This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 KUWAIT 002641 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE ALSO PASS USAID/W 
STATE PLEASE REPEAT TO IO COLLECTIVE 
STATE FOR PRM/ANE, EUR/SE, NEA/NGA, IO AND SA/PAB 
NSC FOR EABRAMS, SMCCORMICK, STAHIR-KHELI, JDWORKEN 
USAID FOR USAID/A, DCHA/AA, DCHA/RMT, DCHA/FFP 
USAID FOR DCHA/OTI, DCHA/DG, ANE/AA 
USAID FOR DCHA/OFDA:WGARVELINK, BMCCONNELL, KFARNSWORTH 
USAID FOR ANE/AA:WCHAMBERLIN 
ROME FOR FODAG 
GENEVA FOR RMA AND NKYLOH 
ANKARA FOR AMB WRPEARSON, ECON AJSIROTIC AND DART 
AMMAN FOR USAID AND DART 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREF IZ WFP
SUBJECT:  PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM PREPARATIONS IN 
KARBALA, AL HILLAH, AND MOSUL 
 
REF: KUWAIT 02416 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  Coalition forces vacated the silo in Karbala and the 
warehouse in Al Hillah to make way for food arrivals, but 
continue to provide security to both structures.  UXO has 
been discovered in the Karbala MOT warehouse.  Large 
quantities of food have begun to arrive in Al Hillah for the 
Babil Governorate.  Ninawa Governorate has been asked to 
prepare for the arrival of 5,000 MT of wheat grain per day, 
but the shortage of adequate silo space in Ninawa could be a 
problem.  The DART briefed Coalition forces in Kuwait on the 
magnitude and needs of the PDS.  End Summary. 
 
----------------------- 
FOOD STORAGE IN KARBALA 
----------------------- 
 
¶2.  The DART met with staff of the U.N. World Food Program 
(WFP), Ministry of Trade (MOT) silo manager, and Coalition 
forces based in Karbala on 19 May.  The DART discussed the 
upcoming public distribution system (PDS) and explained 
WFP's role, observed initial WFP rice deliveries, and 
confirmed wheat grain stocks in the Karbala grain silo. 
 
¶3.  The DART also confirmed that Coalition forces have 
vacated the grain silo in Karbala.  The MOT silo manager 
claims that Coalition forces removed property from the silo 
grounds and has presented an inventory of missing items to 
battalion headquarters.  The DART discussed this issue with 
a Coalition officer who stated that he would follow up to 
determine a course of action.  Amoung the items on the MOT 
list are two tractor-trailer cabs, tools, several computers, 
office furniture, and cash from the office safe.  The DART 
confirmed that all MOT staff in Karbala received USD 20 
emergency payments and is in contact with MOT Baghdad. 
 
¶4.  The DART inquired about the possibility of security 
assistance, and the Coalition officer agreed that frequent 
patrols and visible presence by Coalition forces in the area 
of the silo and warehouses could be established.  At the 
same time, the Karbala Protective Force has been deemed 
antagonistic to rehabilitation efforts and will be disbanded 
by Coalition forces. 
 
¶5.  WFP's ten-person national staff is established and 
operational at the MOT warehouse.  They relayed to the DART 
that any public information messages should be focused on 
instructions to food agents and should include precise dates 
for ration distributions, actual quantities of each 
commodity in the ration, as well as the ration basket 
contents.  This was the pre-war practice, and beneficiaries 
will be expecting this information as a normal function of 
PDS. 
¶6.  WFP and the DART discovered unexploded ordnance (UXO) in 
one area of the MOT warehouse complex.  The DART requested 
and received an initial UXO assessment by Coalition forces 
that confirmed UXO contamination.  A request for UXO removal 
and a general mine sweep of the warehouse area was submitted 
to the Coalition and an operation was approved and set for 
18 May. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
MOVING COALITIION FORCES FROM THE AL HILLAH WAREHOUSE 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶7.  After receiving reports from WFP staff that had recently 
visited Al Hillah and found that Coalition forces were 
occupying the MOT warehouse and tightly controlling WFP 
truck access to the warehouse (allowing only two trucks to 
unload at a time), the DART visited the warehouse on 17 May. 
 
¶8.  The DART met with representatives of the Civil Military 
Operations Center (CMOC) in Al Hillah, as well as a 
Coalition Commander at the MOT warehouse, to find a 
resolution to the problems.   After some discussion, the 
Coalition forces agreed to vacate the warehouse the 
following day (18 May).  The Coalition forces expressed 
concern about the safety of the command post located behind 
the warehouse complex and adjacent to the perimeter wall. 
The Coalition forces proposed to build a barrier wall on the 
warehouse side that would protect the perimeter wall.  The 
fact that trucks would constantly need to enter and leave 
the warehouse facility remained a concern, but the Coalition 
forces agreed to work with WFP to arrive at a solution that 
would increase the turn-around time of the trucks.  In 
addition to the WFP trucks that are delivering commodities 
to the MOT warehouse, food agent trucks are collecting 
rations for the September and October distribution as 
directed by MOT. 
 
¶9.  On 19 May, the DART confirmed that the Coalition forces 
had vacated the MOT warehouse.  It remains, however, under 
the security blanket of the Coalition command that provides 
security at the front entrance to the warehouse compound 
with a ground team and a two-man machine gun nest on the 
roof of the MOT office building. 
 
¶10.  WFP stated that the MOT would eventually be responsible 
for providing warehouse compound security.  But until that 
time, the Coalition forces would continue to secure the 
front gate and inspect incoming vehicles.  On May 20 in Al 
Hillah, DART met with the Coalition Military Police who 
agreed to include MOT security guards in the upcoming Civil 
Military Operations Center (CMOC) police security training. 
In addition to the warehouse, MOT security will also be 
needed at the Al Hillah grain silo facilities. 
 
--------------------------------- 
FOOD DISTRIBUTIONS IN AL HILLAH 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶11.  The MOT reports that September distributions began 
prior to the war and are being completed this month. 
According to WFP staff, current distributions include flour, 
rice, sugar, vegetable oil, white beans, detergent, soap, 
tea, salt, and infant formula.  The ration is missing 
powdered milk and weaning cereal and is low in vegetable oil 
stocks.  (Note:  Much of the country is currently finishing 
August distributions.  End Note.)  WFP stated that even 
though Al Hillah has abundant amounts of flour in the 
market, most Iraqis are unable to afford this commodity at 
current prices. 
 
¶12.  The MOT's decision to proceed with the September 
distribution and October distributions was taken prior to 
WFP arrival in Al Hillah.  WFP international staff first 
visited Al Hillah on 13 May, as it was one of the last towns 
to be approved by the U.N. Security Coordinator in the 
south.  WFP is now hoping to halt an October distribution 
and focus on preparations for the first countrywide 
distribution that it and the MOT wants to begin in June. 
 
¶13.  WFP reported on 20 May that it had received 994 metric 
tons (MT) of rice and 97 MT of wheat flour at the Al Hillah 
silos.  Trucks from Jordan will now be arriving in Al Hillah 
on a daily basis.  In addition, the Taji silo in Baghdad 
experienced mechanical failure on 21 May.  As a result, the 
trucks carrying wheat grain that were to discharge into the 
Taji silo have been diverted to Al Hillah. 
 
¶14.  Although Coalition forces are now willing to allow more 
than two trucks into the warehouse at one time, MOT 
warehouse staff stated that they did not have the warehouse 
personnel to process more than two trucks at a time. 
Approximately 30 food agent trucks per day are receiving 
commodities from the compound.  Trucks normally arrive at 
the compound throughout the morning and continue arriving 
until about 1400 hours.  WFP will address the MOT staffing 
issue at the warehouse, as the Marines were also limiting 
the number of total staff at the warehouse to 20.  WFP is 
cleaning and making minor repair to the warehouse structures 
to accommodate the significant quantities of food that are 
arriving for the June distribution. 
 
¶15.  DART met with WFP national staff in the designated WFP 
office space at the MOT compound.  Neither the WFP space nor 
the MOT office space are in acceptable condition and both 
offices are in need of clean up, refurbishment, office 
furniture, computers and supplies.  WFP is bringing in 
containers to serve as offices. 
 
---------------------- 
SILO CAPACITY IN MOSUL 
---------------------- 
¶16.  On 18 May, the DART traveled to Mosul with WFP to meet 
with the Manager of the Ninawa MOT Grain Board.  WFP 
explained that it would soon be sending 136,000 MT of bulk 
wheat to Mosul (from stocks currently in Syria), hoping to 
move 5,000 MT per day.  WFP requested MOT assistance in 
locating storage for these commodities. 
 
¶17.  The MOT confirmed that the silos could accept large 
quantities beginning in early June, while WFP expressed the 
hope that it could begin delivering to Mosul within one 
week.  The MOT manager stated that he would meet the next 
day with all the silo managers to ensure that any necessary 
preparations could be achieved quickly. 
 
¶18.  Contrary to much more optimistic information WFP had 
received earlier from the MOT, on 18 May the MOT noted that 
a number of silos were not functional and others had been 
damaged by looters after the war.  Current daily offloading 
capacity and silo capacity are as follows, according to the 
updated information from the MOT: 
 
Town             Offloading        Current storage capacity 
Talafar:        1,000 MT/day           50,000 MT available 
Ba'aj:          1,000 MT/day           50,000 MT available 
Mosul:            500 MT/day           14,000 MT available 
Shurkat:        1,500 MT/day           50,000 MT available 
 
¶19.  While the offloading totals only 4,000 MT per day 
capacity, the Mosul silo could possibly accept up to 1,500 
MT per day (instead of 500 MT per day) if milling were done 
concurrently.  All storage figures are for silo complexes; 
MOT said that open bins were not available since these would 
be used to store the upcoming harvest. 
 
¶20.  In addition to these four silos, there remain two other 
possibilities: 
 
¶A.  Makhmour silo, as reported in ref tel, has a large 
storage capacity but needs some minor repairs.  The main 
issue is that it lies in a contested area: technically part 
of Arbil Governorate, but until a few weeks ago, under 
Ninawa Governorate's control.  As stated in ref tel from 
DART's 15 May visit to Makhmour, WFP will not be utilizing 
this silo until the political issues have been resolved. 
 
¶B.  Shekhan silo could accept 1,000 MT per day, with 
approximately 30,000 to 40,000 MT capacity available, and is 
located about 55 km north of Mosul towards Dahuk.  The MOT 
stated that the Shekhan silo is not in a contested 
territory, as it is clearly in the Ninawa Governorate. 
However, as Niawa is a Kurdish area, the Kurdish Democratic 
Party has taken over the silo.  DART and WFP staff contacted 
Mosul Civil Affairs personnel, who promised to send a team 
to Shekhan silo the next day and report back to WFP on 22 
May. 
¶21.  Consequently, until the problems outlined above are 
resolved, WFP is looking at a maximum capacity of 4,000 MT 
per day, if the silos are operating as well as the MOT 
estimates.  The through-put could possibly rise for the 
Mosul silo if milling were done at the same time that new 
tonnage is arriving, and would certainly rise if the Shekhan 
silo could be utilized.   Due to security restrictions 
outside Mosul, however, WFP international staff cannot 
access the other silos to confirm total and daily offload 
capacities.  The DART will attempt to confirm some of the 
data that was presented by the MOT. 
 
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BRIEFING THE COALITION ON PDS REQUIREMENTS 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶22.  On 18 May, the DART briefed Coalition forces in Kuwait 
on the history of the PDS, its importance, current plans, 
and roles of the WFP and MOT. 
 
¶23.  The DART was surprised to discover that the commander 
had the understanding that his troops were instructed not to 
work with the U.N. agencies.  The DART not only confirmed 
that cooperating with the U.N. would be helpful, but 
encouraged it. 
 
¶24.  To facilitate communication, the DART asked the 
Coalition forces to appoint a point of contact (POC) in each 
Governorate that would serve as the liaison to WFP national 
and international staff, as well as the MOT.  The CMOCs, 
Civil Military Information Centers, and Humanitarian 
Assistance Coordination Centers are helpful, but one point 
of contact for PDS issues in each Governorate would be 
extremely helpful to immediately address issues as they 
arise. 
 
¶25.  Coalition forces also requested assistance in locating 
and securing additional warehouses and silos.  The DART 
explained the magnitude of food tonnages that are entering 
the country, and that storage is critical, so that trucks 
can unload quickly to decrease the turn-around time. 
(Comment: Coalition forces have already begun follow-up 
actions and seem quite sincere in wanting to help.  End 
Comment.) 
 
JONES