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UNCLAS  ROME 003162 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
AIDAC 
 
FROM U.S. MISSION IN ROME 
 
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA FOR AMBASSADOR BRAZEAL AND USAID 
DIRECTOR LEWELLEN 
USAID/W FOR ADMINISTRATOR NATSIOS, D/A SCHIECK, AA/DCHA 
WINTER, AA/AFR NEWMAN AND DAA/AFR BROWN, DCHA/D/FFP LANDIS, 
D/OFDA MCCONNELL, AA/GLOBAL PETERSON 
STATE FOR IO A/S HOLMES, A/S PRM DEWEY, A/S AFR KANSTEINER, 
AFR/EA, IO/EDA WINNICK 
USDA/FAS FOR U/S PENN AND CHAMBLISS 
USDA/FAS NAIROBI FOR KESSLER 
USMISSION GENEVA FOR AMBASSADOR MOLRY AND USAID/KYLOH 
BRUSSELS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS AND USAID/LERNER 
NSC FOR JDWORKEN AND AFRICA DIRECTORATE 
 
E.O.  12958:  N/A 
TAGS: EAID AORC PREF EAGR EU WFP UN
SUBJECT: US Mission/Rome visit to Ethiopia June 26-July 5, 
2003 - Part II - Review of UN Agency disaster response 
efforts in SNNPR, Omomiya and Afar 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. In visits to the Southern Nations (SNNPR) (the epicenter 
of the present emergency in Ethiopia), Oromiya and Afar 
regions, US Mission/Rome's Humanitarian Attache witnessed 
local authorities, UN personnel, NGOs, and others trying to 
"get ahead" of the widespread and deep humanitarian crisis 
still unfolding, where the number of people throughout 
Ethiopia at serious risk of death due to starvation and 
related diseases presently stands at 14 million. End 
summary. 
 
---------- 
Background 
---------- 
 
¶2. US Mission/Rome Humanitarian Attache visited Ethiopia 
June 26-July 5, 2003, and traveled to Southern Nations 
(SNNPR), Omomiya and Afar regions, initially with DCHA/FFP 
Director Lauren Landis and subsequently with the United 
Nation's Food and Agricultural Organization's (FAO) 
emergency agricultural unit personnel from Rome and Nairobi. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
World Food Program (WFP) Interventions in SNNPR 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶3. In parts of Ethiopia (including SNNPR), it is generally 
acknowledged that the process of decentralization has 
resulted in a mismatch between administrative responsibility 
and institutional capacity. As recounted by a DCHA/OFDA 
staffer posted there, "In some drought-stricken woredas 
(districts) with a population of several hundred thousand, 
some 10,000 are signed up for emergency food assistance. In 
many areas, there is little capacity at the local level to 
produce accurate numbers of those in need. Simply, you have 
to be totally destitute to qualify." 
 
¶4. One "hotspot" of food shortage and severe malnutrition 
was recently detected by UN OCHA-EUE (UN Emergency Unit for 
Ethiopia) in Gemma-Bossa woreda of Dawro zone, in a gorge 
along the Omo river valley (as reported in their newsletter 
of June 30, 2003). Due to the inaccessability of the area, 
the distribution was made in a place called Gessa-Chere in 
the adjacent Looma woreda where most of the weaker 
beneficiaries had difficulty making the journey which was as 
far as 70 kilometers. Some made transport arrangements with 
highland farmers who own donkeys and charged one-third of 
the relief ration as a transport fee. As a result, the 
designated beneficiaries were left with a ration, depending 
on family size, of a maximum of 8 kilograms per person. 
 
¶5. Moreover, in the UN OCHA-EUE Report on a visit to Sidama 
and Welayta (Rift Valley, SNNPR, May 2003) the following: 
"The OCHA-EUE mission witnessed a government distribution in 
Yirba kebele (Sidama zone). Several farmers interviewed 
complained that `rich' people, traders and owners of large 
numbers of cattle, went off with 50 kilo bags of USAID- 
provided food aid. DPPC and the Rural Development Bureau 
have confirmed some of these unacceptable practices but seem 
unable to do much about them." 
 
¶6. Finally, the UK's DFID representative in Ethiopia, has 
recently commented that targeting food assistance toAND DAA/AFR BROWN, 
DCHA/D/FFP LANDIS, 
D/OFDA MCCONNELL, AA/GLOBAL PETERSON 
STATE FOR IO A/S HOLMES, A/S PRM DEWEY, A/S AFR KANSTEINER, 
AFR/EA, IO/EDA WINNICK 
USDA/FAS FOR U/S PENN AND CHAMBLISS 
USDA/FAS NAIROBI FOR KESSLER 
USMISSION 
Ethiopia's most vulnerable is at present and historically 
"notoriously problematic". 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
FAO emergency agricultural interventions in Oromiya, SNNPR, 
and Afar 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
¶7. FAO's emergency unit in Ethiopia has a working 2003 
budget of USD 4.1 million, largely provided by The 
Netherlands, Canada, and FAO's core Technical Cooperation 
Project (TCP) budget. Note: USAID/OFDA has contributed USD 
118,975 to coordinate NGO and GFDRE efforts related to 
emergency agricultural interventions. End note. 
 
¶8. The GFDRE has relied on the United Nation's Appeal system 
to address their non-food needs.  However, the April 2003 
non-food appeal requested only a proportion of non-food 
needs (e.g., 40% of seed requirements and 20% of water needs 
according to some UN and Government estimates).  The 
assumption was made that GFDRE and Non-Governmental 
Organization resources would be able to fill the gap. 
 
¶9. With some exceptions for the better-off farmers, the 
drought-stricken areas are having serious difficulties 
meeting planting requirements for a reasonable harvest. As a 
general rule, the amount of attention devoted to emergency 
agricultural interventions has been minimal. It has been 
reported that some 38 percent of Ethiopian small-farmers 
were assisted by government agricultural extension schemes 
in 2001; this dropped to 18 percent in 2002. 
 
¶10. As previously reported, the GFDRE's Ministry of 
Agriculture pointed out in June that a sizable gap existed 
related to the opportune supply of seed for the main growing 
season, especially for Amhara, Tigray and Oromiya regions. 
Several factors were involved: 
 
- The UN Appeal in December 2002 and the subsequent Addendum 
(March 2003) were based only on the MOA and FAO souring of 
priority needs, while assuming that the respective Regional 
governments and NGOs would effectively meet the broader 
demand; 
 
- Because of the previously poor history of donor responses 
in the emergency agricultural sector, the choice was made to 
aim for a lower, more achievable level of funding, rather 
than an accurate estimate of overall actual needs; 
 
- the gap was further exacerbated by a general 
underestimation of seeds at the woreda level, the worsening 
general conditions of farmers affected by drought, and an 
largely unsatisfactory Belg production in many areas this 
year. 
 
¶11. There is an obvious need for the introduction of a wide 
variety of seeds, chosen for their drought-resistance and to 
allow farmers to diversify their risks, given increasingly 
erratic rains. 
 
¶12. To minimize livestock losses in Miesso woreda (Oromiya) 
and Awash Fentale (Afar), FAO (with Canadian funding) 
implemented a supplementary feeds and vaccination campaign 
for 5,632 livestock. 16 feeding sites have been established 
and approximately 1,226 households were benefited.2 
 
AIDAC 
 
FROM U.S. MISSION IN ROME 
 
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA FOR AMBASSADOR BRAZEAL AND USAID 
DIRECTOR LEWELLEN 
USAID/W FOR ADMINISTRATOR NATSIOS, D/A SCHIECK, AA/DCHA 
WINTER, AA/AFR NEWMAN AND DAA/AFR BROWN, DCHA/D/FFP LANDIS, 
D/OFDA MCCONNELL, AA/GLOBAL PETERSON 
STATE FOR IO A/S HOLMES, A/S PRM DEWEY, A/S AFR KANSTEINER, 
AFR/EA, IO/EDA WINNICK 
USDA/FAS FOR U/S PENN AND CHAMBLISS 
USDA/FAS NAIROBI FOR KESSLER 
USMISSION GENEVA FOR AMBASSADOR MOLRY AND USAID/KYLOH 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
Other UN organizations in drought-affected regions - 
UNICEF/WHO - "In a normal year, every day the equivalent of 
a commercial jet filled with children under five crashes in 
Ethiopia. In an emergency, the equivalent of a Jumbo jet 
filled with small children crashes." UNICEF expert 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶13. Non-food aid needs are not systematically estimated 
based on vulnerabilities. Up until recently, the UN has not 
had any "problem-solving" mechanisms in-place at the 
regional and woreda levels. This is now changing as UNICEF, 
OCHA and WHO have begun deploying staff to SNNPR. 
 
¶14. Far too many children have not been vaccinated and are 
now at high risk to the lethal combination of malnutrition 
and endemic malaria, measles, acute respiratory infections 
and diarrhea. Characteristics of an emergency measles 
vaccination campaign are a rapid vaccination of the most 
vulnerable children aged 6 months to 15 years; vaccination 
of newcomers and revaccination at nine months for those 
children vaccinated at age six to eight months; and 
vaccination of all children upon entry to a selective 
feeding program (therapeutic or supplementary) along with 
vitamin A distribution.  All children in zones with less 
than an 80 percent measles vaccination coverage rate should 
be revaccinated regardless of prior vaccinations.  If this 
is not feasible, mobile `mop-up' vaccination teams should 
return to remote areas or villages with low coverage to 
revaccinate children. 
 
¶15. Note: Under the guidance of UNICEF, a step-by-step 
guideline called the Protocol on the Management of Acute 
Malnutrition, for the identification of severe malnutrition, 
has been adapted to Ethiopia in an attempt to standardize 
the treatment of acute malnutrition. UNICEF estimates that 
80,000 children in Ethiopia could be acutely malnourished, 
and in need of therapeutic feeding. For children, 
therapeutic feeding centers are the last line of defense 
before death. In the last few weeks, 15 therapeutic feeding 
centers have been opened in the SNNPR, and another 15 are 
presently being opened. With more than half the children in 
Ethiopia already stunted from chronic malnutrition, good 
nutrition presents an enormous challenge under the best of 
circumstances. End note. 
 
--------------- 
Recommendations 
--------------- 
 
¶16. US Mission is concerned about hit-or-miss targeting, 
dilution of rations and low beneficiary estimates, 
particularly in SNNPR, an area where the source of food aid 
is from WFP/DPPC. Food aid deliveries throughout Ethiopia 
need to be at the level of international standards. 
 
¶17. US Mission will urge WFP to bring in additional human 
resources and logistics assistance to support the UN and 
Southern Nations operation for the second half of 2003. 
 
¶18. US Mission stresses the importance of WFP/DPPC provision 
of full-rations (15 kilos/month), i.e., a full ration of 
2100 kilocalories, and if necessary include supplemental 
rations beyond this level to ensure that those most in need 
survive.  The historic 12.5 kilogram of wheat ration may 
have been appropriate in normal years when most families had03162 
 
AIDAC 
 
FROM U.S. MISSION IN ROME 
 
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA FOR AMBASSADOR BRAZEAL AND USAID 
DIRECTOR LEWELLEN 
USAID/W FOR ADMINISTRATOR NATSIOS, D/A SCHIECK, AA/DCHA 
WINTER, AA/AFR NEWMAN AND DAA/AFR BROWN, DCHA/D/FFP LANDIS, 
D/OFDA MCCONNELL, AA/GLOBAL PETERSON 
STATE FOR IO A/S HOLMES, A/S PRM DEWEY, A/S AFR KANSTEINER, 
AFR/EA, IO/EDA WINNICK 
USDA/FAS FOR U/S PENN AND CHAMBLISS 
USDA/FAS NAIROBI FOR KESSLER 
USMISSION GENEVA FOR AMBASSADOR MOLRY AND USAID/K 
 
some degree assets with which to supplement their rations. 
However, at present, many families have been left completely 
destitute and are completely dependent upon food rations. 
 
¶19. We also underline the importance, for both the UN and 
international donors, of giving equal priority to food and 
non-food needs to ensure the most complete emergency 
response possible. 
 
Note: the disaster response effort to date has not been 
adequate in preventing the emergence of acute malnutrition 
or rates of accelerating mortality. End note. 
 
¶20. There is general concern about the lack of the current 
health system and the potential for out-of-control epidemics 
- malaria, measles, meningitis, etc. In other words, the 
current situation is "prime-time" for an epidemic outbreak. 
Immediate and medium to long-term assistance must focus more 
intensely on supporting health, public nutrition and disease 
surveillance systems. 
 
¶21. US Mission would like to pursue with WFP the development 
of a "close-monitoring" contingency blended food aid, pulses 
and vegetable oil stock of up to 20,000 mts that can be 
tapped while on-going assessments and other non-food 
assessments continue to be carried out throughout the 
remainder of this calendar year. 
 
¶22. WFP should actively encourage government to undertake an 
immediate campaign to give top priority to feeding children. 
 
¶23. The UN needs to directly recognize that decentralization 
in Ethiopia is now so extensive that it can exacerbate 
effective emergency response in a number of regions, meaning 
that more needs to be done to effectively increase capacity 
at the district level. 
 
¶24. US Mission will work with WFP Headquarters to promptly 
fill the key post of national logistics officer. WFP 
Ethiopia should accelerate its hiring and placement of field 
monitors. 
 
¶25. US Mission will work with FAO Headquarters to strengthen 
its emergency outreach in Ethiopia. FAO Ethiopia needs to 
focus its attention on a more complete and comprehensive 
emergency seeds needs assessment and on developing with its 
government and NGO partners a common methodology for 
emergency seeds interventions. 
 
¶26. The UN should support the implementation of therapeutic 
feeding programs where these can be properly supervised, 
tied to supplementary feeding programs, and in turn tied to 
an adequate general ration. 
 
¶27. Targeting of blended foods (such as CSB) is not 
presently done though health personal or through screening 
for malnutrition. This is partly due to lack of capacity and 
the large territory covered by the drought. However, partner 
agencies could assist the MOH to play a far greater role in 
screening for targeted supplementary feeding, which would 
also provide an opportunity for immunization and basic 
health service delivery to those most in need. CSB is 
expensive, in short supply and should be reserved for 
targeted supplementary feeding programs and should, along 
with vegetable oil, be given in sufficient amounts.5 ROME 003162 
 
AIDAC 
 
FROM U.S. MISSION IN ROME 
 
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA FOR AMBASSADOR BRAZEAL AND USAID 
DIRECTOR LEWELLEN 
USAID/W FOR ADMINISTRATOR NATSIOS, D/A SCHIECK, AA/DCHA 
WINTER, AA/AFR NEWMAN AND DAA/AFR BROWN, DCHA/D/FFP LANDIS, 
D/OFDA MCCONNELL, AA/GLOBAL PETERSON 
STATE FOR IO A/S HOLMES, A/S PRM DEWEY, A/S AFR KANSTEINER, 
AFR/EA, IO/EDA WINNICK 
USDA/FAS FOR U/S PENN AND CHAMBLISS 
USDA/FAS NAIROBI FOR KESSLER 
USMISSION GENEVA FOR AMBASSADOR MOLRY AND 
 
 
¶28. Emergency water interventions are saving lives even 
where food rations are inadequate to support nutritional 
status. Priorities must include providing clean water for 
health centers and therapeutic feeding centers. 
Rehabilitation of existing wells or construction of new 
wells for the general population should be considered as 
well as consideration of providing point of source water 
treatment (e.g. residual chlorination). 
 
¶29. Finally, in the medium-term, there is a compelling need 
to directly address the problems of under-nutrition in 
infants and expectant mothers. Unlike other countries such 
as India, Ethiopia has no program that delivers a 
combination of services (food supplements, micro-nutrients, 
health inputs, immunizations, etc.) targeted to the most 
nutritionally disadvantaged groups in the population (e.g., 
infants and pregnant women). This is an area WFP and its UN 
Agencies partners might profitably explore. 
 
 
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Comment 
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¶30. We believe the naming of the new UN Special Envoy ex- 
Finnish President Mattai Ahtisaari will greatly assist the 
coordination efforts of the United Nations and provide the 
necessary (and previously lacking) leadership and vision. 
Hall 
NNNN 
 2003ROME03162 - Classification: UNCLASSIFIED