This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 003775 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETRD EAID ENRG EPET MOPS PREL PGOV PTER KU IZ
SUBJECT: SHEPHERDING HUMANITARIAN FUEL FOR BASRA 
 
 
¶1.  Summary.  Apparently frustrated that the Coalition was 
not heeding Kuwait's requests to tighten controls on the 
Iraq-Kuwait border to limit smuggling, the GOK slammed shut 
to civilian traffic its northern border with Iraq on 12 
August.  Convoys of vehicles supplying the contracted-out 
logistics that feed, fuel and house much of the Coalition 
Forces in Iraq were stranded at the border for over a day in 
temperatures that exceeded 130 degrees Fahrenheit; the more 
hazardous cargo, e.g., LPG and gasoline tankers, returned to 
staging areas in Kuwait City.  Critical generator power and 
emergency fuel supplies for Basra, the scene of recent riots, 
could not move north.  Embassy brokered a temporary 
arrangement under which Ministry of the Interior officers 
would permit the passage of trucks vetted by Emboffs at the 
border as properly manifested and indeed carrying 
humanitarian fuel assistance under USG contract.  Embassy is 
coordinating with MFA an interagency, multi-lateral meeting 
among the concerned parties to work out a more durable and 
standardized procedure.  Our objective is to keep the trucks 
rolling north expeditiously while ensuring that they return 
to Kuwait free of contraband or potentially hazardous 
materials.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  On Tuesday, 12 August, the GOK stopped virtually all 
Coalition support to Iraq at the Abdaly/Safwan (aka: Major 
Supply Route (MSR) "Tampa") crossing point without prior 
notice.  This action reportedly was prompted by Ministry of 
the Interior (MOI) suspicions about smuggling (of persons and 
goods) from Iraq into Kuwait on board U.S. contractors' and 
other vehicles deadheading back to Kuwait. 
 
¶3.  Embassy received first word of the border bottleneck from 
our Office of Military Cooperation - Kuwait (OMC-K) on the 
morning of Wednesday, 13 August, as we headed into the local 
Thursday/Friday weekend.  To drive home their desire to get 
Coalition attention, the two agencies most responsible for 
the border closing, the MOI and Ministry of Defense (MOD), 
made themselves unavailable for several hours.  CDA, however, 
did reach the MFA Americas Department Director Ambassador 
Khaled Al-Babtain to express USG concerns, and once 
energized, he succeeded in getting the message that we needed 
the border open directly to the newly appointed Minister of 
the Interior. 
 
¶4.  Working the issue within the GOK, Amb Al-Babtain conveyed 
our argument, that: 
 
    a) USG understands and appreciates that increased 
security concerns dictate a general tightening of controls at 
the border, and given the heightened tensions in Iraq we 
share those concerns; 
 
    b) recent press reports have unfairly portrayed Kuwait as 
uncooperative in the shipment of humanitarian fuel to Iraq; 
 
    c) we are concerned that whatever the source of the 
current misunderstanding regarding the border, its closing 
might be portrayed as Kuwaiti obstructionism and we must 
avoid that; 
 
    d) that it would be helpful to return temporarily to the 
pre-Wednesday border control regime of self-regulation by USG 
and its contractors while together we resolve the border 
issues in a calm atmosphere. 
 
¶5.  Our immediate concern, given the fuel riots in Basra the 
previous weekend, was that emergency LPG and gasoline 
shipments not be delayed another day.  The border problems 
had forced the return to Kuwait City of LPG and gasoline 
tankers destined for Basra on Tuesday and Wednesday.  During 
the second day of the blockage, we learned that 26 military 
generators (providing 20 megawatts of power) for use in 
Basra, had been delayed as well.  Kellogg Brown and Root 
(KBR) and U.S. military personnel reported that these 
generators were needed urgently to supplement the Basra 
electrical grid and to revive critical refinery operations 
there as well. 
 
¶6.  Late on 13 August, Amb Al-Babtain called CDA to report 
that his interlocutors concurred in our para 4 logic.  He 
offered that it might be possible to operate for a few days 
under a temporary, albeit somewhat tighter, variation of the 
earlier self-policing by the U.S. military and civilian 
contractors.  Al-Babtain accepted our proposal that Embassy 
officers accompany the humanitarian fuel shipments to the 
border the next morning to vet for MOI which vehicles were 
indeed humanitarian-related; to ensure that those vehicles 
had military escort; and to establish an ad hoc procedure to 
meet GOK concerns for clear identification of vehicles and 
passengers.  Al-Babtain offered no special exemption for 
anything other than the humanitarian fuel shipments. 
 
¶7.  Early on 14 August, Econ Chief and US Customs Advisor to 
the GOK arrived at MSR Tampa, staged the LPG and gasoline 
trucks on Highway 80 approximately five miles below the 
Navstar assembly point, and then met at Navstar with military 
and civilian representatives of U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
(COE), U.K. military escorts, KBR's LPG and gasoline site 
managers and personnel of the contracted service providers. 
They briefed on the "deal" worked out with MFA the evening 
before.  Unable at the border to reach the MFA-designated MOI 
contact, Emboffs spoke with the MOI OIC present and then 
visited both checkpoints on the military access route into 
Iraq to ensure that all understood and accepted the agreement 
to return to a modified business as usual.  By mid-morning, 
the 3 LPG tankers, 25 gasoline tankers and -- stretching the 
MFA deal to accommodate the Basra generators as 
"energy-related" -- 26 trucks carrying Basra's emergency 
power supply were in train and on the road with a military 
escort. 
 
¶8.  Later in the morning, and in keeping with the MOI 
manifesting and identification agreement, two additional 
25-vehicle gasoline convoys headed north for the 
South-Central Iraq cities of Al Latifiya and Ad Diwaniya. 
That afternoon, the U.K. escort reported back to Emboffs by 
cell phone that the first fuel convoy had arrived in Basra 
without incident and downloaded its fuel successfully.  Other 
convoys had agreed to report to Emboffs and COE civilian 
personnel as they reached their destinations.  No negative 
incidents were reported throughout the afternoon.  On 15 
August, COE personnel informed Emboffs that the revived 
manifesting process continued to work and that several more 
convoys had passed north on the military road without undue 
delay. 
 
¶9.  On 17 August, CDA and Econ Chief met with Amb Al-Babtain 
at the MFA to discuss a regularization of border procedures 
and controls.  On Amb Al-Babtain's recommendation, Embassy 
has requested by diplomatic note the convening of a 
multilateral and interministerial meeting to address border 
concerns.  We propose to bring members of the Coalition 
Forces as well as representatives of the U.K. Embassy in 
Kuwait to this meeting.  We would hope to work directly with 
appropriate officials from the Kuwaiti Ministries of 
Interior, Defense, and Foreign Affairs as well as other 
agencies or departments the GOK might wish to include. 
 
¶10. Comment:  Embassy shares the concerns of the GOK on the 
importance of getting a handle on border security issues 
immediately. Hundreds of now-uninspected trucks with the 
potential to conceal lethal or dangerous contraband return to 
Kuwait from the neighboring war zone each day.  Given the 
unsettled conditions in Iraq and the potential for those 
disturbances to migrate here, we and the GOK should exercise 
as strict a vigilance as possible at the border.  We also are 
concerned about the potential force protection implications 
of this issue, with smuggling of weapons or explosives a real 
possibility.  British Embassy here in Kuwait has asked to be 
part of the process since much of their support in the south 
comes directly from Kuwait.  We have been open to these 
British queries and will continue to include them in our 
discussions with the GOK.  Kuwait Immigration Chief told CDA 
on 18 August that he is receiving increasingly serious 
charges of abuses at the border.  We have passed these 
allegations on to OMC-K for U.S. military consideration.  The 
good news is that the Kuwaiti closure last week has had the 
desired effect.  Now that the GOK is convinced the U.S. is 
taking their concerns seriously, the border is fully open to 
Coalition traffic.  We intend to keep the lines of 
communication open between the Coalition and the GOK, and we 
anticipate no further misunderstandings at the Iraq-Kuwait 
border.  End Comment. 
 
¶11. Minimize considered. 
URBANCIC