This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 HARARE 002044 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AID FOR DCHA/FFP LANDIS, CRUMBLY, MUTAMBA, 
PETERSEN 
DCHA/OFDA FOR BARTON, KHANDAGLE, MENGHETTI, 
BORNS, MARX, HALMRAST-SANCHEZ, MCCONNELL 
AFR/SA FOR FLEURET, COPSON, FORT, BAKER, MACNAIRN 
STATE/AF FOR RAYNOR, DELISI 
PRETORIA FOR DIJKERMAN, HELM, DISKIN, HALE 
NAIROBI FOR SMITH, RILEY 
LILONGWE FOR RUBEY, SINK 
LUSAKA FOR GUNTHER, NIELSON 
MAPUTO FOR POLAND, BLISS 
MASERU FOR AMB LOFTIS 
MBABANE FOR KENNA 
GABORONE FOR THOMAS, MULLINS AND DORMAN 
ROME FOR FODAG FOR LAVELLE, DAVIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREL US ZI
SUBJECT: DISASTER DECLARATION FOR ZIMBABWE 
 
REFS: (A) 02 Harare 02422; (B) State 283715; (C) Harare 
01534; (D) Harare 01950; (E) Harare 01995 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. The Ambassador has determined that the severe and 
complex political, economic, social and humanitarian 
crises facing Zimbabwe continue to be of sufficient 
magnitude to warrant USG assistance and is therefore 
exercising the disaster assistance authority, as per 
Reftel B and 2 FAM-061-062, in declaring Zimbabwe to be 
in a state of complex emergency. 
 
¶2. While three years of drought have had some residual 
effect upon the capacity of some Zimbabwean farmers in 
chronically dry regions to continue farming on a 
subsistence level, it is disastrous misrule, failed land 
reform and ruinous macro-economic policies, not drought, 
that are the root causes of Zimbabwe's current complex 
humanitarian emergency and more general economic and 
social collapse. 
 
¶3. The GOZ made a formal request to the UN and 
international donors for both food and non-food 
assistance in late July (Reftel C). Based on the 
complexity and magnitude of the crisis, the Ambassador 
believes that the Government of Zimbabwe (GOZ) has 
neither the resources nor the capacity to respond 
effectively to the crisis and that it is in the interest 
of the USG to provide humanitarian assistance. As a 
result, the Ambassador requests continuing USG assistance 
for Zimbabwe. 
 
¶4. USG humanitarian assistance to date for this crisis 
from the USAID/DCHA Offices of Food for Peace (FFP) and 
Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and USDA, totals more 
than US$360 million. While no additional funding requests 
are being made at this time, continuing USG humanitarian 
assistance is requested in the areas of food aid, water 
and sanitation, emergency health and supplementary 
feeding programs, assistance to internally displaced 
persons (IDPs), agricultural inputs and technical support 
in selected communal areas, and monitoring and 
coordination of the humanitarian response in Zimbabwe. 
The Mission also requests continuing assistance through 
the USAID/DCHA Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) in 
the areas of constitutional reform and election support, 
independent media, information dissemination, dialogue 
and rule of law. END SUMMARY. 
 
 
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THE WIDENING GYRE: 
THINGS FALL APART 
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¶5. Although rates of malnutrition are down from last year 
(according to the announced results of a not yet released 
UNICEF Nutrition Survey done in February 2003), largely 
because of the timely response of the international donor 
community and the meager May harvest, the threat of 
famine and a deepening humanitarian crisis continue midst 
a more generalized collapse. This collapse is 
attributable to a much broader spectrum of spiraling woes 
- the deteriorating economy, immense policy constraints, 
the devastating effects of HIV/AIDS, and an increasingly 
depleted capacity in the health and social service 
sectors. The country is in its fifth successive year of 
economic decline and faces critical shortages of foreign 
exchange to maintain essential infrastructure, food 
staples, potable water, fuel and energy needs. This 
implosion is in large part the result of the effects of 
the government's failed fast-track land reform program, 
which has decimated the country's once productive 
agricultural sector and left small and subsistence 
farmers without inputs, tillage capacity, technical 
support or access to financing. 
¶6. The current inflation rate is conservatively estimated 
at over 400 percent and is forecast to reach over 500 
percent by the end of the year. The industrial and 
agricultural sectors have been severely undermined by the 
state of the macro-economy, causing mass unemployment and 
worsening rural and urban poverty. State control of 
prices, currency exchange rates and a monopoly on the 
import and marketing of maize and wheat are 
characteristic of an economic framework within which the 
economy has contracted by one-third in four years. This 
had contributed to greater vulnerability as structural 
unemployment is estimated at over 70 percent, and rising, 
and as the major sectors generating employment and 
foreign exchange continue to contract. Zimbabwe's GDP has 
declined 35 percent in the last three years, a fall more 
precipitate than any that has occurred in a country not 
at war. 
¶7. In addition to the deterioration of the health and 
social services sectors because of lack of funding, the 
country is also suffering from a loss of skills in the 
health and social services sector due to emigration and 
HIV/AIDS. The invasive and debilitating effects of the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic in Zimbabwe, where over 25 percent of 
the sexually active adult population is living with the 
disease, exacerbates the current humanitarian crisis at 
multiple levels. HIV/AIDS not only increases food 
insecurity and decimates valuable human resources but is, 
in turn, complicated and fed by the malnutrition and 
opportunistic diseases that are byproducts of food 
insecurity.  As health and public services deteriorate, 
the window for possible disease outbreaks opens wider. 
 
¶8. The UN and the international donor community continue 
to stress the need for the GOZ to assume responsibility 
for responding to the humanitarian crisis and to 
cooperate more fully and openly. As evident in its July 
appeal for assistance (Reftel C), the capacity of the GOZ 
to respond in any effectual way to the crisis, even to 
make the minimal contributions it made last year, has 
diminished considerably. The only GOZ contributions noted 
in its July request were 284,000 MT of planned 
imports/local purchases that have yet to materialize and 
an as yet not fully budgeted ZWD 28 billion to continue 
its heavily criticized "public works" (cash-for-work) 
program over the coming year. [Note: while the official 
exchange rate remains ZWD 824: US $1, the parallel market 
rate is now ZWD 5,600: US$ 1. End note.] 
 
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FOOD CRISIS CONTINUES: 
5.5 MILLION AT RISK 
---------------------- 
 
¶9. As a result of the continuing severe economic decline, 
particularly in the crippled agricultural sector, the 
food crisis in Zimbabwe is expected to continue into the 
2004/05 marketing year.  Projections for Zimbabwe's 
2003/2004 agricultural season are bleak, largely due to 
worsening input supply and financing constraints.  All 
major agricultural sub-sectors are expected to continue 
their decline, even if the weather is favorable.  In 
addition to the critical foreign and local currency 
constraints, serious shortages of seed, fertilizer, crop 
and livestock chemicals, fuel, and agricultural equipment 
and spare parts all point towards another sub-standard 
harvest in the 2003/04 season with continuing significant 
production deficits, food gaps and international 
assistance requirements (Reftel E). Both the Crop and 
Food Supply Assessment Mission completed by the UN World 
Food Program (WFP) and Food and Agricultural Organization 
(FAO) and the ZIMVAC (Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment) 
forecast severe shortfalls in all staple crop 
requirements for 2003/04. Most agricultural experts in 
country predict a maximum 2003/04 maize harvest 
(Zimbabwe's most important staple crop) of around 1 
million MT - similar to last year - leaving a deficit on 
the order of 800,000 MT for the 2004/05 marketing year. 
 
¶10. WFP estimates that up to 5.5 million people, almost 
half Zimbabwe's population, will produce insufficient 
crops and have inadequate income and other entitlements 
to be able to meet even their minimum food requirements 
throughout the coming year and will require food aid at 
least during the height of the lean season (November - 
May). Worst affected are rural Zimbabweans whose 
livelihoods are dependent on agriculture, while former 
commercial farm workers and their dependents are 
especially vulnerable, due to loss of employment and 
displacement as a result of the land redistribution 
activities. As economic deterioration becomes both more 
profound and widespread, however, people in urban and 
peri-urban areas are also increasingly unable to fulfill 
their minimal food requirements. 
 
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UN CONSOLIDATED APPEAL 
---------------------- 
 
¶11. In response to the ongoing humanitarian crisis, the 
UN formally launched a stand-alone Consolidated Appeal 
(CAP) for Zimbabwe in September (Note: The Zimbabwe CAP, 
in abbreviated form, had already been included as part of 
the UN Southern Africa Regional Consolidated Appeal 
released in late July. End note.)(Reftel D). The CAP 
notes that Zimbabwe's humanitarian crisis has largely 
been man-made and that moving beyond emergency to 
recovery would only be viable if a wide range of policy 
reforms took place. The CAP primarily addresses non-food 
emergency assistance in agriculture, water/sanitation, 
health, coordination, economic recovery, education and 
protection/human rights. Unlike some of the other five 
countries in the region, which have experienced varying 
levels of recovery in food security, the situation in 
Zimbabwe remains grave, is deteriorating further and 
accounts for more than half of the aid requested in the 
UN Southern Africa Regional Consolidated Appeal (US$309 
million: US$195 in food aid and US$114 in non-food aid). 
 
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POLITICAL COMPONENT 
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¶12.  On another level, Zimbabwe is now in its fourth 
consecutive year of an acute political crisis.  The 
ruling party, ZANU-PF, has responded to the emergence of 
a popular opposition party, the Movement for Democratic 
Change (MDC), the first serious challenge to its 
hegemonic rule since independence, with persistent and 
unchecked use of force and repression.  Since the defeat 
of the national referendum on the GOZ's proposed 
constitutional revisions in 1999, followed by the 
unanticipated success of the MDC in the 2000 
parliamentary polls and the violent and flawed 
presidential election in 2002, the political climate has 
become increasingly polarized.  The formation of 
extralegal militia, the politicization of security 
forces, and the selective enforcement of the rule of law 
by the GOZ have led to systemic and widespread human 
rights abuses, including sustained and often violent 
harassment of opposition politicians and their civic 
supporters.  A series of repressive laws passed in 2002 
has impinged on the constitutionally guaranteed freedoms 
of expression and assembly in an attempt to stifle 
dissent and silence criticism of the government.  In the 
last year, these laws have been used to harass and deport 
journalists; initiate politically motivated arrests 
across a broad spectrum of society; prohibit peaceful 
protests and opposition election campaigning; close down 
the only independent daily newspaper; and restrict the 
activities of non-governmental organizations.  The 
politically appointed courts have done little to bring 
relief to an embattled population. 
¶13.  There is a critical need for crisis mitigation 
activities and transitional assistance.  Post's 
assessment of the current situation points to a need to 
improve channels of information dissemination, dialogue 
and exchange among all levels of society, from policy 
makers to civil society leaders and the general public. 
Expanding opportunities for dialogue and supporting 
democratic mechanisms will aid the transition process and 
help establish a more democratic and transparent practice 
of governance in the future. 
 
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MISSION REQUEST 
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¶14. Embassy requests USAID/DCHA/OFDA AND OTI assistance 
in developing an integrated strategy to meet humanitarian 
needs in Zimbabwe, and to mitigate the deepening 
political crisis. Although the embassy is not requesting 
any specific emergency assistance at this time, it 
anticipates that funded assistance programs will 
continue. The Embassy will keep the responsible DCHA 
offices informed as additional needs are identified and 
requests for assistance are received and reviewed. 
 
¶15. To the best of our knowledge, no U.S. citizens have 
been affected to date by this crisis other than through 
the general decline in the national political and 
economic environment. The Mission will advise as 
additional information becomes available. 
WHITEHEAD