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Viewing cable 03AMMAN4306, Some Kurds on Jordan's Border Return to Iraq;

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
03AMMAN4306 2003-07-14 12:05 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Amman
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 004306 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR PRM/A, PRMA/ANE AND NEA/NGA 
INS FOR HQSTA AND HQRIC 
ROME, ATHENS FOR BCIS 
CPA BAGHDAD FOR WYLLIE AND LAPENN 
 
E.O. 12958:N/A 
TAGS: PREF PREL IZ JO
SUBJECT:  Some Kurds on Jordan's Border Return to Iraq; 
Restored UNHCR Iraq Operations -- Including Resettlement -- 
Required to Convince the Rest 
 
REF:  A) Amman 4001 
      B) Cheyne/Rusch July 10 e-mail 
 
1.  (U) This is a joint report from Amman and Cairo 
refcoords and contains an action request in para 8. 
 
2.  (SBU) Summary and Action Request:  Amman and Cairo 
refcoords traveled to the Jordanian-Iraqi border July 8 to 
meet with Iranian Kurds who seek resettlement in a third 
country.  UNHCR reported that an additional 79 Iranian Kurds 
have left no-man's land (NML) for northern Iraq, with 
another five Kurdish families rumored to have left NML for 
Iran.  The number of Kurds in NML is now less than 1,000. 
However, the Kurds who returned to northern Iraq reported 
that UNHCR is unable to provide protection or any form of 
assistance to refugees in the north, discouraging others 
from following them.  The Kurds' leadership therefore 
continues to insist that they will not leave NML except for 
resettlement in a third country.  Full-scale resumption of 
UNHCR activities in Iraq -- beginning in the north -- 
appears to be the only way to resolve the lingering problem 
at NML. Department's guidance on possible DHS resettlement 
processing in northern Iraq is requested.  End summary and 
action request. 
 
3.  (U) Amman- and Cairo-based regional refcoords made a 
joint trip to the Jordanian-Iraqi border on July 8 to meet 
with Iranian Kurds who seek resettlement in a third country. 
As reported ref a, a core group of 1,000 Iranian Kurds from 
Iraq's Al Tash refugee camp have been in no-man's land (NML) 
at the Iraqi-Jordanian border since April 12, seeking 
temporary asylum in Jordan and resettlement in a third 
country.  UNHCR (correctly, in our opinion) refuses to 
conduct resettlement screening in NML, fearing it would 
create a pull factor for disgruntled refugees and Iraqi 
nationals from throughout Iraq. 
 
4.  (SBU) During their July 8 meeting, refcoords repeated 
previous assurances that the US would consider the Iranian 
Kurds for resettlement if they would return to Iraq.  The 
Kurds' leadership flatly rejected even a temporary return to 
Iraq.  Northern Iraq is not their land, the Kurds said, and 
their political affiliations make them vulnerable to cross- 
border threats from Iranian security agents.  The Iran-Iraq 
border is porous, they argued, and coalition forces are 
unable to protect Kurdish political activists from Iranian 
intelligence agents who have a known record of assassinating 
opponents abroad.  The group at NML claims to be composed 
entirely of political activists, with five different 
political movements represented:  the Democratic Party of 
Kurdistan of Iran (DPKI), the Communist Party (Kommula), the 
Constitutionalist Movements, the Mujahadeen-e-Khalq (MEK) 
and Khabat.  The Kurds also claimed that Jalal Talabani and 
the PUK, who have been encouraging the Al Tash Kurds to 
resettle in northern Iraq, are known to have good relations 
with Iran and therefore are not to be trusted. 
 
5.  (U) The Kurds confirmed UNHCR's report that 79 
individuals had left NML for northern Iraq (the village of 
Kallar, near Sulaimaniyah) but denied reports that 5 Kurdish 
families had left NML for Iran.  (UNHCR separately confirmed 
that the number of Kurds in NML is now less than 1,000 but 
said it is unable to provide more precise figures, as it has 
never implemented a camp registration system in NML.) 
According to the NML camp leadership, the Kurds who returned 
to northern Iraq reported that UNHCR is unable to provide 
protection or any form of assistance to refugees in the 
north and have discouraged others from following them. 
Although the KDP and PUK have made good on their promises of 
providing land for the Al Tash Kurds, they cannot provide 
food or humanitarian assistance to the group and UNHCR, the 
Kurds noted bitterly, also is unable to provide any 
assistance.  The camp committee asked refcoords how UNHCR 
and the US could possibly advocate the Kurds' return to Iraq 
under these circumstances. 
 
6.  In the meantime, protection conditions in the NML camp 
continue to deteriorate.  With hundreds of trucks queued at 
the border crossing every day, UNHCR reports that the NML 
refugees are increasingly engaged in "business," selling 
food and commodities to the truckers waiting to cross the 
borders.  Refugee children are acting as runners for the 
business, darting in and out of traffic all day.  A child 
was hit by a car during the week of June 30 and medevaced to 
Amman with a serious head injury.  Nevertheless, the 
accident did not sway the camp committee's position in the 
least. 
 
7.  (SBU) Comment:  From our perspective, a full-scale 
resumption of UNHCR activities in Iraq -- beginning in the 
north -- is the only way to resolve the lingering problem at 
NML.  If UNHCR is able to reestablish basic services and 
then move quickly to start resettlement processing, the NML 
Kurds most likely will return voluntarily to northern Iraq. 
However, it is far from certain that UNHCR has agreed upon 
this approach, as there continues to be differences of 
opinion between UNHCR personnel in Geneva, Amman and 
Baghdad.  PRM A/S Dewey's July 15-21 visit to the region 
hopefully will provide an opportunity to develop a common 
approach to this problem. 
 
8.  (SBU) Action Request:  In the meantime, UNHCR/Jordan 
seeks assurances from resettlement countries that they will 
be able to conduct resettlement processing in northern Iraq. 
As requested ref b, refcoords seek guidance on:  whether CPA 
Baghdad and BCIS would consider refugee resettlement 
processing in northern Iraq; and what information and/or 
arrangements BCIS would require to commit to resettlement 
processing in northern Iraq.  We also need to consider which 
Overseas Processing Entity (OPE) -- Istanbul or Amman -- 
would be best equipped to work in northern Iraq. 
 
9.  (U) CPA Baghdad minimize considered. 
GNEHM