This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 001794 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR J. FRAZER 
LONDON FOR C. GURNEY 
PARIS FOR C. NEARY 
NAIROBI FOR T. PFLAUMER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ZI
SUBJECT: UNDAUNTED BISHOPS SEEK BENCHMARKS TO STIMULATE 
TALKS 
 
REF: (A) HARARE 1711 (B) HARARE 1599 (C) HARARE 1130 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY: The bishops troika on September 10 updated 
Ambassador Sullivan on their efforts to facilitate 
inter-party talks.  They were encouraged by ZANU-PF Chairman 
John Nkomo's invitation to a meeting earlier that day, 
although they did not expect ZANU-PF to re-activate the 
bishops' initiative formally in the foreseeable future.  With 
a view to inducing Mugabe to move forward on talks, they 
urged the USG and other international players to identify 
concrete benchmarks -- tangible international benefits that 
would correspond with tangible political progress in 
Zimbabwe.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C) The Manicaland bishops troika of Anglican Bishop and 
President of the Zimbabwe Council of Churches (ZCC) Sebastian 
Bakare, President of the Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe 
(EFZ) Bishop Trevor Manhanga, and President of the Zimbabwe 
Catholic Bishops Conference (ZCBC) Patrick Mutume came to the 
Residence on September 10 for an exchange with Ambassador 
Sullivan on recent developments.  The bishops had just come 
from a meeting with Minister for Special Affairs and ZANU-PF 
Chairman John Nkomo. 
 
¶3.  (C) The bishops reported that they had been lying low for 
some time, not wanting to be seen as exerting influence on 
recent local elections.  The election results, however, 
seemed to give new impetus for attention to resumption of 
interparty talks.  The results underscored to ZANU-PF leaders 
the party's sagging popularity and influence among important 
constituencies.  Manhanga said ZANU-PF still was not prepared 
to come to the table right away but the bishops were 
encouraged that Nkomo had invited them to talk.  Nkomo had 
not disclosed anything new in their meeting, but the bishops 
were scheduled to meet MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai later 
that day and planned to see Nkomo again on September 15.  The 
bishops expected to meet Mugabe again at an unspecified time 
after that to report on their meetings with party leaders and 
representatives of the international community. 
 
¶4.  (C) Speculating on how to motivate the parties to talk, 
Mutume emphasized the importance of not making ZANU-PF appear 
to lose in agreeing to talk.  At this early stage, the key 
would be to "bargain" to a position where the ruling party at 
least was effectively dislodged from the driver's seat. 
Bakare stressed the need to accommodate to some extent 
ZANU-PF's warped view of itself.  It was a liberation party, 
unchallenged in power for 23 years; the increasingly apparent 
erosion of its popularity presented a too radically different 
situation for many to absorb.  One key would be to keep the 
reasonable moderates, such as Nkomo and Party Spokesman 
Nathan Shamuyarira, engaged and credible. 
 
¶5.  (C) All three underscored the potential value of getting 
an indication of benchmarks from international players for 
expanded engagement with Zimbabwe.  In particular, what 
measures (beyond existing programs) would the USG be prepared 
to implement to help Zimbabwe and to what specific measures 
of political progress would they be tied?   The bishops 
asserted that having such indications from the USG, the UK 
and others would make their upcoming meeting with Mugabe much 
more productive.  They wanted to tell Mugabe specifically 
what the international community expected of Zimbabwe and 
what Zimbabwe could expect from the international community. 
The bishops recognized that Mugabe should not be rewarded for 
nothing, but some hope, short of promise, on these points 
could reduce the unhelpful level of distrust and indecision. 
 
¶6.  (C) Bakare expressed optimism about a "new language" 
being spoken by the government but cautioned that a new 
course had yet to be charted.  The bishops were further 
encouraged by progress shown in the conduct of recent 
elections.  The bishops' code of conduct subscribed to by the 
three Mutare mayoral candidates (ref A) had been a success 
and offered a potential model for future elections. 
Following the elections, interested parties, including war 
veteran representatives, had met on September 8 in a 
constructive atmosphere, and the police had committed to 
follow through on the various complaints filed by each side. 
Events in Bindura, Marondera, and Rusape nonetheless 
reflected the ruling party's dominant nature in that the 
opposition was not permitted to present its candidacies or 
was subject to heavy intimidation.  Manhanga emphasized the 
importance of measured, balanced public comments on Zimbabwe, 
as the USG's statement on recent elections had been. 
 
¶7.  (C) COMMENT:  This is the third time (refs A and B) that 
the bishops have pushed us for benchmarks they could share 
with Mugabe.  While we are skeptical that establishing 
concrete benchmarks in advance of tangible political progress 
will be decisive in getting Mugabe off the dime on talks, 
ZANU-PF insecurities about western intentions remain a 
considerable obstacle for those who support talks.  In that 
vein, we should be mindful of opportunities to offer 
balanced, non-provocative statements on Zimbabwean 
developments (a la the recent one on elections), recognizing 
incremental progress when appropriate while continuing to 
hold the GOZ accountable for ongoing abuses.  In ref C, we 
laid out incremental steps the USG could take as the 
political situation here improved.  While consideration of 
such steps would be premature now, it might serve US 
interests to identify to the GOZ discreetly (perhaps via the 
bishops) tangible measures of political progress and benefits 
potentially available to Zimbabwe down the road.  We shall 
make more specific recommendations septel. 
SULLIVAN