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Viewing cable 03ANKARA7769, 2003 INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
03ANKARA7769 2003-12-19 09:46 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Ankara
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 007769 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
STATE FOR INL, EUR/SE, TREASURY FOR FINCEN, JUSTICE FOR OIA 
AND AFMLS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON EFIN KCRM PREL PTER SNAR TU
SUBJECT: 2003 INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY 
REPORT 
 
 
REF: A. STATE 324347 
     B. STATE 328024 
     C. ANKARA 286 
 
 
Following is the preliminary 2003 INCSR report for Turkey. 
Post will transmit any changes to addressees per reftels. 
 
 
I. Summary: 
 
 
Turkey is a major transit route for Southwest Asian opiates 
to Europe, and serves as a base for major narcotics 
traffickers and brokers. Turkish law enforcement 
organizations focus their efforts on stemming the traffic of 
drugs and intercepting precursor chemicals. Turkish forces 
cooperate closely with European and U.S. agencies. While most 
of the heroin trafficked via Turkey is marketed in Western 
Europe, an increasing amount of heroin and opium also is 
smuggled from Turkey to the U.S. There is no appreciable 
cultivation of illicit narcotics in Turkey other than 
marijuana grown primarily for domestic consumption. We are 
unaware of any diversion from Turkey's licit opium poppy 
cultivation and pharmaceutical morphine production program. 
 
 
Turkey signed the UN Drug Convention in 1988 and ratified the 
agreement in 1996. Turkey is an active member of the 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF). The U.S. terminated its 
USD 500,000 annual assistance program at the end of FY 1999, 
due to Turkey's refusal to accept Leahy Amendment 
restrictions.  End summary. 
 
 
II. Status of the Country: 
 
 
Turkey is a major transshipment and opium conversion point 
for heroin. Turkey is also a base of operations for 
international narcotics traffickers and associates 
trafficking in opium, morphine base, heroin, precursor 
chemicals and other drugs. The majority of these opiates 
originate in Afghanistan, and are ultimately shipped to 
Western Europe. A smaller but still significant amount of 
heroin is trafficked to the U.S. via Turkey, and indirectly 
through Europe. 
 
 
Turkish law enforcement forces are strongly committed to 
disrupting narcotics trafficking. The Turkish National Police 
remains Turkey's most sophisticated counter-narcotics force, 
while the Jandarma and Customs continue to increase their 
efficacy. 
 
 
Turkish authorities continue to seize large amounts of heroin 
and precursor chemicals, such as acetic anhydride. It is 
estimated that multi-ton amounts of heroin are processed in 
or smuggled through Turkey each month. 
 
 
Turkey is one of the two traditional opium-growing countries 
recognized by the USG and the International Narcotics Control 
Board. There is no appreciable illicit drug cultivation in 
Turkey other than marijuana grown primarily for domestic 
consumption. The Turkish Government maintains strict control 
over its licit poppy program. 
 
 
III. Country Actions against Drugs: 
 
 
(a) Policy Initiatives: The GOT devotes significant financial 
and human resources to counter-narcotics activities. Turkey 
continues to play a key role in Operation Containment (a 
regional program to reduce the flow of Afghan heroin to 
Western Europe) as well as in other regional efforts. 
 
 
In 2002, the GOT reorganized the Drug Monitoring and Guidance 
Board and transferred its responsibilities to the Turkish 
International Academy against Drugs and Organized Crime 
(TADOC). Note: Last year,s report (Reftel C) mistakenly 
reported that the Board had been &dissolved.8 End Note. In 
2003, the GOT appointed TADOC as its lead agency in dealings 
with the European Monitoring Center for Drugs and Drug 
Addiction (EMCDDA).  The GOT expects to become a member of 
EMCDDA by year end. 
 
 
In 2003 the Turkish National Police issued a regulation under 
which liaison officers were appointed in various provinces to 
establish drug abuse training and prevention units, in 
coordination with the Ministry of Education and the Ministry 
of Health. 
 
 
(b) Accomplishments: At the request of the UN, in 2003 TADOC 
trained 26 Afghan counter-narcotics officers.  Also in 2003, 
the DEA organized at TADOC facilities two training seminars 
for TNP, Customs and Jandarma, on using electronic 
surveillance to combat organized crime. 
 
 
(c) Law Enforcement Efforts: Through 9 December 2003, Turkish 
law enforcement agencies seized 5.2 tons of heroin, 1.9 tons 
of hashish and 4,950,000 pills, and made 6,678 drug-related 
arrests. 
 
 
(d) Corruption: 
 
 
In June 2003 a Parliamentary Commission on corruption issued 
a report examining the reasons for and possible solutions to, 
the problem of corruption. It recommended increased 
transparency in public administration, strengthened audits, 
hiring of more qualified personnel, adoption of international 
judicial standards, and increased public and business 
education. 
 
 
In July, 2003, the Turkish Banking Regulatory and Supervisory 
Agency (BRSA) assumed control of Imar Bank (part of the Uzan 
Group), and subsequently uncovered evidence of a massive 
fraud. Separately, in late 2003, Parliament established three 
commissions to pursue investigations against six former 
government ministers. No connection to narcotics has been 
alleged in any of these investigations. 
 
 
In 2003 Turkey ratified the Convention on Combating Bribery 
of Foreign Public Officials in International Transactions and 
the Council of Europe's Civil Law on Corruption. Turkey has 
signed the Council of Europe's Criminal Law on Corruption and 
the UN Convention Against Corruption, but has not yet 
ratified them.  In 2004, Turkey is expected to become a 
member of the Group of Countries against Corruption (GRECO). 
 
 
(e) Agreements and Treaties: Turkey ratified the 1988 UN Drug 
Convention in 1996 and has been a member of FATF since 1991. 
Turkey ratified the UN Convention on the Suppression of 
Terrorist Financing in April 2002. In 2003 Turkey ratified 
the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. 
 
 
In February 2003 Turkey signed a Precursors Agreement with 
the EU, to combat the production of substances used in the 
manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. 
The Agreement awaits ratification. 
 
 
(f) Cultivation/Production: Illicit drug cultivation, 
primarily marijuana, is minor and has no impact on the United 
States. Licit opium poppy cultivation is strictly controlled 
by the Turkish Grain Board, with no apparent diversion. 
 
 
(g) Drug Flow/Transit: Turkey remains a major route, and a 
storage, production and staging area, for the flow of heroin 
to Europe. Turkish-based traffickers and brokers operate in 
conjunction with narcotic smugglers, laboratory operators, 
and money launderers in and outside Turkey. They finance and 
control the smuggling of opiates to and from Turkey. 
 
 
Afghanistan is the source of most of the opiates reaching 
Turkey. Morphine and heroin base are smuggled overland from 
Pakistan via Iran. Multi-ton quantities of opiates and 
hashish have been smuggled by sea from Pakistan to points 
along the Mediterranean, Aegean, and/or Marmara seas. Opiates 
and hashish also are smuggled to Turkey overland from 
Afghanistan via Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. 
Traffickers in Turkey illegally acquire the heroin precursor 
chemical acetic anhydride from sources in Western Europe, the 
Balkans and Russia. For fiscal year 2003, 5.8 metric tons of 
acetic anhydride was seized in or destined for Turkey. 
 
 
Turkish-based traffickers control and operate heroin 
laboratories at various locations. Some of them reportedly 
have interests in heroin laboratories operating near the 
Iranian-Turkish border in Iran. Turkish-based traffickers 
control much of the heroin marketed to Western Europe. 
 
 
Post has no information concerning synthetic drug 
manufacturing and distribution. 
 
 
(h) Demand Reduction: While drug abuse remains low in Turkey 
compared to other countries, the number of addicts reportedly 
is increasing. Although the Turkish Government appears to be 
increasingly aware of the need to combat drug abuse, the 
agencies responsible for drug awareness and treatment remain 
under-funded. Five Alcohol and Substance Abuse Treatment 
Clinics (AMATEM) have been established, which serve as 
regional drug treatment centers. Due to lack of funds, only 
one of the centers focuses on drug prevention as well as 
treatment. The Health Ministry has not conducted a drug abuse 
survey since 1995 due to lack of resources. 
 
 
IV. U.S. Policies, Initiatives and Programs: 
 
 
(a) U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs: U.S. policy remains 
to strengthen Turkey,s ability to combat narcotics 
trafficking, money laundering and financial crimes. Through 
fiscal year 1999, the U.S. Government extended USD 500,000 
annually in assistance. While that program has now 
terminated, during 2003-04 the U.S. Government anticipates 
spending approximately $100,000 in previously-allocated funds 
on anti-narcotics programs. 
 
 
(b) Bilateral Cooperation: U.S. counter-narcotics agencies 
report excellent cooperation with Turkish officials. Turkish 
counter-narcotics forces have developed technically, becoming 
increasingly professional, in part based on the training and 
equipment they received from the U.S. and other international 
law enforcement agencies. 
 
 
(c) Road Ahead: With the election of a new government in 
November 2002, many of the key government officials 
responsible for counter-narcotics and money-laundering were 
replaced; however, this does not appear to have degraded the 
quality of cooperation. The U.S. Mission in Turkey intends to 
continue to engage the recent appointees, and work with the 
government 
 
 
V. Statistical Tables (through 9 December 2003): 
 
 
Opium (licit) 
- Cultivation                2003:149,787   2002:117,650 
2001:80,791 
- Eradication                2003-01:N/A 
- Harvestable                2003:99,430    2002:50,741 
2001:45,836 
 
 
Drug Seizures 
- Cocaine (kg)               2003:2.6       2002:1.6 
2001:8.4 
- Opium (kg)                 2003:243.6     2002:262.6 
2001:362.9 
- Hashish (tons)             2003:1.9       2002:10.1 
2001:29.1 
- Heroin (tons)              2003:5.2       2002:5.1 
2001:6.1 
- Morphine Base (tons)       2003:0.78      2002:0.78 
2001:2.4 
- Acetic Anhydrite (tons)    2003:5.8       2002:60.9 
2001:22.6 
- Captagon/other synthetics  2003:4.95      2002:1.7MM 
2001:1.2MM 
 
 
- Illicit Labs               2003:7         2002-01:N/A 
- Domestic Consumption       2003-01:N/A 
- Users treated              2003-01:N/A 
- Arrests                    2003:6,678     2002:8,965 
2001:6,131 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VI. Money Laundering: 
 
 
(a) General. In 2001, the GOT signed the Strasbourg 
Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of 
the Proceeds from Crime (ratified September 2003); the 
Criminal Law on Corruption (not yet ratified); and the Civil 
Law on Corruption (ratified April 2003). By becoming a party 
to these COE conventions, the GOT obligated itself to revise 
its laws to include proceeds of all serious crimes in the 
definition of money laundering, and to specify corruption as 
a predicate offense for money laundering. 
 
 
The Turkish Government signed the UN Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime in 2001 and ratified it earlier 
this month. Turkey signed the Convention on Combating Bribery 
of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions in 2000 (ratified February 2003) 
 
 
Turkey cooperates closely with the U.S. and its neighbors in 
the Southeast Europe Cooperation Initiative (SECI). Turkey 
and the U.S. have a MLAT and cooperate closely on narcotics 
investigations and proceedings. 
 
 
Turkey is not an offshore financial center and does not have 
secrecy laws that prevent disclosure of client and ownership 
information to bank supervisors and law enforcement 
officials. Turkey is an important regional financial center, 
particularly for Central Asia and the Caucasus, as well as 
for the Middle East and Eastern Europe. Since the financial 
crisis of 2000, the GOT has significantly tightened oversight 
of the banking system through BRSA. The reputation of BRSA 
has, however, been hurt recently by its failure to detect the 
Imar Bank fraud discussed above and Post has concerns about 
the commitment of the current government to BRSA,s continued 
independence. 
 
 
There is no significant black market for smuggled goods in 
Turkey, but tax evasion is a problem. Informed observers 
estimate that as much as fifty percent of the economy is 
unregistered. The GOT began a joint study with the IRC in 
2001 to improve its tax collection. Turkey has established 
systems for identifying, tracing, freezing, seizing and 
forfeiting narcotics-related assets. Turkey,s laws allow for 
only criminal forfeiture. 
 
 
It is believed that Turkish-based traffickers transfer money 
to pay narcotic suppliers in Pakistan and Afghanistan, 
primarily through Istanbul exchange houses. The exchanges in 
turn wire transfer the funds through Turkish banks to 
accounts in Dubai and other locations in the United Arab 
Emirates. The money is then paid, often through the 
underground banking system, to narcotics suppliers in 
Pakistan and Afghanistan. 
 
 
(b) Investigative Capabilities. Turkey,s police, 
prosecutors, judges and investigative agencies require 
substantial training in financial crimes. The government has 
increased its focus on money laundering, but has had 
difficulty obtaining convictions. Since being established in 
1997, the Financial Crimes Investigative Board (MASAK) has 
pursued more than 500 money laundering cases. Through 2003, 
only two cases have resulted in convictions. While good 
statistics are not available, most of the cases are believed 
to involve non-narcotic criminal actions or tax evasion. 
 
 
MASAK has not yet settled into its role as Turkey,s 
financial intelligence unit and is not yet functioning at a 
high level of efficiency. It requires additional legal 
authority; continuity of senior management; training; and 
computers. Training and equipment needs are being addressed 
by an EU accession project, which MASAK claims will be 
completed by year-end 2004. Note: Last year,s report (Reftel 
C) mistakenly reported that this project was &completed.8 
End Note. 
 
 
Regarding legislation, in 2003, MASAK prepared an amendment 
to its law, which Parliament is expected to ratify early in 
2004.  The new law will broaden the definition of money 
laundering and expand the list of predicate offenses. It will 
also increase MASAK's authority and enhance its ability to 
cooperate with other government agencies. The GOT is 
similarly drafting legislation that will enable MASAK to 
conduct money laundering investigations into bank owners who 
misuse their banks' capital; to investigate the proceeds of 
bribery and corruption; and to investigate fraudulent 
bankruptcy cases. With these changes, the Turkish money 
laundering legislation will include all the predicate 
offenses listed by FATF. 
 
 
 (c) Terrorist Financing. Turkey has not yet explicitly 
criminalized the financing of terrorism. It complies with 
UNSCR 1373 through the distribution to interested GOT 
agencies (but not financial institutions) of ministerial 
decrees. The tools currently available under Turkish law for 
locating, freezing and confiscating terrorist assets are 
cumbersome, limited and not particularly effective. As a 
result, one terrorist financing investigation conducted by 
the FBI and Royal Canadian Mounted Police in 2003 has been 
hampered. Legislation discussed above should ameliorate this 
situation. 
EDELMAN