This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 005409 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR H. KUWAIT - PLEASE PASS TO CODEL 
 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ECON TU IZ
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR CODEL DAVIS' VISIT TO TURKEY 
 
THIS MESSAGE IS SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED. PLEASE PROTECT 
ACCORDINGLY 
 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. (SBU) Your CODEL arrives in Ankara at a time when Turkey 
is considering increasing its cooperation in reconstruction 
and stabilization efforts in Iraq.  The GOT is shifting its 
Iraq policy away from one centered on northern-Iraq and 
ethnic (Kurd or Turkmen) issues towards a more central 
Baghdad-oriented policy based primarily on stability through 
trade, humanitarian assistance and commercial opportunities 
for Turkish businesses. The new focus will help re-establish 
the confident cooperation that characterized U.S.-Turkish 
relations until earlier this year. Turkey has become an 
important source of and conduit for UN and U.S.-supplied aid 
to Iraq, and the GOT is considering contributing to the 
military stabilization force in Iraq. High-ranking Turkish 
officials met August 5 and decided to flesh out the possible 
risks and scope of a Turkish contribution to the Iraq 
Stabilization Force. The governing Justice and Development 
(Turkish acronym: AK) Party, which came to power with an 
overwhelming Parliamentary majority, is in the midst of a 
successful stretch.  It has pursued reforms geared at gaining 
EU accession. In continuing dialogue with the U.S., the GOT 
tells us it is committed to finding a solution on Cyprus and 
is open to improving relations with Armenia. However, the GOT 
continues to emphasize flaws in the Annan plan and does not 
have an alternative route to a comprehensive settlement plan. 
On Armenia, each side wants the other to move first and 
Nagorno-Karabakh is a continuing issue. Turkey has issued 
positive statements in support of the Middle East Roadmap and 
a number of high-level Israeli officials have visited Ankara 
recently, but the Turkish populace generally sympathizes with 
the Palestinians.  Despite its policy of good neighborliness, 
Turkey has supported USG policy objectives in Syria and Iran. 
Two years of sound fiscal/monetary policy and structural 
reforms, the rapid and successful conclusion of the Iraq war, 
expected U.S. financial assistance, and unprecedented IMF 
support have combined to bring down inflation and interest 
rates, restore modest growth, and create some hope that 
Turkey can work its way out from under a high public debt 
burden.  The government has an opportunity in the coming 
months to win the economy some much-needed breathing room, 
but this will require committed implementation of 
IMF-supported reforms as well as wise conduct of foreign 
policy.  End summary. 
 
 
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IRAQ 
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¶2. (SBU) There has been a concerted effort on the part of the 
GOT to shift its Iraq policy away from one centered on 
ethnicity (Turkmen and Kurd) and northern-Iraq towards a more 
central Baghdad-oriented policy based primarily on 
contributing to stability through trade, humanitarian 
assistance and commercial opportunities for Turkish 
businesses.  The Turks have taken a number of concrete steps 
in humanitarian assistance and reconstruction since Secretary 
Powell,s April visit to Turkey. The World Food Program 
continues to ship considerable quantities of food through 
Turkey, and Turkey is also the world's biggest supplier (in 
value terms) to WFP.  The GOT also has supported the US 
military's efforts to establish a ground line of 
communications here to re-supply US forces in Iraq.  Turkey 
recently allowed an energy barter arrangement with Iraq to go 
forward that will help coalition authorities to supply 
essential energy supplies to the Iraqi people, and has 
offered several commercial/aid deals that Washington has 
welcomed. 
 
 
¶3. (SBU) The GOT is also considering making a significant 
contribution to the stabilization force in Iraq. There are 
indications that the GOT is working to convince the Turkish 
populace and Parliament (a majority of which are opposed to 
the idea) to support a Turkish role.  Some Turks -- including 
President Sezer -- argue that further UN action (i.e. another 
mandate) is required. Others (including FM Gul) believe more 
UN, NATO, or Iraqi involvement in requesting Turkish support 
would convince Turkish public opinion that their support 
would be welcome. The Turks also remain concerned about the 
presence of PKK/Kadek terrorists in northern Iraq. 
Parliament recently passed a "re-integration" law allowing 
non-leadership members of the PKK/Kadek to return voluntarily 
to Turkey, and the Turks are looking to the USG to implement 
our commitment to neutralize the PKK/Kadek threat from Iraq. 
The Turks also remain disturbed by what they consider to be 
Kurdish (vice US or Iraqi central authority) control of the 
Iraqi side of the Turkish-Iraq border.  While the two 
governments attempt to move past the July 4 incident, where 
the U.S. arrested Turkish troops believed to be working 
contrary to efforts to create stability, the event and the 
Turks' perception of our mishandling of it are likely to 
linger in the Turks' perceptions of their relationship with 
the U.S. 
 
 
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DOMESTIC POLITICAL SCENE 
------------------------ 
 
 
¶4. (SBU) The governing AK Party, which came to power with an 
overwhelming Parliamentary majority, is in the midst of a 
successful stretch.  AK has pursued democratic and political 
reform (para 6). Meanwhile, AK's principle challengers -- the 
opposition CHP and the xenophobic Genc Party of Motorola 
deadbeat Cem Uzan -- are floundering. Questions about AK 
usually focus on its ultimate social, political, and economic 
intentions domestically or direction internationally 
(although they profess a commitment to relations with the 
U.S. and EU).  Turkey's generals are keen to protect their 
status as Guardians of the (Kemalist) Republic, and thus the 
version of "secularism" they espouse.  They, and much of the 
established State, see AK as a challenge to the founding 
ideology of Ataturk's Turkey. There are also questions about 
AK's ability to field an experienced and consistently 
competent administrative cadre.  Formed in 2001, the party is 
still experiencing growing pains; the AK Government went 
through a rough patch during the run-up to the Iraq war but 
seems to have found its footing since Erdogan was established 
as Prime Minister in March.  The party's convention this fall 
will provide further indications as to Prime Minister and AK 
Chairman Erdogan's ability to develop further the party's 
cohesion and vision. 
 
 
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THE ECONOMY 
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¶5. (SBU) Two years of sound fiscal/monetary policy and 
structural reforms, the rapid and successful conclusion of 
the Iraq war, expected U.S. financial assistance, and 
unprecedented IMF support have combined to bring down 
inflation and interest rates, restore modest growth, and 
create some hope that Turkey can work its way out from under 
a high public debt burden.  The Turkish Government has an 
opportunity, between now and the end of the year, to build on 
this momentum and thus push the economy away from the 
financial precipice on which it has been perched for the past 
three years.  This will require the government, which so far 
has implemented the IMF recovery program with muted 
enthusiasm, to complete the next IMF review rapidly, proceed 
with scheduled privatizations, win a positive EU report in 
October, and avoid walking into a crisis with the Iraqi 
stabilization force issue.  Failure to take advantage of this 
opportunity will not necessarily mean another crisis, but 
will leave the economy extremely vulnerable to external or 
internal shocks and undermine the potential for prosperity. 
 
 
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POLITICAL REFORM PROCESS 
------------------------ 
 
 
¶6. (SBU) In the first nine months in power, the AK Government 
has passed a series of democratization and political reforms 
in the context of EU harmonization. In doing so, Turkey is 
garnering praise from the EU, which should decide by Dec. 
2004 whether to begin formal accession talks with Turkey. 
The reform packages expand freedom of expression including 
mother tongue (i.e. Kurdish language) rights, increase 
penalties for perpetrators of torture, and raise the relative 
authority of elected civilians vis-a-vis the military. The AK 
Government has also launched an anti-corruption drive that 
appears far more comprehensive than any conducted by previous 
governments.  Nevertheless, there are a number of circles 
within Turkey who question AK's commitment to comprehensive 
reform, particularly regarding corruption allegations against 
the party itself. 
 
 
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CYPRUS 
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¶7. (SBU) The AK Government states that it remains committed 
to finding a solution on Cyprus, both for domestic political 
reasons and its interest in promoting Turkey's EU candidacy. 
Turkey's long support for Denktash, his rejection of the 
Annan plan and supporters in Ankara retard progress towards a 
comprehensive solution. Much will depend on the government's 
willingness to take on this issue between now and spring 
2004, when Cyprus' EU membership becomes effective.  AK owes 
nothing politically to "TRNC" leader Denktash and is thus 
interested in promoting transparent and fair elections in the 
North this coming December. 
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ARMENIA 
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¶8. (SBU) The AK government is much less wedded to Aliyev and 
tying improvement of relations with Armenia to settlement of 
Nagorno-Karabakh, but remains under sniper fire from 
entrenched anti-Armenian interests.  AK officials tell us 
they recognize the trade and development benefits to Turkey 
from opening the border.  However, AK officials have made it 
clear, as have the MFA and other Turkish officials, that 
passage of any Armenian genocide language, even by only one 
chamber of Congress, will set progress back significantly. 
 
 
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MIDDLE EAST 
----------- 
 
 
¶9. (SBU) Turkey prides itself on its good relations with both 
Israelis and Palestinians.  While it supports the 
U.S.-sponsored Road Map, Turkey is leery of getting too far 
ahead of a Turkish populace that generally sympathizes with 
the Palestinian side.  On Syria and Iran, Turkey argues that 
Turkey: 1) lives in a rough neighborhood and has an interest 
in minimizing friction with its neighbors; and 2) shares the 
same values and goals in the Middle East as the U.S. 
(stability, democracy and prosperity).  In this regard, 
Foreign Minister Gul delivered a call for democracy and 
reform in the Islamic world at the June OIC Summit in Tehran. 
 
 
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CHILD CUSTODY 
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¶10. (SBU) Turkey has been a signatory to the Hague Convention 
since August 2000. Since that time, we are unaware of any 
children being returned to any country without the agreement 
of the abducting parent.  There are systemic problems:  1) 
Courts meet for 10 minutes monthly on an individual case and 
do not focus on Hague issues; 2) judges do not understand the 
Hague Convention requirement and rule on custody rather than 
Hague issues, thereby requiring a lengthy appeal process; 3) 
the legal process lasts between 2-3 years total; and 4) the 
Ministry of Interior does not focus resources on finding the 
abducted child and the parent.  The US currently has four 
applications pending, each for return of one child to the US. 
 In one case the child has now been in Turkey over a year due 
to the slow court process and the judge used that delay to 
rule the child should stay in Turkey.  In another case, the 
Government of Turkey has been unable to locate a child 
abducted to Turkey in October 2002.  Due to physical abuse by 
the abducting father, the Turkish court ordered the child 
returned to the mother immediately.  The Interior Ministry 
places a low priority on these types of cases and has been 
unable to locate the child. 
 
 
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TURKISH MILITARY 
---------------- 
 
 
¶11. (SBU) Following the early August meeting of the Supreme 
Military Council, TGS CHOD Gen Ozkok now has clearer 
authority over the military than he had one year ago when he 
took over TGS.  He has surrounded himself with  like-minded 
senior officers of his own - vice his predecessor's - 
choosing and appears committed to supporting the reforms 
(both within Turkey and the military) needed to move toward 
the EU while trying to protect the military as defender of 
the secularist Turkish state.  The Turkish military has taken 
some concrete steps after the failed March 1 parliamentary 
vote to mend fences with the US, including supporting the 
establishment of the GLOC and approval of a request to 
station aircraft at Incirlik Air Base in support of Operation 
Iraqi Freedom. Additionally, the TGS has initiated 
preliminary planning to determine scope, risks, and 
requirements for a potential role in the Iraq Stabilization 
Force, and appears to have taken the important steps of 
helping to shape this positively in the public eye with a 
view to gaining the domestic support crucial to passage, 
noting this is in Turkey's interest to participate.  The 
military publicly states that it supports Turkey's EU 
candidacy, but some senior officials continue to criticize 
efforts to pass the necessary reforms to achieve this goal. 
 
 
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TURKISH MEDIA 
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¶12. (U) Turkey has a lively and colorful media scene. 
Reporting often includes absolute fantasy passed as fact. 
Despite the large number of newspapers, however, readership 
is not as broad and deep as might be expected. Newspapers are 
influential in major cities but not far beyond. Most Turks 
get their news from television. Except for government-owned 
TRT television, all television stations in Turkey, like the 
print media, are owned by either individual businessmen or 
conglomerates. The press will be interested in your visit and 
seek comments at a number of venues. 
EDELMAN