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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 THE HAGUE 003087 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
S/CT FOR REAP, EUR, EUR/UBI, D/HS, INL 
JUSTICE FOR OIA - JFRIEDMAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER PREL NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS: 2003 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT 
 
REF: (A) STATE 301352; (B) THE HAGUE 1859 
(C) 02 THE HAGUE 3302 
 
¶1. The 2003 terrorism report for the Netherlands follows. 
Responses are keyed to reftel A's requirements. 
 
¶A.  SUPPORT TO GLOBAL COALITION AGAINST TERRORISM 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
¶2. Immediately following 9/11, the Dutch government 
announced a 46-point Plan of Action for combating terrorism 
and promoting security (reftels B & C).  The plan is 
gradually being implemented.  Recently, its sixth updated 
version was published.  In addition to the Plan of Action, 
Justice Minister Donner released a report in June 2003 on 
"Terrorism and the Protection of Society," in which he 
announced measures to deal more effectively with terrorist 
activities.  According to Donner, the terrorist threat 
within the Netherlands is serious and "anything but 
temporary or simple."  These measures are meant to improve 
the legal infrastructure for combating terrorism 
domestically as well as intensify international cooperation. 
 
¶3.  The bill on terrorist crimes, called for in the Plan of 
Action, was submitted to the Second Chamber of Parliament in 
July 2002.  The bill implements obligations resulting from 
the EU framework decision on combating terrorism.  Under the 
bill, membership of a terrorist organization will be made a 
separate offense.  The maximum prison sentences for 
offenses, such as manslaughter, gross maltreatment, 
hijacking or kidnapping are to be higher if committed with 
"terrorist intent."  The maximum sentence will be raised to 
20 years' imprisonment.  The sentence for participating in a 
terrorist organization will be 8 years, while the leaders 
can get a 15-year sentence. 
 
¶4.  Following his June 2003 report, Justice Minister Donner 
submitted two amendments to the bill on terrorist crimes in 
August 2003 (reftel B).  The first amendment makes 
recruitment for the jihad punishable under Article 205 of 
the Criminal Code.  It reads that "the recruitment for the 
armed fight will be penalized even if it is not yet clear 
whether the recruited person is willing to contribute to the 
armed fight in an organized context."  The maximum penalty 
will be raised from one to four years.  Under the second 
amendment, conspiracy with the object of committing 
terrorist crimes will be a separate criminal offense with a 
maximum sentence of 10 years.  According to the Justice 
Ministry, this is intended to "facilitate criminal law 
action against terrorist networks and movements operating in 
loose and varying collaborations."  For a conspiracy 
conviction, one must prove that two or more persons 
(including the suspect) have agreed to commit terrorist 
crimes.  Such an agreement may be deduced from statements by 
the persons having made the agreement, but may also be 
demonstrated by statements made by witnesses or telephone 
taps.  The agreement itself need not be implemented yet. 
 
¶5.  After extensive debate, the Second Chamber of Parliament 
approved the government's July 2002 bill on terrorist crimes 
and August 2003 amendments on Dec. 9.  The Chamber increased 
the maximum sentence provisions for leaders of terrorist 
organizations (from the 15 years proposed to life 
imprisonment) and for participation in a terrorist 
organization (from the 8 years proposed to 15 years).  The 
package now goes to the First Chamber.  It is expected to 
come into force in mid 2004. 
 
¶6.  The Dutch government took quick action to freeze the 
assets of some important Dutch entities found to finance 
terrorism.  They used national sanctions authority to block 
the accounts and financial transactions of Al Aqsa 
Foundation (a Hamas fundraiser) and Benevolence 
International Nederland (an al-Qaida linked affiliate of the 
Benevolence International Foundation).  The press has 
reported that fundraising for Hamas, al-Qaida, and other 
terrorist organizations, nevertheless, continues to take 
place in the Netherlands. 
 
¶7.  Domestically, the Netherlands has undertaken efforts to 
strengthen its laws, regulations and procedures to safeguard 
its financial system against use by terrorist-affiliated 
individuals and entities.  It has fully implemented 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) terrorist financing 
recommendations.  Legislative proposals to further safeguard 
the financial system (for example, by establishing 
supervisory authority over firms engaged in providing 
international companies with domicile, management, tax, 
administrative, and legal services (so-called "trust 
companies")) have been introduced. 
 
¶8.  The Dutch showed leadership in securing European Union 
designation of Hamas.  The Netherlands also led notable 
efforts in the FATF to launch and complete a project with 
the United States in developing best practices for the 
implementation of financial blocking orders and to initiate 
discussions on the proper treatment of non-profit 
organizations.  The Dutch have supported multilateralization 
of almost all U.S. designations.  We have urged them to 
support EU designation of Hizballah. 
 
¶9.  The government appropriates about 90 million Euros a 
year to fund the Dutch counter-terrorism package and about 5 
million Euros a year to finance intensified CT cooperation 
with the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba. 
 
¶10.  The Dutch government has provided military assistance 
to the fight against international terrorism in both 
Afghanistan and Iraq.  The Netherlands contributed a 
frigate, fighter aircraft and reconnaissance planes to 
Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.  This 
contribution was discontinued on October 1, 2003.  Since 
July, the Netherlands contributes 1,100 troops to the 
Stabilization Force in Iraq.  Further, the Netherlands 
continues to participate with two frigates and one Maritime 
Patrol Aircraft in Operation Active Endeavor in the 
Mediterranean. 
 
¶B.  JUDICIAL SYSTEM - PROSECUTIONS 
---------------------------------- 
¶11.  The acquittals in December 2002 of four men allegedly 
involved in a plot to bomb the U.S. Embassy in Paris, and of 
12 alleged Muslim extremists suspected of recruiting Jihad 
combatants in May 2003 revealed inadequacies in Dutch law. 
In particular, courts have been reluctant to allow the use 
of intelligence information as evidence.  The prosecutor 
appealed against the Rotterdam court's decision in December 
to limit the use of intelligence evidence.  In October 2003, 
the appellate court in The Hague suspended the case because 
of serious delays in the preparations for the trial.  A new 
"pro forma" session is now scheduled for January 14, and the 
actual court sessions are planned for March 17 and 24. In 
October 2003, the Justice Ministry released another four men 
(an additional man had been released earlier) suspected of 
preparing a terrorist attack.  According to the National 
Prosecutor's Office, there was insufficient evidence 
independent of intelligence sources to detain them any 
longer.  The prosecutors emphasized, however, that a planned 
attack had been prevented.  The five were allegedly working 
for a Moroccan (Abdelalim A.) living in Spain, who is 
suspected of having played a role in the Casablanca suicide 
attacks.  The investigation against the five continues. 
 
¶12.  There have been no international terrorist attacks in 
the Netherlands in 2003. 
 
¶C.  EXTRADITIONS 
---------------- 
¶13.  In July, the Netherlands extradited to Spain alleged 
ETA activist Juanra Rodriguez. 
 
¶14.  On January 13, the Netherlands deported to Norway 
Najumuddin Faraj Ahmad, better known as Mullah Krekar, 
leader of the militant Kurdish Ansar al-Islam organization, 
when it appeared that Jordan would not supply essential 
information required to enable his extradition to the latter 
country.   In order to avoid Krekar being set free, Justice 
Minister Donner decided to deport him to Norway, where 
Krekar had residency status, because he believed Norway had 
more legal possibilities to deal with the case.  According 
to press reports, the minister thought he had assurances 
from Norway that Krekar would be taken into custody upon 
arrival, which turned out to be incorrect. 
 
¶15.  In December 2002, the Amsterdam District Court refused 
to extradite to Turkey Nuriye Kesbir, a senior PKK official, 
who had previously applied for but was denied asylum in the 
Netherlands.  Extradition was considered "inadmissible" in 
the absence of guarantees that Turkey would not execute a 
possible death sentence.  The Supreme Court is still to rule 
on the appeal against this court decision.  In February, the 
Council of State ordered the Immigration Service to 
reconsider his request for asylum. 
 
¶D.  IMPEDIMENTS TO PROSECUTION/EXTRADITION 
------------------------------------------ 
¶16.  A major impediment to Dutch prosecution of terrorist 
suspects is the fact that intelligence gathered by the 
intelligence/security agency, AIVD, cannot be checked or 
verified in criminal procedures, or only to a limited extent 
(see para 11 on prosecution).  According to the Justice 
Minister's June 2003 report, AIVD must observe secrecy for 
state security or to protect its sources in spite of courts' 
desire for verification.  Justice Minister Donner, however, 
wants to investigate to what extent and under what 
circumstances confidential information by intelligence 
agencies may be used as evidence in criminal investigations. 
He also wants to examine what procedures are used in other 
EU countries.  According to Donner, the need for legislation 
cannot be ruled out. 
 
¶17.  In April 2003, the Second Chamber of Parliament gave 
Donner the go-ahead to use "criminal civilian infiltrants" 
in exceptional situations in terrorist cases only, if there 
are no other options and their use is essential in an 
investigation.  In each individual case, the use of criminal 
infiltrants will require the approval of both the Justice 
Minister and the College of Attorneys General. 
 
¶F.  COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS BY THE NETHERLANDS 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
¶18.  In addition to the legislative measures mentioned 
above, the government announced the following counter- 
terrorism efforts in 2003: 
 
- an expansion in the AIVD intelligence capacity; 
- better coordination of activities and information sharing 
between intelligence services and the police; 
- the development of an interrelated package of surveillance 
and security measures to protect the vital infrastructure 
and persons requiring special protection; 
- more emphasis on integration programs of ethnic minority 
groups in the Dutch society aimed at preventing radicalism 
and extremism; 
- more intensive use of mechanisms that provide for 
transparency of and effective control on non-profit 
organizations as well as houses of worship, denominational 
schools and Koran schools financed by foreign countries; 
- an amendment to the Civil Code and Sanctions Act to ban 
terrorist organizations, networks and movements or to 
frustrate their activities; 
- the establishment of a Joint Counter-Terrorism Committee, 
which is to assist the Justice Minister in his capacity as 
Coordinating Minister for Counter-Terrorism in carrying out 
his task. 
- in response to a report on immigration policy and 
terrorism, the government agreed in October 2003 to 
investigate the feasibility of introducing a national 
security check in the aliens system.  A systemized file 
comparison between information from the immigration 
department and the security agencies will contribute to 
fighting terrorism, according to the government. 
 
¶19.  The Dutch government continues to monitor supporters of 
radical Islamic organizations in the large Turkish and 
Moroccan communities in the Netherlands, as well as other 
major Muslim groups.  Dutch officials worry about 
polarization between Muslims and non-Muslims, fueled by 
extremists who take advantage of the migrants' 
"disadvantaged" position and their sense of unease.  In some 
conservative Muslim circles, activities by these extremists 
have had a polarizing effect, leading to growing radicalism 
and extreme standpoints among a small minority. Muslim 
authorities indicate there appears to be a willingness among 
young Muslims to take part in the jihad. 
 
¶20.  There have been increasing press reports about radical 
Muslims using the Netherlands as a base for their 
operations.  Questions have been raised about the 
controversial es-Salaam mosque in Rotterdam, which allegedly 
is financed by UAE Finance Minister Hamdan bin Rashid al- 
Maktoum, who is suspected of terrorist connections, and the 
fundamental Al Fourkhan mosque in Eindhoven, which has 
allegedly tried to recruit young Muslims for the jihad. 
This prompted the liberal VVD party to request the 
government to close down mosques threatening the legal 
order.  Other reports mentioned attempts by alleged 
terrorists to get flying and diving lessons in the 
Netherlands.  In October, AIVD warned Dutch universities and 
business to be alert for students or researchers from "risk" 
countries trying to gain high-tech know-how and products 
with which weapons of mass destruction can be manufactured. 
The AIVD compiled a checklist, which should make it easier 
for Dutch companies and institutes to assess possible risks. 
In November 2003, the fiscal police (FIOD) raided several 
Somali money-exchange offices, allegedly as part of an 
investigation against the Al-Barakaat group.  Dutch 
authorities have also investigated local phone shops as a 
possible source of funds for terrorist organizations. 
 
¶G.  SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM 
------------------------- 
¶21.  The Dutch government does not support any terrorist 
groups, neither financially nor politically.  A number of 
foreign political groups, including Kurdish (PKK/KADEK), 
Filipino (New People's Army), Sri Lankan (LTTE/Tamil Tigers) 
and Sikh organizations, have established offices in the 
Netherlands, but they are monitored by the police and 
intelligence services and tolerated as long as they do not 
commit terrorist acts or other crimes in the Netherlands. 
 
¶H.  PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN SUPPORT OF TERRORISM 
--------------------------------------------- 
¶22.  The Dutch government has issued no public statements in 
support of a terrorist-supporting country on terrorism 
issues. 
 
¶I.  GOVERNMENTAL ATTITUDE 
------------------------- 
¶23.  The Dutch government realizes that "the security of the 
Netherlands is seriously threatened" and has taken action in 
Parliament to address the terrorist threat.  The pending 
bill on terrorist crimes that penalizes recruitment for the 
jihad and conspiracy with the object of committing 
terrorist attacks, as well as the Parliament's approval of 
the government's request to use criminal infiltrants in 
counter-terrorism investigations, demonstrate that the 
government has recognized deficiencies in its CT laws (see 
discussion in paras 2-4).  At the same time, the government 
has been criticized for being too tolerant and nave fearing 
that strict internal security measures against Muslim 
fundamentalist groups would irritate the large Muslim 
population in the country, make them more radical and drive 
them underground. 
 
¶J.  SUPPORT FOR US COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS AND INITIATIVES 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
¶24.  The Dutch government is a supportive ally in the fight 
against terrorism.  Under the U.S.-Netherlands Safe Borders 
Initiative, steps have been taken to improve control of 
ports and airports, including: 
 
--Netherlands-U.S. consultations on law enforcement and 
counterterrorism held in The Hague in March 2003 resulted in 
the "Agreed Steps" document, which catalogues specific 
follow-up action to strengthen operational law enforcement 
cooperation.  Bilateral review occurred in Washington on 
November 25, 2003; 
--Continued operation and improvements in U.S. Customs 
Rotterdam Container Security Initiative (CSI) and CSI Plus 
at the Port of Rotterdam, leading to the establishment of a 
bilateral Port and Maritime Security Working Group.  Its 
first meeting was held in May 2003.  The US Coast Guard HQ 
approved establishment of TDY billet for Rotterdam in 2003; 
--Bilateral Aviation Security Working Group was established 
and met in April 2003 to identify best practices; 
--Visit by Dutch interagency group to Washington in June 
2003 to study CIP exchanges; 
--In August 2003, Dutch Finance State Secretary Joop Wijn 
and U.S. Department of Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham 
signed a mutual Declaration of Principles concerning the 
installation of radiological portal monitors in the port of 
Rotterdam - installation is progressing by year's end with 
monitors expected to be operational by January 2004; 
--Visit by EPA Administrator Whitman in April 2003 to review 
areas for cooperation on environmental CT efforts; 
--Visit by DHS Secretary Tom Ridge in September 2003; and 
--Visit by U.S. Coast Guard Commandant Admiral Collins in 
Rotterdam in October 2003. 
 
Sobel