POL:JMAYBURY CGD:JDAVIS

VZCZCADI993
RR RUEHC RUEHDI RUEHZM RUEHZS RUCNEEC
DE RUEHAD #0814/01 0821403
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 221403Z MAR 04
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3657
INFO RUEHDI/AMCONSUL DUBAI 3868
RUEHZM/GCC COLLECTIVE
RUEHZS/ASEAN COLLECTIVE
RUCNEEC/EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 ABU DHABI 000814 
 
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DEPT. PLEASE PASS TO ALNED,CISC, AND ALSAC COLLECTIVES 
 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR G/TIP, INL, DRL, NEA/RA, AND NEA/ARP 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM PREL TC
SUBJECT: TRIP READOUT - G/TIP VISIT TO UAE 
 
REFS: (A) TAYLOR/RADDANT EMAIL, FEB. 3, 2004 (B) 
TAYLOR/RADDANT EMAIL, JAN. 26, 2004 (C) ABU DHABI 2335 (D) 
BAKU 390 (E) DUBAI 1267 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY.  From February 11 to 15, G/TIP Senior 
Coordinator for Reports Mark Taylor and NEA/RA Desk Officer 
Nahide Bayrasli visited the UAE to update information for 
the 2004 Trafficking in Persons Report.  The meetings were 
very informative, and the team stated on several occasions 
that they were impressed with the progress the UAE has made 
over the past year on the camel jockey issue.  However, the 
meetings also revealed that the UAEG and the G/TIP office 
are following different definitions of what constitutes sex 
trafficking and what the UAEG should be doing to address 
it. 
 
¶2. (SBU) One year ago, prior to the UAE's jump from tier 
three to tier one in the Trafficking in Persons report, the 
UAEG determined that it could confront its trafficking 
problem within two years.  Over the past year, the UAE put 
measures into place to successfully control trafficking in 
camel jockeys.  These measures were led by Shaykh Hamdan 
bin Zayed's ban on underage camel jockeys, which was 
implemented despite significant political pressure from 
older and more traditional members of his own family and 
from the Camel Racing Federation, whose director was 
recently replaced.  Dropping the UAE from tier one to tier 
two halfway into its two-year plan would threaten the good 
progress made by the UAEG to date, since Shaykh Hamdan 
would lose the credibility and political leverage required 
to move forward with the next steps of the UAE's anti-TIP 
plan. 
 
¶3. (SBU) While the UAE has put some important measures into 
place to combat sex trafficking, the USG and UAEG will work 
together over the next year to refocus efforts of its two- 
year plan from camel jockeys to trafficked prostitutes. 
Post and UAEG is working together to implement a two-month 
action plan that will fill some of the information gaps 
discovered during the visit.  Also, Post and the UAEG will 
create an extended 12-month action plan to help broaden the 
UAEG's more narrow definition of sex trafficking, while 
striking an appropriate balance between maintaining an 
open, business- and tourist-friendly environment with the 
need to crack down on those attempting to enter the country 
for nefarious reasons. END SUMMARY. 
 
¶4. (SBU) During the visit, the delegation discussed the 
camel jockey issue at length with the Camel Racing 
Federation's Executive Secretary Essa Al Kheyali, and 
afterwards they observed a camel race.  At the Ministry of 
Interior, the team discussed the camel jockey, domestic 
servant, and sex trafficking issues with representatives 
from the Department of Naturalization and Residency, the 
Abu Dhabi Police, the Al Ain Social Support Center, and the 
Legal Department.  At the Ministry of Labor, Undersecretary 
of Labor Dr. Khalid Al Khazraji primarily talked about the 
upcoming labor law and working conditions for domestic 
servants.  At the Ministry of Justice, the delegation 
talked to the Undersecretary for Planning and International 
Cooperation, Ambassador Abdulrahim Al Awadi, about its 
concerns over the low number of prosecutions of 
traffickers.  It also asked a number of questions about 
existing anti-trafficking law, and recommended MOJ review 
of a U.S.-created model anti-TIP law.  Similarly, the team 
asked a number of legal-based questions to the Chairman of 
the Jurists Association, Dr. Mohammad Al Roken.  The team 
gave a trip overview to MFA Undersecretary of Political 
Affairs, Ambassador Abdullah Rashid Al Noaimi, and 
expressed its concerns that the UAE is not doing enough to 
combat sex trafficking and, as a result, may drop to tier 
two.  The meetings with the Dubai Police Department 
Commander Lt. General Khalfan Al Tamimi focused primarily 
on sex trafficking, and the challenges police face in 
controlling the influx of women coming to Dubai each year 
to work as prostitutes.  Conversation about sex trafficking 
continued during a follow-on meeting with a Human Rights 
Committee comprised of representatives from the police, 
immigration, public prosecution, and concerned private 
citizens.  Finally, the team was able to discuss all 
trafficking topics at length with representatives from 
source countries, including the Philippines, India, Sri 
Lanka, Sudan, Indonesia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Ukraine, 
at roundtables in both Abu Dhabi and Dubai. 
 
--------------------- 
CAMEL JOCKEY PROGRESS 
--------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) The delegation, PolChief and PolOff met with 
representatives of the new administration governing the 
Camel Racing Federation (CRF), whose inspection committees 
oversee every camel race on the UAE's 8 major and 15 minor 
camel racing tracks.  These representatives have replaced 
the former Managing Director of the CRF, Khalfan Khamees, 
and his staff, who were unflatteringly featured in the 
February 2003 Australian Broadcasting Corporation's video 
expose about the UAE's continued use of underage foreign 
camel jockeys.  During the meeting, the CRF's Executive 
Secretary, Ambassador Essa Al Kheyali, spelled out the 
 
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steps taken by the UAE in 2003 to combat the use of 
trafficked and underage boys as camel jockeys, while 
pointing out additional work that still needs to be done. 
He described in detail the medical procedures in place to 
check the age and health of the boys before the issuance of 
mandatory identification cards, as well as DNA tests to 
prove that those claiming to be the boys' parents truly 
are.  Al Kheyali stated that, since the DNA testing began 
last racing season, 47 boys have been stopped from entering 
the country with false "parents" (a.k.a. traffickers). 
Working through source country embassies, consulates, and 
NGOs, the boys were humanely repatriated at UAEG expense. 
 
¶6. (SBU) While the new administration is well versed in the 
Presidential Decree specifying age and weight requirements 
of camel jockeys, Al Kheyali told the G/TIP delegation 
that, at this time, the CRF is focusing on the age and 
overall health of the boys, and not emphasizing the weight 
requirement.  Al Kheyali explained that this requirement 
has been the single most contentious issue within the camel 
racing community since the ban was reinforced in September 
2002, and may be the element holding up the ban's passage 
into federal law.  The matter is before the Supreme Council 
for consideration.  While relevant parties from all the 
emirates have generally accepted the age limit, many 
question why the weight requirement is necessary if the age 
limitation is followed and the overall health of the 
jockeys is good.  There have been many comparisons between 
the requirements camel jockeys must follow vs. those of 
horse jockeys, who do not face a weight requirement.  Also, 
in separate conversations, the MFA has pointed out that, 
during its discussions with the ILO regarding this issue, 
the weight requirement has not been emphasized.  The ILO's 
main focus has been on the age requirement and the overall 
health of the jockeys. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Taylor told Al Kheyali that he had heard of the 
impressive progress made by the UAE on this issue, and he 
wished the CRF continued success in eliminating the 
practice.  At meetings at the Ministries of Interior and 
Foreign Affairs, he expressed his concern that the weight 
requirement was not being followed. 
 
¶8. (SBU) During two roundtable discussions during the G/TIP 
visit with embassy and consulate representatives from 
Philippines, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India, Sudan, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Ukraine, all confirmed that they 
thought the camel jockey issue is no longer a major 
concern.  Representatives from the missions of Pakistan and 
Bangladesh have stated the same in meetings over the past 
several months.  They said that traffickers are deterred by 
the tightened UAE restrictions.  Due to the identity card 
mandate, CRF inspectors are locating and assisting 
trafficking victims at racetracks.  Also, source country 
embassies and consulates are intervening and assisting the 
victims when the boys come in to acquire the documents 
required to obtain the mandatory identity cards.  The 
Pakistani Embassy stated that, in 2003, it, with the 
assistance of the UAEG and NGOs in Pakistan, humanely 
repatriated 125 boys who were previously working as camel 
jockeys.  The Bangladeshi Embassy claimed that they have 
done the same for approximately 120 - 150 boys.  Both 
countries have stated that they are satisfied with the 
procedures the UAEG has implemented to locate the 
trafficked boys and return them to their home countries. 
They stated that, due to the stricter requirements and 
medical testing, few, if any, new cases of trafficking are 
occurring. 
 
----------------- 
DOMESTIC SERVANTS 
----------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Meeting with G/TIP officials, the Undersecretary 
for the Ministry of Labor (MOL), Dr. Khalid Al Khazraji, 
reported that approximately 700,000 people, primarily 
women, were working in the UAE as domestic servants.  While 
he, and later police representatives and source country 
representatives, all talked to the delegation about the few 
incidents of abuse that occur in the UAE, they all stated 
that workers are generally satisfied with their situations. 
When problems arise, the Ministry of Interior, police, and 
courts intervene and mediate an agreement between the 
parties.  However, there were some complaints from source 
country representatives during the roundtables that the 
process can be time-consuming, and often the workers prefer 
to settle quickly and return home rather than stay in the 
UAE to fight for their rights.  Both the UAEG and source 
country representatives stated that these jobs remain very 
attractive, and workers compete heavily to get them. 
Domestic servants in the UAE can make 3 - 4 times (or more) 
the salary they can make back home, so they continue to 
come. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Al Khazraji explained that domestic servants are 
not covered under the existing labor law, nor will they 
likely be covered under the new labor law expected to be 
ratified this summer.  He explained that working conditions 
are listed in contracts signed by all parties and 
registered by the Ministry of Interior's Labor Supply 
Office.  Complaints are also resolved through this office. 
A local NGO representative and practicing attorney, Dr. 
Mohamed Al Roken, told the G/TIP team that most or all 
disputes between domestic servants and their employers are 
resolved amicably.  He also told the delegation, and source 
country representatives confirmed, that before domestic 
servants depart the UAE, immigration officials interview 
them to ensure that they have been paid per their 
contracts. 
 
--------------- 
SEX TRAFFICKING 
--------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) Conversations about the UAE's efforts to combat 
trafficking in women for the purposes of sexual 
exploitation revealed that there is considerable 
inconsistency between G/TIP's and the UAEG's definitions of 
sex trafficking.  Police, several ministry officials, and 
even source country representatives, told the delegation 
that they believed that most prostitutes are living and 
working in the UAE by choice, due to extreme economic 
hardship back in their own countries.  The Commander of the 
Dubai Police Department, Lt. Gen. Dhahi Khalfan Al Tamimi, 
cited numerous examples of "repeat cases," or women who are 
deported repeatedly for prostitution only to return within 
a few months, using fraudulent documents, to continue their 
trade.  This trend of economic migration through the sex 
industry is well documented in several USG TIP and Human 
Rights Country Reports from source countries, as well as in 
NGO statements (including the IOM, see ref D), and many of 
the women themselves during interviews here in the UAE. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Police and Ministry of Interior officials told 
Taylor and Bayrasli that many of the women working as 
prostitutes in the UAE are well-educated and have families 
back home to support.  They stated that the women could not 
expect to make a fraction of the money there that they can 
earn in the UAE in this profession.  TIP reports from 
several of the CIS countries confirm the economic hardship 
faced by these women, and the drive to take extreme 
measures to support their households.  At times, the women 
incur a substantial debt to those who smuggled them into 
the UAE.  While some may later come to regret their 
decision, those who do so are not, in the view of the UAE 
(as well as other individuals and organizations, including 
the IOM, see ref D), considered trafficking victims.  Thus, 
G/TIP's broader trafficking definition, by which standard 
nearly all prostitutes working in the UAE might be 
considered trafficking victims, startled most of the 
delegation's UAEG interlocutors. 
 
¶13. (SBU) During the delegation's meetings with the 
Ministries of Interior and Justice, Dubai Police, and the 
chairman of the NGO Jurists' Association, it became clear 
that, while the UAEG's definition of trafficking is 
different from our own, there are legal systems in place to 
try to distinguish trafficking victims from those who 
choose to break the law.  Police in Dubai reported to the 
team that, after arrest, all prostitutes are interviewed by 
the Anti-Trafficking in Persons unit in the Criminal 
Investigative Division (CID), created in July 2003, to 
determine if they are victims of a larger criminal 
syndicate.  Additionally, police attempt to gather 
information about customers, traffickers, and others who 
benefit from the sex industry during these interviews, with 
a goal of prosecuting them. 
¶14. (SBU) In addition to working closely with the new anti- 
TIP CID office, the Dubai Police Department's Human Rights 
Care Department Director, Dr. Mohammad Abdullah Al Mur, 
reported that he also coordinates with anti-TIP specialists 
in the Immigration Department and Public Prosecution.  He 
has recently formed a Human Rights Care Committee that 
includes CID, Immigration, Public Prosecution, and his own 
department, along with representatives from the MFA, Health 
and Labor Departments, and non-governmental entities from 
academia, media, and the business world.  The committee's 
goal is to study TIP and other human rights issues, 
focusing on a multi-dimensional approach toward combating 
these problems.  The G/TIP team stated that it looked 
forward to hearing more about the committee's activities in 
the future, after it has had more time to work together as 
a unit. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS - POST'S TRIP ANALYSIS 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶15. (SBU) There seemed to be a sense of surprise, 
particularly at the Ministries of Interior and Justice and 
the Dubai Police, at the delegation's primary focus on the 
UAE's progress on sex trafficking.  While they were able to 
explain some good steps taken over the reporting year 
(explained in septel Trafficking in Persons Report) to 
combat sex trafficking, the UAEG had expected to use this 
visit to highlight its impressive record on the camel 
jockey issue, which it viewed as the USG's primary focus in 
¶2003. 
 
¶16. (SBU) Post also was surprised by the rapid shift in 
focus from camel jockeys to sex trafficking.  Although sex 
trafficking has understandably been a key piece of the 
trafficking in persons puzzle since the start of the TIP 
reporting requirement, it was never emphasized in the UAE 
as strongly as was the camel jockey issue until very late 
in this reporting season.  Post had been under the 
impression, after months of emails (see refs A and B), 
telephone conversations over the reporting year, that the 
UAE would need to showcase its progress on the camel jockey 
issue in the 2004 report and during the G/TIP visit.  Only 
when the team arrived at Post in February, less than a 
month before the deadline of the annual TIP reporting 
cable, was it made clear that sex trafficking would be the 
focus of the meetings and the litmus test of the ranking 
process in 2004. 
 
¶17. (SBU) As explained in Ref. C, the UAE imposed on itself 
a two-year deadline for full implementation of its anti-TIP 
efforts in May 2003, prior to its tier one ranking in the 
2003 TIP report.  At that time, a number of USG officials 
agreed that this was a reasonable timeframe for such a 
comprehensive undertaking, considering the expected 
resistance from more conservative social elements, the 
taboo nature of the subject, the lack of properly trained 
and experienced law enforcement personnel, and the 
necessity to continue the "open" environment which supports 
the crucial tourism and business industries here.  Post 
feels that it is not reasonable to expect all facets of the 
trafficking problem to be fully addressed in only one 
year's time.  The UAE allotted two years to confront its 
trafficking problem in its entirety.  Now that it has 
successfully confronted and controlled trafficking in camel 
jockeys, it needs this second year to refocus its efforts 
on combating sex trafficking. 
 
¶18. (SBU) All that said, the UAE is politically committed 
to eliminating all forms of prostitution on its soil, 
including and especially those cases involving trafficked 
prostitutes.  Some senior UAEG officials have repeatedly 
classified all forms of prostitution as un-Islamic and a 
scourge to society.  However, the Mission will need to work 
with the UAEG to ensure that its definition of trafficking 
better matches the USG's broader definition.  Doing so will 
be key in our effort to ensure that the UAE improves its 
record of treating trafficked prostitutes as victims rather 
than criminals. Although the political will to fight 
trafficking in persons exists at all levels of government, 
new procedures and institutions will need to be set up. 
Also, most officials need training in the subject, and in 
fact they have been requesting it from the U.S. throughout 
the reporting year. 
 
--------------------------------- 
SPECIAL CHALLENGES AND NEXT STEPS 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶19. (SBU) There are several unique circumstances faced by 
the UAE that will make full implementation of some of the 
steps required to combat trafficking a special challenge. 
One point to consider is the UAE's need to balance a multi- 
approached "crackdown" on TIP with an economic need to 
remain open for business, transportation and tourism, 
especially in Dubai, where oil resources are rapidly 
dwindling.  Tourism, transportation services, and a variety 
of new businesses rely on an open and welcoming environment 
to thrive.  Add to that a private sector workforce that is 
approximately 98% non-national, and it becomes clear why 
the UAE needs some time to create the appropriate balance 
between maintaining this open environment and the need to 
crack down on those attempting to enter the country for 
nefarious reasons.  As the Commander of the Dubai Police 
Department quipped during the visit, "You can't stop all 
beautiful young women from coming to the UAE!"  While it's 
true that some women come here to work as prostitutes, many 
more come to tour, shop, open businesses, or work in any 
number of other occupations.  So the UAE is faced with the 
dilemma of having to decide which women (and their money) 
are allowed in and which get turned around at the border 
after being determined to be at risk for becoming 
prostitutes. 
 
¶20. (SBU) The UAE is in consultations with the IOM in 
Kuwait for guidance in holding two anti-TIP training 
opportunities.  One is an inter-ministerial conference, 
organized through the MFA.  The second will provide 
advanced police training to officers and students at the 
Abu Dhabi Police College.  Both events are scheduled for 
May 2004.  One prominent NGO, the General Women's Union, 
has expressed an interest in hosting a regional anti-TIP 
conference, and will soon travel to the U.S. for 
consultations with State Department experts in women's 
issues in order to determine the best strategy for holding 
such an event. 
 
¶21. (SBU) May 20 through June 10, an MOI lawyer and police 
officer will attend a trafficking in persons seminar in 
Washington, D.C., sponsored by the International Visitor 
Program.  At practically all meetings between PolOff and 
UAEG officials, there are additional requests for training, 
either in Washington, the UAE, or elsewhere in the region, 
and for U.S. guidance in combating TIP.  Post looks forward 
to the arrival of a DOJ Resident Legal Advisor in late 
Spring to help facilitate these requests. 
 
----------- 
ACTION PLAN 
----------- 
 
¶22. (SBU) Since the G/TIP visit, Post has begun to take a 
number of steps aimed at building on other improvements 
taken throughout the year.  We have regrouped with various 
ministries and organizations to redefine the UAE's short- 
term TIP strategy, covering the next two months.  We are 
engaging at both the federal and emirate levels with the 
following action plan that also requires action in 
Washington: 
 
--PolChief has spoken at length with the office manager of 
the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, with the purpose 
of locating and reenergizing the Anti-TIP Conference 
Proposal (drafted with the assistance of IOM).  The goal is 
to hold this conference in May. 
--PolChief has also inquired about the initial impressions 
of the model Anti-TIP law given to MFA in late February. 
MFA stated it is in the process of reviewing the document, 
and will forward it to the Ministry of Justice upon 
completion. 
 
--CG Dubai has met with the Dubai Prosecutor General to 
discuss the model Anti-TIP law and to stress the importance 
of defining the TIP issue more broadly, arresting and 
prosecuting more traffickers, and treating TIP victims as 
victims rather than criminals (see ref. E). 
--CG Dubai has also met with the Dubai Deputy Commander of 
Police to discuss the importance of defining the TIP issue 
more broadly, arresting and prosecuting more traffickers, 
and treating TIP victims as victims rather than criminals. 
He recommended that the police consider requiring all women 
who frequent known "trouble spots" (certain clubs, bars, 
hotels, etc.) have their passports on them.  The Deputy 
Commander was interested in the proposal, and will consider 
it further after discussing it with other departments. 
 
--We plan to meet with Shaykh Saif Bin Zayed Al Nahyan, U/S 
of the Ministry of Interior, to discuss how to progress on 
TIP issues.  We will stress the importance of coordinating 
efforts among MOI departments to more effectively combat 
trafficking in persons in the UAE, and to keep statistical 
data and create annual reports to document progress made. 
 
--PolOff will respond to NEA/RA by March 24 re: feedback on 
the Polaris Project Report, feedback on the camel jockey 
article forwarded by desk, and any other articles/anecdotes 
forwarded by G/TIP. 
 
--By March 30, PolOff will follow up phone calls with a 
meeting with the Abu Dhabi Police College to help arrange 
the May Anti-TIP Training Seminar, with IOM assistance. 
PolOff will also continue to coordinate a visit to the UAE 
by the head of the IOM office in Kuwait. 
 
--PolOff will meet with the Abu Dhabi Police to gather 
specific information of their anti-TIP efforts by March 30. 
 
--PolOff will spend one day in Al Ain by April 7 to be 
fully briefed on TIP efforts by the police, prosecutors, 
and immigration officials. The trip will include a tour of 
the Social Support Center, a meeting with the chief 
prosecutor (who attended the February 2003 anti-TIP 
conference in D.C.), and meetings with non-governmental 
contacts who follow the TIP issue. 
 
--By April 15, the DCM will meet with Undersecretary Al 
Awadi of the Ministry of Justice to discuss the model Anti- 
TIP law, as well as to stress the importance of defining 
the TIP issue more broadly, arresting and prosecuting more 
traffickers, and treating TIP victims as victims rather 
than as criminals. 
 
--By April 15, an appropriate person in NEA/ARP should meet 
with the Embassy of the UAE in DC to brief on the upcoming 
report, warn that there is a risk of dropping to tier two, 
and discuss measures that should be taken to prevent the 
drop.  ACTION: NEA/ARP 
 
--By April 15, PolOff will spend a day in Dubai to be fully 
briefed on all additional TIP efforts since the G/TIP 
visit.  The trip will include an extended tour of the Human 
Rights Care Department, including demonstration of its 24/7 
hotline.  The trip will also include separate meetings with 
immigration, CID, and public prosecution officials, as well 
as the full Human Rights Care Committee. 
 
¶23. (SBU) In addition to this two-month action plan, the 
UAEG and USG will work together to create a year-long 
strategy to tackle the sex trafficking issue as effectively 
as the camel jockey issue was handled in 2003.  Post will 
propose the following action items: 
 
--Formulating a detailed inter-ministry national action 
plan; 
 
--Creating broadly-distributed publicity campaigns; 
 
--Providing Post with more statistics, reports, and other 
quantifiers; 
 
--Drafting and implementing federal anti-TIP legislation, 
based on the model law given to MFA; 
 
--Ratifying the camel jockey regulation currently before 
the Supreme Council; 
 
--Discussing a law to require all non-nationals to carry ID 
(preferably a passport) with them at all times; 
 
--Further strengthening visa requirements from high risk 
source countries prior to entry into the UAE; 
 
--Increasing the frequency of regular inter-ministry task 
force meetings; 
 
--Opening an IOM office in Abu Dhabi and/or Dubai; 
 
--Expanding the Dubai anti-TIP CID and public prosecutor 
units, and duplicate efforts in Abu Dhabi; 
 
--Promoting inter-emirate law enforcement cooperation to 
investigate cases of TIP; 
 
--Offering TIP training regularly (through OPDAT) to 
police, police colleges, jurists, journalists, immigration 
authorities, and other ministries who request it. 
 
-------------- 
FINAL COMMENTS 
-------------- 
 
¶24. (SBU) Shaykh Hamdan bin Zayed took a significant 
political challenge in September 2002 by pushing for a ban 
on underage camel jockeys.  As a younger and more modern 
member of the family, he stood up against more senior and 
traditional members of his own family and the ruling 
families of the neighboring emirates.  He is succeeding in 
his efforts to improve the country's negative trafficking 
in persons record, and evidence of this fact is last year's 
tier one ranking by G/TIP.  However, this good progress 
could be threatened if the UAE is dropped from tier one to 
two in the 2004 Trafficking in Persons report based on a 
new emphasis and criteria on sex trafficking that we 
introduced in January 2004, without giving the UAEG the 
opportunity to fulfill its two-year plan to combat all 
forms of trafficking in persons. 
 
¶25. (SBU) It is clear that the steps the UAEG has taken to 
date to eliminate trafficking of young foreign boys to work 
as camel jockeys have been very effective.  Post believes 
that, given an appropriate amount of time to act, the UAE 
can achieve its goal of combating all forms of trafficking 
in persons with the same level of success in the sex 
trafficking arena as it has shown with the camel jockey 
issue. Dropping the UAE to tier two now would weaken Shaykh 
Hamdan's hand and potentially slow the momentum he worked 
hard to build over the past year in the trafficking arena. 
This benefits no one - neither the victims, nor the UAEG, 
nor the USG's worldwide efforts to combat trafficking. 
 
¶26. (SBU) Post is not/not lobbying to keep the UAE at tier 
one indefinitely.  On the contrary, if tangible results are 
not seen on the sex trafficking issue after one year (thus 
giving the UAE a chance to fulfill its two-year plan), post 
agrees that a drop to tier two would be an appropriate 
wake-up call.  However, until the 2005 report, the USG and 
UAEG should work together to refocus efforts from camel 
jockeys to trafficked prostitutes, following both short- 
and long-term action plans, to help sharply reduce the 
incidence of human trafficking. 
 
WAHBA