This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 006620 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
H-PASS 
SENSITIVE 
 
 
STATE PLEASE PASS TO REP. ROYCE'S STAFF 
 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ECON TU IZ
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR CODEL ROYCE VISIT TO TURKEY 
 
 
REF: SECSTATE 293703 
 
 
THIS MESSAGE IS SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED.  PLEASE PROTECT 
ACCORDINGLY. 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: Your CODEL arrives in Ankara at a time when 
Iraq and resolution of the PKK/KADEK question remain the 
focus of the US-Turkish relationship.  Turks are seized with 
two Iraq-related issues: whether the U.S. will work out with 
the Interim Governing Council the eventual deployment of 
Turkish troops to Iraq as part of the Stabilization Force, 
and whether the U.S. will move against PKK/KADEK terrorists 
in northern Iraq.  Senior GOT officials including PM Erdogan, 
as well as our contacts with ordinary citizens across the 
country, have indicated that concrete progress by the U.S. on 
PKK/KADEK will ease Turkish suspicions that the U.S. favors 
the Kurds in northern Iraq over our relations with Turkey. 
GOT tells us it is committed to finding a comprehensive 
solution on Cyprus, but continues to emphasize flaws in the 
Annan plan.  GOT remains open in principle to improving 
relations with Armenia, and has inaugurated Istanbul-Yerevan 
civil air flights but refuses to open its border with Armenia 
before Armenia recognizes the border.  Turkey has issued 
positive statements in support of the Middle East Roadmap and 
has exchanged a number of high-level visits with Israel 
recently, but the Turkish populace sympathizes with the 
Palestinians.  Turkey cautiously supports USG policy 
objectives in Syria and Iran. 
 
 
¶2. (SBU) The governing Justice and Development (AK) Party 
came to power with an overwhelming Parliamentary majority in 
November 2002 and continues to pass democratic reforms for 
their own sake and in pursuit of Turkey's EU candidacy. 
However, elements within the Turkish establishment, asserting 
emotionally that AK is a radical Islamist party, continue to 
oppose AK at every turn.  On the economic front, two years of 
sound fiscal/monetary policy and structural reforms, the 
rapid and successful conclusion of the Iraq war, expected 
U.S. financial assistance, and unprecedented IMF support have 
combined to bring down inflation and interest rates, restore 
modest growth, and create some hope that Turkey can work its 
way out from under a high public debt burden.  The government 
has an opportunity in the coming months to win the economy 
some much-needed breathing room, but this will require 
committed implementation of IMF-supported reforms as well as 
wise conduct of foreign policy.  End summary. 
 
 
---- 
IRAQ 
---- 
 
 
¶3. (SBU) By a comfortable margin -- 358 to 183, with two 
abstentions -- the Turkish Parliament on October 7 granted 
the GOT broad authority to send troops to Iraq if the GOT 
considers conditions favorable.  Since the vote, GOT 
officials have expressed to us their frustration with public 
statements by elements in Iraq and Turkey opposing a 
deployment of Turkish troops.  The Turks are looking to the 
U.S. to silence the critics and build  support for a Turkish 
deployment.  The recent car bomb attack on the Turkish 
Embassy in Baghdad has heightened public concerns about the 
risks Turkish troops will face in Iraq, but the government 
has been undeterred by the event. 
 
 
¶4. (U) There has been a concerted effort on the part of the 
GOT to shift its Iraq policy away from one centered on 
ethnicity (Turkmen and Kurd) and northern Iraq towards a more 
central, Baghdad-oriented policy based primarily on 
contributing to stability through trade, humanitarian 
assistance and commercial opportunities for Turkish 
businesses.  However, GOT efforts have not found much 
traction with the military, the press or the public, which 
remain focused on northern Iraq.  The Turks have taken a 
number of concrete steps in humanitarian assistance and 
reconstruction since Secretary Powell's April visit to 
Turkey.  The World Food Program (WFP) continues to ship 
considerable quantities of food through Turkey, and Turkey is 
also the world's biggest supplier (in value terms) to WFP. 
The GOT also has supported the U.S. military's efforts to 
establish a ground line of communications (GLOC) here to 
re-supply U.S. forces in Iraq. Turkey recently facilitated a 
Turkish company's export of electricity to Iraq, continues to 
support fuel barter deals to supply essential energy supplies 
to the Iraqi people, and has offered some commercial/aid 
deals that Washington and CPA are considering. 
 
 
¶5. (SBU) The Turks also remain very focused on the presence 
of PKK/KADEK terrorists in northern Iraq.  Parliament 
recently passed a "re-integration" law allowing 
non-leadership members of the PKK/KADEK to return voluntarily 
to Turkey.  Results of the law have been disappointing so 
far.  The Turks are looking to the USG to implement our 
commitment to eliminate the PKK/KADEK threat from Iraq. 
State's Counter Terrorism Chief Amb. Black was in Ankara 
October 2 to discuss PKK/KADEK and agreed with the Turks on a 
plan of action using the full range of statecraft tools to 
eliminate the PKK/KADEK threat. The Turks also remain 
disturbed by what they consider to be Kurdish (vice U.S. or 
Iraqi central authority) control of the Iraqi side of the 
Turkish-Iraq border and a perceived U.S. favoritism of Kurds 
over Turkish interests.  The U.S and GOT are attempting to 
put behind us hard feelings from a July 4 incident, in which 
U.S. forces arrested Turkish troops believed to be working to 
foment instability.  That event and the Turks' perception 
that we mishandled it (although Chief of the General Staff 
Ozkok subsequently transferred the two Turkish generals 
responsible for Turkish special forces in Iraq short of tour) 
are likely to linger in the background of the relationship. 
 
 
------ 
CYPRUS 
------ 
 
 
¶6. (SBU) The AK Government states that it remains committed 
to using the Annan III Plan as the basis for finding a 
solution on Cyprus, both for domestic political reasons and 
its interest in promoting Turkey's EU candidacy.  However, 
the Turkish establishment's long support for Denktash, his 
rejection of the Annan plan, and Denktash supporters in 
Ankara retard progress towards a comprehensive solution. 
Much will depend on the government's willingness to take on 
this issue between now and spring 2004, when Cyprus' EU 
membership becomes effective.  AK owes nothing politically to 
"TRNC" leader Denktash and is thus interested in promoting 
transparent and fair parliamentary elections in the North in 
December.  No matter what the outcome, the elections, which 
have become a de facto referendum on a comprehensive 
solution, will profoundly affect the likelihood of a 
settlement before May. 
 
 
------- 
ARMENIA 
------- 
 
 
¶7. (SBU) The AK government is much less wedded than its 
predecessors to Azerbaijan's ruling Aliyev family.  However, 
continued GOT linkage of normalization of relations with 
Armenia to improvements in Nagorno-Karabakh has thwarted 
progress.  The GOT also maintains that it cannot establish 
normal relations until Armenia recognizes its border with 
Turkey.  GOT and AK party officials tell us they recognize 
the potential trade and development benefits to Turkey from 
opening the border.  However, passage of any Armenian 
genocide language, even by only one chamber of Congress, will 
set progress back significantly. 
 
 
----------- 
MIDDLE EAST 
----------- 
 
 
¶8. (SBU) Turkey prides itself on its good relations with both 
Israelis and Palestinians.  While it supports the 
U.S.-sponsored Road Map, Turkey is leery of getting too far 
ahead of a Turkish populace that generally sympathizes with 
the Palestinian side.  On Syria and Iran, Turkey argues that 
Turkey: 1) lives in a rough neighborhood and has an interest 
in minimizing friction with its neighbors; and 2) shares the 
same values and goals in the Middle East as the U.S. 
(stability, democracy and prosperity).  GOT officials have 
recently indicated to us their belief that Syria is currently 
engaged in a gradual process of democratization, which they 
believe should be encouraged.  In this regard, Foreign 
Minister Gul delivered a call for democracy and reform in the 
Islamic world at the June OIC Summit in Tehran. 
 
 
------------------------ 
DOMESTIC POLITICAL SCENE 
------------------------ 
 
 
¶9. (SBU) The governing AK Party, which came to power with an 
overwhelming Parliamentary majority in November 2002, 
continues to pursue democratic and political reform (para 
12).  Meanwhile, AK's principle challengers -- the opposition 
CHP and the xenophobic Genc Party -- have lost momentum.  AK 
insists its substantial and pathbreaking democratic reform 
packages demonstrate it is wedded to democracy and strong 
relations with the EU and U.S.  However, most people in the 
Turkish establishment question AK's sincerity and remain 
concerned about its religious roots.  There are also 
questions about AK's ability to field an experienced and 
competent bureaucratic team.  Turkey's generals are keen to 
protect their status as Guardians of the (Kemalist) Republic 
and the version of "secularism" that has prevailed in Turkey. 
 They, and much of the status quo forces in the State, assert 
AK is a challenge to the founding ideology of Ataturk's 
Turkey; AK in turn says that its "secular" opponents have 
hijacked Ataturk's intentions and are responsible for the 
stagnation in Turkey's political, economic, and social 
development. 
 
 
¶10. (SBU) Both the AK Government and the Turkish General 
Staff handled the run-up to Operation Iraqi Freedom badly; 
neither showed leadership in the debate about whether Turkey 
should participate in a stabilization force for Iraq.  Apart 
from its Iraq policy, the government has gained better 
footing since PM Erdogan took over in March 2003.  The PM 
demonstrated political leadership and management in 
Parliament's Oct. 7 decision to approve the Iraq troop 
deployment, and Erdogan consolidated his control of AK at the 
party's October 12 convention. 
 
 
------------------------ 
POLITICAL REFORM PROCESS 
------------------------ 
 
 
¶11. (SBU) In its first eleven months in power, the AK 
Government has passed a series of democratization and 
political reforms in the context of EU harmonization.  Turkey 
is garnering praise from the EU, which should decide by Dec. 
2004 whether to begin formal accession talks with Turkey. 
The reform packages expand freedom of expression including 
mother tongue (i.e. Kurdish language) rights, crack down on 
torture, and raise the relative authority of elected 
civilians vis-a-vis the military.  There are questions, 
however, about whether the AK government will be able to 
implement these reforms rapidly, particularly given the 
resistance from those in the judiciary, military and other 
elements of the state which are content with the status quo 
and suspicious of AK, the EU and the U.S.  The AK Government 
has also launched an anti-corruption drive that appears far 
more comprehensive than any conducted by previous 
governments.  Nevertheless, many Turks wonder how far AK will 
take its anti-corruption effort, including against 
allegations of corruption in the military and within AK 
itself. 
 
 
----------- 
THE ECONOMY 
----------- 
 
 
¶12. (SBU) Two years of sound fiscal/monetary policy and 
structural reforms, the rapid and successful conclusion of 
the Iraq war, expected U.S. financial assistance, and 
unprecedented IMF support have combined to bring down 
inflation and interest rates, restore modest growth, and 
create some hope that Turkey can work its way out from under 
a high public debt burden.  The GOT has an opportunity, 
between now and the end of the year, to build on this 
momentum and thus push the economy away from the financial 
precipice on which it has been perched for the past three 
years.  This will require the government, which so far has 
implemented the IMF recovery program with muted enthusiasm, 
to complete the next IMF review rapidly, proceed with 
scheduled privatizations, win a positive EU report in 
October, and improve the environment for foreign direct 
investment. Failure to take advantage of this opportunity 
will not necessarily mean another crisis, but will leave the 
economy extremely vulnerable to external or internal shocks 
and undermine the potential for prosperity.  In late 
September, the U.S. and Turkey signed an agreement under 
which the USG will provide $8.5 billion on low-interest loans 
to support Turkey's economic reform efforts.  Money under the 
agreement could begin flowing once the GOT cabinet and 
President have approved the package. 
 
 
------------- 
CHILD CUSTODY 
------------- 
 
 
¶13. (SBU) Turkey has been a signatory to the Hague Convention 
since August 2000.  Since that time, we are unaware of any 
children being returned to any country without the agreement 
of the abducting parent.  There are systemic problems:  1) 
Courts meet for 10 minutes monthly on an individual case and 
do not focus on Hague issues; 2) judges do not understand the 
Hague Convention requirement and rule on custody rather than 
Hague issues, thereby requiring a lengthy appeal process; 3) 
the legal process lasts between 2-3 years total; and 4) the 
Ministry of Interior does not provide adequate support to the 
unit charged with locating children and parents involved in 
abduction cases.  The US currently has four applications 
pending, each for return of one child to the US. In one case 
the child has now been in Turkey over a year and a half due 
to the slow court process and the judge used that delay to 
rule the child should stay in Turkey.  In another case, the 
Government of Turkey has been unable to locate a child 
abducted to Turkey in October 2002.  Due to physical abuse by 
the abducting father, the Turkish court ordered the child 
returned to the mother immediately.  The Interior Ministry 
places a low priority on these types of cases and has been 
unable to locate the child. 
 
 
------------- 
TURKISH MEDIA 
------------- 
 
 
¶14. (U) Turkey has a lively and colorful media scene. 
Reporting often includes absolute fantasy passed as fact. 
Despite the large number of newspapers, however, readership 
is not as broad and deep as might be expected.  Newspapers 
are influential in major cities but not far beyond.  Most 
Turks get their news from television.  Except for 
government-owned TRT television, all television stations in 
Turkey, like the print media, are owned by either individual 
businessmen or conglomerates.  The press will be interested 
in your visit and seek comments at a number of venues. 
 
 
¶15. (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
 
 
EDELMAN