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Viewing cable 03ANKARA7113, GOT CLAIMS VESSEL TRAFFIC SYSTEM NOT FULLY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
03ANKARA7113 2003-11-14 15:05 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Ankara
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

141505Z Nov 03
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 007113 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
 
STATE FOR E, EB/CBED, EB/IFD AND EUR/SE 
DEPARTMENT PASS OPIC, NSC FOR BRYZA 
USDOC FOR 4212/ITA/MAC/OEURA/CPD/DDEFALCO 
USDOE FOR CHARLES WASHINGTON 
TREASURY FOR OASIA 
 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ENRG EINV ECON PREL TU
SUBJECT: GOT CLAIMS VESSEL TRAFFIC SYSTEM NOT FULLY 
FUNCTIONAL 
 
 
This message is sensitive but unclassified, not for internet 
distribution.  Please handle accordingly. 
 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary.  Turkish Maritime Undersecretariat 
officials told us that the testing phase of the Vessel 
Traffic System (VTS) in the Istanbul area would have to be 
extended beyond the end-October deadline due to technical 
problems.  Turkish Coastal Safety and Ship Rescue Management 
Director General also has confirmed the delay. The GOT is 
working with the contractor, Lockheed Martin, to resolve any 
difficulties; however, Lockheed insists that there are no 
major outstanding problems.  Unlike the Istanbul region where 
the contractors have completed both construction and 
training, the Canakkale region has yet to be completed.  Some 
shippers maintain that the Istanbul system is operational 
with only minor technical problems while complaining that 
politics is becoming a problem due to GOT concerns over 
hazardous material traffic through the Turkish Straits. 
Although full implementation of the VTS system will improve 
traffic safety in the Turkish Straits, this government is 
trying to downplay public expectations that the system is 
totally foolproof and also quell widespread speculation that 
the Straits could automatically accomodate more tanker 
traffic.  End Summary. 
 
 
2.  (SBU) Martime Undersecretariat officials told us on 
October 24 that the testing phase of the VTS system, which 
began on 20 June, would not be completed in October as 
initially planned and may not even be ready for prime time 
before the end of the year.  One of the main complaints 
involves the system integration software because the hardware 
was procured from both local and international firms. For 
example, the cameras were bought from a Turkish firm, and the 
GOT officials say that the cameras often malfunction, 
disrupting the systems record and replay capability. 
 
 
3.  (SBU) Another problem involves the charting system, which 
Lockheed had contracted to a local firm; according to the 
Maritime authorities, it is sometimes difficult to pinpoint 
the exact location of ships.  They note, for example, that 
the faulty VTS electronic charts showed the ship that ran 
aground in the Istanbul Straits in mid-October had passed 150 
km offshore.  In contrast, these officials credited the VTS 
system with effectively detecting accidents on November 11, 
which allowed the relevant GOT authorities to take 
precautionary measures during bad weather conditions. 
Nonetheless, Maritime officials maintain that the GOT has a 
contractual relationship with Lockheed, not with the 
subcontractors, and expect the company to adress these 
problems.  To this end, they have forwarded a list of the 
problems to Lockheed and are working closely with the 
engineers to resolve the problems.  Moreover, the Maritime 
Undersecretariat officials hinted that the GOT would consider 
delaying full acceptance of the project if these outstanding 
issues are not handled in a timely manner. 
 
 
4.  (SBU) The $225 million VTS system consists of two areas 
of the Turkish Straits, Istanbul and Canakkale, with a total 
of 16 remote sensor sites; 8 in the Straits of Istanbul, 5 in 
the Straits of Canakkale, and 3 in the Marmara Sea. There 
also are 4 VHF-DF communications sites, 5 Radar beacons 
(RACON) stations, and 1 dGPS reference station in the Black 
Sea and another in the Aegean Sea.  The main Vessel Traffic 
Center, which is located in Istinye on Istanbul's European 
side, hosts the supervisor and operator traffic consoles, 
administrator console, track correlation, database, and 
expert system processing, controls all sensors, communication 
and recording systems, and interfaces with external users. 
Under the VTS system, each ship is required to have a 
functional radar system from the Black Sea to Canakkale; 
equipment is loaned to ships lacking the proper devices and 
detailed information about the cargo and crew are collected 
for the VTS database. 
 
 
5.  (SBU) On October 22, Lockheed Martin told us that they 
have officially delivered the Istanbul VTS stations to the 
GOT and have completed the legally required training of 
Turkish personnel, but the Canakkale section remains under 
construction.  Lockheed admitted that the VTS system is not 
as efficient as it could be, given the complex nature of the 
Turkish Straits.  Nonetheless, the contractor is fully 
satisfied that the system would improve traffic safety in the 
Istanbul and Canakkale area.  The contractor cautioned that, 
while the system does not give the GOT law enforcement 
capability over the Turkish Straits, it gives the authorities 
an advisory role over ships transiting the area and is a 
deterrent to illegal activity.  (Comment. Despite the 
Montreaux convention, which defines the Turkish Straits as an 
international waterway and does not recognize Turkish 
sovereignty, the GOT maintains that the Straits is not a 
pipeline for tankers and continues to seek ways to regulate 
shipping, promote Baku-Tibilisi-Ceyhan as an alternate route 
for oil, and protect the environment, historical buildings, 
and Istanbul's 12 million population. End comment). 
 
 
6.  (SBU) The Maritime officials argued that the VTS system 
was acceptable but not totally satisfactory.  In their view, 
an efficient system would result in shorter waiting periods 
for ships instead of automatically facilitating larger 
volumes of traffic through the Turkish Straits.  These 
officials admitted that political pressure was growing, in 
part due to the lengthy and costly waiting periods for ships 
in the Black Sea, Marmara Sea, and Canakkale.  They told us 
that shippers incur costs of about $25,000-$45,000 due to the 
long wait period, and some shippers' associations already 
have registered complaints with the Ministry of 
Transportation.  The Maritime authorities also said that the 
stakes are high for this government with upcoming local 
elections, which are scheduled to be held in Spring 2004, 
because the previous government had wrongly raised public 
expectations and convinced Istanbul residents that the VTS 
system would be foolproof. 
 
 
7.  (SBU) In conversations with shippers on November 7, we 
learned that the VTS system is improving safety, despite some 
minor problems.  Shippers noted that freighters are allowed 
to transit the Straits without restrictions even with zero 
visibility.  Some of the freighters have 155,000 dead weight 
ton capacity and are roughly 280 meters, roughly the same 
size of many tankers.  Turkish authorities, however, do not 
take even a small risk with tankers and subject them to 
lengthy waiting periods.  Because freighters are not subject 
to the same restrictions as tankers, the shippers we 
contacted argued that passage through the Turkish Straits has 
become more of a political issue than an environmental safety 
issue. 
EDELMAN