This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

101342Z Jun 03

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 003753 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV TU
SUBJECT: TURKS ASSERT WILLINGNESS TO MOVE FORWARD DURING 
BRUCE JACKSON'S VISIT 
 
 
Sensitive but Unclassified -- Protect Accordingly 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: During a June 1-4 visit to Ankara, 
President of the Project on Transitional Democracies Bruce 
Jackson urged Turkish officials to consider a wider, European 
context as it pursues foreign policy over the next 18 months. 
 GOT interlocutors embraced Jackson's message and seemed 
willing to move forward on a host of issues.  Although 
Jackson suggested that the GOT not dwell only on Iraq and 
look to other areas in which to take steps, Turks across the 
board were eager to discuss GOT Iraq policy in the run up to 
war as largely a reflection of the blame game, still underway 
in Ankara, that makes rapid action difficult.  End summary. 
 
 
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The Message 
----------- 
 
 
¶2. (SBU) In a June 1-4 visit to Ankara, President of the 
Project on Transitional Democracies Bruce Jackson met with a 
variety of senior Turkish government officials (including 
Justice Minister Cicek, MFA U/S Ziyal, P.M. Erdogan advisor 
Davutoglu, and AK vice chairman for foreign affairs Disli), 
TGS J-5 Gen. Turgut, and press.  Jackson outlined his 
organization's vision of a united, democratic Europe -- 
including western Balkans, Ukraine, and Caucasus -- and 
Turkey's key role in completing that vision. 
 
 
¶3. (SBU) Jackson urged Turkish officials to consider the big 
picture as key deadlines, such as the December 2004 EU 
summit, are approaching.  He encouraged them to take concrete 
steps quickly both internally and regionally to help 
strengthen trans-atlantic ties and to bring Europe together. 
As an example, Jackson suggested that Turkey contribute 
immediately to a solution in Nagorno-Karabakh.  On 
Turkey-U.S. relations, Jackson noted that personal 
relationships matter and that Turkey should seek to explore 
ways -- other than in Iraq -- that it can help build stronger 
U.S. ties.  Jackson stressed that the important thing will be 
to achieve early successes to create momentum that will carry 
over into more sensitive issues. 
 
 
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Turks receptive... 
------------------ 
 
 
¶4. (SBU) Across the board, GOT officials were eager to 
express their willingness to move forward on a variety of 
issues.  Offering a representative view, Disli began his 
meeting with Jackson by asking, "How can we make things 
better?"  Minister Cicek agreed with Jackson that 
U.S.-Turkish cooperation in southeastern Europe is key to 
regional stability.  He also added, "we are ready to help out 
in every way in the Middle East."  Noting his appreciation of 
USG support for Turkey's EU membership, Davutoglu said that 
the GOT shares Jackson's view of the significance of 
transatlantic cooperation in the European project.  Echoing 
Jackson, Davutoglu said that the current institutional 
constellations in the western Balkans should be expanded to 
the Black Sea region and Caucasus. 
 
 
¶5. (SBU) MFA officials also, in large part, embraced 
Jackson's message.  MFA U/S Ziyal said Turkey will continue 
its regional work to move "from survival to quality of life 
issues" -- i.e. to eliminate regional security concerns and 
to focus on development.  In a forward-leaning presentation 
to Jackson, MFA DDG for European Affairs Yenel outlined a 
clear strategy for the run-up to December 2004.  The GOT, 
Yenel explained, understands that it must pass all of the 
legislation for EU political criteria this year and will work 
on implementation next year. 
 
 
------------------------------- 
... But Still Defensive on Iraq 
------------------------------- 
 
 
¶6. (SBU) Although Jackson repeatedly attempted to steer 
discussions away from Iraq, our interlocutors felt compelled 
to defend Turkey's policy prior to and during Operation Iraqi 
Freedom.  Without prompting from Jackson, Turkish officials 
spoke as if from the same talking points: 
 
 
-- Minister Cicek, Disli, Amb. Ender Arat -- foreign affairs 
advisor to Erdogan -- and Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman 
Mehmet Dulger cited Turkey's losses in the first Gulf War and 
the distribution of political cartoons disparaging F.M. Gul 
as factors playing on the minds of M.P.s and thus 
contributing to the failure of March 1; 
 
 
-- Arat further noted that Kurdish opposition groups in N. 
Iraq held anti-Turkish demonstrations on March 1; 
 
 
-- Disli and MFA Deputy U/S Banguoglu claimed that, in any 
case, Turkey had contributed more to USG efforts in Iraq than 
any other country except the U.K.; 
 
 
¶7. (SBU) More informally over dinner at the Ambassador's 
residence, our contacts were more willing to point out other, 
more substantial factors.  Opposition DYP vice chairman 
Ensarioglu stated that the AK government's March 1 motion 
contrasted with the "policy of the State."  Columnist Cuneyt 
Ulsever highlighted "military foot-dragging" and also 
rejected the polite explanation offered by AK's Reha Denemec, 
who had focused on parliamentary procedural and arithmetical 
obstacles in the voting process.  Seconding Ulsever's point, 
AK M.P. Ersonmez Yarbay, a long-time contact, observed in an 
aside to us that Denemec was unwilling to air Turkey's dirty 
laundry "in front of strangers" -- a point later volunteered 
privately by Denemec himself. 
 
 
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Comment 
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¶8. (SBU) In their meetings with Jackson, Turkish officials of 
all stripes clearly indicated a willingness to move forward 
but, in many cases, were unable to express in concrete terms 
how they will do that.  On normalizing relations with 
Armenia, for example, our interlocutors recognize the need 
for progress but continue to hew to the line that Armenia 
must make the first move.  We will continue to press our GOT 
contacts to move beyond words to concrete policy initiatives. 
PEARSON