This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 HARARE 002241 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AID FOR DCHA/FFP WELLER, MUTAMBA, PETERSEN 
DCHA/OFDA FOR MARX, BARTON 
AFR FOR FLEURET, LOKEN, BAKER, COPSON, MACNAIRN 
PRETORIA FOR HALE 
NAIROBI FOR ESTES, DEPREZ 
LILONGWE FOR SINK 
LUSAKA FOR NIELSON 
MAPUTO FOR POLAND, BLISS 
MASERU FOR AMB LOFTIS 
MBABANE FOR KENNA 
GABORONE FOR THOMAS, MULLINS AND DORMAN 
ROME FOR FODAG FOR LAVELLE, DAVIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREL US ZI
SUBJECT:  FOOD ASSISTANCE IN NEWLY RESETTLED AREAS 
 
REF:  HARARE 2062   HARARE 2024 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  The World Food Program recently wrote to the major 
international donors requesting their concurrence with a 
proposal to provide food assistance in the newly 
resettled areas, i.e., the former commercial farming 
areas that were subject to the Government of Zimbabwe's 
fast-track, often violent, land reform program.  This 
request followed closely the release of a Human Rights 
Watch Report that criticized international donors for 
allegedly politicizing food assistance by not allowing 
distributions in newly resettled areas.  Devising an 
effective means of providing food assistance to the most 
vulnerable populations in these areas, without giving 
support to Zimbabwe's failed land reform program, is a 
complex matter that raises a host of practical and policy 
concerns.  This cable analyzes three options for 
responding to this sensitive issue that the mission has 
discussed extensively at post with the European Union and 
the British High Commission.  Based on these discussions, 
this cable recommends that the USG allow the World Food 
Program to pilot a small food assistance effort in newly 
resettled areas on a trial basis, subject to a number of 
stringent conditions and additional assurances regarding 
how the program would be implemented in a transparent and 
non-political manner without supporting the fast-track 
land reform program or rewarding lawlessness.  End 
Summary. 
 
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BACKGROUND 
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¶2.  Zimbabwe is in its third year of a complex food 
security crisis brought about by a combination of 
economic mismanagement, disrupted agricultural production 
due to the chaotic and often violent invasions of 
formerly white-owned commercial farms, and erratic 
rainfall.  The food security crisis is further compounded 
by the country's high HIV prevalence rate (currently 
estimated at around one quarter of the adult population). 
The Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee, led by 
the World Food Program (WFP), estimated in April 2003 
that 5.5 million Zimbabweans (nearly half of the total 
population of 11.6 million) will need food assistance in 
the July 2003 to June 2004 agricultural year.  To meet 
these needs, WFP has appealed to international donors for 
452,900 metric tons (mt) of food, less carryover stocks 
from last year of 106,815 mt, for a total net new 
requirement of 346,085 mt.  A revised vulnerability 
assessment is tentatively scheduled for December 2003, 
but WFP has already informally advised post that the 
total number of Zimbabweans requiring food assistance may 
rise, resulting in WFP increasing its appeal to donors. 
 
¶3.  To date, virtually all international food assistance 
to Zimbabwe has been distributed in communal areas, rural 
parts of the country populated almost exclusively by 
black Zimbabweans and organized with traditional village 
structures of chiefs and headmen.  WFP, through its 
implementing partner (IP) non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), is providing food assistance in communal areas in 
47 of the countries 57 rural districts.  The USAID-funded 
C-SAFE program, a consortium of World Vision, CARE and 
Catholic Relief Services, is covering 9 rural districts; 
and Save the Children/UK covers the remaining rural 
district with funding from Great Britain's Department for 
International Development (DFID).  The Government of 
Zimbabwe's (GOZ) food assistance is managed as a cash-for- 
work program, under which able-bodied persons work on 
public works projects and receive cash with which to 
purchase food from the GOZ's Grain Marketing Board (GMB). 
Although the GMB imported substantial amounts of cereals 
for its cash-for-work program in the 2002/2003 
agricultural season (estimated in excess of 700,000 mt), 
there are numerous, credible allegations that significant 
portions of these stocks were diverted from their 
intended purpose due to corruption and/or politicization. 
A number of these allegations are detailed in a recently 
issued Human Rights Watch report entitled "Not Eligible: 
The Politicization of Food in Zimbabwe." 
 
¶4.  The GOZ's land reform program is divided into two 
schemes: A1 and A2 (see reftel).  Under the A1 land 
reform scheme, subdivided plots were redistributed to 
small-holder farmers with average plot sizes of around 30 
hectares each.  The August 2003 report of the Utete Land 
Commission found that 127,192 farmers were allocated a 
total of 4,321,080 hectares of land under the A1 scheme, 
contrary to earlier GOZ assertions of 300,000 farmers. 
Under the A2 scheme, 2,198,814 hectares were 
redistributed to "new commercial" large-scale farmers. 
According to the Utete Commission, only 7,260 farmers 
have taken up their farms under the A2 scheme, despite 
official claims of 54,000 beneficiaries.  As described in 
reftel, the A2 scheme has been the subject of substantial 
controversy, with plots allocated on the basis of 
cronyism, and numerous violations of GOZ policy 
prohibiting multiple farm ownership and setting maximum 
plot sizes.  Traditional village structures are absent in 
these former commercial farming areas, under either the 
A1 or A2 schemes.  Our best information is that these 
areas are largely governed by hastily established 
political committees that include war veterans and other 
individuals who participated in the land invasions. 
 
¶5.  The only notable international assistance being 
provided in the newly resettled areas are efforts to feed 
and comfort former commercial farm workers who have 
become displaced (IDPs) by the GOZ's fast-track land 
reform program.  The International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) recently started a program to assist IDPs 
with funding from USAID/OFDA and possible additional 
funding from the Swedes.  DFID is implementing a similar, 
small-scale program through a local NGO called the Farm 
Community Trust of Zimbabwe (FCTZ).  Because donors, 
including the UN, have not been allowed unimpeded access 
to these newly resettled areas, and the GOZ has 
stonewalled for more than a year on the UN's attempts to 
conduct any type of comprehensive survey, there is no 
reliable data on the status of the former farm workers or 
the newly resettled farmers.  Nonetheless, given the 
limited number of reported population movements, the UN 
estimates that 50-70% of commercial farm workers have 
likely remained on the farms where they were previously 
employed or on neighboring farms. 
 
¶6.  The UN believes that the former farm workers are 
among the most vulnerable population in Zimbabwe.  Recent 
assessments by C-SAFE, SADC and Save the Children/UK 
suggest that food insecurity may be as prevalent in the 
newly resettled areas as in communal areas.  Both 
populations are affected by hyperinflation and the 
general macro-economic deterioration, shortages of 
agricultural inputs, drought conditions, and inadequate 
draught power.  While these assessments have not 
adequately quantified the food needs in resettlement 
areas, they have raised concern about increasing 
vulnerability that is not being addressed by 
international food assistance.  Based on a desk study of 
these recent assessments, WFP estimates that 500-600,000 
people in the newly resettled areas require food 
assistance.  Absent reliable data, WFP's best guess is 
that 10-20% of this total vulnerable population consists 
of newly resettled A1 farmers (and their families), 
whereas 80-90% would be former farm workers (and their 
families) on both A1 and A2 land.  This would mean that 
the vast majority of vulnerable people not being assisted 
in the newly resettled areas are former farm workers (and 
their families) who were victims of the GOZ's fast-track 
land reform program. 
 
----------------------------------- 
THE WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME'S PROPOSAL 
----------------------------------- 
¶7.  On October 27, 2003, WFP wrote to the major 
international donors requesting their concurrence with a 
proposal to provide food assistance in the newly 
resettled areas.  WFP proposes to pilot a small 
assistance effort at two food distribution sites in the 
newly resettled areas, using the same vulnerability 
criteria it uses in communal areas, to gather more 
reliable data on vulnerability and to test the waters to 
see if assistance can be provided in a transparent, non- 
political manner.  WFP's request followed closely the 
widely publicized release of a Human Rights Watch Report 
that criticized international donors for not allowing 
distributions in newly resettled areas.  In addition to 
criticizing the GMB for political bias, corruption and 
lack of transparency, the Human Rights Watch Report 
asserts that international donors have politicized food 
aid by excluding vulnerable populations in the newly 
resettled areas from eligibility. 
 
¶8.  Devising an effective means of providing food 
assistance to the most vulnerable populations in the 
newly resettled areas, without giving support to 
Zimbabwe's failed land reform program, is a complex 
matter that raises a host of practical and policy 
concerns.  Post has discussed these issues extensively 
with the European Union and the British High Commission 
(including DFID), both of whom have concerns similar to 
ours. 
 
     -- First, all major donors, including the U.S., have 
insisted that the nature and extent of vulnerability in 
the resettled areas must be established before feeding 
programs can be authorized, as is ordinarily the case in 
humanitarian assistance programs.  Because donors have 
not been allowed unimpeded access to these areas, it has 
not been possible to assess the degree and extent of food 
insecurity. 
     -- Second, the GOZ's failure to disclose the level 
and coverage of GMB food distributions in the resettled 
areas, or any of its projected food imports, has 
prevented proper planning and coordination.  Primary 
responsibility for feeding Zimbabweans must rest with the 
GOZ and it is important that international donors not 
fill every gap, which would alleviate the GOZ of its fair 
share of the burden. 
     -- Third, the absence of traditional village 
structures in the newly resettled areas means that WFP's 
current methods for beneficiary selection/registration 
and food distribution could not be used to ensure a 
transparent and non-political program.  Because of the 
continued presence in the newly resettled areas of 
persons who employed violence and/or intimidation to 
acquire land, more stringent methods would have to be 
used to guarantee that assistance programs remain non- 
partisan.  In particular, so as not to reward lawlessness 
or bail out the GOZ's disastrous land reform program, 
special precautions would have to be taken to exclude 
from beneficiary lists those who engaged in acts of 
violence, intimidation or the illegal occupation of land. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
POSSIBLE RESPONSES TO WFPs PROPOSED FOOD ASSISTANCE IN 
NEWLY RESETTLED AREAS 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶9.  Option 1:  Inform WFP that the US cannot consider 
contributing to a new program in the newly resettled 
areas until existing programs have been adequately 
resourced.  To date, WFP has received pledges for only 
43% of its total net appeal of 346,085 mt.  The current 
appeal only contemplates assistance in the communal 
areas.  Expanding its program to cover the newly 
resettled areas, to feed an estimated vulnerable 
population of 500-600,000, would require additional 
resources.  Moreover, WFP expects soon to conclude a 
vulnerability assessment for urban areas, which have also 
experienced increased food insecurity, necessitating even 
more resources.  The lack of clarity regarding expected 
GOZ food imports and uncertainty concerning pledges from 
other major donors (such as the South Africans) make it 
difficult for WFP or the donors to plan for an expansion 
of food assistance efforts.  This option would, in 
effect, postpone a decision on the issue until WFP could 
provide adequate information on its total resource needs 
and expected contributions from other donors.  By 
deferring the decision, however, this option would 
unnecessarily delay responding to vulnerable people in 
the newly resettled areas, most of whom are believed to 
be innocent former farm workers. 
 
¶10.  Option 2:  Allow WFP to provide targeted assistance 
in newly resettled areas with resources other than those 
contributed by the U.S. government.  Under this option, 
we would inform WFP that we would raise no objections to 
a targeted food assistance program in newly resettled 
areas that is done in a transparent and non-partisan 
manner, using non-USG resources.  This option would 
require WFP to obtain additional resources from other 
donors to carry out the proposed assistance, which WFP 
believes may be possible.  One potential contributor 
would be South Africa (although post has not fully 
explored this with the South African High Commission). 
South Africa provided approximately 58,000 mt of cereals 
through WFP for the 2002/2003 season, but has not yet 
pledged assistance for the 2003/2004 season.  As South 
Africa is reportedly considering providing its 2003/2004 
assistance through the GMB, which would be of significant 
concern to many donors, an additional advantage of this 
option is that it could encourage South Africa to 
continue providing its resources through WFP.  Although 
this option side steps many of the issues, due to the 
complexities and political sensitivities entailed in the 
other options, it may allow for the swiftest response to 
increasing vulnerability in the newly resettled areas. 
This option, however, would represent a significant 
departure from the traditional approach to managing 
international humanitarian assistance programs.  The U.S. 
and other donors ordinarily subscribe to an entire 
humanitarian assistance effort and do not attempt to 
"wall off" parts of the assistance program with which 
they have concerns.  Unsubscribing to part of the food 
assistance effort in Zimbabwe would potentially set a bad 
precedent, could expose us to public criticism and would 
weaken our negotiating position with WFP and other donors 
regarding the management and oversight of the overall 
food assistance program. 
 
¶11.  Option 3:  Allow WFP to pilot a food assistance 
effort at two distribution sites in A1 newly resettled 
areas, subject to stringent conditions and additional 
assurances to satisfy the donor concerns described in 
paragraph 8.  WFP has consistently maintained that it 
cannot in good conscience do a survey to assess 
vulnerability in the newly resettled areas without being 
prepared to provide food assistance because the 
vulnerability assessments in and of themselves raise 
community expectations.  This option would enable WFP to 
begin food distributions on a trial basis, gather more 
reliable data on vulnerability, and test the waters to 
see if assistance can be provided in a transparent, non- 
political manner.  WFP and its NGO implementing partners 
would select the pilot sites based on preliminary 
information regarding need and the amenability of local 
authorities to the program.  Under this option, prior to 
commencing assistance, WFP would have to assure donors 
that it has: 
 
     -- (a) obtained a guarantee from the GOZ of 
unimpeded access to the newly resettled areas (to assess 
the nature and extent of food insecurity, to select and 
register a targeted group of the most vulnerable 
beneficiaries, and to effect and monitor food 
distributions); 
     -- (b) developed a plan for management of the 
beneficiary selection/registration and food distribution 
processes that puts its implementing partner NGOs in full 
control, rather than politically created committees, and 
specifies how they will respond when problems inevitably 
arise (including procedures for the immediate suspension 
of distributions); 
     -- (c) clarified the criteria for beneficiary 
selection, taking into account the unique circumstances 
of the former commercial farming areas, to target food 
distribution to the most vulnerable while excluding from 
eligibility perpetrators of violence, intimidation or 
illegal acts (such as illegal land occupations); and 
     -- (d) obtained a commitment from the GOZ/GMB to 
coordinate distributions, including a commitment to 
provide information regarding GMB import and distribution 
plans. 
 
Post proposes to communicate these conditions to WFP in a 
letter responding to its request.  The letter would also 
specify that this must be a phased approach, allowing the 
US and other major donors to evaluate the pilot effort 
thoroughly before agreeing to any expansion to other A1 
areas or to A2 areas. Post also proposes to allow WFP to 
commence immediately therapeutic and wet feeding programs 
to the most vulnerable in newly resettled areas, without 
any need for further assurances. 
 
¶12.  If adopted, option 3 would effectively respond to 
the concerns outlined in paragraph 8.  This option, 
however, may be difficult to implement because the GOZ 
may not agree to the conditions without protracted 
negotiations.  If the GOZ does agree, it could be 
difficult to identify persons to be excluded from 
eligibility due to their past participation in violence, 
intimidation or illegal acts.  We would have to be 
prepared to accept the possibility that some such 
individuals may slip through the cracks of any system we 
devise and receive food aid.  Moreover, making such 
distinctions could become divisive and exacerbate 
tensions within already fragile communities.  This option 
could also leave the US open to criticism that we have 
excluded individuals from eligibility for humanitarian 
assistance on grounds other than need.  We would have to 
be prepared to respond publicly to such criticism that we 
are taking a principled position of not rewarding 
violence and lawlessness, while trying to respond 
effectively to the humanitarian needs of the innocent 
victims of the GOZ's chaotic land reform program. 
Sullivan