This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 006411 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
H-PASS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON IZ PGOV PHUM PREL TU
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR CODEL SAXTON VISIT TO TURKEY 
 
REF: A) 6307 B) STATE 285773 
 
 
THIS MESSAGE IS SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED. PLEASE PROTECT 
ACCORDINGLY 
 
 
----------------- 
SUMMARY 
----------------- 
 
 
¶1.  You arrive in Ankara at a time when Iraq remains the 
focus of the US-Turkish relationship which in fact is much 
broader.  The Turks are seized with two primary Iraq-related 
issues:  The decision, approved by Parliament October 7, to 
contribute troops to the stabilization force in Iraq, and the 
presence of PKK/Kadek terrorists in northern Iraq.   While 
the Turks insist the two issues are not linked, senior GOT 
officials including PM Erdogan have made it clear that 
concrete progress by the US on PKK/Kadek will strengthen the 
GOT's hand in convincing a skeptical populace to support 
contributing troops to Iraq.  Also playing into the dynamic 
will be statements by the Iraqi Governing Council on its 
views of the Turkish deployment.  On its larger Iraq policy, 
the GOT is trying in the face of some military and public 
opposition to shift its Iraq policy away from one centered on 
northern-Iraq and ethnic (Kurd or Turkmen) issues towards a 
more central Baghdad-oriented policy based primarily on 
stability through trade, humanitarian assistance and 
commercial opportunities for Turkish businesses.  The new 
focus could help re-establish the confident cooperation that 
characterized U.S.-Turkish relations until earlier this year. 
 
 
¶2. The GOT tells us it is committed to finding a 
comprehensive solution on Cyprus, but continues to emphasize 
flaws in the Annan plan and does not have an alternative 
route to a comprehensive settlement. The GOT remains open in 
principle to improving relations with Armenia, but refuses to 
open its border with Armenia and insists that improvement of 
bilateral relations can only after a resolution to the 
Nagorno-Karabakh problem.  Turkey has issued positive 
statements in support of the Middle East Roadmap and a number 
of high-level Israeli officials have visited Ankara recently, 
but the Turkish populace generally sympathizes with the 
Palestinians.  Turkey has supported USG policy objectives in 
Syria and Iran. 
 
 
¶3. The governing Justice and Development (Turkish acronym: 
AK) Party came to power with an overwhelming Parliamentary 
majority in November 2002 and continues to pursue reforms 
geared at gaining EU accession.  However, there is a question 
within Turkey as to whether AK is committed to reform and a 
number of elements within the country continue to oppose AK 
at every turn.  On the economic front, two years of sound 
fiscal/monetary policy and structural reforms, the rapid and 
successful conclusion of the Iraq war, expected US financial 
assistance, and unprecedented IMF support have combined to 
bring down inflation and interest rates, restore modest 
growth, and create some hope that Turkey can work its way out 
from under a high public debt burden.  The government has an 
opportunity in the coming months to win the economy some 
much-needed breathing room, but this will require committed 
implementation of IMF-supported reforms as well as wise 
conduct of foreign policy.  End summary. 
 
 
-------- 
IRAQ 
-------- 
 
 
¶4. There has been a concerted effort on the part of the GOT 
to shift its Iraq policy away from one centered on ethnicity 
(Turkmen and Kurd) and northern Iraq towards a more central, 
Baghdad-oriented policy based primarily on contributing to 
stability through trade, humanitarian assistance and 
commercial opportunities for Turkish businesses.  However, 
GOT efforts have not found much traction with parts of the 
military, the press or the public which remain focused on 
northern Iraq issues.  The Turks have taken a number of 
concrete steps in humanitarian assistance and reconstruction 
since Secretary Powell's April visit to Turkey.  The World 
Food Program (WFP) continues to ship considerable quantities 
of food through Turkey, and Turkey is also the world's 
biggest supplier (in value terms) to WFP.  The GOT also has 
supported the US military's efforts to establish a ground 
line of communications (GLOC) here to re-supply US forces in 
Iraq.  Turkey recently facilitated a Turkish company's export 
of electricity to Iraq, continues to support fuel barter 
deals to supply essential energy supplies to the Iraqi 
people, and has offered some commercial/aid deals that 
Washington and CPA are considering. 
 
 
¶5.  The GOT asked and received on 10/7 Parliament,s approval 
to make a military contribution to the stabilization force in 
Iraq.  The GOT is concerned that statements by some IGC 
members suggesting the IGC would not welcome Turkish troops 
will harm GOT efforts to convince the Turkish public to 
support a Turkish role.  Some Turks (including President 
Sezer) argued that further UN action (i.e. a UNSCR mandate) 
is required.  Others (including FM Gul) sought more UN, NATO, 
or Iraqi involvement in requesting Turkish support to 
convince Turkish public opinion that their support would be 
welcome.  However, with the passage of the motion in 
Parliament, expectations are that there will soon be 
US-Turkey talks to determine the details of the Turkish 
deployment (including where the Turks would serve, how many 
soldiers they would bring, what supply line routes they would 
use, what us support would be provided, etc.   We do not yet 
have information about when or where such discussion will 
take place.  The Parliament,s decision, and PM Erdogan,s 
initiative to secure the Parliament,s support will have a 
significant impact on our relationship with the GOT. 
 
 
¶6. The Turks also remain concerned about the presence of 
PKK/Kadek terrorists in northern Iraq.  Parliament recently 
passed a "re-integration" law allowing non-leadership members 
of the PKK/Kadek to return voluntarily to Turkey.  Results of 
the law have been disappointing so far.  The Turks are 
looking to the USG to implement our commitment to eliminate 
the PKK/Kadek threat from Iraq.  State's Counter Terrorism 
Chief Amb. Black was in Ankara October 2 to discuss PKK/Kadek 
and agreed with the Turks on a plan of action using the full 
range of statecraft tools to eliminate the PKK/Kadek threat. 
The Turks also remain disturbed by what they consider to be 
Kurdish (vice US or Iraqi central authority) control of the 
Iraqi side of the Turkish-Iraq border and a perceived US 
favoritism of Kurds over Turkish interests.  As the US and 
GOT attempt to put behind us hard feelings from a July 4 
incident, where the U.S. arrested Turkish troops believed to 
be working contrary to efforts to create stability, the event 
and the Turks' perception that we mishandled it are likely to 
linger in the background of the relationship. 
 
 
------------ 
CYPRUS 
------------ 
 
 
¶7. The AK Government states that it remains committed to 
finding a solution on Cyprus, both for domestic political 
reasons and its interest in promoting Turkey's EU candidacy. 
Turkey's long support for Denktas, his rejection of the Annan 
plan, and Denktas supporters in Ankara retard progress 
towards a comprehensive solution.  Much will depend on the 
government's willingness to take on this issue between now 
and May 2004, when Cyprus' EU membership becomes effective. 
AK owes nothing politically to "TRNC" leader Denktas and is 
thus interested in promoting transparent and fair elections 
in the North this coming December.  December Parliamentary 
elections in northern Cyprus have become a de facto 
referendum on a comprehensive solution, and we continue to 
encourage the Turks to persuade Denktas to allow free and 
fair elections, including international observers.  We are 
concerned by continuing credible reports of padding voter 
rolls with new "citizens", media manipulation, politically 
motivated hirings and firings of civil servants, and 
interference by Turkish officials. 
 
 
--------------- 
ARMENIA 
--------------- 
 
 
¶8. The AK government is much less wedded to Azerbaijan,s 
ruling Aliyev family than its predecessors.  However, 
continued GOT linkage of normalization of relations with 
Armenia to improvements in Nagorno-Karabakh has retarded 
progress.  AK officials tell us they recognize the potential 
trade and development benefits to Turkey from opening the 
border.  However, AK officials have made it clear, as have 
the MFA and other Turkish officials, that passage of any 
Armenian genocide language, even by only one chamber of 
Congress, will set progress back significantly. 
 
 
---------------------- 
MIDDLE EAST 
---------------------- 
 
 
¶9.  Turkey prides itself on its good relations with both 
Israelis and Palestinians.  While it supports the 
U.S.-sponsored Road Map, Turkey is leery of getting too far 
ahead of a Turkish populace that generally sympathizes with 
the Palestinian side.  On Syria and Iran, Turkey argues that 
Turkey: 1) lives in a rough neighborhood and has an interest 
in minimizing friction with its neighbors; and 2) shares the 
same values and goals in the Middle East as the U.S. 
(stability, democracy and prosperity).  In this regard, 
Foreign Minister Gul delivered a call for democracy and 
reform in the Islamic world at the June OIC Summit in Tehran. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
DOMESTIC POLITICAL SCENE 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
 
¶10.  The governing AK Party, which came to power with an 
overwhelming Parliamentary majority in November 2002, 
continues to pursue democratic and political reform (para 
12).  Meanwhile, AK's principle challengers -- the opposition 
CHP and the xenophobic Genc Party -- have lost momentum.  AK 
insists it is wedded to democracy and strong relations with 
the EU and US.  However, most people in the Turkish 
establishment question AK's sincerity and remain concerned 
about its religious roots.  There are also questions about 
AK's ability to field an experienced and competent 
bureaucratic team.  Turkey's generals are keen to protect 
their status as Guardians of the (Kemalist) Republic and the 
version of "secularism" that has prevailed in Turkey.  They, 
and much of the established State, see AK as a challenge to 
the founding ideology of Ataturk's Turkey. 
 
 
 
 
¶11.  The AK Government handled the run-up to Operation Iraqi 
Freedom badly and initially did not show leadership in the 
debate about whether Turkey should participate in a 
stabilization force for Iraq.  However, the government has 
gained better footing since PM Erdogan took over in March 
¶2003.  PM Erdogan and FM Gul demonstrated good political 
leadership in the face of continuing opposition in the 
October 7 Parliamentary approval to send troops to Iraq.  The 
party's October 12 convention will provide further 
indications whether Erdogan can or wants to bring coherence 
to the party and the government. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
POLITICAL REFORM PROCESS 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
 
¶12.  In the first eleven months in power, the AK Government 
has passed a series of democratization and political reforms 
in the context of EU harmonization.  In doing so, Turkey is 
garnering praise from the EU, which should decide by Dec. 
2004 whether to begin formal accession talks with Turkey. The 
reform packages are designed to expand freedom of expression 
including mother tongue (i.e. Kurdish language) rights, crack 
down on torture, and raise the relative authority of elected 
civilians vis-a-vis the military.  There are questions, 
however, whether the AK government will implement these 
reforms rapidly, particularly given the resistance from those 
in the judiciary, military and other elements of the State 
which are content with the status quo and suspicious of AK, 
the EU and the US.  The AK Government has also launched an 
anti-corruption drive that appears far more comprehensive 
than any conducted by previous governments. 
Nevertheless, many Turks wonder how far AK will take its 
anti-corruption drive, including against allegations of 
corruption in the military and corruption within AK itself. 
 
 
------------------------ 
THE ECONOMY 
------------------------ 
 
 
¶13.  Two years of sound fiscal/monetary policy and structural 
reforms, the rapid and successful conclusion of the Iraq war, 
expected U.S. financial assistance, and unprecedented IMF 
support have combined to bring down inflation and interest 
rates, restore modest growth, and create some hope that 
Turkey can work its way out from under a high public debt 
burden.  The Turkish Government has an opportunity, between 
now and the end of the year, to build on this momentum and 
thus push the economy away from the financial precipice on 
which it has been perched for the past three years.  This 
will require the government, which so far has implemented the 
IMF recovery program with muted enthusiasm, to complete the 
next IMF review rapidly, proceed with scheduled 
privatizations, win a positive EU report in October, and 
improve the environment for foreign direct investment. 
Failure to take advantage of this opportunity will not 
necessarily mean another crisis, but will leave the economy 
extremely vulnerable to external or internal shocks and 
undermine the potential for prosperity.  In late September, 
the US and Turkey signed an agreement under which the USG 
will provide $8.5 billion on low-interest loans to support 
Turkey's economic reform efforts.  Money under the agreement 
could begin flowing as early as late October. 
 
 
-------------------------- 
CHILD CUSTODY 
-------------------------- 
 
 
¶14.  Turkey has been a signatory to the Hague Convention 
since August 2000. Since that time, we are unaware of any 
children being returned to any country without the agreement 
of the abducting parent.  There are systemic problems:  1) 
Courts meet for 10 minutes monthly on an individual case and 
do not focus on Hague issues; 2) judges do not understand the 
Hague Convention requirement and rule on custody rather than 
Hague issues, thereby requiring a lengthy appeal process; 3) 
the legal process lasts between 2-3 years total; and 4) the 
Ministry of Interior does not focus resources on finding the 
abducted child and the parent.  The US currently has four 
applications pending, each for return of one child to the US. 
 In one case the child has now been in Turkey over a year due 
to the slow court process and the judge used that delay to 
rule the child should stay in Turkey.  In another case, the 
Government of Turkey has been unable to locate a child 
abducted to Turkey in October 2002.  Due to physical abuse by 
the abducting father, the Turkish court ordered the child 
returned to the mother immediately.  The Interior Ministry 
places a low priority on these types of cases and has been 
unable to locate the child. 
 
 
------------------------- 
TURKISH MEDIA 
------------------------- 
 
 
¶15.  Turkey has a lively and colorful media scene.  Reporting 
often includes absolute fantasy passed as fact.  Despite the 
large number of newspapers, however, readership is not as 
broad and deep as might be expected.  Newspapers are 
influential in major cities but not far beyond.  Most Turks 
get their news from television. Except for government-owned 
TRT television, all television stations in Turkey, like the 
print media, are owned by either individual businessmen or 
conglomerates. The press will be interested in your visit and 
seek comments at a number of venues. 
EDELMAN